Tactics as an art of offensive.

Surprise Offensive

At all times and in all wars surprise has been and remains an ally of sorts, a tramp card of the side on an offensive. Not infrequently it helped skilful commanders compensate for inadequate forces and assets and to rout a numerically stronger enemy. An opposite is equally true: neither numerical strength, nor flexible cooperation, nor careful planning can rescue an operation if the element of surprise is absent from it. Today, surprise has become even more important than ever.

All sorts of strike, fire, maneuver and defense possibilities available today to combined-arms formations and units allow them to vary their methods of launching an offensive and achieving surprise. To score a victory formations and units should take into account all measures the defending enemy may recur to: reconnaissance and delivering strikes in real time.

By achieving an average density of surveillance (8 to 10 observation posts per 1 km of the front) the enemy can build up 3-, 4- or 5-fold observation of the battlefield to the depth of up to 5 km, that is, to the entire depth of artillery and mortar deployment. Radio battlefield surveillance allows the defending enemy to control the territory to the depth of up to 10 km. Television reconnaissance that can spot tanks to the depth of 15 km offers even greater possibilities. Being aware of this the side on the offensive should regroup and approach FUP secretly. It is wise to select FUP outside the zone that the enemy can reach with its technical means of tactical reconnaissance, that is, removed from the frontline by about 20 to 30 km or more.

This may create another problem: the troops become exposed to enemy fire as they are moving toward the frontline. The problem can be solved by an active use of all sorts of decoys and the entire range of camouflage measures: limited visibility, camouflage and imitation, decoys, feints, radio silence, etc.

Creative approach and original methods, unexpected means and forms of maneuvering, wise selection of the main axis of advance, battle order, destruction fire methods, methods of attack that ensure high offensive pace, determined pursuit of the retreating enemy day and night, and assault crossing of water obstacles are the main elements of surprise. It is signally important to confront the enemy with surprise preemptive strikes to deprive it of possible. breathing spaces, to keep it in constant alert, to disorient its reconnaissance so that to prevent the enemy from distinguishing between true strikes and decoys.

Skilful planning of destruction by fire is one of the main elements of surprise attacks. During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 the Soviet command learned and used varied methods of artillery and aviation offensive that have not yet lost their topicality. Artillery preparation for an attack was normally carried out in a way that duped the enemy. The enemy could not reliably identify its end and brought up personnel either too early to be destroyed by fire or too late when Soviet tanks and infantry had been already on the move. This was achieved by false switching of fire to the depths of enemy defenses when infantry imitated an attack. A well-organized and decisive attack is the best vehicle of surprise. During the war commanders and staffs had to display a lot of skill to conceal the moment infantry and tanks moved into an attack. Many years later Georgi Zhukov said: "Any attack should be launched during artillery preparation while its timing should vary: it can be launched on the 27th or 38th or 44th minute so that the enemy would not know in advance and would have no time to ready itself. The art of camouflaging the moment of the attack and an ability to attack first are the keys to the fighting skills." (1)

Today, automatized systems of fire control and high precision weapon have created prerequisites for achieving surprise through organizing and carrying out fire destruction of the enemy and the use of results produced by fire strikes. First, there is a possibility of observing the objects and destroying them immediately; second, the effect of a surprise attack can be increased by multisided pressure on the enemy through varied means of destruction; third, there is a possibility of promptly paralyzing the enemy command and control system thus preventing it from adequately responding to the surprise attack.

Disruption of the enemy command and control system is especially important: the effect of a surprise attack can be increased many times over if from the very beginning the enemy is blinded, so to speak, by destroying its system of observation, target designation, and the main command and communication posts, and using radio jamming. As a result the enemy defense system can be successfully paralyzed.

Maneuvering in an Offensive

The greater spatial range of contemporary offensives, their more resolute nature and the use of highly mobile units and subunits call for wider maneuvering. We all know that in the past offensive operations were carried out in two stages: breaching the enemy defenses and operating in tactical and operational depths. They differed where maneuvering possibilities were concerned.

When breaching the enemy defenses tanks and infantry acted in a well-measured and consistent way. In the course of the breaching stage the troops had to advance in the compact battle order. They mainly attacked the front because it was nearly impossible to closely envelop and outflank the continuous static defense line. In addition, the methods of fire support (the moving barrage or consistent concentration of fire) demanded that the troops protected by fire barrage press forward in lines.

When acting in tactical or operational depths the troops acquired more freedom of maneuvering because they were normally confronted with shallow pockets of resistance. By skillfully using the gaps in the enemy's battle orders the troops in an offensive widely used close and wide envelopment and encirclement.

Today maneuvering has acquired more resolution, depths and variety. It is interesting to note that fire maneuvering is synchronized with maneuvering by forces and assets, and strikes. In its direct meaning, unlike fire and strike, maneuvering does not directly embody material force yet no timely concentration of efforts in the decisive sector is possible without it. The same applies to active fighting, surprise movements, clear and uninterrupted interaction in a battle and preservation of the troops' ability to survive and their battle-worthiness.

Skilful maneuvering helps the troops in an offensive to tap their tactical advantages, to prevent enemy's moves, to impose on it their will, to build up fire superiority as well as superiority in forces and assets at the right time and in the right places, to pursue the retreating enemy, to force water obstacles, and to cross zones of radioactive (chemical) contamination, destruction, and flooding.

The greater and increasing role of maneuvering in contemporary combats creates many problems in organizing and carrying out maneuvers. This is explained by the fact that both sides try to maneuver while the enemy has equal or even greater possibilities. As a result a combat turns into a competition in the art of maneuvering between the commanders.

Maneuver is organized together with other preparatory measures. As soon as the commander receives the combat task he should formulate a clear idea about the maneuvering planned by the superior commander in the coming combat, about the forces and assets used for such maneuvering and about what is expected of him and his units by way of cooperation. This creates a firm foundation for organizing maneuvers by forces and assets at his disposal.

