Tactics as the art of offensive.

An offensive brings victory. The troops on the offensive deliver blows with all means at their disposal and use the results to swiftly move into the enemy deployment, destroy and capture manpower, machines and equipment, and occupy key objects and areas. Sun zi looked at an offensive as the summit of the art of warfare. He was convinced that pressure and boldness alone could disrupt the enemy's plans.

At all times success in offensive operations was reached through sudden blows, concentration of forces at the main axis of advance, coordinated command and control, flexible cooperation, all-round support, and skilful deployment of the troops.

The Art of Offensive in the 18th-20th Centuries

An analysis of the wars of the late 18th-early 19th centuries testifies that the steadily rising power affected the methods of offensive operations. Handguns with curved butts made aimed fire possible. In the Crimean, Franco-Prussian, and Russian-Turkish (1877-1878) wars the tactics of column formation was abandoned for extended formations that added effectiveness and dynamism to offensive operations and increased the troops' maneuverability. Defense became more active that called for new methods of an offensive.

Late in the 19th and early in the 20th centuries (during the Spanish-American, 1898, the Boer, 1899-1902, and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905) rifles, ten times more efficient than smoothbore weapons, began to be used in great numbers. Artillery increased its fighting potential three to four times; machineguns appeared on the battlefield. Many military theoreticians predicted a decisive role of firepower that would further improve the means and methods of an offensive at all stages.

The changes in the nature of an offensive battle, its longer duration, its greater intensity and wide territory made it much harder to command all units and subunits. Open formations on the battlefield made personal initiative of the tactical-level commanders more important. Later this was reflected in the Field Manual of the Russian Army published in 1912. It said, in part: "Each commander and each soldier should act independently when carrying out his task. Everyone should display personal initiative and act according to circumstances without waiting for orders of senior commanders."

On the eve of World War I the experience of the Russo-Japanese War in which the methods of an offensive were further developed was registered in field manuals of the Russian and other European armies. The 1912 Field Manual of the Russian Army concentrated on the offensive battle: "Attack is the best weapon against the enemy."

In the 20th century the offensive-defense opposition became more stubborn and tense. It took the form of several consistent offensive and defensive battles that together created a new form of armed struggle--an operation. In the Russo-Japanese War the continuous front line was 75 km long at Liao-Yang and 155 km long at Moukden. The earlier depth of battle of 2 to 4 km reached 25-50 km in the early 20th century, while battles no longer lasted for one or two days but continued uninterrupted for 10 to 17 days. An offensive was successfully combined with defensive efforts.

Over time, an opposition between the offensive and defense became even bitterer. World War I destroyed the earlier ideas about an offensive battle and created new methods of its conduct. An offensive became more resolute thanks to the massive use of artillery (160 to 180 guns per one kilometer of the frontline); softening-up process; gases; ramming tank thrust; greater aviation involvement to support the land forces on the offensive; infantry attacks behind the moving barrage; a greater role of night action.

At the same time, the war displayed a certain decrease of efficiency of offensive operations caused by excessive pedantry and too simple troop actions together with predictable methods of breakthrough and battle formations. These factors slowed down the pace of an offensive: in the Verdun operation the German army covered 40 m a day while the British and French on the Somme about 70 m. It was in 1918 in the Amiens operation that the British and French covered 8 km on the first day having broken through the enemy tactical defense zone. On the whole World War I was a classical example of an equilibrium between the means of offensive and defense that created a static warfare.

World War II brought considerable changes in the nature of offensive operations. Aviation, artillery, and tanks together with the increased striking and fire power of combined-arms formations made it possible to promptly disrupt the enemy defenses, while mobile tank and motorized units added to the strike force. This resulted in fast tactical and operational successes.

Defensive and offensive operations were competing against one another during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. An increased power of strikes delivered by the troops on the offensive forced the armies to switch from archipelago defense to total integrated defense in depth that balanced the sides' fighting possibilities to a certain extent. While the attacking side pressed on with tanks to increase the pace of its forward movement the side on the defense improved the antitank system with strong points, centers, and defended areas to the total depth of tactical and even operational defense. The same happened in the air where the increased power of air strikes was parried by stronger air defenses.

During World War II the sides were competing for superiority of fire. Resolute offensive actions, high pace of breakthroughs, pursuit of the retreating enemy, and forcing water obstacles without stopping were made possible by the improved methods of destruction by fire and artillery and offensive actions of aviation.

On the whole World War II enriched the forms and methods of attack yet negative factors were also obvious: on many occasions the enemy was defeated by the superiority of forces and means rather than military skill and stratagems. Stereotypes and oversimplified approaches were used in planning and waging battles while straightforward actions predominated.

