Tactics: the art of defense.

Interaction in Defense

Success in a defensive operation is to a very large extent contingent on how thoroughly commander and headquarters staff are able to organize synchronization of activities and functions and interaction of forces and assets. The existing system of interaction and teamwork, as reflected in field manuals, is a product of long historical evolution. Pre-war Red Army field manuals established that synchronization of efforts by troops and elements of battle order in defense formation should be ensured by lines and objects. (1) In the course of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, however, it was deemed more expedient to organize interaction in defense not by lines but missions performed by troops. (2) That made it possible to better synchronize combat activities. Subsequently, it was established that in addition to synchronization of efforts by specific combat missions, interaction also should be organized by the type of defensive engagement and lines of enemy action.

In principle, this system of interaction in defense formation, with some adjustments, is applicable also to contemporary conditions. Thus the Field Manual of the Land Forces says: "Battalion (company) commander organizes synchronization of activities and functions by the tasks, possible lines of advance by enemy forces, and options for defensive action on the subunit level". (3)

Yet while the basic logical scheme for synchronization of defensive efforts today remains essentially the same, the content of interaction and methods of work by commanders and headquarters staffs in organizing it are changing substantially. Plenty of new elements have emerged here. The system of interaction and teamwork is affected by the physical expansion of the battle field, the increasingly complex character of combat action, and the introduction of new types of modern weapons and automated command and control systems. Therefore, today, the system of interaction in a defensive operation should be especially flexible and mobile. In synchronizing combat efforts, commander should take into account that combat action can, from the very beginning, cover the entire tactical defense area. So it is essential to provide for the possibility of troops to perform various, impromptu tasks, synchronizing the activities of all these elements of the battle order so that they are able to repulse enemy strikes not only laterally but also from the flanks and the rear, accept engagement in encirclement, and combine positional and maneuvering forms of combat.

Synchronization of activities and teamwork is considerably impacted by the mine situation. As is known, as of the mid-1980s, U.S. army field manuals officially use the term "mine warfare." A key role in this warfare is assigned to remote minelaying and remotely controlled minefields. Thus, in an air-ground offensive operation, the latter are to account for 80 percent of total artificial obstacles. (4)

In synchronizing activities by troops, the following should be taken into account: when, at what stage of combat, the adversary can use remote minelaying, to what end, in what areas, and how, and therefore appropriately organize reconnaissance and warn the troops about the mine danger, reconnaissance of remotely controlled minefield on the ground and ways of making minefield lanes and establishing procedure for reconstituting the operational effectiveness of units following the delivery of a massive strike by the enemy combined with remote minelaying.

Expansion in the spatial scope of modern warfare makes it necessary for operational commander to have information on an enemy group deployed on an area two to three times a division's area of responsibility, making a comprehensive assessment of the situation in the interest of organizing effective synchronization of activities and functions. Now he needs continually watch the adversary not only on the tactical but also on the operational level.

The end result of enemy assessment in the interest of organizing effective interaction should be to determine the axis of the main strike as well as other strikes, the composition and character of action by its groups along each axis of advance, and possible methods of delivering air strikes and accomplishing maneuver with forces and assets on land and in the air. In so doing, it is important for division commander to have a clear understanding of the role and place of his formation in an operation, its capability to perform the assigned combat missions as well as of the way in which activities are synchronized with neighboring friendly formations and superior commander's assets.

In analyzing the conditions impacting on interaction and the synchronization of activities and functions in a defensive operation, it is essential to point to an increased scope of tasks performed in synchronizing combat efforts and their growing complexity, combined with a sharp reduction in the time allotted to their performance. The increased volume of information gathering, processing and analysis as well as operations/tactical calculation tasks in the interest of organizing effective interaction substantially enhances the role of combat simulation, coupled with a skillful and creative use of computing facilities by command and control agency officials.

In organizing effective synchronization of activities and functions, it is important to bear in mind that a defensive engagement usually begins with repulsing a prolonged massive air and missile strike by enemy forces. Meanwhile, the attacking force is most likely to concentrate its efforts on effectively engaging weapon emplacements; command and control points; EW installations; antitank, antiaircraft, and anti-air assault systems, as well as troops holding in-depth defense positions and reserves. Therefore, combat action should be prioritized to ensure favorable conditions for delivering a massive retaliatory counterstroke against the enemy, maintaining the firmness of defense at any cost.

In organizing effective interaction at this stage, it is important to pay attention to ensuring the survivability of troops through a rational force disposition, an optimal dispersal of units and subunits, a preliminary elaboration of defensive measures, a timely withdrawal of troops from under possible massive enemy strikes, and effective counter-fire maneuver. To this end, operational commander determines the most likely sectors (axes) of attack by enemy air forces and establishes advantageous positions for air defense assets to repulse surprise action by enemy aviation.

Special difficulty for commanders and headquarters staffs of defending troops in organizing effective interaction is constituted by the need to synchronize the efforts of aviation and branches of service in the interest of effectively engaging enemy forces at distant approaches to defense positions. In this event, the sequence of effective engagement of enemy targets is contingent on their priority. First priority should be given to destroying nuclear strike assets and precision guided weapons, disrupting command and control systems, and taking out air-mobile and army aviation forces. With sufficient combat assets, the task is to thwart enemy advance and its organized attack.

Very close attention should be given to synchronizing activities to hold the first line of defense. The firmness and dynamism of defense is ensured by a number of factors, primarily defense organization in conformity with the prevailing situation on the ground, raising defensive troops, and conducting defensive action. In one instance, the firmness of defense will he achieved by holding defensive positions combined with counterstrokes from in-depth, in another by employing maneuverable defense, or finally, through a combination of both types of action.

The most challenging part of a dynamic defensive operation is the organization of effective interaction in a situation where the combat efforts of defending troops are to be shifted from one position (line) to another--i.e., in switching from positional to mobile defense. This situation is characterized by extreme dynamics and strain.

The art of organizing effective synchronization of assets in conducting a mobile defense operation consists in defeating, with limited assets, a superior enemy, playing for time, forcing enemy troops to act in unfavorable conditions and complicating their maneuver while at the same time husbanding friendly forces and assets, withdrawing them from under a strike, driving an advancing enemy force into fire pockets and ambushes, misleading it as to the real intentions of the defending troops.