At the same time, any well-substantiated decision about maneuvering can be adopted only after a careful and all-round assessment of the situation. It is very important to identify the weakest spots in the enemy's battle formation from the very beginning (gaps, unprotected flanks, etc.) to be used for performing enveloping and outflanking movements as well as raids. It is necessary to foresee all possible measures the defending enemy may use to counter maneuvers of the attacking side: it may create obstacles, deliver strikes with high-precision weapons, use radioelectronic jamming, etc. When assessing the enemy's possible actions it is important to find out what exactly it can do to maneuver and how to disrupt its plans.

An analysis of the enemy's possible actions should serve the purpose of comparing its maneuverability with one's own; it is necessary to identify the most rational means of maneuvering when fulfilling combat tasks, the composition of the units selected for performing outflanking movements and raids, the forces and assets designed to strengthen them and the way they will be supplied with everything they might need; commanders should coordinate actions of the units engaged in maneuvering and raids with the units attacking the enemy along the front and with tactical landing groups.

When adopting decisions on maneuvers one should correctly assess the terrain, use its protective and camouflaging potentials to secretly move closer to the flanks and the enemy's rear, as well as to erect obstacles on the routes of the enemy's possible movements.

The key to success in maneuvering is moving faster than the enemy to the most advantageous objects (lines). It is important to correctly identify the ways and methods of performing a maneuver; to correctly calculate time needed to perform such maneuver while taking into account its depth, the terrain and the speed with which the outflanking (raid) groups will be moving.

Fire maneuvering plays an important role in scoring success in an offensive. It is designed to capture and retain initiative, to promptly concentrate efforts on destroying the newly discovered objects (targets) in the enemy defenses. Today, any maneuver is highly mobile as is demanded by the conditions of fire exchange with the enemy.

The sphere of fire maneuvering is greatly extended by the use of latest fire means handled by formations and units. This makes it possible to strike in depth before the enemy does the same, to maintain fire against the first and second echelons, reserves, command and control posts, land elements of systems of high-precision weapon, air defense, reconnaissance and radio-electronic warfare and to prepare conditions for promptly undermining tactical stability of defenses and landing airborne groups in the enemy rear.

It is signally important to learn how to perform fast fire maneuvering in an encounter battle that goes on at a fast pace and in which minutes or even seconds bring either success or a failure. An efficiency of maneuvering in an encounter battle directly depends on reconnaissance possibilities, timely and exact identification of targets (objects) and the skilful use of fire.

To develop success achieved in an offensive one has to maneuver so that to build up efforts in the main sector. This is normally done by bringing into action the second echelon or the reserve, by delivering artillery or air strikes. Previous experience has proved that it is important to correctly identify the moment when the second echelon should be brought into action to build up efforts before the pace of the offensive slackens, that is, before the troops exhaust their offensive impetus. With this aim in view it is important to exactly determine the time, forces and assets needed, to foresee possible developments, to compare the sides' potentials and to maintain high pace of maneuvers.

One can expect that raids will play a greater role in a contemporary war. While in the Great Patriotic War tanks and mechanized troops (that is, highly mobile units) were mainly used today motor rifle units (subunits) can be used--they are as mobile as tank units.

Today, raid groups have to be more active than before: they can penetrate into greater depths of enemy deployment, to act for a long time independently of the main forces in cooperation with landing groups, forward detachments and independently destroy enemy nuclear weapons, land elements of its air defenses, radio-electronic warfare and reconnaissance, to capture communication lines, mountain passes, and water crossings. It should be added that it is not easy to support such groups by fire and to control them. It is equally important, therefore, to carefully plan and carry out such maneuvers, coordinate actions of raid groups with the units advancing at the front and air-borne landing groups supported by artillery and aviation.

Fire Destruction

Success in an offensive directly depends on reliability of fire destruction of the defending enemy. Its main aim is to inflict losses that would deprive the enemy of an ability to organize resistance. This will create an opportunity to successfully fulfill combat tasks achieved by delivering combined missile, artillery, and air (including helicopter) strikes, fire of tank and motor rifle subunits, fire throwers, and the use of explosives.

Today, the content and structure of fire destruction are changing: the correlation between contemporary striking means and the means of defense suggests a conclusion that their opposition will become even tenser. The "fire survivability" of defense has increased many times over. To impose its will on the enemy the side on the offensive should destruct enemy defenses in depth: all systems of precision weapons (guided missile and missile complexes,) nuclear means, combat helicopters, means of reconnaissance and radio-electronic warfare, and well as means of remote mining.

The need to destruct the enemy in depth (to the tactical and operational depths of its defenses) is prompted by the fact that the main means of destruction are normally far removed from the line of encounter. NATO experience has shown that field artillery of the defending side is removed to the distance of 3 to 5 km from the frontline; guided missile complexes are removed by 8 to 10 km from the frontline; DMRS, by 10 to 25 km; guided missile control centers, by 13 to 50 km.

Today, when weapons, reconnaissance and command and control means are integrated in automatized system it has become possible to deliver fire strikes in real time or close to it.

To achieve deliberate and prompt pace of attack one should reach a high level of fire destruction of the defense objects. Experience of the Great Patriotic War has shown that a break through enemy defenses required that at least up to 25 percent of the targets of the first and second lines of the main enemy defenses should be destroyed and at least 30 percent of the objects suppressed. Today, this is no longer enough: 100 percent of the means of nuclear warfare, precision weapon systems, command and control posts should be destroyed together with at least 70 to 75 percent of other targets and objects. Otherwise the defending side may disrupt the attack.

This creates a problem: how can one achieve a high level of fire destruction if the side on the offensive possesses rather limited possibilities to build up artillery density in a breakthrough? The only answer is: it should work toward high precision of artillery strikes and avoid area fire. This makes it possible to considerably cut down the number of artillery or missile units, of aircrafts and helicopters as well as the amount of ammunition used.