Further Development of the Theory of Offensive

The experience of two world wars determined the post-war development of the theory and practice of the offensive. Action was discussed in the context of a large-scale war waged mainly in the conditions of position warfare. This was reflected in the fighting manuals of the Land Forces that concentrated on breaking through the enemy's deliberate defenses. The rapid changes in the means of warfare did not radically change the theory of the offensive. Old tactics prevailed: the land and air electronic battle was still seen through the prism of the past wars even if the use of nuclear weapons was surmised. The old stereotypes survived: position warfare, the linear forms of struggle and the battle's regular pace have been preserved.

Today, the military theory is facing an urgent task of forecasting possible changes in the forms and methods of the offensive brought to life by new weapons and fighting machines. Experts believe that in the nearest future the troops should be alerted three to four times faster than in the past that will cut down the time for preparation for fighting in the most dramatic manner. Artillery, tanks, combat armored vehicles (IFV), APCs and other weapons will increase their firing range by 1.5 to 2 times and will improve their accuracy.

One can expect that new machines will create new operational forms with the use of fire-intelligence, air-space, radio-electronic, informational-psychological methods, the first elements of which were clearly seen in the local wars of the 1980s and 1990s.

The new conditions will call for a combination of the traditional methods (a breakthrough and attack in dismounted formations) and novel methods of warfare (air-land attacks, precision strikes by high precision weapons, destruction with fire, radio-electronic strikes, fighting and maneuvering with helicopters, raids of air assault units and landings of paratroopers). It will become even more important to rebuff subversive actions and to undertake reconnaissance actions and strikes. Frontal thrusts will be combined with an active front in the enemy rear created by landed groups. A non-contact battle can be regarded as a promising means of an offensive over "an extended battlefield" in which blows are delivered by operational-tactical means (cruise missiles, aviation and dispersed multiple rocket systems (DMRS) at deep targets).

New more efficient weapon systems and combat vehicles will add complexity and more dimensions to offensive battles, will make them tenser, more dynamic and more maneuverable, and extend its territory. Fight for initiative will became even bitterer.

Radio-electronic operations as a sum-total of radio-electronic strikes at the enemy command and control systems will hold a special place in the system of offensive actions.

It will be fundamentally important to disrupt the balance between defensive and offensive means. In the new conditions a breakthrough in the enemy's defenses will move to the background, its place being taken by the offensive maneuvers. This means that in future an offensive will start not with a breakthrough of the frontline but with the use of the already existing gaps in the enemy battle formation, with envelopment and oufflanking movements, rapid penetration of the enemy's defenses on land and in the air, delivering combined strikes at the defending enemy from different directions (at the front, flanks and the rear, on land and in the air).

This has already been done during World War II yet maneuvering became possible in the course of a battle in the depth of the disrupted enemy defenses when the enemy nearly stopped resisting.

In the contemporary conditions an offensive can start with a land and air maneuvering even if the enemy has managed to establish a fairly stable frontal defenses. Massive electronic and fire strikes create massive SAMs to be used to probe deeper into the defense lines.

Naturally enough, a breakthrough should be preserved as a tactical device since prolonged and protracted forms of struggle have not yet been ruled out. In the conditions when the attacking side is forced to break through the enemy defenses it should support its efforts with fire. It is unwise to compensate for deficient fire density with tight infantry-and-tank battle order in narrow front strips. Today, it is impossible to pierce the defenses strengthened with armored targets with the help of infantry alone.

The nature of breakthroughs has changed: it will become deeper. In the past the main task was to destroy the frontline of enemy defenses--today the main thing is to suppress the enemy fire group, to disrupt its fire system, disorganize command and control, neutralize the air defenses in the zone of one's own aviation. The attacking side should try hard to move the main battle efforts to the depth of enemy defenses so that to undermine it by delivering blows from the front and the rear.

Earlier, in two world wars, the attacking side was operating in a fairly straightforward and obvious manner so that to split the front. In the new conditions it is expected that absolutely new tactics will be used that can be described as multi-dimensions. Equally intensive blows will be simultaneously delivered from several sides: from the land and the air, at the front, flanks, and the rear. This will bring good results.

This multi-dimensional nature of an offensive requires skilled commanders and headquarters. It is highly important to synchronize the use of all sorts of weapons and combat resources, to channel their efforts to one aim only and to revise the old methods of organization of a battle. It is highly advisable to demonstrate fresh approaches when identifying the main axis of advance. Here I have in mind not so much the direction of the main effort as concentration of major forces in the selected zone. The main idea is to concentrate first of all on the key objects in the depth of enemy defenses: its fire means, command and control posts, air defenses, means of intelligence and radio-electronic warfare that are normally sited in the depth of tactical defenses.

It is equally important to identify the main axis of attack: this should be done when we want to split the enemy group and to use its weakest point (a gap in its battle formation) to move one's troops forward at a high pace. This is most typical of tactical formations that cannot deliver intensive and deep cutting blows at the enemy.

Today violation of the enemy's tactical stability is seen in a new light: while in the past defense was based on positions and areas distributed in depth and victory depended on their capture, today no matter how important it is to capture the enemy positions this does nothing more than creates a possibility of disrupting the enemy's defenses. A road to victory lies through a complete destruction of the enemy's main fire group and disorganization of its command and control.

