Tactics: the art of meeting engagement.

Meeting engagement, like no other form of combat action, requires from commanders and headquarters staffs special skills in its organization and conduct as it involves an extremely strained competition in initiative, speed of movement, fire delivery, maneuver, and strike. That commander wins who shows the most foresight and prudence, an ability to take risk, creativity in choosing unconventional tactics, and can achieve the element of surprise. None of these qualities come by themselves: They are a result of commander's (staff officer's) all-round tactical preparation and training.

The Art of Meeting Engagement in War History

The theory and practice of meeting engagement as a form of the offensive did not become a subject of analysis in the military art until the late 18th century. One of the first meeting engagements took place on Trebbia River in June 1799, in the course of A.V. Suvorov's march across Italy where he showed great art in leading his army under trying circumstances and attaining a decisive victory.

Meeting engagement evolved out of mobile forms of combat action and intensive development of warfare. Adoption of rifled artillery for service (the second half of the 19th century) with an effective range of up to five kilometers made it possible to effectively engage the enemy before it approached the deployment line (position). The greater independence of action by military units as part of the advance guard gave the main forces greater freedom of action, enabling them to conduct maneuver to strike enemy flanks and combat service areas. As a result, meeting engagements began to be increasingly used in offensive tactics.

In the late 19th century, the field manuals of some militaries provided first recommendations on organization and conduct of meeting engagement. The early 20th century saw further development of weaponry (magazine-fed rifles, machine-guns, high-rate-of-fire and long-range artillery, etc.); aviation began to be used for military purposes; new communication technology emerged, and the numerical strength of armies increased dramatically. The growing firepower and effective range of weapon systems compelled troops on the march to begin deployment at a considerably greater distance from the enemy force than in the era of smoothbore arms. In those conditions, preemptive artillery fire delivery and rapid deployment of troops on positions of advantage was critical in the initial engagement of the enemy. Maneuver and strike to an advancing enemy's flank and rear became the main method of action in meeting engagement.

During the years of the Civil War in Russia, meeting engagements commonly took place in the course of offensive operations in the absence of continuous, stable fronts. Meeting engagements with the participation of large masses of cavalry--the most mobile arm of service at the time--were marked by especial strain and maneuverability.

In the inter-war period, the Soviet military art gave considerable attention to development of the theory and practice of meeting engagement. Meeting engagement was defined as a highly mobile form of combat action where both sides seek to attain their goals through offensive action. The main rules and propositions were generalized and formalized in field manuals and regulations. It was generally held that meeting engagement would begin from the line of march and could be employed in various conditions of the situation. (1) On the eve of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, those views were considerably revised. Meeting engagement came to be seen as a special kind of offensive action. (2) The conditions for its employment also expanded: not only in encountering the enemy on the march (which was seen as the main condition), but also in meeting the enemy's counterattacking reserves as well as in delivering counterstrokes in the defense. (3)

Pre-war theory subdivided meeting engagement into three stages: initial engagement of the enemy; deployment and action by the main forces; conclusion of combat action by encircling and routing the enemy. Preemptive action in deployment, fire delivery, and attack was seen as the key to success. (4) Meeting engagement had the following distinguishing characteristics: a fast-flowing situation; fluidity of combat action, and action to seize the initiative.

In the Great Patriotic War, meeting engagements became part and parcel of both offensive and defensive operations. In the operational depth, meeting engagements were conducted mainly by tank and motorized divisions and corps. The general trend in the evolution of meeting engagement in the war years consisted in expanding the conditions for its employment, and changes in its character. It was typically used in the course of an offensive operation. Of the reviewed 55 meeting engagements conducted by Soviet troops during the Great Patriotic War, 32 (58 percent) occurred in the offensive, including 17 (31 percent) at exploitation stage in the operational depth, nine (16 percent) in repulsing enemy attempts to break through the encirclement, and six (11 percent) in breaking through the enemy defense. The remaining 23 engagements (42 percent) occurred in defensive operations. (5)

Meeting engagements during the period of the Great Patriotic War were characterized by: rapid approach march and movement to contact with the enemy; limited time available for organization of combat action; the need to enter battle from the line of march; fast-flowing situation with abrupt shifts and changes; continuous, pitched battle to seize and retain initiative; aggressive, dynamic combat action; deployment and action on a wide frontage; fast-moving battle formation; open flanks and freedom of maneuver. Meeting engagements were conducted in all seasons and time of day, and on different terrain.

Organization of meeting engagement during the war period included two stages: advance preparation and immediate organization. Stage 1 was conducted in anticipation of a meeting engagement and Stage 2, with the initial engagement of the enemy.

