Tactical intelligence shortcomings in Iraq: restructuring battalion intelligence to win.
At 0800, three individuals approach the gate with information about a known terrorist cell. The unit detained four of their relatives at a traffic control point three days prior and they want to trade the information for the release of their relatives. Since there is no counterintelligence (CI) team at battalion level the battalion intelligence officer (S2) has to gather information. The S2 will take information from all three separately to get their information.
The S2 must determine the legitimacy of their stories by comparing their accounts with those of the four detainees, using pattern analysis and past human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting. The detainees are key because they can validate the information given by the three walk-ins. The detainees do confirm the accounts of the three walk-ups after 4 hours of questioning. The information is validated by the S2.
The S2 will now have to pinpoint the location of the objective area. He can use the source to take him there or the source can pinpoint it on a map, imagery, or pictures. Once the location is pinpointed, the S2 will begin to plan the operations. He plans and develops products in conjunction with the S3 who will issue a warning order (WARNO) to the maneuver element conducting the raid. Once the order is given, the S2 will accompany the element to assist with questioning detainees on the objective, identifying critical information and evidence about the objective, and advising the command element the on ground. Once the detainees and contraband are secure, they move back to the forward operating base (FOB).
It is 0300, there are now six people with valuable information. At 0800 there will be somebody else at the gate to give information. The cycle will continue.
Military Intelligence (MI) assets--organized, equipped, and trained to win a conventional linear war--are failing to provide maneuver battalions with the analyzed intelligence and information needed to conduct effective stability operations and support operations in Iraq. The following article will discuss the shortcomings of tactical intelligence that one battalion task force (TF) experienced during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and provide some recommendations on future organizations, equipment, and training of MI at the tactical level.
Task Force 1-68 Armor operated north of Baghdad as part of the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division. When the TF first moved south from Tuz, Iraq, into the current area of responsibility (AOR) on 25 June 2003, it consisted of two armor companies, one infantry company, a headquarters company (scout and mortar platoons), a separate infantry platoon, a howitzer battery, an engineer platoon, and a civil affairs (CA) team. The TF later lost the howitzer battery, separate infantry platoon and engineer platoon; and the infantry company was detached from December through February 2004.
The TF's AOR was spread over 800 square kilometers and was split by Highway 1, the primary north-south main supply route in Iraq. The main population center is the Tarmiyah district, an outlying agrarian suburb of the Baghdad Governate with an estimated population of 150,000. The AOR also included an area south of the Balad Airfield (Corps logistics support area) that belongs to the Salah Din Governate. With the exception of Highway 1 and a few paved roads, the area is dominated by irrigation canals and dirt roads. The area is host to the homes and farms of a large number of high-ranking Ba'athists, including "Chemical Ali" and others directly related to the former dictator. The population is highly tribal and generally unwilling to work with the coalition, unless coerced (money, force, shame). During the deployment no local leader came forward with relevant information about enemy attackers.
The enemy conducted over 250 attacks in the AOR from 26 June 2003 through March 2004. These included mortar and rocket attacks on FOBs; rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and small arms ambushes, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In addition to attacks on coalition forces, the attackers have targeted contractors, police, local leaders, and soldiers of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). The primary tactical missions of TF 1-68 include raids, cordon and searches, area security, route security, area and route reconnaissance, and mounted and dismounted ambushes.
The TF detained over 700 Iraqis and killed or wounded an unknown number. Additionally, the TF spent nearly 2 million dollars rebuilding 16 schools and irrigation projects in the area. reforming the local government (firing a number of city councilmen, mayors, ministry workers, and police), and recruiting and training both local police and more than 180 CDC soldiers.
The Battalion S2 Section
The standard table of organization and equipment (TOE) for an armor battalion intelligence section is an S2 (35D captain), one Battalion Intelligence Center Coordinator (BICC) (35D second lieutenant), one Senior Intelligence Analyst (96B30), one Intelligence Analyst (96B10), and one S2 NCOIC (19Z50). Only five personnel are authorized to analyze intelligence and produce threat information on a continuous basis.