This prompts a conclusion that we should take into account the newly formed context when trying to identify the most vulnerable place in the enemy defenses. In the past they were the boundaries between units (subunits), open flanks and stretches of defense lines defended by less battle-worthy troops. They were the main targets of the attacking enemy because it was the easiest way to split the defense line and move to the depth of defense.

Today when defense hinges on the means of fire (artillery, guided missile and missile complexes, DMRS, air defense, antitank defense, and REW) it is signally important to identify their weak and strong points and to find out which of them is the weakest and should be attacked first so that to capture and keep fire initiative in the shortest time possible and gain dominance in the air. Otherwise other tasks cannot be successfully addressed.

The thrust should be multidimensional and should be combined with an impact in depth. These requirements are inseparable and mutually complementary. They strengthen one another and make it possible to use the entire range of forms and methods of concentration of forces in space and time.

The local wars and armed conflicts have already demonstrated that most frequently concentrated fire of artillery, guided missile and missile complexes, and aviation is aimed at objects in the depth of enemy defenses to isolate the battlefield, prevent maneuvering and Landing of tactical groups, reconnaissance, subversion, and aeromobile units. This is not new--this method was used in World War I when aviation appeared and was further developed in the course of World War II under the impact of longer-range means of fire and more efficient reconnaissance methods.

In the past massive fire impact on distant objects was not of a decisive importance since the troops were not mobile enough to penetrate fast into the fire-affected zone. More often than not concentrated fire was used on an operational scale. Much has changed since that time: formation commanders can now concentrate a large amount of fire means against objects deep in the enemy defenses and combine them with air strikes. They can act in accordance with the available forces and assets and on the strength of gathered intelligence: there is a possibility of either directing fire consistently against the enemy objects as soon as intelligence reports reach the staff or directing fire against all enemy objects simultaneously.

Both methods have their advantages but simultaneous massive fire directed against the enemy's most important group and supported with varied means of destruction applied for a long time is more effective.

Overcoming the enemy's antitank defenses remains one of the most difficult tasks. In World War H they were the backbone of the defense system and were deployed to the tactical and operational depth; the density reached 20 to 30 units of infantry antitank weapons (IATW) along the most important stretches. The majority of them were armored; today the number of such objects in foreign armies is increasing with each passing year.

This obviously calls for new and more effective use of neutralization and disorganization of such defenses with the entire range of forces and assets the attacking side has at its disposal. The majority of IATW are armored that calls for well targeted selective strikes at each of the objects individually. Reconnaissance-striking and reconnaissance-firing complexes may play a special role--they are designed to identify the objects in a short span of time and deliver strikes at them in real time.

Much depends on a consistently developing advance: the troops should be able to cross water objects on the march, wage baffles at all times, seasons, and in all weather which strains the troops' strength and stamina to the utmost. Georgi Zhukov wrote in his time: "Speed is one the major means of routing the enemy in the shortest time possible. One should operate at a fast speed so that to outpace the enemy. We should learn how to do this and to teach our troops to accomplish this task. We have enough machines to do this and accomplish the boldest and fastest maneuvers."

An offensive baffle today covers the tactical depth of the enemy defenses, therefore the subunits should learn how to wage a battle in depth while being separated from the main forces for a long time: they should perform bold enveloping and outflanking moves, raids on staffs and fire positions, capture important communication lines and rebuff reserves and aeromobile subunits moving into the fighting area. The enemy groups should not be merely pushed aside from one position to another: they should be split, encircled, and destroyed.

Commanders and staffs of all levels should build up their efforts in the sectors where success is more tangible. The main thing is not to allow the enemy to restore the disrupted command systems and obstacles destroyed by fire, to continue regrouping in a planned way along the front and from the depth. The commanders should keep the initiative in any conditions.

In the Great Patriotic War success was developed by bringing in rear echelons: as soon as the first defense line of the enemy was disrupted the rear echelons of regiments and even divisions were brought into action. On many occasions mobile army groups and even fronts were brought into the battle to complete a breach of the main defense line. This slowed down the rate of operation speed.

Today, success depends on flexible accumulation of fire in the main sector. Sudden fire strikes may disrupt the enemy attempts to close the breach, to retreat in an orderly way to the prepared positions, and to bring in reserves.

The attacking troops should immediately exploit the results of the fire strikes, especially in-depth strikes. An important role belongs to tactical airborne groups, forward, raid, and outflanking detachments.

Airborne assault forces can play a decisive role when delivering in-depth fire strikes and creating an active front in the enemy rear. When on an offensive they capture road junctions, crossings, passes and other important objects that can slow down the enemy advances, disrupt enemy maneuvers and help the advancing troops negotiate defense lines and natural obstacles and create conditions to rout the enemy groups part by part.