Today this task has been facilitated by high precision of strikes; tests have demonstrated that the use of high precision artillery shells allows the attacking side to cut down the amount of ammunition by 10 to 15 times, while the use of aviation clusters cuts down the number of bomb by 4 to 5 times.

The striking force of ammunition has likewise contributed to the effectiveness of fire destruction and made it possible to decrease artillery and aviation density.

The need to fight enemy helicopters is a new element in fire superiority: helicopters can reach their targets unnoticed, their strikes are sudden, precise, and highly effective. Today, NATO during military exercises widely uses mixed aircraft-helicopter groups (ground-attack aircrafts and attack and reconnaissance helicopters).

Fighting experience and the results of military exercises testify that high mobility of helicopters allows commanders to concentrate fire to strike at most important objects, to promptly move fire from one object to another to win and retain superiority in fire. Concentrated strikes by helicopters are normally used at critical moments to rebuff counterattacks, attacks by tanks, when second echelons are moved into action, and while forcing water obstacles.

Structurally fire destruction on the offensive is normally divided into two parts: fire destruction in the form of fire strikes of different intensity (general) and fire destruction when fulfilling limited operational and tactical tasks (direct).

General fire destruction is carried out without interruptions at the entire range of fire means and the most important targets or groups of objects. They are: operational and tactical means of nuclear attacks; command and control posts of formations; operational centers of radio-electronic warfare; command points (centers) of aviation and air defenses, operational and tactical reserves. They are destroyed in the course of massive and individual fire strikes by missiles, aviation, guided missiles, and artillery. General fire destruction is not rigidly synchronized with troop movements and is tied up to definite objects. It is carried out according to the principle of fire destruction in depth as an independent stage of any operation.

Direct fire destruction is carried out in the interests of the attacking troops and is regarded as a component of general fire destruction and an independent stage of fire destruction carried out in the interests of an operation as a whole.

How to Conduct an Offensive

Today, an offensive is a highly dynamic stage therefore in some places there is no direct contact between the opposing sides while they both strive to destroy the enemy at the entire depth of tactical and operational formations. Hostilities acquired the air and land nature.

The main aim is to capture and retain fire superiority, to destroy the enemy with preemptive strikes at the key objects of the fire destruction, command and control, reconnaissance, and radio-electronic warfare systems and at manpower and fighting machines.

When going over to the offensive on the march by moving forward from the depth of deployment the troops should be given artillery cover. It is in fact an independent phase of fire destruction. As soon as the troops start moving forward artillery should aim against those of the enemy means that can offer effective artillery fire on the remote approaches to the defense lines. At the same time, artillery and aviation are expected to destroy command and control posts, radar systems and the systems of the first line logistics support of the enemy. As the troops approach the line beyond which they will launch an attack fire is gradually moved to the front line to support the attacking units.

When an offensive is launched from the position of direct contact with the enemy the attacking troops should destroy the defended points in the nearest approaches. This is achieved by artillery softening-up the aim of which is to deliver the first crippling strike. Its duration and methods may vary while it is expected that it will destroy the precision weapon systems, self-propelled armored artillery, tanks, anti-tank systems, command and control points, air defense, means of reconnaissance and of radio-electronic warfare.

Softening up can comprise several fire attacks against predetermined targets (objects) combined with the fire from other guns, tanks, anti-tank means used to deliver direct fire at observable fire means, armored targets, and fortifications at the enemy front line and immediately behind it during the entire duration of softening up. By the beginning of an attack fire density should reach its maximum.

During an attack supporting artillery and aviation should concentrate on destroying the enemy in the defended points especially at the first line of enemy defenses and the exposed means of fire. Combat helicopters should act from ambushes by delivering strikes at tanks and other armored objects.

Fire support begins as soon as the subunits launch an attack. It is very important to switch from softening up to fire support so that the enemy would not be able to detect the change. With this aim in view the side on the offensive should conduct overlapping artillery strike when the supporting fire at the first line of the defenses should be as dense as during the last artillery strike.

When switching from softening up to fire support the side on the offensive creates a deep zone of fire. To deprive the enemy of a possibility to fire at the attacking units a dense curtain of fire (ordinary or double barrage) is created or a consistent concentration of fire if hastily established defenses are attacked.

Fighting in the depth of enemy defenses ("dog fight") is carried out in a complex situation that changes rapidly and unexpectedly. The attacking units may be required to carry out diverse tasks--destroy approaching reserves, rebuff counterattacks of the second echelon, negotiate zones of obstacles, destruction and flooded areas, destroy airborne landing troops, carry out pursuit and encounter battles, seal off and encircle the enemy and force water obstacles.

It is very important to bring into action second echelons (reserves) on time so that to develop success, build up efforts and ensure high pace of an offensive. This should be done while the first echelon is still pressing forward yet a danger of slackening the pace has become obvious. To successfully bring into action second echelons one should use the gaps between the defended points and the breaches in the enemy battle order created by fire strikes. This allows the attacking side to move inside enemy defenses at a fast pace, to inflict surprise strikes, to destroy the enemy's means of fire and to suppress its centers of resistance.

In an effort to stem the attack on the depths of its defenses the enemy may counterattack in the key sectors. If the attacking side outnumbers the enemy or is numerically equal to it the enemy can be destroyed by fire and determined assaults on the march, that is, in an encounter battle.

If the enemy outnumbers the attacker and is better armed the attacking side should strive to destroy the enemy with fire or try complete destruction by a determined assault. If needed the attacking side can strike against the flanks and the rear of the counterattacking enemy thus completing its destruction and moving on to the next stage, the pursuit.

