Terrorism: what is it and can it ever be morally justified?
Today no single issue of public concern seems to be quite as widely and hotly hot·ly
In an intense or fiery way: a hotly contested will.
Adv. 1. hotly - in a heated manner; "`To say I am behind the strike is so much nonsense,' declared Mr Harvey heatedly"; "the debated as that of terrorism. With good reason: the threat of terrorism has never been as salient and ubiquitous as it seems to be at present.
Social sciences and humanities are making an important contribution to these debates. Philosophy, too, has a contribution to make. When addressing issues of morality and of value in general, philosophers seek to do two things: to analyse and clarify the concepts involved, and to analyse, clarify and criticise arguments for and against various positions taken on those issues, as well as moral and other principles and values that ground those arguments. Whereas social sciences study the causes, varieties and effects of terrorism, and history traces the way terrorism has evolved over time, philosophy focuses on two basic questions: What is terrorism? Can it ever be morally justified?
Current usage of the word reflects considerable variation and confusion over its meaning. This makes discussing the moral and political questions to do with terrorism a difficult and often frustrating frus·trate
tr.v. frus·trat·ed, frus·trat·ing, frus·trates
a. To prevent from accomplishing a purpose or fulfilling a desire; thwart: undertaking. The one thing that is clear in this usage is that terrorism is a bad thing--nothing to be proud of or to support. Virtually no one today would apply the word to oneself and one's own actions, nor to those one has sympathy with or whose actions one supports. As the hackneyed cliche has it, one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter. This suggests there is a double standard at work, of the form 'us versus them'.
Another type of double standard, less obvious and therefore even more of an obstacle to understanding and judging terrorism, is the tendency to accuse ac·cuse
v. ac·cused, ac·cus·ing, ac·cus·es
1. To charge with a shortcoming or error.
2. To charge formally with a wrongdoing.
v.intr. insurgents Insurgents, in U.S. history, the Republican Senators and Representatives who in 1909–10 rose against the Republican standpatters controlling Congress, to oppose the Payne-Aldrich tariff and the dictatorial power of House speaker Joseph G. Cannon. who resort to violence of resorting to terrorism, without taking a closer look into the type of violence and who its victims are. This is coupled with an unwillingness to talk of terrorism in relation to the violent actions and policies of a state and, in particular, one's own state--even though what is done is the same. This indicates a double standard of the form "state versus non-state actors', and the assumption that whatever it is, terrorism is by definition something done only by insurgents and never by a state.
The debates about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
tr.v. en·ti·tled, en·ti·tling, en·ti·tles
1. To give a name or title to.
2. To furnish with a right or claim to something: to use violence to this end. That isn't terrorism, but rather fighting for freedom. Israelis respond by saying that the state is merely using its armed forces and security services Security services are state institutions for the provision of intelligence, primarily of a strategic nature, but also including protective security intelligence. Examples include the Security Service (MI5) and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) in the United Kingdom, and the in defence of the country and the security of its citizens against terrorist attacks. Thus Palestinians are assuming that the decisive criterion of terrorism is the ultimate goal of the agent: if it is a legitimate goal such as national liberation, it can't be terrorism. In their view, 'terrorists fighting for freedom' is a contradiction in terms Noun 1. contradiction in terms - (logic) a statement that is necessarily false; "the statement `he is brave and he is not brave' is a contradiction"
logic - the branch of philosophy that analyzes inference . Israelis, on their part, are assuming that it is the identity of the agent that determines whether some act or policy of violence is terrorist or not. If it is a state, then it can't be terrorism but rather warfare or policing action; if it is an insurgent INSURGENT. One who is concerned in an insurrection. He differs from a rebel in this, that rebel is always understood in a bad sense, or one who unjustly opposes the constituted authorities; insurgent may be one who justly opposes the tyranny of constituted authorities. group, then it is terrorism. In their view, 'state terrorism' is a contradiction in terms. Additionally, both sides may well be assuming that if there is a violent conflict between two parties and one of them is guilty of terrorism, then the other party is thereby absolved of the charge of terrorism. If they are terrorists, we can't be.
In these circumstances, the debate has to be at cross-purposes to misunderstand or to act counter to one another without intending it; - said of persons.
