TURKMENISTAN - Saparmurat Niyazov.

Niyazov was born on Feb. 19, 1940 into a poor worker's family. His father was killed in World War II. During the 1948 earthquake in Ashgabat, he lost the remaining members of his family. He grew up in an orphanage and subsequently lived with distant relatives. He graduated as an electrical engineer from the Leningrad Polytechnical Institute in 1966.

After working at the Bezmeinskaya power plant in Turkmenistan, Niyazov rose in the ranks of the local Communist Party. In 1985 he was made prime minister as a reward for his work and was elected First Secretary of the Central Committee of the local Communist Party, the highest state and party post. On Jan. 13, 1990, he became chairman of the Supreme Soviet and in October he was elected the republic's first president. On Oct. 27, 1991, Turkmenistan became independent for the first time in its history.

A Russophile educated as a staunch Communist, Niyazov has a tight grip on the reins of power. Described as "the worst of the worst" in a US congressional hearing in 2000, he has given himself the title of "Akbar Turkmenbashi" (the great father of the Turkmen people). In Turkey people have had Mustapha Kemal as their father, Ataturk, for seven decades. At official functions, his aides wear gold pins in their lapels embossed with Niyazov's portrait.

The Turkmen government on April 19 said it was in talks with the Russian energy giant Gazprom to raise exports of natural gas by two-thirds over the next three years to 50 BCM/y by 2009. On Sept. 5, after months of hard bargaining, Gazprom finally agreed to pay $100/000 CM. Russia, mainly through Gazprom, has extended its reach into the Central Asian gas sector via a series of carefully crafted bilateral agreements. This year China and Pakistan struck agreements with Niyazov to import Turkmen gas through pipelines to be built which will also supply Afghanistan and India. There is significant potential in Turkmenistan to provide Europe with "alternative (non-Russian) gas for many years (see gmt14TurkmGasExptsOct2-06). After Niyazov has gone, Gazprom may find its hegemony over Turkmen gas exports seriously challenged.

Niyazov's dominance of Turkmenistan was extended in 2005 after purges in the petroleum industry and a wholesale reorganisation of the energy sector "to eliminate corruption". There were some changes in 2005 to the constitution aimed at providing a more orderly succession after Niyazov has gone.

Niyazov has repeatedly suggested that a presidential election might be held in 2008. But the People's Council session held in October 2005 decided this would not even be discussed for at least three years. The absence of any domestic parties other than the ruling group or credible opposition in exile suggests Niyazov will be in power until he dies. He is not in good health. The constitutional position in the event of his death in office remains unclear, adding to fears that any succession struggle would be disorganised and violent.

There have been some changes to rectify this by reducing the age and ethnic barriers to the presidency, leading to speculation that Niyazov's son, Murat (who is only half-Turkmen), is being groomed for the top post. But Murat's reputation as a playboy and his lack of tribal support mean he is unlikely to remain in office for long. Any prolonged succession struggle may lead to federalisation of the country along regional and tribal boundaries. This is likely to seriously affect the petroleum sector because the major fields are in the south-west (Yomut region) and the south-east (Ersari and Mary Teke).

Government institutions are dominated by the Ahal Teke tribe based in Ashgabat. In the absence of a strong central figure such as Niyazov, the government might find it difficult to retain control over oil and gas fields. Even under Niyazov, senior oil and gas officials have favoured their own tribes and embezzled millions of dollars before central government has taken action.

The energy sector was thoroughly purged by Niyazov between May 2005 and March 2006. This involved dismissal and imprisonment of leading officials, followed by reorganisation of the sector. Key dismissals included:

Yolly Gurbanmuradov: deputy prime minister, de facto head of the oil and gas sector and "face" of the industry to foreign companies, previously regarded as one of the few "untouchable" officials. He was dismissed and imprisoned in May 2005 for embezzlement.

Saparmamed Valiyev, head of state oil firm TurkmenNeft; Ilyas Chariyev, head of state gas firm TurkmenNefteGaz; and Guymurat Esenov, head of the Turkmenbashi refinery on the Caspian coast. They were all dismissed in May 2005 and given long prison sentences for embezzlement and other crimes.

Rejep Saparov, head of the presidential staff and considered an "untouchable", was fired in July 2005 and imprisoned for 20 years for bribery and nepotism.

Guichnazar Tachnazarov, Gurbanmuradov's replacement as minister for oil and gas, was dismissed in October 2005 and accused of embezzling $290m.

Amangeldy Pudakov, head of Turkmenbashi refinery, was fired for embezzlement in March 2006.

Niyazov, in removing some of the most high-profile officials, retains control of the petroleum sector. Replacements have generally been from non-Teke areas. He always feels the need to maintain a tribal balance in this sector. But the bureaucracy is running dangerously low on competent personnel, accentuated by promotion of unsuitable figures. He has been concerned that senior officials have been bleeding the state dry. Recent pension cuts indicate that the state budget may be facing a fiscal crisis. Key elements of the reorganisation:

TurkmenNefteGaz has been brought under the direct control of the oil and gas ministry. Oil export-trading is the reserve of the State Commodities Exchange. Gas export-trading is the reserve of TurkmenGaz, also responsible for drilling operations. The Turkmenbashi refining complex co-ordinates all refinery and export procedures.

Niyazov in April paid an important visit to Beijing, which led to the signing of several accords, including one for construction of a 30 BCM/y gas pipeline by 2009/10 linking the two countries. This project will take gas from the Urtabulok gas condensate fields in eastern Turkmenistan to western China, providing early gas for an internal Chinese pipeline eastwards to Guangzhou, Shanghai and the Yangtze River delta. The Chinese government in December 2005 agreed to make 25-year low-interest loans for the purchase of 50 new drilling rigs and the upgrading of refineries.

Russia's gas agreements with Central Asian states will enable Gazprom to meet its contracts to supply Europe and allow it to delay costly development of big Arctic gas fields. Russia provides security to the incumbent regimes in Central Asia. Russian President Vladimir Putin does not raise uncomfortable questions over human rights or democratisation, and Russian forces would, if necessary, be made available to prop up the existing political order.