The recent local wars and armed conflicts taught us to pay special attention to the paratroopers' armaments. They should be given powerful combat vehicles and weapons to bring them closer to other all-arms formations of the Land Forces. The landing means are being constantly improved so that to carry heavy machines together with paratroopers. The efficiency of aeromobile combined-arms formations is also increasing: today it has become possible to move by air heavy machines and large formations. A fundamentally new aeromobile formations and units are created in foreign armies; they can be moved either by air or by land and to attack by combining air strikes with strikes on land.

Many armies look at army aviation as a dynamic means that makes the land forces more mobile directly in the zone of hostilities. It can add dynamism to military actions and helps increase efforts when they are moved from one sector to another, it is used to protect the flanks, cross water obstacles, and give the troops fire support.

Today, armies have at their disposal a large amount of the means of transport aviation that adds depths to the integrated all-arms battle and creates new types of fighting formations. Here I have in mind not only tactical landing groups but also air-raid detachments and helicopter-striking groups. One can surmise that the process will develop further therefore commanders when deciding to start an offensive should plan to use effectively the air echelon in the zone of fire destruction, build up efforts in the course of a battle and organize resistance to the enemy airborne assault groups.

Radio-electronic warfare will inevitably become an element of the offensive: the means of such warfare are rapidly developing and are used by armed forces. As a result not only operational but also tactical level can organize REW.

Electronic countermeasures (ECM), including those in the tactical link, can considerably enhance the effect of fire and air strikes at the enemy and disorganize its system of weapon command.

Complex use of the latest automatized reconnaissance systems, systems of command and control and REW, of powerful long-range and precise means of fire together with massive landings in the enemy rear can extend the territory on which the battle is being fought and will make it possible to identify and destroy all elements of the enemy grouping to the depth of up to 5 km in a battalion; to 15 km in a regiment (brigade), up to 70 km in a division, and up to 150 km in a corps.

Today, foreign armies are frantically looking for new means and methods of an offensive. In the United States this quest was born by the conception of an air-land operation. It is commonly believed there that the corps plans such operation on the tactical level. An in-depth attack on the enemy combined with fire destruction is believed to be a fairly widely accepted form of an in-depth strike. It presupposes that the attacking side that presses with its assault echelon is trying to avoid close combat and is seeking to deliver strikes against the flanks and the rear. What is important is the attempt not only to prevent the enemy from strengthening its assault echelon but also to disrupt cooperation to the counterattacking units in the depth.

There is another form of an in-depth strike that the Americans believe to be even more complex and harder to implement: the enemy is defeated with fire and strikes of mobile subunits combined with close combat. It is commonly believed that it will interfere with the enemy's attempt to concentrate its forces; it will deprive its actions of speed and will help rout its forces. The U.S. Field Manual says that the efficiency of this form of an in-depth strike depends on precise cooperation of all arms and services.

There is another form of an in-depth strike that presupposes simultaneous or one-by-one suppression of the main enemy objects that may affect the attacking troops. Their destruction will greatly contribute to a success in a battle. It is presupposed that the systems of delivery of nuclear weapons should be destroyed in the first place. The routes along which the enemy may bring in its reserves should be blocked with fire at natural obstacles such as crossings of water obstacles.

It is emphasized that success of any of these forms of an in-depth strike will depend on concentrating all efforts against the aim to be attained and at delivering blows against those elements of the enemy battle formations the destruction of which may help achieve maximal advantages.

Other countries, too, hinge their offensive conceptions on in-depth strikes. From this it follows that the battle in the depth will be accompanied by wedging troops into the enemy's depth that will create numerous seats of fighting in the enemy and one's own rear. This creates special demands to flexible command and control, maneuvering in the air and on land, enveloping and outflanking movements

How to Move on to the Offensive

The art of offensive and the level of its development depend, to a great extent, on the methods the troops use to launch an offensive. In the past, and as late as the mid-19th century the troops openly deployed themselves close to the enemy and delivered a blow after a series of preparatory measures.

In the latter half of the same century grooved firearms created a new stage of an offensive--advance to contact during which infantry under cover of artillery fire approached the line of attack in extended formations. The start line was not fortified--the art of offensive demanded that the troops should move further.

During World War I with its position warfare the first stage of an offensive consisted in deploying the troops in the prepared FUP found in direct proximity to the enemy's FEBA. This method was widely used in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and allowed commanders to concentrate large forces and a great number of machines at the breakthrough sectors (up to 200 artillery pierces and more, three to five battalions, 30-40 tanks per 1 km of front line.)

Today, there are many methods of switching to an offense: this can be done in the situation of a direct contact with the enemy (when troops regroup after defensive operations); on the move by deploying the troops moving forward from the areas equipped in the depth; on the move by deploying the troops into battle formation from columns en route; these two methods can be combined.