See also: cross-purpose . It is in such cases that philosophy might help by pointing at the sources of confusion and by offering clarification, and perhaps even a definition of the concept at issue. I won't try for a definition that captures the core meaning of 'terrorism' in ordinary usage; that is probably a hopeless task. Nor will I stipulate stip·u·late 1
v. stip·u·lat·ed, stip·u·lat·ing, stip·u·lates
a. To lay down as a condition of an agreement; require by contract.
b. a definition that should be pertinent in every possible context and prove useful for every possible purpose. Mine should be helpful in the context of the debate about the rights and wrongs of terrorism, that is, one we could use both in everyday moral and political discussions of terrorism and in applied ethics--which is nothing but the same debate continued in a somewhat more careful and sustained way, informed by ethical theory.
For these purposes, I believe terrorism is best defined as the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating in·tim·i·date
tr.v. in·tim·i·dat·ed, in·tim·i·dat·ing, in·tim·i·dates
1. To make timid; fill with fear.
2. To coerce or inhibit by or as if by threats. some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take. Defined in this way, terrorism is an indirect strategy. It has two targets. One person or group is attacked directly in order to get at another person or group and intimidate in·tim·i·date
tr.v. in·tim·i·dat·ed, in·tim·i·dat·ing, in·tim·i·dates
1. To make timid; fill with fear.
2. To coerce or inhibit by or as if by threats. them into doing something they otherwise would not do. In terms of importance, the indirect target is primary and the direct target secondary. The secondary, but directly-attacked target, are innocent people. In the context of war, this is usually taken to include all except members of armed forces and security services; those who supply them with arms and ammunition; and political officials directly involved in the conflict.
What is the sense in which the direct victims of terrorism are 'innocent'? They aren't guilty of any action (or omission) terrorists could plausibly bring up as a justification of what is done to them. They aren't attacking terrorists; therefore terrorist action can't be justified in terms of self-defence. They aren't waging war on terrorists, nor on those on whose behalf they presume to act; therefore terrorists can't say that they, too, are merely fighting a war. 'Innocent people' aren't responsible--on any credible understanding of responsibility--for the (real or alleged) injustice or suffering that is being inflicted on terrorists or on those whose cause they have adopted, an injustice or suffering so grave that a violent response to it can properly be considered. Or, if they are responsible, it is unknown to the terrorists.
What are the advantages of this definition? For one thing, it distinguishes between terrorism, on the one hand, and war and political violence proper, on the other. To be sure, political violence and acts of war Tom Clancy's Op-Center: Acts of War is a technothriller by Jeff Rovin Plot introduction
The mobile Regional Operations Center (ROC) in Turkey investigates a dam blown up by Kurdish terrorists. proper can also intimidate and coerce; but their intended victims aren't innocent people. However, the military can employ terrorism in war--indeed, that is one of the main types of state terrorism State terrorism is a controversial term, with no agreed on definition, used when arguing that there may be a similarity between terrorism and certain acts done by states.
The concept of state terrorism and indeed of terrorism .
The definition preserves the historical connection of 'terrorism' with 'terror' and 'terrorising'. It doesn't confine terrorism to the political sphere Noun 1. political sphere - a sphere of intense political activity
arena, domain, sphere, orbit, area, field - a particular environment or walk of life; "his social sphere is limited"; "it was a closed area of employment"; "he's out of my orbit" , but makes it possible to speak of non-political terrorism, such as the criminal terrorism employed by the Mafia.
The definition is politically neutral: it covers both state and anti-state, revolutionary and counter-revolutionary, left-wing and right-wing terrorism. It is also morally neutral, at least at a very basic level of discussion. I believe it captures the elements of terrorism that lead most of us to judge it as gravely wrong: the use or threat of use of violence against the innocent for the sake of intimidation and coercion coercion, in law, the unlawful act of compelling a person to do, or to abstain from doing, something by depriving him of the exercise of his free will, particularly by use or threat of physical or moral force. . But it doesn't pre-judge the moral question of its justification in particular cases. For it entails only that terrorism is generally wrong and therefore doesn't rule out its justification under certain circumstances. Accordingly, particular acts and campaigns of terrorism still have to be examined and judged on their merits.
Yet another virtue of this definition is that it relates the issue of the moral standing of terrorism to 'just war' theory. For a central tenet TENET. Which he holds. There are two ways of stating the tenure in an action of waste. The averment is either in the tenet and the tenuit; it has a reference to the time of the waste done, and not to the time of bringing the action.
