Printer Friendly
The Free Library
22,741,889 articles and books

Synthetic multi-sector CBOS.

Since late 1999, CBOs referencing structured product have been an established part of the investment landscape, representing over a third of total CBO CBO

See: Collateralized Bond Obligation.
 issuance. The major drivers behind this growth are the stable spreads, minimal event risk, nearly non-existent defaults, relatively stable credit migration and enhanced diversity of the underlying collateral. We will use the term "multi-sector CBOs" to label CBOs referencing predominantly pre·dom·i·nant  
1. Having greatest ascendancy, importance, influence, authority, or force. See Synonyms at dominant.

 structured product, although the name "ABS (Automatic Backup System) See backup program.  CBO" is also commonly used. Multi-sector CBOs reference some combination of structured product (e.g., ABS, CMBS CMBS

See: Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities
, MBS See Mb/sec.

MBS - mobile broadband services
 and CDOs themselves), with a small bucket A reserved amount of memory that holds a single item or multiple items of data. Bucket is somewhat synonymous to "buffer," although buffers are usually memory locations for incoming data records, while buckets tend to be smaller holding areas for calculations. See hash table, buffer and variable.  often allocated to investment grade and high yield bonds and leveraged loans.

In this article, we evaluate structured product collateral as a candidate for synthetic multi-sector CBOs.


There are myriad Myriad is a classical Greek name for the number 104 = 10 000. In modern English the word refers to an unspecified large quantity.

The term myriad is a progression in the commonly used system of describing numbers using tens and hundreds.
 collateral combinations in multi-sector CBOs. However, the two principal structure types are cash and synthetic. The traditional cash structure is the most visible in the market, because cash deals are almost always publicly rated and widely advertised. The synthetic variety falls into the category of tranched portfolio default swaps or CLNs, which allow investors to leverage a well-diversified portfolio Well-diversified portfolio

A portfolio that includes a variety of securities so that the weight of any security is small. The risk of a well-diversified portfolio closely approximates the systematic risk of the overall market, and the unsystematic risk of each security has been
 of credits without exposure to interest rate, price and collateral sourcing risks normally associated with cash CBOs. Many portfolio default transactions are unfunded, with tranched participations swapped out swapped out - swap  to counterparties Counterparties

The parties on either side of an interest rate swap or a currency, equity or commodity swap, or to an options or futures position.
 off balance sheet. Further, since many tranches Tranches

A piece, portion or slice of a deal or structured financing. This portion is one of several related securities that are offered at the same time but have different risks, rewards and/or maturities. "Tranche" is the French word for "slice".
 are unrated, most of the issuance has fallen under the radar This article is about the magazine. For other uses, see Under the Radar (disambiguation).

Under the Radar is an American magazine that bills itself as "The solution to music pollution." It features interviews with accompanying photo-shoots.
 screen, making this type of structure substantially less visible than the cash format.

The two principal motivations for issuing multi-sector CBOs are arbitrage arbitrage: see foreign exchange.

Business operation involving the purchase of foreign currency, gold, financial securities, or commodities in one market and their almost simultaneous sale in another market, in order to profit from price
 and capital relief. Whereas the former is structured in either the cash or synthetic format, the latter principally relies upon synthetic structuring. It is the high funding cost in the cash alternative that requires managers to target a weighted average rating factor (WARF WARF Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
WARF Wide Aperture Research Facility
WARF Wartime Active Replacement Factors
WARF weighted-average risk factor
WARF Wartime Attrition and Replacement Factors
WARF Whylie Animal Rescue Foundation
) in the BBB BBB

A medium grade assigned to a debt obligation by a rating agency to indicate an adequate ability to pay interest and repay principal. However, adverse developments are more likely to impair this ability than would be the case for bonds rated A and above.
 area. Therefore, CBO managers specialized spe·cial·ize  
v. spe·cial·ized, spe·cial·iz·ing, spe·cial·iz·es

1. To pursue a special activity, occupation, or field of study.

 in buying subordinated structured product tranches are ideally suited for running a traditional multi-sector CBO fund. However, with a substantially lower funding cost in the synthetic format, it is possible to achieve an adequate arbitrage with an AAA/AA+ WARF. Of course, higher WARF multi-sector CBOs can have substantial leverage (e.g., less equity, or first loss protection), which further reduces the funding cost. Lastly, many synthetic transactions are more passively managed and therefore involve significantly lower, if any, management fees, which again enhances the equity IRR IRR

In currencies, this is the abbreviation for the Iranian Rial.

