TURKEY - The Political Atmosphere Is Changing.

The main impetus for the change in Turkish political conduct has come from public opinion. After a decade of repeated government changes, coup warnings, corruption scandals and economic uncertainty, the Turkish people voted in Ecevit in 1999 with a surprisingly strong majority. On the one hand it signalled their exasperation with the bigger mainstream parties - the True Path Party and Motherland Party - and on the other it showed that they were not in favour of the Islamists either.

For its part, the Turkish military establishment continued to pull strings from behind the scenes whenever they felt that the Kemalist secular ideal was in danger. As such, the military showed little mercy in getting the Refah Party and its leader Necmettin Erbakan cut out of the political mainstream.

Today Turkish politicians and generals realise that the key to the country's future prospects is political stability. And there are growing indications that they are acting on this realisation. The latest example is their choice of president, which reflects a wise compromise among the various political groupings in the 550-seat Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA, the parliament). One of the reasons for the compromise was that, if they had not been able to agree, elections would have had to be held again. This is something which none of the political parties want at present.

Nevertheless, the choice of Sezer as president has sent several positive signals. Because he is a compromise candidate, everybody is unhappy with Sezer for one reason or another. Yet they also find him acceptable for the same reason, i.e. he does not have a power base of consequence nor any ambitions to be a party politician despite his relative youth.

Whether this translates into stability in the coming years will depend on the way Sezer handles his role after current President Suleyman Demirel steps down on May 16. Most observers feel that he will fit in well, because of his ability to straddle different political orientations at the same time while maintaining an image of integrity.

In terms of political liberalisation, Sezer is an ideal candidate. His most famous comment to date is the one he made on April 26, 1999: "Turkey should make necessary alterations in the constitution and laws in order to harmonise with global norms. Articles incompatible with freedom of expression should be changed". He pointed out that "Turkey has accepted an individual application mechanism to the European Human Rights Commission and the commission's rulings are binding...There is a need to harmonise Turkey's legal principles with the convention". Stressing that "basic rights and freedoms were limited in the 1982 constitution", which was formulated after a military coup, he listed a number of areas that needed alteration, such as the anti-terrorism law, regulations on political parties, and the quasi-military state security courts which mostly prosecute Kurdish, Islamist and leftist dissidents (see his profile in News Service, Vol. 52, No. 19).

In light of his background, the EU welcomed Sezer's appointment. Although it remains unclear whether Turkey will be able to deliver the changes required in upgrading basic rights and freedoms soon, the overall trend is positive. In December 1999, speaking to parliamentary deputies, Ecevit had pledged his government would do its utmost to solve territorial disputes with Greece ahead of a 2004 deadline set by the EU for a negotiated settlement on the status of the Aegean Sea dividing the two NATO members. In addition, he promised that Turkey would work to meet all of the EU's conditions for full membership.

Some of the conditions include expanding political freedoms and treating minorities in accordance with human and basic rights principles accepted throughout the EU. This may be less difficult for Turkey at present, given that it has virtually crushed the Kurdish separatist rebellion, but it still remains a very tricky issue. Turkish leaders have been reluctant even to admit that the Kurds form a minority, referring to them as "mountain Turks".

This attitude is changing, and senior figures such as Foreign Minister Ismail Cem and Motherland Party leader Mesut Yilmaz have spoken of the need to allow more freedom for the Kurds. There have also been calls for the military to ease the very tough martial law in the provinces of South-East Anatolia, where the Kurdish rebellion has been concentrated.

Although there is a general sentiment among political leaders in favour of relaxing draconian laws dating back to the 1982 constitution, not much has been done to change things. There are more than a dozen bills pending that would toughen penalties for torture, ease restraints on free speech, eliminate the death penalty, bolster efforts to combat organized crime and bring more democracy and transparency to the election process.

From the EU perspective, the way in which Turkey deals with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan would be a test case. A Turkish court sentenced Ocalan to death on treason charges in June 1999. An appeals court upheld the verdict in November 1999, but Turkish leaders have indicated that Ocalan's life will most likely be spared in line with EU demands that the death sentence be abolished.

It is important to note that, since Ecevit became premier, the military establishment has once again moved quietly into the shadows as far as Turkish politics are concerned. Most observers are confident that they will remain in the shadows, as long as the threat of an "Islamic takeover", however mildly packaged, does not loom on the political horizon. So far that does not appear likely. But the military has rebuffed efforts to bring it under civilian control; in January 1999 the military dismissed suggestions that the powerful General Staff be placed under the authority of the Defense Ministry.

For its part, the Refah Party's successor, Virtue Party, has not shown an inclination to confront the military establishment. They are well aware that they, too, could be banned. This may explain to some extent their support for Sezer's presidency. Virtue leaders may be hoping that, if he succeeds in reforming the legal system and expanding political freedoms, the party would once again get a shot at forming a government. Such a turn of events is unlikely, the observers say, though not impossible.