2. of that theory, the principle of discrimination, tells us that we mustn't deliberately attack innocent civilians.
Clearly, the definition is both narrower in some respects and wider in others than common usage would warrant. Attacks of insurgents on soldiers or police officers, which the authorities and the media depict and the public perceives as terrorist, would not count as terrorism, but rather as political violence or guerrilla warfare guerrilla warfare (gərĭl`ə) [Span.,=little war], fighting by groups of irregular troops (guerrillas) within areas occupied by the enemy. . The bombing of German and Japanese cities in World War II, or numerous Israeli Army attacks on Lebanon and some of its current actions in the occupied territories This article is about occupied territory in general: for more specific discussion of the territories captured by Israel in the Six-Day War, see Israeli-occupied territories.
Occupied territories , on the other hand, are commonly presented as acts of war, but would count as terrorism according to according to
1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians.
2. In keeping with: according to instructions.
3. my definition.
Is this a damaging objection? I think not. If what we hope for is more discerning dis·cern·ing
Exhibiting keen insight and good judgment; perceptive.
dis·cerning·ly adv. and critical moral understanding of these matters, we shouldn't be unduly bound by conventional usage. What matters is that in the former case, the targets are soldiers or police officers and not innocent people. In the latter case, innocent people are deliberately targeted with the aim of intimidation and coercion. The former case doesn't involve the four morally problematic components the definition singles out; the latter does. On the other hand, whether the bomb is planted by hand or dropped from an aircraft, or who does or does not wear a uniform, can hardly matter, morally speaking.
If this is what terrorism is, the next question to ask is whether it can ever be morally justified. The answer to this will depend on one's approach to moral issues, one's ethical theory. Now Western moral philosophy has evolved two main approaches, or two types of ethical theory: consequentialism consequentialism
In ethics, the doctrine that actions should be judged right or wrong on the basis of their consequences. The simplest form of consequentialism is classical (or hedonistic) utilitarianism, which asserts that an action is right or wrong according to whether it and non-consequentialism.
Consequentialism tells us to judge human action solely in terms of its consequences. When its consequences are good (on balance), an act or policy is right; when they are bad (on balance), it is wrong. Nothing is right or wrong, obligatory obligatory /ob·lig·a·to·ry/ (ob-lig´ah-tor?e) obligate.
unavoidable; something that is bound to occur. or prohibited, in itself, but only in the light of its consequences. The goodness or badness of consequences is understood in terms of how they affect people. Different versions of consequentialism offer different explanations of this: whether the consequences of an action or line of action contribute to happiness or cause suffering; whether they promote people's interests or set them back; or whether they fulfil or frustrate people's preferences.
Terrorism, too, is judged solely in terms of its consequences. That means that it, too, isn't wrong in itself, but only when it has bad consequences (on balance). Of course, given what it is, it is likely to have bad consequences most of the time, so consequentialists will judge it as wrong most of the time.
Consequentialist thinkers also criticise those who resort to terrorism too quickly, without checking thoroughly whether their terrorist actions and campaigns can indeed be justified by their consequences. This is something many terrorists do and many apologists of terrorism condone condone v. 1) to forgive, support, and/or overlook moral or legal failures of another without protest, with the result that it appears that such breaches of moral or legal duties are acceptable. . A consequentialist justification of an act or policy of terrorism must show three things: that the aim sought is good enough to justify the harm inflicted; that the aim will indeed be achieved by terrorism; and that it can't be achieved by any other, less costly means.
However, consequentialists have no case against those terrorists who do their calculation responsibly and thoroughly, and reach the conclusion that yes, given the circumstances, terrorism will have good consequences on balance. It will indeed lead to liberation from an oppressive foreign rule, which can't be achieved in any other way.
If we are not happy with this position and want a more robust critique of terrorism, a less permissive permissive adj. 1) referring to any act which is allowed by court order, legal procedure, or agreement. 2) tolerant or allowing of others' behavior, suggesting contrary to others' standards.
PERMISSIVE. stance on its morality, we must turn to non-consequentialist ethical theories. These theories don't tell us that consequences do not matter; to say that would be quite implausible im·plau·si·ble
Difficult to believe; not plausible.
im·plausi·bil , indeed preposterous. What they tell us is that other considerations (justice or rights, for example) matter too, and that some acts or lines of action are right or wrong in themselves, independently of their consequences.