Synchronization of activities in retrograde movement, which is designed to withdraw friendly forces from under strikes by superior enemy troops, play for time, and take up more favorable positions (lines), has some specifics. Special importance here belongs to maneuver with fire and artificial obstacles. Strikes by helicopter gunships and artillery fire from covered positions are so organized as to ensure effective engagement of enemy targets from maximum range, area and route denial, deployment and preparation for attack as well as protection of retreating troops, denial of close envelopment and flanking movement, and effective engagement of an air assault force. The most favorable conditions for covert retrograde movement are ensured at night time, on terrain offering concealment, and also with declining enemy activity.

Concealment and the Element of Surprise in Defense

Today, the effectiveness of all types and forms of reconnaissance has greatly enhanced, which considerably complicates concealment in defense. Troops should be able to counter different forms of enemy reconnaissance, whose number increased four to six times, compared to the World War II period.

Combined arms units in a number of foreign armies have capability to conduct many forms of technical reconnaissance with their own assets: visual, radio and radio-technical, radar, heat, radiation, magnitometric, and acoustic intelligence and sound ranging reconnaissance.

It is also essential to note that whereas in World War II, aerial reconnaissance was an operation command asset, now it is conducted also on the tactical level. The general depth of division-level reconnaissance is up to 150 kilometers.

Today, priority is given to space reconnaissance. Thus, in the operation by coalition forces in Iraq, a large number of radar, radio and technical reconnaissance satellites were used to conduct space reconnaissance. Space reconnaissance provided digital terrain maps for cruise missiles and other weapon systems. So today, it is virtually impossible to conceal defense organization. Nonetheless, it is one thing to locate individual targets in a defensive force (enemy reconnaissance is well in a position to do this) and quite another to develop the defensive system as a whole. This is a far more difficult task. A defending force has increased capacity to counter enemy reconnaissance.

Commanders and headquarters staffs need to master the art of concealed, covert defense, which requires a whole complex of measures that during the years of the Great Patriotic War was known as "deception plan" and which, according to G.K. Zhukov, was key to gaining the element of surprise. (5) That plan was drawn up on the front or army level because only operational command had the necessary assets for that. In the present conditions, it is expedient to develop such a plan also on the division/regimental level since enemy deception has become part and parcel of any tactical operation plan.

A deception plan is essentially a creative plan. There are no hard and fast rules as to how to draw it up--in graphic form, as a chart, or in writing. During the war, deception measures are reflected in various documents--operation; battle; camouflage, concealment, and deception, and disinformation plans as well as in separate orders and directives. (6) In 1944, special Regulations on Operational Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception Measures were issued. (7) With regard to modern defensive operation, it is expedient, time permitting, to develop such a plan on a map. It should reflect the most important activities designed to mislead the enemy. Above all, it indicates the objective of these measures, which is to conceal the operation concept from the enemy insofar as concerns force disposition; defense organization; concentration of main efforts; positions, fires and obstacles; and antitank, antiaircraft, and anti-air assault activities.

During the Great Patriotic War, passive measures prevailed in such plans: keeping secret the operation concept, implementation of camouflage, concealment, deception and masking measures, deployment of dummies and decoy targets, the use of smoke screens, imitation of troop concentration areas, reconnaissance, re-grouping of forces, diversionary defensive actions in secondary sectors, sound screens, etc.

In contemporary conditions, there are broad opportunities for active deception measures. These include: covert withdrawal of troops from under an impending strike by an attacking force; trapping the attacking force into fire pockets and ambushes; creation of unexpected artificial obstacles in the enemy's path of maneuver with remote minelaying; the use of dummies and decoy targets with an imitation of military activity; active countering of all forms of enemy reconnaissance through massive electronic jamming and deception jamming; undermining of the enemy's ability to stand up in combat through continuous harassing fire, raids, and surprise counterattacks; broad use of nighttime conditions to conduct regrouping, repositioning, maneuvering, and retrograde action; setting artificial obstacles; reconnaissance in force, etc. All of these activities should be integrated by a single operation concept and placed under the constant supervision by the headquarters staff.

To achieve concealment, it is important above all to organize effective counteraction of enemy reconnaissance. This requires timely detection and destruction of reconnaissance assets or their obstruction (neutralization) and jamming as well as camouflage and masking of friendly troops and targets. Counter-reconnaissance action should be thoroughly planned, comprising a complex of continuous operational/tactical, technical and organizational activities. In organizing counter-reconnaissance action, it is essential to identify and exploit the enemy's vulnerabilities.

One effective way of deceiving the enemy as to defense organization is creation of a system of decoy targets (positions, concentration areas, command and control points, etc.) and conduct of diversionary actions. This method was widely used by the Soviet command during the Great Patriotic War.

Deception action should be conducted with due consideration for visual, heat, radar, space, and other forms of enemy reconnaissance. The use of modern combat hardware and equipment sets higher standards for camouflage, concealment, and deception. This applies above all to the use of T/O camouflage, deception, and masking assets and all sorts of dummies and decoys. At the same time, the role of covert action, including at night time and under limited visibility, has grown substantially. A considerable deception effect can be achieved through periodic change of positions and skillful dispersal. To conceal separate objects, it is expedient to use camouflage complexes and masking screens, ensuring protection against observation and visual reconnaissance. Jamming is effective against radar reconnaissance and aerosol screens against visual and laser reconnaissance.

At the same time, it is important to note the gap that has emerged between modern reconnaissance capabilities and the existing camouflage, concealment, and deception assets and techniques. Thus, while an army reconnaissance system numbers up to 15 to 18 types, camouflage, concealment and deception assets can effectively counter only three to five of them. In particular, MKT-L and MKT-S complexes ensure concealment against visual and partly optical observation at a range of not more than 400 meters to 600 meters. These complexes are absolutely useless against laser, IR, or radar reconnaissance. Hence the pressing need for their technical modernization. Special attention should be given to development of technical concealment, camouflage and deception facilities, ensuring concealment against the enemy's radio, radio-technical, and heat reconnaissance.