The main activities in advance preparation were: establishment of the meeting engagement area and the line of deployment of troops into battle order; the decision to accomplish a march in anticipation of a meeting engagement; and organization of all-round support. A special role was assigned to reconnaissance, designed to timely detect an advancing enemy force; determine its composition, possible lines of deployment, and the axis of the main strike, and assess the impact of terrain conditions.

In the course of initial engagement of the enemy, unit commander, in addition to leading the combat action by the advance party (advance guard), had, under extreme time constraints, to refine or detail the mission or make a new decision for meeting engagement and assign troops particular missions as well as take measures to ensure the rapid advance and deployment of the main forces and their shifting to the offense. Selection of the main axis of attack was key to a successful meeting engagement. At the initial period of the war, commanders tended to deliver a head-on strike on a superior advancing enemy force. In the subsequent period, especially as of the summer of 1943, conditions were created for delivering the main strike to the flank of an advancing enemy force. Amassing assets along the main axis of attack, constituting between 30 percent and 50 percent of a unit's attack zone, was of critical importance here. Usually up to 60 percent to 75 percent of all division (corps) assets were concentrated there. (6) During the third period of the war, tactical depth along the main axis of attack had grown 2.5 to 4 times, compared to the first period.

Analysis of war experience helped identify a number of trends in the evolution of the art of meeting engagement: the growing drift toward engaging an advancing enemy force with artillery and air strikes at approach stage; a sharp increase in the importance of the time and surprise factor and the growing role of maneuver owing to the greater mobility of troops; aggressive action to seize and hold initiative; and ongoing effort to achieve a more effective synchronization of functions and activities, command and control, reconnaissance, and combat and rear service support.

Major prerequisites to success in a meeting engagement also were: advance force packaging in line with the battle concept, seizure of advantageous positions for the deployment of main forces, concentration of main efforts on the main axis of attack, lightning strike to the enemy front and rear, reliable antiaircraft system, and effective flank and rear service support.

In local wars and armed conflicts of the 1950s-1990s, there were no major meeting engagements, which was due to the specific conditions of warfare at the time.

Typical Characteristics of Meeting Engagement in Contemporary Conditions

In appraising the character of contemporary warfare, there is reason to suggest that meeting engagements will occur more often than in the past. This is due to the higher dynamics, maneuverability, and spatial scope of combat operations and the determination of the opposing forces to attain decisive goals within a shorter time. There are grounds to believe that the proportion of meeting engagements will increase at the initial stage of war, which will be characterized by aggressive action to take and retain initiative and preempt the enemy in deployment and fire delivery.

Meeting engagement can occur on the march, in meeting with the enemy; in the defense: in mounting counterattacks and delivering counterstrokes, in movement forward by troops toward the battle line or in the process of relieving (replacing) first-echelon troops, in fighting enemy air-mobile units, tactical assault or amphibious landing forces and other troops penetrating the defense line; in the attack (counterattack): in entering battle, repulsing enemy counterattacks (counterstrokes), exploitation, contact with the enemy moving forward to close breaches or take up positions of advantage, and in the course of maneuver deep in the enemy rear.

Meeting engagement in contemporary conditions will be characterized by: rapid movement to contact and close with the enemy and joining the battle from the line of march; fluidity and insufficient clarity of the situation, sharp and abrupt changes in the situation; fast-moving combat action; aggressive action to gain time and seize and retain initiative; conduct of combat action on a board frontage; freedom of maneuver and the existence of considerable gaps and open flanks; and limited time for organization of battle.

The very essence of meeting engagement predetermines the aggressive struggle to seize and hold initiative when each of the opposing sides considers itself capable of routing the other with aggressive offensive action.

The struggle to seize and hold initiative will be of a protracted character, continuing throughout the battle. Beginning at a considerable distance between the opposing sides with air strikes by aircraft and helicopter gunships, multiple rocket launcher and tube artillery fire delivery, and the dropping of air assault forces, as the opposing sides close, the struggle for initiative will become increasingly determined and fierce. Along with fire delivery, an important role will belong to preemptive deployment and attack and seizure of advantageous positions and areas, ensuring a successful course of subsequent combat action, as well as implementation of measures to hinder and thwart the enemy forward movement and organized deployment.