An offensive on the enemy in the defensive in a situation of a direct contact is carried out in prearranged battle formation from defensive positions after all necessary maneuvering has been done or by occupying the lines of attack by moving forward from the depth, in this case the defending troops are replaced. This method is used when the troops have already come into contact with the enemy and when they have received an order to launch an offensive or when the terrain makes it impossible to launch an offensive by performing forward movements (in the north, mountainous and other difficult terrains).

The situation in which an offensive is prepared in the conditions of a direct contact allows commanders and staffs of all tactical command-and-control levels to organize an offensive directly on the terrain while the personnel of the attacking units have a chance to carefully study the objects of an attack and the approaches to them. At the same time, the troops remain within the enemy impact zone and may suffer considerable losses even before an offensive begins. This calls for secrecy and constant attention to the measures of protection.

Today, offensive on the move is the most frequently used method. When readying for an offensive the troops are normally deployed in the specially equipped depth of their defenses that is removed to a safe distance from the enemy tactical means of destruction that also decreases efficiency of the means of land reconnaissance.

To synchronize forward movements, deployment and launching an attack the units are usually informed about the routes of their forward movement, the lines of departure, deployment, report and start. The lines of departure are usually selected with a view of allowing the units to move at high speed so that to decrease possible losses under enemy fire. The start line is selected with a view to the nature of enemy defenses, the degree of its fire vulnerability, the terrain and the method of attack (on fighting vehicles or on foot). In the latter case the attack line is selected as close to the enemy defense lines as possible so that to cut down the time gap between artillery softening-up and the attack. If the troops attack on fighting vehicles the start line is selected with a view of secrecy of approach and at a distance that will make efficient destruction by the fire means used in close combat possible. The units should be able to attack the enemy at a high speed and in designated time.

Under favorable conditions especially in the course of an offensive the units (subunits) may attack while deploying into battle formations, that is, on march. This complicates the situation, does not allow the enemy to maneuver and makes an attack a surprise. In such cases the battle is planned and organized while the troops are on march or during short intervals. The subunits are sent into attack as they approach the defense lines.

In all cases described above an offensive should be carefully organized and have all possible support.

Combat Tasks and How They Should Be Fulfilled 

Formulating combat tasks for units and subunits is an important element of an attack. A combat task outlines the schedule, serves as the basis for planning combat, organize cooperation, command, control and all-round support of the battle. If the task is fulfilled completely and on time the offensive can be regarded as success.

The content of combat tasks of the troops on the offensive should correspond to their technical means, the level of their training, and personnel's moral and fighting qualities. To correctly identify combat tasks means that all factors should be carefully analyzed: the situation, the combat potentials of one's own troops and those of the enemy, the correlation of forces, the impact of the terrain, etc. Under all conditions the combat tasks should be realistic--they should not be beyond or below the troops' potential. The tasks that cannot be fulfilled produce nothing but dead bodies, depleted forces, and undermined morale.

The combat task in an offensive is rout of the enemy group and seizure of a certain line (area) by designated time. The enemy is the main object against which the actions of the troops on an offensive are directed. The victory can be ensured only when its live force is destroyed or taken prisoner and the fighting means are likewise destroyed or captured in the course of battle.

The art of command and control consists in selecting the means of routing the enemy that will undermine the enemy defenses, the system of fire and command and control.

The method of delivering blows from different directions designed to limit the enemy's maneuverability has been known from time immemorial. Under such blows the enemy has to divide its forces thus allowing the troops on the offensive to destroy the enemy group piecemeal. During the last two world wars characterized by continuous static front line this possibility was offered either by an encounter battle or by the dynamics of hostilities when the side on the offensive could use its reserves and the enemy's exposed flanks to maneuver.

When breaking through a strongly fortified and well-equipped defense line the side on the offensive should gradually "cut in" the line by destroying the enemy forces and means while a possibility of maneuvering was extremely limited. As the troops on the offensive were building up their potentials they tried to step up their activeness by delivering frontal blows at the enemy along a wide front in several sectors. In the past such actions and decisions to use them belonged to the operational instances.

Today, all-arms formations can use decisive means to rout the enemy such as frontal slicing blows by tank and motorized units in one or two sectors combined with landing groups in the enemy rear and maneuvering with forward, flanking, and raid detachments. This makes it possible to paralyze the enemy, limit its possibility of moving in reserves and create prerequisites for speedily routing it piecemeal.

If the defending enemy exposed its flanks the side on the offensive can deliver a combined land-and-air blow at the enemy front and flanks so that to move into its rear area and land tactical groups.

It is necessary to identify the stability-determining objects in the enemy defenses and the areas and lines that should be captured first. The rout of the enemy and seizure of objects cannot be separated--this is a single process.

The terrain as an element of the combat conditions influences the course of the warring sides' actions to a great extent. The degree of impact of its tactical properties (both positive and negative) on the fulfillment of combat tasks is manifested by the extent to which the side on the offensive exploits these properties.