To achieve concealment and the element of surprise in the defense means to fully use concealing and protective features of terrain in selecting the forward edge, configuration of positions, and deployment of weapon emplacements, command and control points, and rear services support and administrative installations. In taking up defensive positions, uncamouflaged, unmasked hardware is detected by enemy reconnaissance on open terrain with the probability of 0.7 to 1.0, as compared to 0.1 to 0.15 on terrain offering concealment.

As shown by the experience in the Great Patriotic War, a special role in gaining the element of surprise belongs to military stratagem. It received high priority soon after the outset of hostilities. The September 5, 1941 directive by the chief of the General Staff stressed that military stratagem to mislead the enemy about our forces and their intentions was only used on a very limited scale. (8) The directive demanded that commanders and headquarters staffs factor concealment, camouflage, and deception into the decision-making process.

The experience of Soviet troops in using such a form of deception as preplanned retrograde action in a sector where the enemy was expected to deliver the main strike is still relevant. The action pursued a dual objective: first, to trick the attacking force into delivering preparation fire on an empty place and second, to lure it into an in-depth fire pocket and destroy it.

It is not at all an easy task to outsmart and mislead the enemy, imposing one's will on it. In deceiving the enemy, it is necessary to always be on the alert so as not to be deceived by the enemy. In organizing the defense, it is important to remember that the enemy, for its part, also will seek to achieve surprise. So it is essential to provide for appropriate measures to counter its surprise actions and quickly neutralize their effects.

Maneuver in Defense

The intensive modernization of the materiel and technical base in present conditions has had a substantial impact on the character of maneuver. In the fire-strike-maneuver triad, the role of the last mentioned component has grown considerably. In the defense, maneuver is not only a major factor in enhancing its firmness and dynamics but also in ensuring the survivability of troops. Fluid maneuver and mobile defense brings certain changes into the organization of force disposition of units and large combined-arms formations, defensive positions and areas, and the system of fires and obstacles, also impacting the choice of area of concentration of combat effort.

Past experience--in particular, in World War I and World War II--shows that maneuver in the defense was for the most past subordinated to positional forms of warfare. It was designed to ensure a firm holding of defensive positions since defense was built on the "not a step back" principle. Maneuver with forces and assets in combat was used to amass defending troops in sectors of danger as well as to recover ground by mounting counterattacks. Today, maneuver with fire and strikes is key to achieving firmness in defense.

Today, as in the past, development of maneuvering tactics is determined by more advanced combat hardware that is provided to the troops. In the estimate of foreign military experts, as a result of technical modernization conducted in the U.S. Army in the 1970s- 1980s, the maneuvering capability of a mechanized division as well as its operational effectiveness increased five times, compared to the 1950s infantry division and 10 times, compared to the armor division of the same period. (9)

The maneuvering capability of combined-arms units is enhanced by their provision with combat and transport helicopters.

Maneuver is acquiring an increasingly combined air/land character. Meanwhile, priority is given to air maneuver as the tempo of maneuver with helicopters eight to 10 times exceeds that of land movement of troops. It is also important that the speed of the airlift is not affected by terrain trafficability or the presence of artificial obstacles, roadblocks or swampland.

One qualitatively new feature of modern maneuver is the growing employment of EW assets. Experience in local wars shows that combat action begins primarily with winning air superiority: A kind of an EW operation is carried out to suppress the enemy's command and control system. EW has become part and parcel of efforts to achieve fire superiority over the enemy. A defending force can only count on successful attainment of its goals in repulsing enemy attack if it ensures the viability of its command and control system. To achieve EW and fire superiority over the enemy, it is essential to concentrate the main EW assets along the decisive axis of action, ensuring their effective and flexible synchronization with other combat assets. It is necessary, by organizing active interference and jamming, to deliver an EW counterstroke against the enemy, also, by using passive measures, to weaken the effectiveness of the enemy's counter-EW assets.

Maneuver with EW assets in delivering an EW strike on the enemy should be synchronized with fire maneuver to ensure an integrated and massive impact with various combat assets on the enemy's critical EW assets and weapon systems to the entire depth of its battle order. In so doing, it is critical to ensure stable command and control and synchronization of counter-EW and reconnaissance activities with fire delivery. To ensure a timely maneuver with EW assets, it is necessary to maintain their constant high operational effectiveness and combat readiness as well as their timely deployment for action in a difficult operational/tactical and EW environment.

Maneuver with fire is the main form of maneuver in a defensive operation. The effectiveness of defensive action today is contingent above all on its fire-maneuver capability. The objectives of maneuver have also expanded. It is designed to concentrate the main fire efforts on effectively engaging the most dangerous enemy group by systematically shifting massed fire on newly identified targets in the course of a combat operation. Maneuver with fire plays a special role in destroying the enemy's nuclear weapon systems, precision guided weapons (missiles), command and control points, and antiaircraft, reconnaissance and EW systems.

One distinguishing feature of maneuver is its complex character: It is conducted with the employment of various types of weapons, the leading place among which, in addition to artillery, belongs to aircraft, including helicopter gunships. This makes it possible, within a short time span, to effectively engage the enemy's in-depth targets, and hinder its maneuver by creating fire barriers and cutting off its combat area from inflow of reserves.

Helicopter maneuver is marked by a high degree of mobility. Thus, a squadron on Level 1 alert can deliver a strike on an enemy force within 17 to 23 minutes of being called: two minutes for call transfer, five to eight minutes to start the engines, and 10 to 13 minutes to fly to a target area 40 to 50 kilometers away at cruise speed. A helicopter wing, in the same conditions, can deliver a strike within 16 to 20 minutes. The time for a follow-up sortie by a squadron or wing takes 50 to 60 minutes.

Fire maneuver should be combined with maneuver with obstacles (remote minelaying). This substantially enhances the effectiveness of fire delivery against the enemy.