From a non-consequentialist point of view, terrorism does appear as never, or hardly ever, morally justified. To see why let's look into two central non-consequentialist objections to it. First, terrorism offends against the fundamental moral principle of respect for persons. The principle of respect for persons can be construed in (at least) two ways. Respect for persons can be understood as respect for their basic human rights. Human beings are to be respected as holders of rights, which circumscribe cir·cum·scribe
tr.v. cir·cum·scribed, cir·cum·scrib·ing, cir·cum·scribes
1. To draw a line around; encircle.
2. To limit narrowly; restrict.
3. To determine the limits of; define. a certain area of freedom, thereby both acknowledging and protecting personhood per·son·hood
The state or condition of being a person, especially having those qualities that confer distinct individuality: "finding her own personhood as a campus activist" . The terrorist can't show this type of respect. For if you have any basic rights at all, surely the right not to be killed or maimed maim
tr.v. maimed, maim·ing, maims
1. To disable or disfigure, usually by depriving of the use of a limb or other part of the body. See Synonyms at batter1.
2. for a terrorist cause is one of them.
Alternatively, showing respect for persons can be taken to mean not treating them as mere means. In attempting to capture the supreme law of morality; Kant famously fa·mous·ly
1. In a way or to an extent that is well known: "his famously neurotic mannerisms [are] lampooned in the novels of Evelyn Waugh" enjoined us never to treat humanity, whether in our own person or in that of another, as a mere means but always also as an end. To be sure, the details and implications of Kant's account are a matter of considerable controversy. But it can be safely said that, at a minimum, his principle enjoins that the other should be able to 'share in the end' of our action towards another person, that is, to consent to it. But that is just what the terrorist's victim is in no position to do. Indeed, terrorism is often brought up as a paradigmatic See paradigm. example of reducing other people to mere means and thus offending of·fend
v. of·fend·ed, of·fend·ing, of·fends
1. To cause displeasure, anger, resentment, or wounded feelings in.
2. against what Kant puts forward as one formulation of the supreme law of morality.
The second major non-consequentialist objection to terrorism takes us back to the distinction between responsibility and the lack of it, or between guilt and innocence. This is one of the most basic moral distinctions. We give it the pride of place in any consideration of war or violence in general from a moral and legal point of view. Its import is that hostile treatment of another human being must be justified by the fact that he or she is responsible for some wrongdoing wrong·do·er
One who does wrong, especially morally or ethically.
wrongdo , the gravity of which is proportionate to the gravity of our response. Those who aren't responsible for such wrongdoing shouldn't be subjected to hostile treatment and, in particular, mustn't be subjected to violence. Philosophers usually don't seek to prove this point, but rather make it their point of departure when putting forward arguments about the morality of violence, war and terrorism. They are right to do so. As Michael Walzer Michael Walzer (3 March 1935) is one of America's leading political philosophers. Currently, he is a professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey and editor of Dissent, a left-wing quarterly of politics and culture. puts it in his book Just and Unjust Wars, 'the theoretical problem is not to describe how [this] immunity is gained, but how it is lost. We are all immune to start with; our right not to be attacked is a feature of normal human relationships.' Yet terrorists deliberately attack, kill and otherwise severely harm innocent people; this, and the aim of intimidation and coercion they seek to achieve in this way, is what makes them terrorists.
To be sure, some terrorists claim that their victims aren't innocent. But they can do so only after extending the notions of responsibility and guilt so drastically as to make it possible for them to say such things as: 'All Israelis are responsible for the policies of the Sharon government'; 'All Palestinians are implicated im·pli·cate
tr.v. im·pli·cat·ed, im·pli·cat·ing, im·pli·cates
1. To involve or connect intimately or incriminatingly: evidence that implicates others in the plot.
2. in terrorism'; or 'All Americans are guilty of American imperialism'. However, when the notions of responsibility or guilt are stretched to this extent, the very distinction between responsibility and the lack of it, or between guilt and innocence, no longer makes much sense, at least when we are concerned with the sort of thing terrorists do to their victims.
These objections to terrorism show it to be at odds with some of the most basic moral beliefs of many of us. Those of us who hold these beliefs will find consequentialist accounts of terrorism both much too permissive and wide of the mark, not attending to what is at issue. But do they have to say that terrorism can never be justified, whatever the circumstances?