The battalion S2 section was required to be more detailed and responsive than the brigade S2 and division G2 because of the dynamics and enemy situation in Iraq and the fact that battalion (and below) conducted offensive operations almost daily. It was rare for a brigade or larger size unit to conduct offensive operations. As opposed to conventional top-down intelligence development, the majority of intelligence for the TF operations was originated, developed and refined at the battalion level.
Typically a request for information (RFI) can be sent higher to be answered. This was not the case in Iraq. Information requests were constantly tasked down. The battalion submitted numerous RFIs but the brigade and division intelligence structures were not equipped, capable, or were too overtaxed and could not answer detailed information requirements. For example we could not expect division to tell us if the mayor of our region was facilitating enemy operations. Occasionally, division would be able to provide information pertaining to enemy activities originating from our sector, but the majority of the time it did not have the resolution or assets to dedicate to developing the intelligence. It fell to the battalion S2 to develop intelligence in order to assure successful operations. It was quickly determined that the battalion S2 section was not manned to provide a continuous and maximized intelligence capability.
The 1-68's S2 section was at full TOE strength at all times. It had one organic All Source Analysis System (ASAS) computer. ASAS utilization was limited because there was no connectivity between battalion and brigade until seven months into operations. Even when a link was established, the computer did not perform to its full capability as an ASAS platform because of restricted bandwidth; the S2 was unable to effectively access and leverage division and national assets.
With limited guidance and support from the brigade, the TF managed to develop effective, although resource-intensive, methods to collect information and develop exploitable intelligence. We started with relatively little information. The information that was available was on a macro level and not very helpful. The S2 section generated databases that helped us determine enemy disposition, composition and strength in the AOR. In stability operations and support operations it is very difficult to define the criteria that will lead you to the enemy, so everything seems to be important. Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence, lists the critical variables of a contemporary operational environment (COE) but they were too broad and only provided a baseline from which to start.
The Battalion S2 needs to focus on information that is going to allow him to capture the enemy; a manual cannot define this information because the situation is different for each AOR. Initially, we tried to define indicators of enemy activity; the S2 section tracked everything including traffic patterns, electrical blackouts, flares, light usage, weapons movement, and other standard information such as spheres of influence and HUMINT reporting. The amount of information was overwhelming and unmanageable. Eventually, the requirements were narrowed down to 29 tasks. The seven most important ones are listed in Figure 1 along with the TF action officers who performed the tasks compared to the Army specialty that is most appropriate to perform the task. These tasks consumed the majority of the S2 section's time and were performed on a daily basis. Tasks were assigned by duty position, but with limited manpower every soldier was required to be proficient in each task.
The S2 section spent less than half of its time doing analysis because the specified and implied tasks required in the current threat environment went far beyond its capabilities and resources. The analysis the S2 section did provide was done without the benefit of traditionally available products like doctrinal templates and "off-the-shelf" enemy courses of action (COAs) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The threat situation was so dynamic that there were no tactical pauses for battalions in Iraq and no chance for the S2 section to get ahead in its tasks. Compounding this problem was the fact that most of the actionable intelligence used to plan operations originated within the battalion AOR. Useable enemy situation templates or detailed intelligence about targets from higher regarding the battalion AOR were nonexistent. Battalion AORs were too diverse and the brigade AOR was too large to expect this type of detail from higher headquarters. Occasionally national level assets provided some actionable intelligence, but this information was wrong as often as it was correct. Cooperation between battalion S2 sections sharing boundaries was unusual and limited product support came from brigade or higher.
In addition to the traditional role of analyzing information and creating or refining products in support of operations, the battalion S2 section became the primary collector for the battalion. This is a change from conventional intelligence gathering, which takes place above the battalion level and is filtered down. While every soldier and leader who comes in contact with Iraqis is a potential collector of information, the battalion S2 section collects, sorts, analyzes, links, and packages this information into useable intelligence. On any given day it was not unusual for local civilians, police, ICDC soldiers, contractors, and representatives of other government agencies to show up for scheduled and unscheduled appointments, interviews, and briefings. These people all had different priorities and agendas and all wanted to talk to the S2, CA representative, S3, or commander. The challenges of managing interpreters, separating competing ethnic and religious factions, and deconflicting information were daunting.