Second-echelon units (subunits) of a large combined-arms formation, in a defensive operation, are usually assigned the following tasks: to be ready to ensure a firm defense of the third (fourth) line, preventing the enemy's in-depth penetration; strengthen the defense of first-echelon units in sectors of threat; deliver a counterattack in two to three sectors; and effectively engage and destroy enemy tactical air assault and raiding forces. These missions are performed by different methods, but maneuver will prevail in the majority of cases. The maneuver zone for divisional reserves is the area beyond the first-echelon regiment defense lines (up to the second defensive line). The mission to hold a tactical defense area will be performed with the employment of army and sometimes front assets with the objective of destroying a large enemy force that has penetrated the defense. Typically, second-echelon units and army and front reserves can be employed to hold first and second lines of the defense. So the tactical in-depth defense area will be the zone of maneuver with operational reserves.

The point of this division of tactical-defense depth is to ensure target-specific planning of maneuver, duly prepare battle-order elements of units (combined-arms formations), synchronize the combat activities of forces and assets, and prepare in advance the lines for maneuver as well as command, control and communication systems.

The Conduct of Defense

With outbreak of war the course of warfare is hard to predict. It is most likely that a ground offensive operation will be preceded by a sustained air/missile/EW strike to achieve air superiority, disrupt the command and control system, destroy key targets, and reduce the combat capabilities of a defending force. Thus, in the course of Operation Desert Storm, aviation delivered a series of massive strikes until the Iraqi combat capabilities were reduced 40 percent to 50 percent (more than half of the first echelon's combat capabilities and 50 percent to 75 percent of second-echelon forces were destroyed).

With the outbreak of war, the shift to the defense will proceed in an extremely difficult situation, under the enemy's massive fire delivery and EW impact.

In repulsing a massive fire delivery, priority should be given to disrupting the enemy's information channels. This applies above all to command and control data as well as to data on weapon systems capable of effectively resisting an attacking force. During the Great Patriotic War, in the interest of thwarting an offensive, a defending side delivered a pre-planned, short but powerful surprise attack (in the form of air and artillery counter-preparation fire) against the enemy's main force poised for the offensive and its key weapon emplacements.

But then such counter-preparation fire was conducted before the forward edge of the battle area to a small depth, which did not always achieve success.

In contemporary conditions, defending forces have a broad arsenal of means and assets to impact on the enemy both at near and far approaches. Front aviation is the main asset of long-range effective engagement. Its share in the total volume of an army's (corps') fire missions is 18 percent, as compared to 80 percent beyond the artillery and army aviation range.

In defense action, along with aviation, missile troops and artillery play an important role in effectively engaging enemy forces. Multiple rocket launchers are especially effective. A salvo by one multiple rocket launcher firing cluster shells equates the effect produced by a salvo of three 203.2-mm howitzer artillery battalion.

Covering forces play a significant role in a tactical-zone defensive operation. By using artillery fire and air strikes, subunits operating in the security area can repulse an attack by the enemy's advancing troops, inflicting serious losses on them and forcing the enemy to deploy its main forces advancing to the forward edge into early deployment. By maneuver with fire and assets, retreating from one position to another, and using obstacles and explosive demolition, troops in the security area contain and delay the enemy in sectors where it is planned to deliver air and artillery strikes against it.

Combat to hold the forward defense position is marked by great determination. Subunits detailed for its defense open fire from the maximum range and are supported by artillery fire as well as by air strikes. In so doing, it is essential to correctly assess the character of enemy action so as not to mistake a reconnaissance operation or an advance by a limited contingent of forces for an offensive with the main forces. To this end, it is necessary to have a good knowledge of enemy tactics.

The culmination of the defensive operation is the repulse of the enemy's attack before the forward edge, when it concentrates its assets on disrupting the fire delivery system. To resist its massive fire delivery and preserve combat capability is the most important task of a defending force, which is key to the outcome of the battle as a whole.

With the onset of preparation fire for the offensive by the enemy force, personnel, either on commanders' orders or on their own, take cover in slit trenches, dugout shelters, infantry fighting vehicles (tanks), emplacements, or foxholes, ready to quickly take up their combat positions to repulse the enemy attack. During this period, commanders conduct observation and provide final briefing to refine or detail missions to their troops, artillery, and other weapon assets in effectively engaging the enemy's precision guided weapons, artillery, tanks, and other armored vehicles and motorized infantry advancing or poised for attack. At the same time, they assess the situation in the area where the advancing force has already attacked, taking measures to close gaps in force disposition, and reconstituting command and control, the fire delivery system, and interaction and synchronization of functions and activities. Attempts by the enemy, in the course of preparation fire, to make breaches in artificial obstacles before the forward edge of the battle area are stopped with fire from standby assets. At the end of preparation fire, the main efforts of all defense assets are concentrated on effective engagement of advancing tanks and motorized infantry.

The moment the enemy shifts fire in depth can be seen as the beginning of the offensive. If infantry attacks on foot, defending troops cut off infantry from tanks and destroy it with machine-gun and automatic rifle fire. As infantry approaches the forward edge of the battle area to within 30 meters to 40 meters, motorized rifle troops engage it with grenades while the part thereof that has crossed the forward edge is destroyed at point-blank range. To prevent enemy troops from overrunning trenches and communication tunnels and trenches, personnel set up in advance hedgehogs, knife rests, and other portable obstacles.

Antiaircraft as well as motorized rifle and tank subunits that are not engaged with an advancing land force repulse attacks by low flying aircraft and helicopters. Enemy tanks and infantry fighting vehicles are destroyed with fire by artillery and antitank assets, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from their emplacements or line of fire positions.

An important role in destroying an enemy force that has penetrated the defense is played by the ambush party. As the enemy force approaches, it suddenly opens fire, first engaging its tanks and other armored vehicles and forcing the remaining tanks and armored vehicles to move in a direction that is unfavorable for them, where the defending troops have prepared minefields and explosive obstacles. Air and land ambushes are highly effective in this situation. Their essence consists in that subunits airlifted by helicopter are deployed along the possible axis of enemy advance, taking up combat positions, while the helicopters are concealed amid terrain irregularities. An approaching enemy force is effectively engaged with fire by land subunits, supported with helicopter onboard weapons. After that, subunit personnel quickly board the helicopters and are airlifted to another area.

Roving tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and mortars are key to enhancing the aggressiveness of defense. Their broad and effective employment within the system of ambushes and strongholds and in between combat positions increases the survivability and effectiveness of the fire delivery system, helping mislead the enemy.