The striving by each side to gain an advantage through maneuver to deliver a strike to the enemy flank or rear will predetermine fast-flowing action on a wide frontage and to a deep depth. At the stage of initial engagement the sides will seek to deploy the maximum possible amount of assets, take bypassing movement, envelop the enemy's exposed flanks, and at the same time protect their own flanks. Operational depth is ensured by in-depth fire delivery, the landing of tactical air assault forces, and action by advance and bypassing forces. Meeting engagement is marked by its fast-moving character. Should one side preempt the other in effective fire delivery, attack, maneuver, and a surprise strike to the flank and rear, the outcome of the battle will be a foregone conclusion.

Success Factors in Meeting Engagement

Success in meeting engagement is contingent on a number of factors. The main factors are: organization of effective reconnaissance and timely detection of the enemy's concept of operations; an effective organization of march formation, ensuring rapid deployment for battle order, and preemptive fire delivery; selection of effective methods of routing the enemy, assignment of target-specific missions and an expedient organization of battle order; organization of an effective synchronization of functions and activities, command and control, and all-round combat support.

In engaging the enemy's guard force, it is very important that the advance guard take up a position of advantage thus creating conditions for preemptive deployment of the main forces. The advance guard is usually comprised of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced with a tank company, an artillery battalion, an engineer platoon, and a flame-thrower platoon. The main march guard force is comprised of a motorized rifle company with a tank platoon, an artillery battery, an AT platoon, an antiaircraft platoon, and an engineer section.

In anticipation of meeting engagement, combat formation on the march are to ensure rapid deployment in battle order to deliver a preemptive strike. To this end, it is necessary to take into account a number of factors, above all the combat capabilities of own (friendly) as well as enemy forces; the correlation of forces; the possibilities for gaining time in deployment and fire delivery and achieving the element of surprise in attacking the flank of the advancing enemy.

It is critical to pin down and hold the enemy from a position of advantage, effectively engaging it with artillery fire and air strikes, and by accomplishing bypassing movement (if possible on both flanks), rapidly advancing to the enemy rear and cutting off routes for maneuver by landing a tactical air assault party. The advantage of this combined impact from the front, flanks, and rear consists in that the enemy will have to disperse its efforts along many lines and sectors, thus creating conditions for thwarting its maneuver, splitting and bisecting its advance units, cutting them off from the rear and the approaching reserves, and, finally, seizing and holding initiative throughout the combat operation.

Effective employment of these advantages is to a very large extent predicated on the timely detection of weak spots (exposed flanks) in the enemy's battle formation, and the location of its weapon emplacements, command and control points, and rear service installations.

If, owing to terrain conditions or a belated deployment of assets, it is not possible to deliver a preemptive strike, it is then necessary to make a frontal strike (a forced method of action), which requires effective engagement along the axis of concentration of the enemy's main efforts. The frontal strike can yield the best results if it comes at the same time as the landing of a tactical air assault force in the enemy rear. This will ensure aggressive action to rout the enemy with the subsequent shifting of efforts to the depth of its battle order. Yet it is much more difficult to achieve the element of surprise with this method of action so it is essential to mislead the enemy by delivering decoy (diversionary) strikes along a secondary axis, ensuring rapid deployment of assets and delivering a preemptive strike. The advantage of a splitting attack lies in that it makes it possible to rout the enemy more quickly by bisecting it.

In order to gain time, closing with the enemy should proceed at maximum speed. In this event, the lines of deployment of troops from the march into approach march formation should be brought as close as possible to the line of contact with the enemy. Thus, the line of deployment into battalion columns can begin at a distance of 6 kilometers to 8 kilometers and into company columns, at a distance of three kilometers to four kilometers. Deployment into battle order proceeds in two ways: by consecutive redeployment from march formation into battalion formation, then into company and subsequently platoon columns with the simultaneous turn of all battalion column machines toward the enemy. Experience in combat exercises shows that deployment into a battalion battle order takes approximately 25 minutes.

Should the enemy shift to the offensive, it is critical not to allow it to consolidate its positions by mounting a decisive attack from the line of march with a simultaneous bypassing movement on its flanks. Reserves to reinforce the effort should be committed from the flank.

Should the enemy preempt friendly units in deployment, it is expedient, by repulsing its attack and taking a position of advantage, to accomplish a maneuver with the main forces to the enemy flank. It must be stressed that successful employment of all forms and methods of combat action is predicated on effective engagement of the enemy.

Combat Missions and Battle Formation of Units

The character (content) of combat missions assigned to subunits in a meeting engagement depends on their role and place in battle formation, commander's concept of operations, the configuration and combat capabilities of subunits, the importance of the axis of attack that has been selected, the composition and the combat capabilities of the enemy force, and the extent of its effective engagement.