The currency market, also known as the Foreign Exchange market, is the largest financial market in the world, with a daily average volume of over US $1 trillion.

The ability to invest the majority of the collateral in AAA AAA: see American Automobile Association.

(Triple A) A common single-cell battery used in a myriad of electronic devices of all variety. Like its double A (AA) cousin, it provides 1.5 volts of DC power. When used in series, the voltage is multiplied.
 and AA structured product greatly reduces sourcing risk in synthetic multi-sector CBOs. With over $5 trillion One thousand times one billion, which is 1, followed by 12 zeros, or 10 to the 12th power. See space/time.

(mathematics) trillion - In Britain, France, and Germany, 10^18 or a million cubed.

In the USA and Canada, 10^12.
 of senior structured product notes outstanding (see appendix for supply figures) and financial institutions seeking regulatory and economic capital relief for this asset class, we foresee fore·see  
tr.v. fore·saw , fore·seen , fore·see·ing, fore·sees
To see or know beforehand: foresaw the rapid increase in unemployment.
 robust issuance of synthetic multi-sector CBOs in the years to come. To the extent the recent terrorist attacks dampen CDO (Collaborative Data Objects) A programming interface from Microsoft for accessing MAPI-based e-mail, calendaring and scheduling servers. Originally called "OLE Messaging" and "Active Messaging," CDO wraps the Enhanced MAPI library into a COM object that provides the  issuance, we believe any decline will be minimal for a few reasons. First, among all collateral going into CBOs, structured product is the most stable and free of event risk. Second, synthetic multi-sector CBOs focus their buying on the highest rated tranches of structured product. Lastly, we believe the need for insurance companies to obtain alternative sources of funding off balance sheet in the wake of large P&C losses will result in additional securitization Securitization

The process of creating a financial instrument by combining other financial assets and then marketing them to investors.

Mortgage backed securities are a perfect example of securitization.

May also be spelled as "securitisation.
 of structured product via multi-sector CBOs.


Between January 2000 and August 2001, $25 billion of cash multi-sector CBOs had been issued in 60 transactions. The first publicly rated multi-sector cash flow deal--the $300 million DASH--was issued in late 1999 when the cash arbitrage spread for subordinated structured product was near today's level of approximately 140 bps. Despite a tightening arbitrage spread in February 2000 as Y2K See Y2K problem and Y2K compliant.

Y2K - Year 2000
 fears started subsiding sub·side  
intr.v. sub·sid·ed, sub·sid·ing, sub·sides
1. To sink to a lower or normal level.

2. To sink or settle down, as into a sofa.

3. To sink to the bottom, as a sediment.

, issuance took off and has held relatively steady ever since. Exhibit 1 shows monthly issuance volume in dollars (bars) and by number of deals (lines).


Over this period, an average of three deals have been issued per month, totaling about $1.25 billion per month. In fact, the only month to have no issuance was July 2000. Year to date through August 2001, $11.5 billion of cash multi-sector CBOs have been issued, an annual run rate of $17.2 billion--29% above last year's $13.4 billion of issuance. We expect multi-sector CBO issuance to continue to account for at least 30-40% of total CDO issuance, primarily due to the high defaults being experienced in both high grade and high yield corporate collateral, the competing asset class. The major threat to future cash multi-sector CBO issuance is sourcing risk due to the dependence on subordinated structured product to earn a high arbitrage spread. However, managers have recently somewhat circumvented this supply constraint Constraint

A restriction on the natural degrees of freedom of a system. If n and m are the numbers of the natural and actual degrees of freedom, the difference n - m is the number of constraints.
 by diversifying into corporate collateral. Although increasing default risk, adding more corporate debt to the mix also increases the diversity scores in these deals.

Although the limitations of deal disclosure force us to estimate, we believe synthetic multi-sector CBO issuance to have already exceeded cash issuance of $25 billion on a notional no·tion·al  
1. Of, containing, or being a notion; mental or imaginary.