Fire pockets are very important in defense organization. In setting up fire pockets, an advantageous front line configuration is chosen, in gaps between strongholds, approaches to commanding heights, choke points, defiles, valleys, gorges, etc. Virtually all types of small arms are used in organizing fire pockets. So they can be set up not only by regimental commanders but also by every company (battalion) commander with his organic assets. In the operational defense, in addition to fire pockets, killing grounds can be organized into which the enemy attacking force is trapped and subsequently destroyed with surprise counterstrokes from the flanks.

Under favorable conditions, a penetrating enemy force is effectively engaged in the course of a counteroffensive that is conducted until it is completely destroyed and the defense is fully restored. In so doing, first-echelon subunits employ all of their weapon assets to effectively engage a penetrating enemy force, holding advantageous in-depth positions, stopping its further advance, thus ensuring advancement and deployment for a counteroffensive by second-echelon (reserve) forces. Counteroffensive, especially with small subunits, does not always guarantee success. Simple calculations show that a motorized rifle battalion in place can repulse an attack by an enemy force of up to a brigade while in a counteroffensive it can only rout a force of approximately company size.

It is inexpedient to mount a counteroffensive with heavy losses as a result of the enemy's fire delivery or the penetration of a large amount of its tanks and motorized infantry. In this situation, the main efforts should be concentrated above all on destroying enemy troops trying to take control of sections of terrain that are key to the firmness of the defense. To this end, an attacking force is effectively engaged from the line of fire position, with concentrated, massed, and barrage artillery and mortar fire as well as with fire from tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, antitank rocket systems, and all motorized rifle and small arms assets so as to stop its further advance in depth or toward the flanks. To strengthen the flanks and the defense in a penetration area, troops defending this sector as well as reserves, antitank assets, mobile obstacle construction detachments, and other assets from sectors that have not been attacked are employed.

In the course of a defensive operation, subunits can be used to engage the enemy's tactical air assault force as an anti-airborne assault reserve. Once he has established that an air assault force has been dropped, reserve force commander sends out a follow-up reconnaissance party and provides final briefing to refine or detail the mission to organic and attached assets. The reserve force is quickly moved to the airborne assault force landing zone, deploys for battle, and employs all of its assets to effectively engage the enemy force, completing its destruction with a decisive attack. Should an enemy airborne assault force manage to land, assemble, and begin to advance toward a designated target area, the anti-airborne assault reserve effectively engages it with ambushes, completing its destruction in a meeting engagement. If however it proves impossible to destroy the enemy force on the move, without a halt, subunits then pin it down, and after brief preparation fire attack and destroy the airborne assault force.

In an unfavorable defensive engagement scenario, subunits can receive orders to retreat to a new line, in depth. Retrograde movement should be carried out in an organized, concealed, and expeditious manner so that the subunits could simultaneously enter the designated area or take up a designated position in operationally effective condition. Retrograde movement can also be used either in direct contact with the enemy or out of contact. To facilitate retrograde movement, covering subunits are usually detailed. Their task is, while being in direct contact with the enemy, to maintain maximum permissible rate of fire, preventing penetration of enemy scout detachments in depth and also repulsing attacks by enemy advance detachments, preventing them from pursuit. To mount an organized retreat, subunits operating as part of the main forces are assigned an assembly area, the axis or route of retrograde movement, phase lines, the final line of retrograde movement, and the time for reaching it.

In the course of combat, certain units and subunits can end up in encirclement. In this situation their task is to hold their positions and, by inflicting substantial damage on the enemy, to prevent the bisecting of their battle order. The fire delivery system in encirclement is linked up with the system of minefields and explosive obstacles and is called upon to ensure effective engagement of the enemy force both frontally and in depth. To destroy separate penetrating enemy groups, fire pockets, lines of fire for reserves, armored groups, and other weapon assets as well as reserve (alternate) line of fire positions are prepared for artillery. In the course of combat in encirclement, subunits must ensure rapid and concealed maneuver with forces, assets, and fires toward sectors of threat and be ready to destroy a penetrating enemy force with fire delivery or a decisive counterattack. Enemy attack is repulsed with fire by all weapon assets.

Breaking out of encirclement proceeds in interaction with subunits in a meeting engagement frontally or independently. At least half of all subunits and the bulk of artillery assets are assigned to ensure the breaking out of encirclement. Motorized rifle subunits are reinforced with tanks and anti-tank and obstacle clearing assets. On the rest of the encirclement frontage, only a minimum number of subunits remains: Their task is to hold their positions and conduct active operations, misleading the enemy force and preventing it from tightening the encirclement frontage. Covering subunits are reinforced with artillery, tanks, and engineer troops with obstacles construction detachments.

To achieve surprise and concealment of action, breaking out of encirclement should begin at night or in conditions of limited visibility. The breakout should be carded out in a place where the necessary assets can be concentrated within the shortest possible time. Thereupon, rapid, fast-flowing action is taken to breach the noose of encirclement, making sure that all subunits break out of encirclement.

Nighttime Defense

Preparation and conduct of defensive combat at night is considerably impacted by: the limited range of observation and conduct of aimed fire; limited possibilities for maneuver with fire, forces and assets; more time that is needed for the conduct of engineering and other forms of work; difficulties in synchronizing functions and activities and exercising command and control of troops; and personnel's great psychological strain.

Preparation and conduct of defensive engagement at night time can proceed in different conditions of the situation. In some cases, the defense can be organized before darkness while in others, subunits have to shift to and organize the defense at nighttime, having no opportunity to conduct reconnaissance or organize a fire delivery system during hours of light. This situation can arise in the course of an offensive operation, in retrograde movement or as a result of an unsuccessful outcome of a meeting engagement. It goes without saying that the defense is more difficult to organize during nighttime. Subunits will meet with considerable difficulties in choosing defensive positions and developing and organizing these positions. Sometimes defense positions will have to be taken when the enemy has already begun an offensive operation. In this case troops will be required to repulse attacks by the advancing enemy force and build a defensive system at the same time. The shift to the defense in such conditions proceeds in the same battle order that a given subunit was in before the operation began.