As the de facto proponent for information collection in theater, the battalion S2 section was also the principal manager of the intelligence assets employed at the tactical level. These assets included attached or battalion operational control (OPCON) Tactical HUMINT collection teams (THTs), tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs), mobile interrogation teams (MITs), CI teams, Prophet, psychological operations (PSYOP), and ground surveillance radar (GSR). Each of these collection assets must be integrated into the battalion collection plan; the S2 section bears the responsibility for being the subject matter experts for the battalion in terms of synchronizing and emplacing these assets to ensure they are utilized to the fullest extent. Doctrinally, the S3 is in charge of tasking these assets but the S2 advises the S3 on where these assets should go and what to look for to answer the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). Because of these management tasks, the traditional role of battalion S2 in analyzing information and creating or refining products in support of operations became secondary.
One of the most time-consuming tasks of our S2 section was the processing of detainees. Doctrinally, the S1 section has many of the responsibilities in processing enemy prisoners of war (EPWs), but in Iraq all the processing quickly became a requirement of the S2 section because it was intimately involved in detainee operations. We found that many PIRs and information gaps can be answered through detainees.
Processing detainees in a short period of time (the standard is 24 hours) is a daunting task under any circumstance. But in Iraq (where all information and sources are suspect, familial and tribal ties and loyalties seem ubiquitous, and exact locations of targets and identification papers are rarely available), simply determining the accuracy of names is a challenge. The challenges of detainee processing are illustrated in the following scenarios taken from actual experiences during TF 1-68's deployment:
* An informant provides information about an alleged attack cell. The informant gives names and locations of the personnel. A raid is conducted. All of the named individuals (four) are present on the objective and are detained along with two additional personnel (adult males), but no weapons or contraband equipment are found.
* Several independent sources identify a leader or supporter of anti-coalition forces. A raid is conducted and the target is detained along with three of the target's sons, two brothers, and several local sheiks who were meeting at his house at the time of the raid. No weapons or contraband were found.
* Three Iraqis are engaged while attempting to set up an RPG ambush, one is wounded. They abandon their weapons and attempt to leave the area. The blood trail is followed to a house where the wounded Iraqi and five other individuals are found. One is an old man. It is unclear who the two companions of the wounded Iraqi are, and it is unclear if the others found in the house are accomplices or simply "in the wrong place at the wrong time." No weapons or contraband are found. The wounded individual claims to have been shot mistakenly by coalition forces while he was working in his fields.
* Two men are stopped during a mounted patrol. They are carrying diagrams of an improvised rocket launcher. One is clearly more involved, refuses to speak and is belligerent. The second seems weak and confused and more likely to talk.
Under current standing operating procedures (SOPs), all of these individuals must be sent to higher within 24 hours. But do the circumstances surrounding each case warrant these individuals being imprisoned? As important, do some of them have information that could be used by the detaining unit to build link diagrams and develop the intelligence picture in the AOR? Clearly each case is different, but none of the individuals in the scenarios above have much potential to provide significant intelligence. This situation, coupled with the fact that battalions do not receive intelligence about detainees that are sent higher, argues for a more robust interrogation or investigation capability at the battalion level. Not only would this alleviate the large number of "innocent" Iraqis being sent to coalition prison but also it would allow maneuver battalions with a vested interest in reducing attacks and defeating the enemy in their AORs to develop the necessary intelligence. It would also increase the power of the battalion commander in relation to local sheiks and civic leaders because the decision to detain and to set free would lie with the commander most connected to the area.
The battalion detainee screening process highlights the necessity and importance of the S2 section's ability to make recommendations to the battalion commander about who is detained and who is released. The commander should be able to look a detainee's family in the face and feel comfortable with the explanation for why their son or daughter was detained. The reason should not be, "We didn't have time to figure it out so we sent him on." The only way to accomplish this is through interrogating, screening, or tactically questioning the detainees at the battalion.