To create conditions conducing to the rout of the enemy forces the side on the offensive should capture the key objects of the terrain on which the enemy is deployed: crossroads, settlements, commanding heights, mountain passes, and water crossings. When the defending side loses these objects it will be deprived of. many advantages: it will be no longer able to maneuver with its forces and means, the fire system together with the system of command and control will be disrupted while the troops on the offensive will find it easier to impose its will on the enemy while pressing against it.

Time is one of the key factors. The commander who is organizing an offensive should time his actions with high precision, to plan the battle, to suppress enemy fire on time (especially guided missile and missile complexes), antitank means, to disorganize the enemy's command and control. All actions of the defending enemy should be forestalled in conformity with Suvorov's dictum: "To forestall means to win." Strict coordination of the forces and means, cooperation along the lines and synchronization of actions are the key to success in an offensive.

The, width of the line (front) of the offensive is an important part of the combat task. It is determined by the need to build up superiority of forces and assets in the direction of the main blow so that to destroy it by fire to the entire depth of the combat task, to ensure a possibility of continuous attack and uninterrupted build up of efforts to the depth and at the flanks, to rout the enemy grouping piecemeal before it could bring in reserves. During the Great Patriotic War to succeed the subunits attacking deliberate defense were expected to build up dominating superiority on the breakthrough segment (6 : 1 ratio in tanks and artillery and 4 : 1 in infantry companies). It is commonly believed that this ratio is still valid.

It should be noted that the increasing dissemination of forces and assets their density in defense is still rather high especially in the context of the ever-growing efficiency of means of destruction.

Combat Order

Combat order of units and subunits should correspond to the general combat task and the obtained conditions. The troops should be arranged in the way that will make the rout of enemy possible, to ensure concentration in the selected sectors together with close and uninterrupted combination of fire, movement and maneuver in the course of the offensive, timely building up of efforts from the depth, the use of the advantages offered by the terrain, to achieve least possible vulnerability of the troops, and continuous coordination and reliable command and control.

Normally the units and subunits form one or two echelons in an offensive. The first echelon as a rule is the strongest and is designed to rout the opposing enemy group and develop the offensive. The second echelon is needed to build up efforts and develop success, to replace the subunits of the first echelon that sustained losses, to rebuff the counterattacking enemy and to launch an offensive in another sector. If there is only one echelon a combined-arms reserve is formed to deal with the tasks that may spring in the course of the offensive.

Motorized units and subunits are used in an offensive as the first or second echelon, as an all-arms reserve or as the vanguard, the forward, flanking, or raid detachments or as tactical airborne or naval landing forces.

Tanks play an important role in routing the defending enemy: their high striking power and maneuverability allow them to use the gaps in the defenses to attack the enemy from the rear, to destroy seats of resistance, means of nuclear attack, precision weapons, approaching reserves, command and control points, rear infrastructure, and to capture important objects. This allows tanks to rout the defending group in the shortest time possible. Tanks are used in an offensive to support motorized infantry; they can also be used independently. In the latter case they are used at the main axis of advance.

When deciding on the battle formation of the troops on the offensive their fighting strength and the condition of the defending enemy should be taken into account together with the nature and degree of readiness of its defenses, as well as potentials of one's own troops (including the potentials of attached forces and assets under command and supporting forces and assets), the neighbors and their tasks, terrain, season, time of day and weather conditions.

In an offensive the troops can act in combat, approach march formation, and march order. Approach march formation is designed to ensure high rates of an offensive, the least-possible vulnerability of the units and their maximally possible protection against weapons of mass destruction, precision weapons, artillery fire, air strikes. The units should be able to rapidly deploy and to overcome obstacles, areas of mass destruction, fires and floods.

When moving to the line of attack, developing an offensive in the tactical depths of enemy defenses and pursuing the enemy subunits can re-deploy into march order to move and deploy into approach march and combat formation at a high speed.

Organization of an Offensive

It starts with formulating the combat task by a senior commander and includes: organization of the battle, readying the troops to the fulfillment of the combat tasks, preparation of FUP, control over the readiness of units and subunits, and other measures. Organization of an offensive battle includes: decision to conduct the battle, reconnaissance, formulation of combat tasks to units and subunits, interaction, and all-round support for the battle and command and control.

The qualitative changes that occurred in the means of armed struggle have changed the methods and means used to prepare for an offensive. On the one hand, the volume and complexity of tasks that commanders and staffs have to deal with increased while the time allocated to carry them out decreased.

In the deficit of time it is very important to use it wisely. This depends on coordinated efforts of the commander and the staff: if they waste little time the troops have more time to carry out the task. When taking a decision to wage a battle the commander formulates the tasks and assesses the situation (the enemy, his own troops, terrain, and radiological, chemical, and tactical situation).

In the process of setting the task the troops should understand the plans of the superior officers in the coming battle (where the main forces will be concentrated, how the combat order will be arranged, the order in which the enemy will be destroyed by fire, etc.). The troops should also understand the role and place of units in the battle, how cooperation with the forces and assets of the senior commander and the neighbors will be realized, the time by which readiness should become complete, the time allocated to achieve it.