Organization of a defensive area at night time includes the same elements as by day: main, reserve, and decoy strongholds; main, reserve, temporary, and decoy line of fire positions for artillery, tanks, and other weapon assets; lines of fire for tank and motorized rifle subunits in infantry fighting vehicles, deployed in the second echelon; lines of deployment for counterattacks; firing positions for roving tanks and artillery pieces; mining areas; reserve deployment areas; switch positions; ambush positions; lines for maneuver; command and control and observation points, etc.

At night time, in the interest of organizing effective perimeter defense and covering the gaps and exposed flanks, a part of weapon assets can take up temporary line of fire positions. The readiness of the fire delivery system at night is contingent on a part of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery pieces taking up line of fire positions, preparation of data for nighttime fire delivery, and the availability of illumination facilities.

Special attention in defense action at night time must be given to illumination. This includes terrain illumination in the interest of reconnaissance and effective engagement of the enemy force; organization of the conduct of counterattacks; blinding an advancing enemy force, its weapon assets, and observation and command and controls points; countering (neutralizing) the enemy's illumination assets; ensuring interaction and synchronization of functions and activities of subunits through effective command and control; designation of lines and routes for maneuver, minefield lanes, areas of artificial obstacles and roadblocks as well as decoy positions, weapon assets and combat action; and development of combat positions.

If the defense is prepared out of contact with an enemy force, lines and fields of illumination are designated and organized by using various containers with combustible materials. Illumination lines can be designated at 300 meter to 500 meter intervals, beginning with the far approaches to the forward edge of the battle area so that the last line is 200 meters to 300 meters from the forward edge of the battle area. Operation of illumination lines is usually remote.

Successful conduct of defensive action at night is impossible without effective neutralization of the enemy's illumination assets. To this end, it is critical to identify the positions of its artillery and mortar batteries firing illumination shells (mines), and take action to suppress them. Action against night-vision devices consists in destroying them together with the objects on which they are installed, or in blinding them.

In organizing effective interaction and synchronization of functions and activities in conditions when nighttime defense is organized in advance, priority is given to establishing the procedure for shifting from daytime to nighttime action. If necessary, measures are taken to reorganize the holding positions and battle order for nighttime action.

At first signs of enemy preparation for attack, action is taken to reinforce the defense, and weapon assets and personnel are put on high alert. Illumination posts periodically illuminate the terrain to observe enemy activities. Night-vision devices are used for the same purpose. Weapon assets deliver fire on concealed approaches to defensive lines.

Enemy attack is repulsed with continual illumination of terrain. In so doing, special attention should be given to covering the flanks since, taking advantage of the darkness, the enemy can penetrate through gaps in battle order and attack the defending force from the flanks and the rear service area. Should the enemy penetrate the defense, a counteroffensive can be mounted. It should be simple in concept, conducted without complicated maneuver and to a small depth. As subunits deploy for counteroffensive, the countering of the enemy's night vision and illumination assets is stepped up. After a successful conduct of a counteroffensive, subunits consolidate their positions, organizing effective fire delivery and illumination.

So, preparation and conduct of defensive action at night time requires commanders and headquarters staff officers to show considerable skills and personnel to display high combat proficiency. Defending troops should be able to take advantage of night time conditions to achieve surprise and concealment in delivering fire against the enemy and misleading it as well as show doggedness and determination in holding combat positions.

Defense in Built-up Areas 

Organization of defense in built-up areas is impacted by: limited visibility and limited fields of fire; the complexity of maneuver with forces and assets and the difficulty of maintaining close interaction and synchronization of functions and activities between the subunits; and the possibility of widespread fires and destruction. All of this sets enhanced requirements on defense organization, conduct of reconnaissance, protection of flanks and boundaries between adjacent units, implementation of measures to counter the enemy's flanking movement, establishment of command and control, and organization of perimeter defense on all levels and in all elements.

In conducting a defense operation in a built-up area, a defense sector (a defense area for a motorized rifle battalion) is designated, comprised of several strongholds (strong-points). In some instances a battalion can defend one or two especially large and hardened buildings and sometimes a whole block. A company defends a stronghold that includes one or several large buildings, sometimes a block. A tank battalion is expedient to be used in the second echelon or in a combined-arms reserve force. To facilitate maneuver, a regiment's second echelon can be deployed not in one but in two areas.

In the event of a linear configuration of a built-up area, its considerable length, and insufficient depth, a regiment's battle order can be built in one echelon with a detailing of a strong combined-arms reserve. Its essential elements could be raiding parties (groups), detailed from second echelons. Artillery groups are created in a smaller composition or there may be none at all. The bulk of artillery assets should be attached to battalions and even companies in order to deliver direct fire. In point-of-resistance defense, in the interest of ensuring their independence, motorized rifle units should be reinforced with tanks, guns, mortars, AT assets, and engineer subunits in amounts larger than usual.

In organizing positions, hardened buildings, located at crossroads, on squares, near bridges, or along thoroughfares, are chosen. The main efforts are concentrated on holding open and sparsely built-up areas that the enemy can use to break through to the center and bisect the battle order of the defending troops. Strongholds should be so organized as to block off wide streets, boulevards, squares, bridges, and crossings over rivers and canals. They are prepared for perimeter defense, ensuring fire coordination between them. Additional stocks of ammunition, food, medicines, and other materiel are created at strongholds.

To ensure maneuver by subunits between neighboring streets and blocks, passages are made within them, and underground communication lines and installations are used. In underground installations that are not used for maneuver, obstacles are set up and fire delivery is prepared on exits from them. On the most likely axes of advance by the enemy force, line of fire positions for tank and motorized rifle units, lines of deployment for counterattacks, and lines of deployment for an AT reserve and a mobile obstacle construction detachment are prepared. To this end, vacant plots of land, broad boulevards, thoroughfares, public gardens, and parks are used.

The fire delivery system in a built-up area should be based on a combination of flank and cross direct fire delivered with all assets, also combined with air strikes and all types of artificial obstacles. Special attention should be given to fire delivery along the streets, on crossroads, approaches to bridges, overpasses, and crossings, approaches to water obstacles and squares, and gaps in between buildings. An important role is played by AT ambushes that are set in narrow lanes, near overpasses, and on major crossroads. AT defense requires thorough organization, using the least built-up districts and tank accessible streets. Especially effective here is fire delivery from roving tanks and guns as well as fire pockets that should be set up in lanes, near overpasses, and on major crossroads.

