Terrain denial missions in OIF III.

During the second week of November 2004, in Logistical Support Area (LSA) Diamondback in Mosul, Iraq, one of the most prominent threats to the camp was daily anti-Iraqi forces (AIF) mortar and rocket fires aimed at the installation. Soldiers and civilian workers alike wore body armor and Kevlar helmets wherever they traveled.

Because of this threat, I was charged to develop a plan to incorporate counterstrikes and psychological operations (PSYOP) and conduct combined arms and coalition ground combat patrols to disrupt enemy activities--including terrain denial. These operations resulted in a decrease from one attack daily to two or three isolated attacks monthly.

I was attached to 2d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (2-10 SFG) (Airborne), at Forward Operating Base (FOB) 102 as a fire support officer (FSO). This was a unique arrangement worked out by 10 SFG and the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (3d ID), my original unit of assignment.

My duties included coordinating indirect fire support for all of FOB 102's operational detachments that were spread throughout northern Iraq and coordinating and conducting counterstrikes for the base defense of FOB Hornbeck, the FOB 102 living area within LSA Diamondback. Through the implementation of an aggressive campaign combining indirect fire assets and nonlethal effects, we disrupted AIF attacks on LSA Diamondback. The campaign included harassing and interdicting (H & I) fires with the collection of enemy indirect fire data using Q-36/Q-37 radars and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) unique test system: the unattended transient acoustic measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT) system (UTAMS).

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UTAMS is an acoustic mortar detection system that detects points of origin (POOs) and points of impact (POIs) by triangulating the lines of bearings (LOBs) developed by each UTAMS array. Each array consists of a tripod, four acoustic microphones, a global positioning system (GPS) antenna, a temperature sensor and an electronics unit. Once the arrays are set up, the microphone with north-seeking arrow on each array is aligned either at true north or at a known distant aiming point (DAP). Although its main use is for acquiring indirect fires, it also can pinpoint improvised explosive device (IED) explosions and small arms/rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fires. The UTAMS has detected POOs up to 10 kilometers out.

Pattern Analysis. After researching enemy mortar and rocket attack data back to October 2004, it was obvious the LSA Diamondback Airfield was being targeted. In the month of October, there were 27 mortar and rocket attacks; in November, there were an additional 27 attacks.

After conducting pattern analysis, it was apparent the AIF was firing mortars everyday between 1300 hours and 1800 hours. Firing times coincided with dining hours, so the assumption was that the AIF was trying to maximize its chances of producing mass casualties.

Not only were we able to establish a most likely time when they would shoot, we also were able to establish a pattern of where they would shoot from. Primarily, the AIF were shooting their mortars from the east side of the Tigris River from the farm fields north and south of Palestine, a Sunni neighborhood in Mosul. Occasionally, the AIF traveled across the Tigris River by boat and shot their mortars from an island we called "Gilligan's Island" and the western bank of the river.

Counterstrike--Terrain Denial. The rear area operations center (RAOC), initially a combat support battalion and later an FA battalion, was responsible for the LSA base defense. In conjunction with the RAOC, we developed courses of actions (COAs) to counter the enemy indirect fires.

As our primary COA, we requested a mortar section from Task Force 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry (TF 1-24 IN) and established a firing position for them in FOB Hornbeck. Its mission was to conduct terrain denial fires and counterstrike missions to deny the AIF terrain that could easily range the targeted LSA and to have psychological effects on the AIF who witnessed these displays of firepower.

The mortar section fired more than 380 of rounds of 81-mm and 120-mm illumination (ILLUM) and high-explosive (HE) rounds throughout their five-month tour on the FOB. When the mortar section was not available to shoot, we conducted terrain denial missions with the M198s (155-mm towed), located in FOB Courage, eight kilometers north of the target area. The howitzers shot 43 rounds of both ILLUM and HE on the same targets as the mortars.

When neither the mortars nor the M198s were available, we used MH-60 helicopters armed with 7.62-mm machine guns, 30-mm main guns and 2.75 rockets or Apache attack helicopters for terrain denial fires.

Terrain Denial fires were executed based on the established time pattern of enemy indirect fires. When the AIF established a pattern of firing their mortars during night hours, we conducted terrain denial missions using ILLUM rounds and the armed MH-60 helicopters to disrupt their pattern. When the AIF established a pattern of firing in the daytime hours, we conducted terrain denial fires using HE rounds and the Apache helicopters. This continued for two weeks until the AIF adjusted firing times to odd, random hours of the day. Likewise, we adjusted our mission times to correspond to the AIF's.

After six weeks, the frequency of mortar attacks declined significantly from one attack per day to one attack every three to four days. We had disrupted the AIF mortar cell but only temporarily.

We considered bringing the fight closer to the enemy to put more pressure on him. The problem was the Tigris River, an obstacle on the eastern boundary of our area of operations (AO). The east side of the river belonged to a different task force that was already spread thin and could not provide a forward observer (FO). Due to terrain limitations and the proximity of the Palestine neighborhood, we had to restrict our terrain denial missions to either Gilligan's Island or a piece of terrain west of the river.