Having grasped the task the unit commander should identify the measures necessary to fulfill the combat task, to ready his subunits for its fulfillment, to allocate the time needed for the process, to order subordinate commanders to start preparations for the fulfillment of the combat task, and to inform them about the time and the order of actions on the terrain.

An enemy assessment includes investigation of general characteristics of the group and the possible nature of its actions; an outline of the FEBA, the places where the fire means are situated (especially antitank defenses) along the FEBA and in the nearest depth; presence or absence of minefields; strong points; open flanks and gaps between the strong points and their protection; fire positions of the artillery and mortars; available resources and a possible nature of their actions; expected tank density, antitank weapon density, motorized platoons and mortars density by the beginning of an attack; command and control points and radio electronic means of fire control; the nature of future actions by aviation, helicopters, missile and guided missile systems.

On the strength of the above information the commander identifies: which of the enemy groups and in which order should be routed; the sectors of main efforts and the combat order; combat tasks for the subunits and the tasks of all-round logistic support.

When assessing his own troops the commander specifies their state; the state of the protection means; the means and forces of carrying out radiological, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance and their potentials; the schedule according to which attached subunits will be arriving and who is responsible for their arrival. The commander should also determine the state of the fighting machines and weapons; service support; combat readiness and the degree of personnel readiness.

The commander's conclusions about the state of his subunits should identify the combat order and the place of each of the subunits in it; the order in which they will be moved forward to the line of attack if an offensive is carried out on the move; the order of regrouping when an offensive is carried out in direct contact with the enemy; the measures needed to conduct reconnaissance, and logistic and technical support.

When assessing the neighbors the commander should study their state, the nature of future actions, the tasks and conditions of cooperation with them. His assessments should prompt a conclusion about his future cooperation in definite lines and objects; which forces and means should be used to protect the flanks in the course of the offensive; the means of methods of communication and mutual information.

When assessing the terrain the commander should study the routes of deployment and the conditions in which the troops moving on from the RIP to the start line should be camouflaged; the best and concealed approaches to the enemy frontline; the lines of deployment, attack, and dismounting; the direct fire lines; and the places where control and command posts and the rear units can be placed. When assessing the terrain of enemy deployment the commander should scrutinize the frontline of defense; the system of fire and obstacles, the strong points, placement of reserves, and possible directions of counterattack.

On the ground of the above the commander identifies the best sector of the main thrust; the best combat order; the enemy objects and the lines to be captured first; the combat tasks for the subunits, the order of their deployment; the places in which tanks should be equipped with mine-clearing attachment; the measures to ensure engineering and other support.

The conclusions about the radioactive, chemical and bacteriological (biological) situation prompt corresponding countermeasures.

Having studied and carried out all necessary tactical measures the commander is ready to take the basic decision about the aim of battle, which identifies the sector of the main thrust (where the main efforts are applied); which of the enemy groups should be routed first and which means should be used; the order of fire destruction; the battle order, and stratagems.

Having informed senior commanders about his plans the commander conducts reconnaissance to study the terrain, the enemy with an aim of specifying the decisions taken on the map.

The reconnaissance makes it possible to identify the outlines of the front line of enemy defenses; the citing of its fire means; strong points and the level of their equipment; the objects to be destroyed by the means at the disposal of senior commanders and those to be destroyed by direct fire; the approaches to the front line; the presence and nature of obstacles; the terrain in the sector of the future offensive; the front of an offensive and the direction of the main thrust (concentration of main efforts); combat tasks of units (subunits); tasks to be performed by neighbors; gaps in the obstacles; the time and order of creating such gaps; the places where tanks with be equipped with mine sweepers, etc.

Cooperation in an Offensive

The system of cooperation in an offensive that has taken shape by the present time is a result of a long evolutionary process. During World War I interaction in infantry regiments was realized between infantry and artillery. During World War II large number of forces and assets (including tanks, antitank means, air defense, engineering subunits, etc.) were involved in the hostilities. It was at that time that the still valid principles of interaction were elaborated.

While analyzing the system of interaction developed during the Great Patriotic War one can say this followed certain methods: offensive was conducted in a planned manner. Enemy defenses were breached with artillery and aviation softening-up and consistent seizure of the first, second, and other defensive positions. Then the troops developed success and persecuted the retreating enemy if situation allowed it. Combat efforts were coordinated along these lines.

Today, the side on the offensive tries to deliver deep thrusts and to envelop the enemy tactical defense zone with hostilities so that to bind all elements of enemy combat order, to move the efforts of the depth of enemy defenses as promptly as possible, to create a permanent front by landing airborne groups in the enemy rear the efforts of which are combined with the fast moving advanced units and flanking and raid detachments. Obviously this method will predetermine new approaches to cooperation of combat efforts of units and services that will disperse along the front and in the depth.