Airborne assault defense in a built-up area includes an antiaircraft system to effectively engage the enemy's airborne assault forces in the air, prepared artillery fire and fire from other weapon assets in expected assault force landing zones, and action by combined-arms units to destroy the enemy's landed airborne assault force.

Engineer support of defense in a built-up area includes preparation of certain buildings, blocks, and essential installations for defense so as to ensure protection against all types of weapons; setting ambushes and artificial obstacles to deny armor access to the streets; conversion of underground installations and facilities into shelters; and preparation of covert routes to facilitate maneuver with forces and assets.

The system of artificial obstacles should be diversified and closely interconnected with the fire delivery system both at the approaches to a built-up area and within it. The main characteristics of the system of artificial obstacles are as follows: the wide use of debris and roadblocks; a larger than normal use of nonexplosive obstacles; laying minefields and explosive obstacles not only at approaches to a built-up area but also within it, before strongholds, in between them, and in the streets; and the mining of underground communication lines, exits from and entries to them.

Organization of combat service support includes evacuation of the wounded. It is, therefore, necessary to reinforce medical posts with additional personnel, equipment, and materiel supplies Special attention should be given to searching for wounded and sick and providing them with timely medical aid. Infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and tanks can be used to evacuate them.

Stability and continuity of command and control is ensured by putting in place a diversified network of observation posts, bringing command and control points closer to units and subunits, deploying them in cellars and semi-cellars and hardened installations, and organizing effective protection and defense of command and control posts.

Should an enemy force penetrate a built-up area, combat may take on a point-of-resistance-defense character. Units must fight doggedly to hold every strong-point, every building. Even in complete encirclement this compels the enemy to disperse its forces, reducing the pace of advance, limiting its maneuver with fire, and forcing it to commit second echelons and reserves at the very beginning of combat in a built-up area.

Counterattacks can be carried out to regain lost ground or buildings seized by the enemy. Yet limited maneuver impedes participation of considerable assets in the effort. Counterattack in a built-up area consists in storming buildings and is conducted with relatively small assets from the second echelon (reserve) force. In so doing, a moment is chosen when the enemy has not as yet consolidated its positions and put in place a fire delivery system. Underground installations, covert maneuver routes, etc. are used to achieve surprise in launching a counterattack and ensuring that troops attack the enemy's flanks and rear service areas.

Defense in Mountain Areas

Mountainous terrain gives defending troops a certain advantage. Hilltops, spurs, outriders, mountain ranges, and mountain passes serve as convenient lines helping build a multi-tier fire delivery system and facilitating a wide use of artificial obstacles. At the same time, in organizing and conducting defense in mountain areas, difficulties arise from a large number of covert approaches, blind spots, and fields of invisibility. Maneuver with forces and assets is limited by rugged, rough terrain. Meanwhile, an advancing force, by taking advantage of terrain irregularities, can covertly penetrate the flanks and rear service areas of defending troops. So it is necessary to take measures to counter the enemy's enveloping and flanking movement. In all elements, firm perimeter defense must be organized, the flanks and rear service areas reliably protected, and effective reconnaissance and observation ensured.

The system of strong-points in mountainous terrain is set up so as to block off lines and axes of advance that could be used by an attacking force. Strongholds must have close fire coordination. Depending on the configuration of valleys, mountain ridges, passes, and gorges (defiles), subunits can take up defense positions across a broad or narrow valley, along or across a mountain ridge, covering a defile or a gorge. The character of defensive action by subunits will vary, contingent on terrain conditions and enemy action.

In organizing defense of a valley, the main efforts are concentrated on holding commanding heights abutting the valley. A small part of forces and assets can take up defense positions in the valley itself, using various obstacles.

Defense of gorges is organized on approximately the same principle. But in this case priority is given to holding high ground forming an entry into a gorge (choke point) that turns into well fortified strongholds with a multi-tier fire delivery system. Narrow frontage requires greater operational depth. The flanks of defending troops should abut hard-of-access sectors. In the gorge itself, small groups are deployed that use ambushes combined with effective fire delivery.

In organizing defense of a mountain range, the forward edge is usually chosen on a slope facing the enemy force, as close as possible to the foot of the ridge so as to narrow the dead area. In organizing defense positions across a mountain ridge, it is important to take control of the most accessible (vulnerable) point to prevent flanking or enveloping movement by the enemy force. To this end, it is necessary to hold one of several commanding heights on the ridge crest, which is the pivotal element of the entire defense system. Special attention in defending mountain ranges should be given to mountain passes. The bulk of assets should be detailed to hold them. In defending a mountain pass, priority should be given to taking up and holding commanding heights as well as spurs and outriders at the approaches to it. A multi-tier fire delivery system is organized by echeloning the weapons assets on the slopes. Approaches to commanding heights are covered by multi-layered flanking and cross fire from all types of weapons, and fire pockets and ambushes are set at covert approaches.

Development of positions in mountainous terrain is organized with the use of natural and artificial obstacles and debris. Dugout trenches can be used in defending a valley or a mountain plateau.

The fire delivery system is so organized as to eliminate dead, "non-fire" zones before the forward edge. To this end, weapon assets are usually positioned in tiers. A frontal, cross and flank fire delivery system is created. In ambushes, weapons assets are positioned covertly so that they could, by taking advantage of terrain irregularities, effectively engage the enemy force with surprise close-range concentrated fire. Tanks, AT guns, and AT rocket launchers are commonly used at strong-points by troops defending road junctions, exits from valleys, gorges, tunnels, defiles, and crossings over mountain rivers. Line of fire positions for them are so chosen as to be able to effectively engage the enemy at maximum range. Artillery pieces and mortars are used to deliver fire on covert approaches and dead zones before the forward edge as well as in depth.

A penetrating enemy force is effectively engaged with concentrated fire by all weapon assets. Subunits firmly hold strong-points, shifting to perimeter defense. In favorable conditions, a counterattack is mounted.