Some want to say just this: one must never resort to terrorism and that is all there is to it. Thus Australian philosopher Tony Coady, who has done extensive research on the morality of violence, war and terrorism, argues that, 'we surely do better to condemn the resort to terrorism outright with no leeway lee·way
1. The drift of a ship or an aircraft to leeward of the course being steered.
2. A margin of freedom or variation, as of activity, time, or expenditure; latitude. See Synonyms at room. for exemptions, be they for states, revolutionaries or religious zealots Zealots (zĕl`əts), Jewish faction traced back to the revolt of the Maccabees (2d cent. B.C.). The name was first recorded by the Jewish historian Josephus as a designation for the Jewish resistance fighters of the war of A.D. 66–73. .' In general, but especially in the present worldwide terrorism alert, the moral prohibition of terrorism should be understood and endorsed as absolute.
Others (myself included) opt for a less uncompromising position. They reject the consequentialist view that terrorism is justified whenever its consequences are good (on balance), but admit that it might be justified in certain extreme and extremely rare circumstances. This position shouldn't be confused with the argument about terrorism being 'the only method available to the poor and powerless', a way of 'levelling the field', popular among apologists of terrorism. For the position I have in mind lays down two conditions: that terrorism is indeed the only method available and likely to succeed; and that what is to be prevented by its use is an evil so great that it can be termed a moral disaster.
But just what is--what counts as--a moral disaster? This question doesn't permit a single and clear-cut answer, one that would enable us to draw a line dividing what is and what isn't a moral disaster. What can be said is, first, that--contrary to what fighters against social or economic oppression The term economic oppression, sometimes misunderstood in the sense of economic sanction, embargo or economic boycott, has a different meaning and significance, and its meaning as well as its significance has been changing over a period of time, and its contextual application. , or colonial rule, or foreign occupation tend to say--evils of such magnitude that they can justify indiscriminate in·dis·crim·i·nate
1. Not making or based on careful distinctions; unselective: an indiscriminate shopper; indiscriminate taste in music.
2. and wholesale killing and maiming of innocent people and all manner of destruction are extremely rare. Not every case of oppression, foreign rule, or occupation, however morally indefensible, amounts to a moral disaster in the sense I have in mind.
Second, I can still give one or two examples. If a nation is subjected to genocide genocide, in international law, the intentional and systematic destruction, wholly or in part, by a government of a national, racial, religious, or ethnic group. , or to being 'ethnic cleansed' from its land, then it is facing a true moral disaster and may properly consider terrorism as a means of struggle against such a fate. To be sure, in such a case it will be morally justified in resorting to terrorism only if there are very good grounds for believing that terrorism will succeed where nothing else will: in preventing, or stopping, the genocide or 'ethnic cleansing'. Obviously, cases where both these conditions are met will be extremely rare; indeed, they will be virtually--but not absolutely--nonexistent.
If, at this point, we recall the distinction between state and non-state terrorism and ask which of the two is more likely to be justified in these terms, the answer would seem to be this: facing a prospect that amounts to a moral disaster, virtually every state will have options other than the use of terrorism. Thus, the first of the two conditions of the "moral disaster' justification won't be satisfied. A stateless Refers to software that does not keep track of configuration settings, transaction information or any other data for the next session. When a program "does not maintain state" (is stateless) or when the infrastructure of a system prevents a program from maintaining state, it cannot take community, on the other hand, seems to be more likely to find itself in such circumstances where it truly has no alternative. Therefore, such a community might be able to justify its resort to terrorism when facing the threat of genocide or 'ethnic cleansing'. This, indeed, is one of the reasons why I believe that, morally speaking, state terrorism is, by and large, worse than terrorism employed by sub-state groups.
Igor Primoratz is Professor of Philosophy at the Hebrew University Hebrew University of Jerusalem, at Mt. Scopus, Givat Ram, Ein Karem, and Rehovot, Israel; coeducational. First proposed in 1882, formally opened 1925. It is the world's largest Jewish university and is noted for its work on the Dead Sea Scrolls. , Jerusalem, and principal research fellow at the Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, University of Melbourne
In 2006, Times Higher Education Supplement ranked the University of Melbourne 22nd in the world. Because of the drop in ranking, University of Melbourne is currently behind four Asian universities - Beijing University, . His publications include several papers on terrorism and the anthology Terrorism: The Philosophical Issues, which he edited for Palgrave Macmillan (in press).