The pursuit is a complex and dynamic form of an offensive that calls for determined actions to win time. It is characterized by the fast changing situation and extremely difficult conditions for command and control. It is carried out with the single aim of completing destruction of the retreating enemy so that to prevent it from mounting defenses along advantageous lines and joining approaching reserves. To be successful the pursuit requires decisive, consistent actions carried out at a fast pace. It is very important to prevent the enemy from breaking away and to disrupt its orderly retreat. To achieve this subunits should profit from tanks' and armored personnel carders' high mobility to reach the enemy's routes of retreat in battle or approach march formation and, in cooperation with neighbors, attack its flanks and the rear to destroy it. If it is impossible to pursue the retreating enemy along the routes parallel to the retreat route subunits should pursue the enemy from the front, destroy its advanced guard, perform a lighting move to the enemy main forces and, together with the neighbors, tactical airborne groups and the vanguard, attack the enemy on the move.

So create sustainable fire support of the pursuing subunits the large part of the artillery should move together with the vanguard at the front of the main column; it should be ready to open fire when the pursuing subunits enter into an engagement with the guard and the main forces of the retreating enemy.

Aviation should carry out uninterrupted reconnaissance, deliver strikes at the retreating columns, prevent reserves from approaching, ensure safe landing of tactical landing groups and support the vanguard. Air defenses should concentrate on protecting the subunits operating together with the main forces especially when they negotiate gorges, force water obstacles, pass through settlements and mountain passes and while they deploy for a battle.

Tactical landing groups should capture road and river crossings, passes and other important objects on the route of the retreating enemy, detain its reserves and disrupt their maneuvering.

Forcing Water Obstacle

Forcing water obstacles is a complex task that requires a lot of commanding skill from officers and the staffs, combat skills of the personnel, and their joint determination to fulfill the task.

Depending on the situation the forcing of water obstacle can be carried out on the march or with previous deployment of the main forces at the obstacle. In both cases success depends on careful preparation, well-organized reconnaissance of the enemy and the water obstacle, surprise moves, reliable air protection, destruction of the enemy, timely move forward of the crossing means and equipment, etc.

Forcing on the march consists in the troops' fast movement to the obstacle in combat formations and crossing the obstacle along a wide front after a short artillery softening up, determined attack and uninterrupted exploitation of success on the other bank. This method saves time, makes it possible to deliver surprise strikes and maintain high pace of an offensive.

Such conditions are usually created in a context of an engagement. It is very important to pursue an enemy, to seize crossings and force the obstacle on the heels of the enemy. Vanguard units have an important role to play in these conditions.

The commander should formulate his plan of crossing as early as possible so that to explain it to the troops, to organize interaction and to carry out all necessary measures while moving toward the water obstacle. Such plan should normally include: the means with which the enemy should be routed at the approaches to the obstacle and on the other bank; places and types of the main and reserve crossings; distribution of the means of crossing; the routes along which the troops will be approaching the obstacle and the order in which they will be doing this; the way machines should be prepared to crossing and the order in which the obstacle should be crossed.

Combat tasks of motor rifle (tank) units (subunits) during the crossing depend on the nature of the enemy defenses, the degree of the damage inflicted by fire, availability of water crossing equipment and other factors. It is advisable to allocate the tasks and organize interaction on the terrain. The first echelon should receive the tasks of approaching the water obstacle, of crossing and of fighting on the other side; it is given the places of the main and reserve crossings, the area where tanks should be waterproofed; the area of loading personnel and machines on self-propelled crossing means, the initial line of forcing and the time within which this operation should be concluded. Artillery receives instructions about the area of firing positions, the time it should be ready to open fire, the tasks of supporting the crossing units and those engaged in fighting on the opposite bank, and the order in which artillery should cross the obstacle. Air defenses are instructed about the order of approach movement; the tasks of protecting the first echelons against air attacks while they are moving toward the water obstacle and fighting on the opposite bank; its firing positions; the time by which it should be prepared to open fire, and the order of crossing.

The start line is determined, wherever possible, according to the nature of the terrain and outside the reach of the enemy's direct laying. If it is intended that the tanks should cross the obstacle under water it is necessary to identify the area of waterproofing inaccessible to enemy close defensive fire.

According to the plan of forcing and the combat task the troops on the offensive form battle order. It is designed to help the troops cross the obstacle as promptly as possible and to constantly build up their fighting capacity on the other bank.

Fire destruction of the enemy during forcing the water obstacle on the march starts when subunits begin moving to the obstacle. Fire is aimed at the enemy precision weapon, artillery, defended points, reserves, command and control posts, and means of radio-electronic warfare.

The troops of the first echelon exploit the results of fire strikes and actions of the vanguard and tactical airborne landing group (if such group is landed) to force the water obstacle, to destroy the enemy by the fire of all means while they are still afloat, capture a toehold on the other bank and develop an offensive to the enemy depths without interruption.

The combat on the opposite bank may prove to be stubborn and tense. The enemy will try to destroy the units that have already crossed the water obstacle with fire and counterattack so that to move them back from the toehold they have already captured. In these conditions the attacking troops may use hidden maneuvers to build up efforts, capture advantageous lines, rebuff possible counterattacks and develop the offensive in the depth of enemy deployment.

If the troops on the offensive fail to force the obstacle on the march or if the situation demands it (the enemy had time to entrench itself on the other side, the banks and the flood plain are too hard to storm on the march or the water regime changes abruptly) the water obstacle is forced after the main forces had time to deploy at the obstacle and short or all-round preparation had been completed. This brings the troops into a direct contact with the enemy at the river line, which calls for even more careful preparations for the crossing. The commander should study carefully the nature of the obstacle and the terrain at the approaches to it and on the opposite bank. It is his task to organize assault crossing, to secretly concentrate crossing means, to formulate the tasks of equipping the FUP for forcing and preparing crossings.