Defense in Desert Areas

Desert terrain creates considerable difficulties in organization of defense. Vast spaces, flat and open terrain, and the lack of pronounced natural lines makes the choice of defense lines and positions especially difficult. Defense is organized along the most likely axes of advance by the enemy. It is based on holding vital installations. Secondary, hard-of-access sectors are defended by smaller assets and covered with obstacles or are not held by troops at all. In between critical sectors, observation and patrolling is organized, and artillery and air strikes are prepared.

Open, flat terrain facilitates organization of observation and long-range fire delivery. This makes it possible to deploy weapon assets at a large distance, which increases the general depth of defense.

To counter possible flanking and enveloping movement by an advancing force, it is expedient to prepare all defense areas and strongholds for perimeter defense, thoroughly camouflaging them. To this end, positions are so chosen as to be covered from the flanks by natural obstacles (quicksand, saline land, etc.). At strongholds and defense areas, the necessary supplies of water and ammunition are provided. Special attention is given to support and protection of flanks and intermediate positions.

One distinguishing feature of battle order is the detachment of strong reserves, deployed in depth. Subunits conducting defense action in isolation from main forces are reinforced with weapon assets, engineer and radiation, CW and BW reconnaissance groups, and provided with a sufficient supply of materiel and water.

The fire delivery system must ensure effective engagement of the enemy at approaches to defense lines, before the forward edge of the battle area, and on the flanks, also concentrating fire, on short notice, on any sector or axis of threat. Owing to the low density of assets, massed continuous fire zones are only created along separate, most likely axes of advance by the enemy. To make up for a shortage of forces and assets, it is expedient to conduct maneuver with artillery, tank, AT and reserve-force fire on sectors of threat. In critical sectors, flank and cross machine-gun fire is prepared, fire pockets are created, and ambushes set.

In desert terrain, it is exceptionally important to ensure the concealment of the fire delivery system and battle order. To this end, decoy strongholds, line of fire positions, and lines are prepared in depth, in gaps between positions, and on exposed flanks.

In building defense installations, sandbags, mats, and fascine and brushwood of indigenous, locally available materials are used to reinforce the sides of foxholes, dugout shelters, trenches, emplacements, and communication and connecting trenches. Covers and protective shelters are mostly of the light, makeshift kind.

Synchronization of functions and activities includes interaction with adjacent units in effectively engaging the enemy in between defense positions and on exposed flanks; procedure for resisting an advancing enemy force in the process of accomplishing enveloping or flanking movement; procedure for creation of artificial reference points and routes for movement forward by reserve forces toward deployment positions; protection and defense of command and control posts; warning signals (opening and shifting of fire); and measures to protect emplacements, defense installations, and water sources against sand drifting.

Defense in Arctic Areas

The difficult, rough, and rugged terrain of arctic areas, a great number of water obstacles, and a limited number of roads and their poor condition provide favorable conditions for organization of firm and effective defense with relatively small forces and assets. At the same time, it should be taken into account that in winter the trafficability of terrain improves when firm ice forms on rivers, lakes and marshes, so in the cold season it is necessary to organize perimeter defense and ensure effective protection of flanks and intermediate positions.

Both positional and mobile defense can be organized in arctic areas. Position defense should be used when terrain does not favor maneuver, the defense area is not very deep, and the forces and assets are limited while the enemy features high mobility and has air superiority. Defense is organized along the most likely axes of advance, around vital areas, communication nodes, and built-up areas. Sometimes defense can be mounted in iced-over areas to hold and protect airfields and other important installations located on ice or on the coast.

Position defense, however, has a number of flaws, the main one being that in taking up defense lines, areas, and prepared positions, troops are not able to rapidly and effectively respond to shifts in the axis of the main strike by the enemy. Furthermore, a certain measure of isolation of defense areas and positions on the tactical level enables the enemy to make a wide use of enveloping and flanking movement. So defense organization must be based on a flexible combination of positional and mobile methods of defense: determined holding of key sectors of terrain; deeply echeloned battle order along the most likely axes of advance by the enemy, ensuring an effective building up of resistance to an attacking enemy force; close fire coordination between elements of battle order; and delivery of surprise fire by mobile groups and separate assets on the most vulnerable and critical targets and elements of the battle order of the advancing enemy force. In protecting friendly troops, it is necessary to implement a number of measures, the most important of them being the countering of the enemy's reconnaissance efforts to identify the configuration of the forward edge and weapon emplacements. Strongholds are prepared for perimeter defense. There can be large gaps between them, which are covered by fire and obstacles. Special attention is given to creation of fire pockets and traps and the setting of ambushes. In summer, the forward edge is chosen on slopes of commanding heights facing the enemy as well as behind natural AT obstacles. In winter, it is expedient to organize it on a hilltop so as to deny the enemy the possibility to use skis in mounting an attack, and impede action by its tanks. The system of defense positions is built on a combination of strongholds, ambushes, fire pockets, and armor group positions. An adequate combination of an effective fire delivery system with all available weapon assets and a system of artificial obstacles is key to successful defense.

One of the most important tasks in organizing defense in arctic areas is action to counter the enemy's airborne assault forces, air-mobile formations, raiding parties, and hit-and-run units.

NOTES:

(1.) See: Razvitiye taktiki Sukhoputnykh voysk v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne, VAF Publishers, Moscow, 1981, p. 207.

(2.) See: Razvitiye taktiki Sovetskoy Armii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny. 1941-1945, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, p. 332.

(3.) See: Boevoy ustav Sukhoputnykh voysk, Part 2, Batalyon-rota, Voenzidat Publishers, Moscow, 1989, p. 79.

(4.) See: Voennaia mysl', No. 1, 1991, p. 14.

(5.) See: Voennaia mysl', Special issue, February 1985, p. 28.

(6.) See: V.A. Matsulenko, Operativnaya maskirovka, Voenizdat Publishers, Moscow, 1975, pp. 181-198.

(7.) See: Nastavleniye po operativnoy maskirovke (OPMASK-44), Moscow, 1944.

(8.) See: V.A. Matsulenko, op. cit., p. 7.

(9.) See: Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, No. 1, 1981, p. 71.