The screening process (tactically questioning) requires at least two hours for each detainee. This is just to get basic screening data and information. If the detainee is found to be of higher intelligence value or involved in terrorist activity, a detainee packet is filled out on the individual. This can take up to three hours depending on available evidence. An incomplete packet often means a detainee is refused for processing by higher headquarters. If the intelligence is immediate and actionable, the detainee is of more value to the battalion in its AOR. The detainee can be used to positively identify (PID) terrorists, show safe houses and weapons caches, or identify other activities that are of military value to the battalion.
All of this takes time, and all of these things are impossible when a detainee goes higher. The lack of understanding about battalion intelligence concerns and overburdened interrogation teams at brigade and division levels guarantees information cannot be exploited in a timely manner at higher levels. Unfortunately, battalions are not equipped to hold detainees for extended periods of time and recent events suggest that the centralized detention system in place during the past twelve months was flawed. Empowered battalions with a more robust and experienced Military Police (MP) and HUMINT capability could certainly help alleviate the overcrowded and overburdened detention system; conducting interrogation as soon after detention and as close to the alleged incident as possible has been proven more effective.
Doctrinal Note: The issues arising from personnel detention and evacuation in the current complex operational environment are being addressed by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) in FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, and by the U.S. Military Police (MP) School in FM 3-19.40, Internment and Resettlement Operations. An MI and MP Internment, Resettlement and Interrogation (IRI) Coordination Checklist is pending. Joint Publication 3-63, Joint Doctrine for Detainee Operations, is also under development. These documents will refine the doctrine and procedures for detaining and evacuating detainees.
Tactical HUMINT Collection Team (THT)
As currently configured, THTs canvass the countryside in Iraq to answer PIRs and gather information for brigade and higher headquarters. They are supposed to make coordination with the unit in whose AOR they plan to operate; but this only occurs with varying degrees of success. In the case of TF 1-68, on more than one occasion, a THT operating in the TF AOR came under direct fire attack without the TF tactical operation center (TOC) knowing that the team was even operating in the area. On other occasions, the THT spent hours questioning sources and gathering information that was either already known to the TF S2, was irrelevant, or was beyond its useful significance. Typically THTs operating in the TF area spent three to four hours a day (which included travel time), two to three days a week, developing information. For the final four months of the deployment, the THT did not come to the TF area because of maintenance and security concerns. This experience may not be typical, but the capabilities embedded in a THT are too valuable not to be used more efficiently. Despite attempts to have the THT attached to the TF or to focus its reconnaissance priorities, it continued to operate on its own timeline and with its own agenda.
Since tactical information and intelligence collection occurred almost exclusively at the TF level, it makes sense that the THT work for the TF commander. In some cases it may even be appropriate to attach the THT down to the main-effort company. In this way, the THT is available to develop intelligence whenever the opportunity arises from walk-ins, after enemy engagements, or during actions on the objective. If the team is embedded in the TF, its security is inherent and it will have the opportunity to circulate throughout the battle during normal TF operations as well as to participate in planned operations and questioning of detainees.
The bottom line is that every battalion TF needs the capabilities that a THT brings to the battlefield. The amount of combat information and HUMINT reporting that was received at battalion and below level was overwhelming when compared to the small number of THTs operating in theater. All of this information is being lost on a daily basis because of lack of training and assets at battalion level. To fully exploit all combat information and HUMINT reports, a 97B must be at battalion level.
Doctrinal Note: Tactical HUMINT team employment will be phased out in favor of HUMINT collection teams (HCTs). A THT is a task-organized element drawing from mainly HUMINT and CI personnel. THTs developed out of the need for trained personnel with language skills to conduct operations. The shortage of trained HUMINT personnel led to the augmentation of HUMINT teams with CI personnel. As the concept and employment evolved, various occupational specialties were added to and taken from the THTs. HCTs will be organized with three HUMINT personnel. The HCT capability at the brigade level is three THTs and an operational management team (OMT). The HCT capability at the Unit of Employment X (UEx) echelon is more robust than the current division. The result is greater numbers of HCTs operating in a brigade area of operation (AO) and a greater opportunity for HCTs to be task organized to the battalion level.