Secrecy is the main condition of success therefore everything enumerated above is done at night or in conditions of limited visibility. To prevent the enemy from identifying well in advance the places of crossing and to prevent congestion of personnel and machines at the crossings troops of the first echelon should be loaded on armored vehicles and self-propelled crossing means in places well protected against enemy fire and far from the water line itself.

At designated time the troops should move at a fast pace to the water line. The crossing starts when the subunits of the first echelon move away from the bank. Having landed on the opposite bank the troops should profit from artillery fire and aviation strikes destroy the enemy in its defended posts of the first echelon and develop success further.

Night Offensive

Experience has shown that offensive operations at night offer numerous tactical advantages, the main of them being the factor of surprise. In darkness the side on the offensive can maneuver without being detected, move to the line of attack, deploy its battle formations, deliver a surprise blow, perform enveloping or outflanking maneuvers or move units out of strike. The defending side finds it much harder to detect enemy preparations for an attack; it is much harder to counter such attack, it is equally hard to maneuver with artillery fire, forces, and assets. The side on an attack can maintain tension thus imposing its will on the enemy and retaining initiative.

At the same time, night creates problems for the attacking side as well: night vision, lighting, radar and other devices diminish the negative effects of darkness but cannot totally remove the problems created by it. At night it takes one and a half or even two times more time to hit the aim, which requires more ammunition; maneuverability of fighting equipment diminishes by one-third and the time needed for engineer tasks increases by 25-30 percent. In darkness it is hard to judge distances, to distinguish between one's own and enemy troops. Night increases physical and psychological tension that wears personnel out.

Offensive at night is undertaken in varied conditions and for varied reasons: to carry on daytime fighting or to break the enemy's defenses. At night, just as in daytime troops can attack from the march moving from the depth or from close-in positions.

If the night attack develops the daytime success there should be no gap between the day and night actions so that the enemy could not gain time to move in reserves and fighting equipment or regroup its forces. To deliver surprise strikes the attack should be mounted from the march. This will require additional measures.

A night offensive from close-in positions can be mounted when a counterattack is successfully rebuffed or after the enemy lost an encounter battle. Normally this is done in winter conditions, in absence of good roads, in mountains or forests where the troops cannot attack from the march.

Night offensives should be carefully prepared in daytime, certain details can be specified when darkness fells. Lighting calls for special attention: it is organized from one center, follows a single plan according to lines of attack, objects and time to the entire depth of the battle task so that to offer the best possible conditions to one's own troops and impede enemy actions. Lighting support is designed to point to objects of attack and aims in the enemy defenses that should be suppressed by artillery and aviation; marker lights (alignment lights) are used to indicate directions of the offensive, units' positions and the lines they reach in the course of an offensive; light identification signals should be used for mutual recognition, target indication, and coordination maintenance as well as for suppression of the enemy's lighting night vision devices.

Night battle demands special organizational measures. To coordinate fighting the troops should be offered unified and clearly seen landmarks; it should be decided in advance which aims and objects should be hit and destroyed first and which should be lighted up and blinded along the front of an offensive; the order of attack should be clearly identified together with the way night-vision devices and clearance lights should be used; light landmarks should be placed on spots identified in advance; the units should be informed of the methods they should employ when they reach definite lines; they should be instructed how to switch from night to daytime actions, which mutual identification, target indication, and information signals should be used.

Normally night attacks are introduced by artillery softening-up. When the troops attack from the march they secretly approach the line of attack in formation that allows them to rapidly deploy into battle (pre-battle) formation. As soon as the attack is launched it is necessary to indicate its directions with the help of light marking (alignment lights) and by lighting up individual objects.

Nighttime success should be consistently developed in daytime.

Offensive in Urban Conditions

Offensive in cities is influenced by various factors: limited visibility and limited range of fire; possible large-scale destructions; orientation and reconnaissance difficulties; difficult maneuvering with forces and means, problems with supply and evacuation of the wounded; lower efficiency of certain weapon types.

Fighting experience has confirmed that motor rifle units are best suited for street fighting; they can advance on foot, move along narrow streets, back alleys, through holes in walls and stone fences; along underground communications and rooftops. Their small arms do not allow them to destroy the enemy behind walls and inside fortified structures, which means that they need tank and artillery support, fire throwers, engineering units and aviation.

Aviation plays an important role yet its efficient use is hampered by the sides being too close to one another and by the meandering front line; non-precision weapons cannot be used in direct closeness to one's own troops while ruins, smoke and dust make it hard to identify small targets and hit them. The need to aim better requires special groups of aviation aimers in the fighting formations of infantry and tank units.

The counter-terrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus demonstrated that machine-gun fire and bombs of small calibers are ineffective against the enemy entrenched in buildings. Guided aviation bombs and missiles that can be aimed against individual buildings and fire weapons produce much better result, the same can be said about incendiary and cluster bombs as well as incendiary tanks used to set enemy-occupied buildings on fire or to destroy manpower and fighting equipment in places of their concentration.

Air reconnaissance can be carried out by pilotless and reconnaissance aircrafts.

It is not easy to use artillery in urban conditions either: densely built areas limit maneuvering, decrease range of fire and its efficiency, limits the range of destruction. It is very important to use direct or semi-direct laying. Buildings, other structures, and shelters can be ruined only with the help of assault large-caliber guns protected against anti-tank means.

Built-over areas, dust and smoke decrease efficiency of precision artillery shells and mines; self-propelled mortars can be used with good result: their high trajectory fire hit aims in dead zones formed by buildings, as well as on squares, wide streets, and vacant patches.

In cities it is hard to find gun positions suited for artillery; their protection requires considerable forces and assets. From this it follows that artillery and motor rifle units should closely cooperate and coordinate their actions.

Units of anti-radiation, anti-chemical, and anti-biological protection are widely used in street fighting. Armed with fire throwers they can hit well-defended firing positions, disable light armored machines, and start fires. Aerosols are another important means: they are used to blind enemy guns, camouflage one's own battle positions, troop movements, routes by which supplies are brought in and wounded evacuated.