The challenge was that many of the enemy indirect fires came from east of the river. We were able to deny the AIF enough terrain that he was unable to range the LSA with 60-mm mortars, his primary indirect fire asset.

Our assessment of only temporary disruption was correct. On 7 February 2005 a mortar attack hit the LSA, injuring four people. Four days later, the AIF resumed more accurate attacks. Based on these attacks we extended our terrain denial missions into Palestine.

The immediate response to the mortar attacks was executing a terrain denial mission on 14 February 2005 using the armed MH-60s, firing on a target on the east side of the river within observation of the mortar POO in Palestine. The commander directed the MH-60s to "rock the neighborhood and knock pictures off of the walls of the houses surrounding the POO" without causing collateral damage. MH-60s do not require an observer as they observe their own fires.

We then used the gunships to drop 3,000 PSYOP leaflets throughout the area, warning the local population that if they continued to allow the enemy to shoot from their neighborhoods, we would counter with artillery and mortars. The leaflets also informed residents of the local tip line phone number to report AIF activities. We followed the MH-60 fires with several nights of terrain denial fires using ILLUM east of the river.

This show-of-force combined with a leaflet drop had an immediate influence on the population of Palestine. Mortar fires ceased, and the next three weeks were the quietest the LSA had experienced in a long time. Obviously the populace realized we would no longer tolerate their willingness to cooperate with AIF.

The local nationals in Palestine reported to the MultiNational Forces (MNF) patrols that they were tired of our constant firing. Several of them told the task force that owned the battlespace they would promise to do their best to prevent the AIF from shooting mortars from within their neighborhood.

They also tipped MNF troops about the location of several weapons and ammunition caches. While the majority of the neighborhood remained anti-MNF, the populace also decided that the AIF were unwelcome.

The LSA saw four incidents of indirect fires from late February to early March 2005. However, none of these attacks came from Palestine. All were 107-mm rockets placed in an improvised launching tube and set on time fuzes from south of Palestine.

In response, MNF set up observation posts (OPs) to overwatch the POO locations. Believing the AIF emplaced the rockets after curfew, we executed additional terrain denial missions late at night using a 1-5 IN mortar section.

Once again, the AIF were deterred from shooting rockets at the LSA. This was true until late April when we were hit with two additional rounds of 107-mm rockets in two attacks, injuring seven people. The rounds came from the far eastern side of Palestine. Currently, we are targeting the area by developing POO and time patterns.

Albanian Support. A major factor in the countermortar fight was the integration of combat patrols by the Albanian Coalition Support Team (CST) whose main task at LSA Diamondback was base defense. The Albanian CST combines US Special Forces advisors with three rotating platoons of Albanian Kommandos who have since been replaced with two rotating squads of Albanian Special Forces. The Albanian CST goes outside the perimeter daily to conduct combat patrols along the river and occupy OPs.

The Albanian CST was key to the countermortar fight for three reasons. First, it could respond quickly outside the perimeter and conduct crater analysis on indirect rounds that landed short of the targeted LSA. We provided them with the impact locations from the UTAMS. Once the Albanian CST received the UTAMS readings and conducted crater analysis, they provided the pertinent information to the RAOC and the conventional forces' fire support cells that rarely ventured outside the perimeter.

Second, the Albanian CST was the security force for all our OPs as we executed the calls-for-fire (CFFs) for terrain denial missions. I knew the terrain intimately by patrolling the area east of LSA Diamondback with the Albanian CST. We conducted more than 130 combat patrols and occupied more than 50 OPs through more than 90 hours of continual observation.

Third, the Albanian CST was available to conduct recovery operations for the Raven unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), whenever necessary. We used the UAV to observe fires when we could not observe the target from a safe distance due to the minimum safe distance of the type of rounds being fired or the gun-target line (GTL) being online with the observer-target line (OTL).

Terrain denial fires have proven to be an excellent deterrent to enemy indirect fires in this ever-changing combat environment. While the physical effects of the fires on the "target" are minimal, the psychological effects on the real targets, the minds of the AIF mortarmen, were substantial. Firing 400 rounds of mortar/artillery rounds is a small price to pay for the life of a single Coalition Soldier. These missions reinforce the concept of using lethal fires to create nonlethal effects.

Captain Justino Lopez, Jr., is the Battalion Fire Support Officer for 2d Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group in Mosul for Operation Iraqi Freedom III. His previous assignments include serving as Assistant Brigade Fire Support Officer for 3d Brigade and Targeting Officer for 3d Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, both in the 3d Infantry Division at Fort Stewart, Georgia, and Firing Platoon Leader with 1st Battalion, 38th FA Regiment, 2d Infantry Division in Korea.

By Captain Justino Lopez, Jr.