Mobile Interrogation Team (MIT)
The MIT is a useful asset that brought a much needed capability to deployed battalions. Unfortunately, there are too few in theater and because of their scarcity, they are rarely found below the brigade level. When they are "pushed down" to battalions, their usefulness is limited by the general lack of knowledge about the specific AOR. This is not their fault; battalion AORs are too diverse for one team to be "read in" on the many cells and personalities involved.
In the experience of TF 1-68 Armor, much of the collected information and intelligence was based on personal relationships built over time, coupled with a reputation of fairness and the demonstrated ability and willingness to go after targets regardless of social status. An interrogation team, with an experienced interrogator incorporated into the existing S2 section, is a necessity if the intelligence picture in Iraq is to improve and relieve some of the inefficiency due to the existing interrogation process.
Doctrinal Note: The MIT is a task-organized element formed and utilized at the direction of the commander. Unless a unit is equipped with excess personnel, the formation of an MIT draws organic personnel from assigned duties. The benefits of an MIT must be weighed against the degradation to tasks normally conducted by the team members.
Other Collection Assets
TUAV. TF 1-68 used the TUAV extensively during OIF. Unfortunately, for all the times it was used, it provided no actionable information or intelligence. During the one event that it was actually positioned to "see" (the burning of a police station), the grid it transmitted was over 1,000 meters away from the actual target it was observing; 1,000 meters is a significant distance in an urban environment. The operators had a difficult time identifying what they were looking at and because of a lack of confidence in the picture being sent, no forces were sent to counter the threat. In fact, the event was over by the time the situation became clear. A large part of the problem is that the operators were not familiar with the terrain they were viewing or the operational significance of what they were observing. Having unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a trained teams at the battalion level would increase this effectiveness.
GSR. The terrain, coupled with the reality of a battlefield busy with civilian traffic, made GSRs less than effective. Often these teams were simply used as static observation posts. One such team operating in the TF 1-68 area, not task organized to the TF, performed this job well until it made contact with the enemy. Once in contact with the enemy, the team reacted, received a casualty, and evacuated the area, leaving the reaction force and arriving aircraft to identify and eventually kill the attacker.
Again, the ad hoc relationship and (apparently) insufficient training of an MI asset resulted in the ineffective employment of this asset. If troop strength tradeoffs must be made, the addition of more HUMINT capability at the expense of GSR teams would certainly pay immediate dividends. The actual GSR could be given to scout platoons to use when appropriate.
Doctrinal Note. GSRs will be absent from the heavy brigade combat team (HBCT) and the infantry brigade combat team (IBCT).
PSYOP. TF 1-68 had a PSYOP team attached for the duration of the deployment. From the TF perspective this is one asset that was used to its fullest capacity. The three-man PSYOP team regularly performed human and signals collection, product translation, and information operations (IO) production and broadcast. The team was represented at all of the scheduled targeting meetings and was attached to the battalion main effort company for the majority of the deployment. The PSYOP team was the most responsive external asset the TF employed.
Restructuring the Battalion S2 Section
To fully maximize the exploitation of intelligence and to make the troop-to-tasks ratio more manageable, the battalion S2 section needs to have intelligence capabilities similar to those of brigade and division. In the previous chart, five of six critical tasks were conducted by soldiers without the proper military occupational specialty (MOS) or training. The majority of our time was spent dealing with humans; and most battalion S2 sections have no organic assets to deal with these types of operations. Additionally, the S2 section is not properly resourced to operate continuous operations in a hostile environment. Figure 2 outlines a recommended TOE change to properly staff a battalion S2 section for success, not just in Iraq but anywhere in the COE.
Now in Iraq and in the future anywhere in the COE, tactical-level intelligence will have strategic relevance, and tactical level engagements with strategic importance will continue to be won or lost at the TF level and below. In order to better support the maneuver TF commanders, MI assets must be reorganized, retrained and, in some instances, re-equipped. (The increase in manpower within the battalion S2 section under the current HBCT TOE is a step in the right direction but the correct skill identifiers, rank, and experience need to accompany it as well.) The Army must recognize that in the current environment with the proliferation of technology to lower and lower levels, actionable information and intelligence with strategic relevance comes from the bottom up and is not generated by centralized and stovepiped assets. The intelligence community will continue to be limited and severely challenged until the focus is placed where it needs to be--battalion level. The MI community's challenge is to transform itself quickly or risk a slide towards irrelevance at the tactical level.