Reconnaissance in cities and towns requires a system of observation posts in direct proximity to the enemy on top floors, rooftops, and attics. Visual reconnaissance plays an important role. One should never forget about signaling means. The possibilities of air and radar reconnaissance are limited.

Electronic warfare in cities is very specific because of screening and reflex effects of buildings and other structures--they interfere with the means of radar battlefield surveillance and jamming of the enemy command and control systems; it is equally hard to locate and suppress infrared, TV, laser and visual reconnaissance, observation, and command and control systems and means. Fighting experience has demonstrated that it is wise to concentrate means of EW on the lower tactical level.

Engineering support is of great importance when troops are fighting to capture and keep large railway junctions, bridges and crossings; when troops need holes in obstacles and blocks; when defensive structures should be destroyed; when mines should be cleared, and when buildings should be taken by storm. To perform these tasks engineering units will need more cumulative and concentrated charges, and bangalore torpedoes, blowing up means; hand-held infantry anti-tank rocket launchers, smoke grenades, and special means for mine clearing in buildings. Motorized rifle, tank, artillery, and other units will need more engineering units and means than in other conditions.

In cities and towns mobile obstacle construction detachments are ineffective. Urban conditions call for different methods of building up dense mixed minefields in the course of battle. This is achieved with the help of artillery and aviation means of remote mine laying and the use of movable mining sets.

Technical and logistic support acquires special features in urban conditions: fighting in cities requires more ammunition especially incendiary, concrete-piercing, and smoke ammunition; much more should be done to repair military machines.

The rear services should work toward more autonomy of all units and sub-units where their logistic support is concerned. Battalions and regiments require larger storages of material means, especially ammunition, fuel, foodstuffs, and water. The usual supply line (division-regiment-battalion) should be adjusted to the fighting conditions. The higher instances (division and regiment) should directly supply sub-units. Medical service should be moved as close to the wounded and sick as possible.

To maintain combat readiness of troops and to preserve their spirit and ability to act in difficult conditions of fighting in urban conditions troops should receive moral and psychological support. Personnel are rapidly exhausted both morally and physically by constant threats of surprise attacks, sharpshooters, fighting in small groups in closed spaces (buildings, cellars, underground communications), fires, destruction, and mines yet soldiers should remain alert to avoid unnecessary losses.

Cities are normally stormed from several sides: cities laid out in circles are attacked from the suburbs to the center and along the main streets; cities with rectangular layout should be attacked along the streets moving toward the city's opposite suburbs so that to break up the enemy ranks and to destroy it one by one. Storming of cities is a very complicated operation that calls for high battle training.

To capture large buildings and important well-defended objects regiments and battalions of first and second echelons should form assault detachments, assault groups and special groups to destroy enemy sharpshooters. In addition, the troops will need sub-units to guard command and control points as well as sub-units to guard artillery, air defenses and the rear especially needed at night.

When pressing forward in towns sub-units should be ready to repulse counterattacks from streets, courtyards, parks, and even underground communications. This means that underground communications in the rear and at the flanks of the troops on the offensive should be guarded, mined or destroyed.

The enemy will try to create strong points in the majority of corner buildings in squares and the city center. Fighting may go on for a long time. As long as the immediate rear of sub-units on an offensive remains occupied by the enemy the enemy units defending themselves in buildings on the opposite side of the square should not be attacked. Until the enemy remains in the buildings along at least one of the sides of the street large number of sub-units should not be taken out onto an open space.

Offensive in Mountains

Offensive operations in mountains are very specific because of the nature of the terrain. Normally, the enemy organizes its defenses along a wide front and tries to defend the commanding heights, passes, road junctions, water crossings, and other tactically important points. Defense line in the mountains is never continuous; it has a developed system of obstacles combined with natural obstacles. In these conditions an offensive takes a form of gradual capturing key stretches of the terrain one by one.

Captured commanding heights allow the side on an offensive to detect and hit enemy strong points in the valley with aimed artillery, mortar and small-arms fire thus limiting its maneuverability and disrupting its cooperation. A captured mountain pass deprives the defending side of a possibility to retreat, allows the side on an offensive to encircle the enemy and helps it to resolutely move to the depth of enemy defenses. Captured road junctions and water crossings on mountain rivers prevent the enemy from retreating to new lines of defense.

Mountain terrain offers good conditions for strong defenses with a multi-tiered flank and cross fire at the from, the flanks and in the depth. The side on an offensive should try to envelop or to outflank the strong points and attack them simultaneously from the front, at the flanks and in the rear. Ravines that are numerous in mountains as well as covered lines of approaches to enemy defenses help perform these maneuvers.

Mountain specifics force motor rifle units to act independently from each other and without mutual fire support therefore they should receive additional means of fire to boost their firepower and tactical independence.

Offensive in a mountainous area has many specific features; while assessing the enemy one should pay particular attention to the enemy system of fire: location of fire means along the front and up the slopes; covered and dead zones in front of the FEBA and each of the tiers; fire cooperation between the strong points; it should be decided which means will be most effective and where they should be cited; account should be taken of the distances between the strong points and the way they are covered by fire from neighboring strong points and from the defense depth, as well as areas where reserves are concentrated and the ways the enemy will use to move them to deployment lines.

Terrain assessment requires identification of covered approaches to the defense lines and the best place where the front line can be crossed; it is necessary to decide whether ravines, steep slopes and other mountain obstacles can be negotiated or by-passed; guns and mortars should be cited in a way that would allow the side on an offensive to fire above its attacking units until they reach the top of the stormed heights.

Cooperation demands that each of the guns, machine-guns and mortars should be given concrete aims to be suppressed or destroyed before the offensive begins. It is absolutely necessary to specify which means of fire stay on their initial positions to support motor rifle units and how they should execute fire as well as to specify in advance when they should switch fire to the depth of enemy defenses and by what sort of signals. To ensure uninterrupted fire support it is necessary to decide in advance, which of the units and at which places of the adverse terrain should help guns and tanks negotiate obstacles.