The type of the land-air combat should be supported by a flexible "multi-echelon" system of interaction. In the process of its organization commanders and staffs should take into account a possibility of a deep mutual penetration of the sides and possible combat with a "reversed" front, sharp and sudden shift from one type of combat to another that requires constant correction of combat plans and an interaction system. The commanders should demonstrate tactical foresight; forecast future developments on the battlefield; the degree of enemy resistance; new combat methods and weapon types possibly used by the defending side, and identify corresponding strike potentials of one's own troops and their maneuverability to ensure better interaction.

It is equally important to respond to changes in the combat situation: to take timely measures designed to prevent possible violation of agreed cooperation, to specify the tasks of subunits, to correctly determine importance of services.

One should also bear in mind that certain theoretical works provide detailed recommendations of how to better organize interaction in the depth of an offensive. (2) It seems that this approach does not fully reflect the changed conditions of contemporary warfare in which combat acquired depth and volume. This approach relies on past experience when combat tasks consisted of capturing the enemy defensive positions while the range of a division (regiment) fire means was comparatively small. The situation has changed: the enemy defenses depend on a group of fire means-this means that the defenses cannot be pierced without suppressing the group. This requires strikes against the means of close- and long-range battle. From this it follows that cooperation should be planned in great detail to the entire depth of the combat task at the preparatory stage. This will allow commanding officers and staffs to correctly assess their forces and assets, distribute combat resources, ammunition, fuel and other material means for the entire battle duration.

This creates new demands on the way reconnaissance is organized, the situation should be analyzed on a greater scale, tactical and operational plans should be more detailed. The same applies to simulation of hostilities. Since the defense system changed in many respects and the defending troops mainly concentrate not so much on keeping their positions as on preserving stability of the key areas (in which the maih means of destruction are concentrated together with second echelons and reserves) coordinated efforts of units and subunits on an offensive should be aimed not only at lines and objects but also at the most important areas the capture of which will undermine stability of the defensive system.

Great changes in the nature of contemporary hostilities brought about by new weapon types require different approaches to continuity of coordinated combat efforts where particular tasks are concerned. In the past, coordination started during artillery and aviation softening-up while everything that happened before this stage was not regarded as coordination. This happened because an offensive was normally started after a direct contact with the enemy. It was very rarely that the enemy could use artillery and aviation to destroy the group ready to attack to disrupt an offensive.

Today, this possibility has become much more real and should not be ignored. The troops on an offensive can attack while on the march when they are approaching the start line from the depth. In such cases they are especially vulnerable to precision weapons. Even when an offensive is launched in direct contact the units remain vulnerable. Their vulnerability becomes greater as soon as they leave cover.

Therefore, when organizing cooperation it is important to take steps to prevent disruption of an offensive. This is a difficult task that requires concerted efforts of all forces and assets involved so that to ensure an efficient fire and radio electronic opposition to the enemy; create reliable fire protection on the land and in the air for the forces on an offensive to let them overcome at a fast pace obstacles created by the enemy forces of remote minelaying; rebuff enemy landing forces. Mobile airborne detachments and groups of subversion landed along the routes of advance and in the rear of the troops on an offensive therefore it is highly important to protect units against strikes of precision weapon and ensure their fast recovery after nuclear and fire strikes.

When coordinating the actions of units and subunits in the course of their forward movement one should take into account the range and efficiency of the enemy's means of combat that may be used against one's own troops. With this aim in view those means of combat that may strike at the approaching troops as soon as the latter enter their range of destruction should be suppressed on time. This refers, first and foremost, to the land and air elements of guided missile complexes, missile launchers, volley fire systems, helicopters on pads, field artillery that uses aiming ammunition, antitank missile complexes and other antitank means.

When coordinating the efforts of the advancing troops to fight airborne landing groups it is necessary to identify possible places of landing and concentrate there adequate forces and helicopters that should act together with aviation and artillery as well as motorized and tank subunits that are part of antitank reserves.

To prevent disruption of an offensive it is necessary to discover on time command and control points and the zones where means of fire are placed and to immediately destroy them.

Cooperation also requires attention to secrecy of troop movement and the ability of units and subunits to survive. With this aim in view the troops should maximally exploit the protecting and camouflaging properties of the terrain. To defend fighting machines against enemy precision weapons optical and radar dead ground formed by the terrain and objects should be used. Heat and radio decoys should be placed along the visible stretches of the routes along which the troops march. At the same time, decoy tank columns and ECM should be placed on open areas.

Coordination between forces and assets should be especially carefully organized to launch a decisive attack at the enemy front line. This is the peak of a battle. To rebuff the attacking troops the enemy will use the maximally great amount of means of fire of close- and long-range baffle. This creates a need to coordinate one's own means of destruction to affect those of the enemy placed along the front line and in the depth.

NOTES:

(1.) Quoted from: Voennaia mysl', 1985, Special Issue, p. 29.

(2.) G.A. Zubarev, Vzaimodeistvie voisk v boiu, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1965, p. 9.