Doctrinal Note: The S2 sections of the combined arms battalions (CABs) of the HBCT and IBCT with an authorization of ten positions will be more robust than those of current maneuver battalions. See Figure 3 for a breakout of those positions.
CI representation begins at the BCT level in the brigade S2X, a sub-element of the S2 section. The increased presence of task-organized HCTs at the battalion level and the prioritization of assets facilitated by the S2X will support greater HUMINT and CI capabilities and levels of support. Additionally, the S2X will facilitate integration and coordination of HUMINT or CI assets to maximize efficiency and economy of force.
The S2 will remain the subject matter expert on intelligence capabilities, synchronization, and employment, but, ultimately, the commander drives intelligence. It is at the commander's discretion to sacrifice the analytical process of long-term analysis in order to attain short-term goals. It is also the commander's prerogative to allocate limited staff specialties to guard prisoners in the pursuit of combat information rather than devote the staff's time to pattern and link analysis in support of threat model development. The additional personnel in the CAB will now allow the commander to better manage the risks involved in shifting from long-term collection and analysis to short-term combat information collection.
In the near-term, USAIC&FH has dispatched Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to assist deployed and deploying units by training their personnel in the conduct of information collection and intelligence analysis based on the intensity and unique challenges of the current operational environment. (See the article on page 52 by Mr. Masterson and Major McDeed entitled "USAIC&FH Task Force Modularity MTT Mission.")
In the mid-term, the Department of the Army formed TF Actionable Intelligence to determine the Army's future intelligence needs and to identify a way ahead to fulfill these requirements. As the Army reforms and employs its new BCTs, the concepts developed by TF Actionable Intelligence will foster an integrated intelligence capability allowing commanders at lower echelons to collect and process information into intelligence that they can exploit faster than ever before. (See the article on page 43 by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Iwicki entitled "CSA's Focus Area 16: Actionable Intelligence: One Year Later.")
Figure 1. Task Breakout for TF 1-68 S2 Section TASK ACTION OFFICER Participate in raids as the S2 subject matter expert to advise 35D Tactical commanders and expedite combat Intelligence decisions on the ground. Officer Produce a packet for each detainee S2 to be sent higher that had 35D Tactical multiple sworn statements, Intelligence pictures, evidence, a Coalition Officer Provisional Authority worksheet, inventories of all personal items, and any targeting (linkage) that should accompany each detainee--roughly a 2-hour process for each detainee at a minimum. Tactically question all detainees S2 and civilians on the battlefields 35D Tactical who may have been involved with Intelligence an attack or have information of Officer value. Maintain and update a Detain/ BICC Suspect/Protect list and 35D Tactical supporting database. Intelligence Officer Maintain an area to accommodate 19Z50 detainees 24 hrs a day 7 days a NCOIC week with food, water, shelter, and medical care if necessary. Ensure all seized propaganda, 96B30 paperwork, and any other relevant Senior written information was translated Intelligence and analyzed in a timely manner. Analyst TASK REMARKS Participate in raids as the Only one DIV directed mission and subject matter expert to advise three BDE missions were executed commanders and expedite combat during stability operations; decisions on the ground. nearly all actionable intelligence was produced at the BN level . Produce a packet for each detainee DIV and BDE's G2/S2 sections do to be sent higher that had not process detainees. All multiple sworn statements, written work is done at BN, and pictures, evidence, a Coalition the detainees are handed over to Provisional Authority worksheet, DIV MPs. inventories of all personal items, and any targeting (linkage) that should accompany each detainee-roughly a 2-hour process for each detainee at a minimum. Tactically question all detainees DIV and BDE G2/S2 sections are and civilians on the battlefields not in the middle