When pressing against an enemy entrenched on an individual height troops should act according to specific conditions: whether the approaches and the slopes at the front and flanks are easy of access. When attacking a height with tiered means of fire the guns of the attackers should consistently switch fire to the next tier as soon as the lower one is captured; artillery should also concentrate fire on places of possible counterattacks.

When fighting for mountain passes the attacking side should first capture adjacent heights and then destroy the defending enemy by attacking its front and rear.

The content of combat tasks and the battle order of the troops in an offensive are greatly affected by the specific nature of defenses in the mountains. The adverse terrain limits maneuvering and the use of tanks and artillery therefore combat tasks inevitably relate to smaller depths.

The width of the front of the attacking units (sub-units) will never be constant: in the localities abounding in ravines and obstacles the front is wider than usual. Deployment in battle order should ensure more independence to combined-arms units especially to those fighting separately from the main forces.

When advancing along a narrow valley the battle order should be deeper and extended along the route. When acting across a mountain range the battle order can be extended along the front and be curved to fit the terrain. If one of the flanks is exposed battle order should be organized in right, left echelons or forward echelons if both flanks are threatened. This is frequently used when pressing forward along a gorge.

Tank units (sub-units) can fight together with the first echelons on accessible terrains. They can be entrusted independent tasks such as capturing mountain passes, road junctions, important settlements and commanding heights. In these cases they should be strengthened with motor rifle and engineering units; when fighting on adverse terrains tanks normally support motor rifle units or are used as a reserve.

Since the situation may change quickly it is vitally important to have strong reserves prepared for outflanking and enveloping movements. They should be used to protect the rear units, command and control posts, fight against groups of subversion and build up efforts in the main direction.

Tactical paratrooper groups play a great role in fighting high in the mountains. They can be entrusted with capturing mountain passes, road junctions and other important objects in the enemy rear. By increasing the depth of simultaneous pressure on the enemy they help isolate regions and prevent movement of enemy reserves to the front. Composition of such groups can be different: to capture an important object (a pass or a road junction) a paratrooper (motor rifle) battalion may be needed.

Artillery in the mountains is distributed according to the need to ensure independent actions of motor rifle and tank sub-units. To make direct fire possible guns should be placed on commanding heights and mountain slopes.

Anti-aircraft guns are sited in accordance with the terrain and in places where a possibility of an air attack at low altitudes is the greatest. The guns are placed on heights and slopes; their readiness to open fire varies. Individual batteries should be placed along the roads and in the valleys where one can expect low-flying enemy planes and helicopters.

Aviation should concentrate on destroying the enemy objects in the depth of its defenses and outside the range of artillery fire. It is especially important to hit aims concealed by mountain ranges and on the opposite slopes, to destroy water crossings, create obstacles on roads and passes.

When an attack begins artillery and mortars should concentrate on suppressing the aims and objects in the direction in which the troops are moving; they should do their best to destroy the enemy means of fire on the flanks, mountain slopes and offshoots. The tiered enemy fire means should be suppressed simultaneously while the lower tier should receive special attention. To let the troops move without hindrances along valleys and roads the side on the offensive should first capture the adjacent commanding heights and mountain ranges. There are many methods of capturing commanding heights: the enemy, front and rear should be approached as secretly as possible so that to attack the height from the front, the flanks, and the rear.

As soon as the enemy entrenched in strong points is destroyed the sub-units that have reached the valley should reorganize themselves into approach march or march formation while moving into the depth of enemy defenses.

Offensive in a Desert

Offensive in a desert is a very specific operation: the terrain is flat and monotonous; roads are practically non-existent; water is scarce; vegetation is partly or totally absent; the air and the soil are hot; dust storms are frequent; sanitary-and-epidemiological conditions are complex. In these conditions it is hard to organize an offensive and carry it out.

It is wise to press along a wide front in individual directions; fighting for the key objects is normally stubborn. The troops attack from the march by performing enveloping and outflanking maneuvers and striking at the flanks and the rear. If this is impossible or time consuming the enemy can be attacked at the front. Since enemy defenses are dispersed the side on an offensive should move deeper.

The decision to start an offensive should deal with the following factors besides the usual ones: the composition and the tasks of sub-units that will perform outflanking movements and the way they should coordinate with the forces and assets pressing at the front; the way the directions and the compass course of the advance are marked; measures designed to protect the flanks and the rear; how troops will be supplied with water and fuel; how to boost cross-country performance of wheeled vehicles; methods used to negotiate adverse terrain; formation of sub-units engaged in enveloping (outflanking) maneuvers and in routing enemy reserves; the best direction to perform enveloping (outflanking) movements; camouflage.

Exposed flanks should receive special attention when the battle order arrangement is discussed[ Since the attacking troops will have to act separately from the main forces they Should be tactically independent. With this aim in view artillery, tanks, fire thrower and engineering sub-units are placed under their command. They are supplied with greater than usual amounts of fuel, material means, and water.

Combat tasks should indicate the most prominent objects in the line of attack and the compass course of the advance. Barchans, shrubbery, and wells can be used as landmarks; on no occasion objects the shapes of which change in the wind or sand storms should be selected as landmarks.

Combined-arms formations that perform enveloping (outflanking) movements or that make part of a large formation performing such movements should be clearly explained from which line and in which direction they should start moving; where, when and with what task they will be moving; which means of fire will support their maneuvers; with whom they should cooperate in the battle; which signals should be used for mutual recognition, target indication and calling for fire; how much fuel, water, and foodstuffs they should have. Artillery and tanks should be informed of how they should support motor rifle units negotiating adverse terrains. The enveloping sub-units should synchronize their actions with the sub-units pressing at the front so that to deliver a surprise attack. It is also important to carry out measures designed to help the troops orientate themselves and to constantly control the course of an offensive.