Battle formation in meeting engagement should ensure the delivery of a powerful first strike and effective accomplishment of impromptu tasks arising in the course of combat action. These conditions are best met by a one-echelon formation with a detailing of a strong reserve.

Subunits usually enter a meeting engagement with reinforcement assets that they had in the course of previous action. In certain cases, should the situation so require and if possible, assets are redistributed depending on the place of particular subunits in battle formation and the combat missions assigned to them.

An artillery grouping in a meeting engagement is created in the form of artillery groups so that operational commander can ensure flexible artillery fire command and control as well as an effective synchronization of their functions and activities with those of advancing units. A part of artillery assets can be assigned to deliver direct fire.

The main tasks for artillery and aviation are: to support combat action by the advance party and advance guard (the main guard force); destruction of ground based missile systems, artillery and mortar batteries, AT assets, command and control points, antiaircraft systems, and EW installations; effective engagement of approaching enemy columns and thwarting their organized deployment and attack; ensuring the deployment of friendly main forces; artillery (air) preparation fire ahead of attack, effective fire delivery in the course of attack, and the covering of flanks.

The grouping of antiaircraft assets and forces is created to ensure reliable cover of troops against air strikes by air strikes by combat aircraft and helicopter gunships from any direction or altitude--super low (up to 40 meters), low (up to 300 meters), medium (up to 500 meters), and high (over 500 meters). Tactical antiaircraft subunits act as part of battle formation of motorized rifle and tank units to ensure their direct cover.

Tactical air assault forces in meeting engagement are used mainly to seize positions and lines of advantage, commanding heights, crossing sites, choke points, and defiles; to effectively engage precision weapon systems, EW installations, and command and control points, and to perform other missions. The tactical air assault force can be reinforced with a motorized rifle (airborne) battalion.

Organization and Conduct of Meeting Engagement

Organization of meeting engagement proceeds under tremendous time pressure. The time allotted to organization of a meeting engagement on the march depends on the distance between the main forces and the enemy and the speed of closing with the enemy.

Organization of meeting engagement includes the same elements as in the offensive, namely: decision-making, tasking, and organization of synchronization of functions and activities, effective engagement, air-defense, command and control, and all-round combat service support. All of these tasks, however, are performed in a fast-moving manner, in the course of a march.

The enemy is bound to take action to thwart the march. In these conditions, commander and headquarters staff need to show particular efficiency and promptness of action so as not to be late in deploying the troops and ensuring their entering into battle in a planned manner. To detail his decision on initial engagement, commander will most likely need to move forward toward the guard force. This will enable him to see the position of subunits on the ground and refine their mission: what line is to be taken by what time and then held in order to ensure the deployment of main forces, also specifying procedure for action by march security forces as the attack begins.

Here on the ground, commander also can refine missions for organic and attached artillery in supporting the advance guard force; then missions for the main forces and areas of their fire positions and the deadline for opening fire, also signals for opening, shifting, and ceasing fire and procedure for redeployment in the course of combat.

Initial engagement of the enemy will require a review of the concept of operations: refining the concept of operations; identifying the axis of the main thrust and the form of maneuver upon contact with the main enemy forces; defining battle formation, and planning anti-raiding action and action to protect command and control points and combat service areas.

Tasking in these conditions can proceed in the form of battle orders. Priority is given to detailing missions for reconnaissance, march security forces, and covering troops in the course of movement forward, deployment and actual combat action.

At the same time as tasking, commander issues short instructions on synchronization of functions and activities to ensure teamwork, detailing procedure and time for delivering preemptive strikes on advancing enemy forces, coordinates action by the advance security force and tactical air assault forces to seize positions of advantage, ensure movement forward, maneuver, deployment and attack by the main forces, and coordinates the efforts of organic, attached and supporting artillery in preparation fire and fire support for the offensive operation.

It is essential to clearly lay down procedure for action following effective engagement of the enemy as well as action by first-echelon units and artillery to split and rout the enemy.

NOTES:

(1.) Vremennyy polevoy ustav RKKA, 1936, p. 140; Polevoy ustav RKKA. Proekt, Art. 357; Polevoy ustav Krasnoy Armii, 1940, Art. 409.

(2.) Polevoy ustav Krasnoy Armii. Proekt, 1941, Art. 326.

(3.) Ibid., Art. 328.

(4.) Ibid., Art. 330.

(5.) Razvitiye taktiki Sukhoputnykh voysk v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne, VAF Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 257.

(6.) Ibid., p. 262.

(Continued from No. 1-4, 2002 and 1-3, 2003)