of the battle who may have been involved with and have HUMINT collection teams an attack or have information of assigned to deal with these value. issues. Maintain and update a Detain/ Detain/Suspect/Protect lists are Suspect/Protect list and developed from bottom up; 99% of supporting database. the names tracked at BN will be derived from HUMINT at BN level and below. BDE and DIV lists will be derived from the bottom and the top; 99% of the BN targets will come from a BN Detain list. Maintain an area to accommodate BDE and DIV S2 sections do not detainees 24 hrs a day 7 days a have to worry about detaining week with food, water, shelter, anyone. All of these specified and medical care if necessary. and implied tasks are handled at the BN level. Ensure all seized propaganda, BDE and DIV S2 sections do not paperwork, and any other relevant understand the value of seized written information was translated propaganda or documents nor are and analyzed in a timely manner. they involved in the processing. Valuable information is being thrown away or bypassed because of lack of assets at lower levels. Only someone with an intimate understanding of their AO could identify what is important. TASK Required MOS Participate in raids as the S2 subject matter expert to advise 35D Tactical commanders and expedite combat Intelligence decisions on the ground. Officer Produce a packet for each detainee 97E HUMINT to be sent higher that had Collector & multiple sworn statements, 95B pictures, evidence, a Coalition Military Provisional Authority worksheet, Police inventories of all personal items, and any targeting (linkage) that should accompany each detainee-roughly a 2-hour process for each detainee at a minimum. Tactically question all detainees 97E and civilians on the battlefields HUMINT who may have been involved with Collector an attack or have information of value. 97B Maintain and update a Detain/ Counterintell- Suspect/Protect list and igence (CI) supporting database. Agent Maintain an area to accommodate 95B detainees 24 hrs a day 7 days a Military week with food, water, shelter, Police and medical care if necessary. Ensure all seized propaganda, 97E HUMINT paperwork, and any other relevant Collector & written information was translated 37F PSYOP and analyzed in a timely manner. Specialist Figure 2. Recommended TOE Changes to a Battalion S2 Section Duty Title Rank MOs Duty Description # Personnel Required S2 CPT 35D Primary intelligence 1 officer NCOIC MSG 19Z50 NCOIC 1 S2X 1LT 35D Manages HUMINT 2 (day and database night shifts) BICC 2LT 35D Assistant S2 2 (day and night shifts) HUMINT Enlisted 97E BN HUMINT collector 2 (day and Collector night shifts) Translator Enlisted/ 09L/Civ Translator aide 2 (day and Civilian night shifts) CI Team SSG/SFC 97B30/40 Conduct CI 2 (day and operations night shifts) Senior SSG/SFC 96B30/40 Senior enlisted 1 Analyst analyst Analyst SPC 96B10 Assistant to 2 (day and senior analyst night shifts) Analyst SPC 96B10 Database manager 2 (day and night shifts) Total 17 Figure 3. Combined Arms Battalion S2 Section 1 X 35D 0-3 S2 1 X 35D 0-2 Assistant S2 1 X 11B E-7 S2 NIOIC 1 X 96B E-6 Intelligence Sergeant 2 X 96B E-5 Intelligence Analyst 2 X 96B E-4 Intelligence Analyst 2 X 96B E-3 Intelligence Analyst Equipment ASAS-Light Total (2/0/8/10) Total MI (2/0/7/9)
Major Bill Benson is currently the XO, 1-68 Armor, 3d BC T, 41D, and served in Iraq as the Battalion S3. He received a BA from the University of New Hampshire and an MA from Tennessee Technological University. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College, Infantry Advanced Course and Armor Basic Course. He has served in various command and staff positions in 1-7 CAV at Ft. Hood and 3d ACR at Ft. Bliss. He also has served as AC/RC trainer supporting the 278th ACR in Tennessee and briefly as Russian Foreign Area Officer.
CPT Sean C. Nowlan and MAJ Bill Benson both served with TF 1-68 AR BN, 3 BCT, 41D (M), during OIF 1. CPT Nowlan has served as the 1-68BN S2 for 2-1/2 years and prior to that was branch-detailed Infantry and assigned to 1-508 (ABCT) in Vicenza, Italy. His military education includes IOBC, MIOBC, and the MICCC. CPT Nowlan has a Bachelor of Arts degree in Criminology from Auburn University.
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|Author:||Benson, Bill; Nowlan, Sean|
|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Oct 1, 2004|
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