When attacking from the march the troops reach the attack line by roads, cross-country tracks and along the most accessible routes. Since camouflaging is hard to achieve aerosols are used to conceal these movements. The deployment lines are further removed from the enemy front line than in normal conditions: flat terrain allows the enemy to follow the movements and to execute fire. Softening up is normally targeted at individual defense points; fire density should increase as the attacking side is moving closer to the objects of attack.

An attack can be simultaneous in all places or can be mounted in different times at different places--this depends on the terrain and the nature of enemy defenses. Part of the forces can strike at the front, the rest of the troops may press at the flanks and in the rear. In some cases the sub-units engaged in enveloping movements at directions of secondary importance should start attack before the main forces strike at the front so that to dupe the enemy and detract its attention from the main direction.

Combat in the depth of enemy defenses is normally waged in several places simultaneously by disunited groups. The pace of an offensive in the desert depends to a great extent on how well the troops can overcome natural obstacles especially barchans and solonchaks, rock outcrops (smaller ones are normally by-passed) covered by the enemy fire. Stubborn fighting unfolds at wells, oases, road junctions--the defending side concentrates there its main forces. An offensive in an oasis may take a long time because of stubborn resistance and a huge number of obstacles (irrigation constructions, marshy areas, thickets, adobe buildings, etc.). Oases should be either by-passed or taken from the march.

If an engagement in an oasis is unavoidable motor rifle and tank units (sub-units) should be given an adequate amount of means to overcome such obstacles (bridge elements). Water obstacles, irrigation systems, and other barriers should be negotiated, as well as storming of buildings and mined constructions should be performed only if they are absolutely unavoidable. Motor rifle units advancing in an oasis should concentrate on road junctions, irrigation and technical constructions; irrigation ditches and ravines are used to secretly approach the enemy flanks and the rear.

Sand storms create additional difficulties for the troops advancing in a desert. Warnings about them should be taken as a signal to specify the tasks of all sub-units, gun and tank crews and the compass course of the advance; measures are taken to bring them to the favorable lines as promptly as possible. Special units are formed to carry on the offensive if the storm proves to be too strong or too prolonged.

Offensive in Northern Conditions

Offensive operations in the north have their specific features: mountainous and marshy tundra terrains; limited number of roads; numerous difficulties for engineering units, deep snow in winter, low temperatures, complex meteorological conditions and the polar night disunite the advancing sub-units; slow down their progress and hamper maneuverability. In these conditions an offensive is normally mounted from close contact with the enemy. On the terrains where tanks and armored vehicles can be used off roads an assault can be mounted from the march.

When organizing an offensive it is important to take account of the specific features of enemy defenses based on retaining the tactically important lines and areas that control the rare accessible directions. The attacking side should use wide gaps in the enemy defenses to be able to carry out surprise and bold actions at the enemy flanks and in the rear and to encircle and isolate defending groups.

A decision to carry out an offensive should additionally identify: measures to negotiate swamps and stretches covered with deep snow should include steps to improve cross-country performance of fighting equipment; how the direction of assault of sub-units should be marked; measures to protect the flanks and the rear, and all-round support.

The best visible and typical features are selected as landmarks: heights; visible road stretches; recognizable outlines of lakes, islands and peninsulas. One should avoid selecting as landmarks objects that can be changed by snow and wind.

Battle order is organized with a view of possible fighting separately from the main forces. This calls for an ability to fight independently and for stronger than usual reserves to deal with unexpected problems. When the troops are advancing in narrow defile or along a narrow beach their battle order can be deeper.

To organize cooperation one should decide how to mount an assault (on foot, on skis or on armored personnel vehicles); which forces and assets and where should be used to help tanks and guns overcome obstacles (marches, boulders, water obstacles, blocks, minefields); how artillery, tanks, and fighting helicopters should support motor rifle units negotiating obstacles. In winter insulated shelters should be used.

Offensive is normally carried out along roads and rivers and in the easily negotiated places. It is concentrated on capturing settlements, road junctions, defiles; heights; ports; passes; crossings and other important objects. The content of battle tasks depends on the nature of objects, terrain and the nature of enemy defenses.

When offensive is conducted at night and in snow storm the troops should be given reliable landmarks and supplied with night-vision devices. In hard conditions bold and decisive actions of even small groups can bring success. Limited visibility helps the side on an offensive to maneuver undetected.

Attacks on enemy strong points may start at different times with the sub-units performing enveloping movements delivering blows at the flanks before the enemy front is attacked. To achieve surprise dark time of the day should be used or snow storms or limited visibility caused by other factors. To move forward at a fast pace the most favorable and well protected stretches should be selected as well as weakly protected stretches of the enemy defenses, gaps, and exposed flanks. In lake countries motor rifle units may move on amphibious vehicles in summer and on skis in winter to attack rear and flanks. They can negotiate water obstacles, deliver a surprise blow at the enemy, capture and retain major objects.

When fighting in the depths of enemy defenses the pressing sub-units concentrate on routing the enemy units defending roads and directions, defiles, narrow roads, and settlements. If it proves impossible to by-pass tree barriers they should be destroyed with artillery fire or blasted. Snow barriers are removed with tanks or overcome through passes created by blasts. In winter rivers, lakes and narrow bays are negotiated from the march with the support of aviation and gun fire after engineer reconnaissance. Second echelons (reserves) are brought to action on the terrains with roads and easily accessible stretches.

Harsh northern conditions demand careful and preliminary preparation of personnel. Soldiers should know how to ski, how to build simple snow, ice and stone shelters, how to orientate in polar night, fog, snow storm, how to organize camouflage, and prevent frost biting.

NOTE:

(1.) Voennaia mysl'. Spetsialniy vypusk, February 1985, p. 31.