2. Speculative or theoretical.

 basis. On a rated note basis, we estimate there is over $7 billion in synthetics outstanding. Because many of the synthetic deals are privately rated and unfunded, or only partially funded, little information is available. Further, to a large extent the Street prefers to maintain confidentiality for these deals because the structures tend to be proprietary. Nevertheless, Exhibit 2 details 14 publicly rated synthetic multi-sector deals totaling almost $4 billion in notes that have closed since May 2000. The fact that they were publicly rated meant that they were intended for wide distribution, necessitating dissemination dissemination Medtalk The spread of a pernicious process–eg, CA, acute infection Oncology Metastasis, see there  of the deals' structure and pricing.

Although the rating agencies got comfortable with rating cash multi-sector deals last year, they are still climbing the learning curve for rating synthetic structures. Consequently, among the publicly rated deals, it has been typical that only one agency rated a particular deal. Of the 14 deals in Exhibit 2, 11 were rated by Fitch fitch: see polecat.  only and two by Moody's only, while the remaining deal was rated by all three rating agencies. For the eight deals disclosing the full capital structure, on average, 84% (with a range between 75% and 92%) is rated AAA and/or super senior. Although most of these publicly rated deals are denominated in USD USD

In currencies, this is the abbreviation for the U.S. Dollar.

The currency market, also known as the Foreign Exchange market, is the largest financial market in the world, with a daily average volume of over US $1 trillion.
, many others are in Euros. With little data on the overall synthetic multi-sector CBO market publicly available, it hardly makes sense to draw conclusions on structures for past deals. That said, in our Structure and Arbitrage section (see page 7), we present a template (1) A pre-designed document or data file formatted for common purposes such as a fax, invoice or business letter. If the document contains an automated process, such as a word processing macro or spreadsheet formula, then the programming is already written and embedded in the  for a generic structure going forward.


The primary motivation for issuing traditional cash multi-sector CBOs is arbitrage. Hedge funds hedge fund, in finance, a highly speculative, largely unregulated investment device. Originating in the 1950s, the funds "hedge" by offsetting "short" positions (borrowing a security and then selling it at a higher price before repaying the lender) against "long"  and other asset managers specializing in structured product have relied greatly on CBOs to increase assets under management Assets Under Management (AUM) is a term used by financial services companies in the mutual fund and money management or investment management business to gauge how much money they are managing.  and create a stable source of fee income. On the synthetic side, the primary motivation has historically been regulatory capital arbitrage, internal economic capital relief, and off-balance sheet funding. However, arbitrage is increasingly driving synthetic issuance as well.

As regulatory capital rules still require 8% equity (100% risk weight x 8% minimum capital requirement) applied against all structured product except for some residential mortgage classes, financial institutions are strongly motivated mo·ti·vate  
tr.v. mo·ti·vat·ed, mo·ti·vat·ing, mo·ti·vates
To provide with an incentive; move to action; impel.

 to free up regulatory capital by securitizing these assets via balance sheet CBOs. Exhibit 3 shows risk weights for all structured product sectors. Only home equity ABS and RMBS RMBS Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities
RMBS Rambus, Inc. (NASDAQ stock symbol)
RMBS Russian Mortgage-Backed Securities
 pass-throughs have risk weights under 100%. Further, since the sponsor typically retains only the first loss exposure, securitization allows for a reduction in the amount of economic capital allotted al·lot  
tr.v. al·lot·ted, al·lot·ting, al·lots
1. To parcel out; distribute or apportion: allotting land to homesteaders; allot blame.

 to the securitized securitized

Of, related to, or being debt securities that are secured with assets. For example, mortgage purchase bonds are secured by mortgages that have been purchased with the bond issue's proceeds.
 portfolio. Lastly, banks and insurers use multi-sector CBOs as a means of off-balance sheet financing. Particularly in times of distress, financial institutions can obtain funding synthetically without alarming the markets publicly and raising their cost of funds Cost of Funds

The interest rate paid on an outstanding loan.

Money isn't free! Cost of funds is the cost of borrowing money.
See also: Interest Rate

Cost of funds

Interest rate associated with borrowing money.

Financial institutions hold structured product on balance sheet in one of four ways:

* As an unsold portion of an underwriting Underwriting

1. The process by which investment bankers raise investment capital from investors on behalf of corporations and governments that are issuing securities (both equity and debt).

2. The process of issuing insurance policies.

* As an unsold portion of a sponsored transaction.

* As a securities portfolio investment.

* As a loan portfolio investment (whole loan).

Financial institutions have typically used synthetic securitization to securitize Securitize

The practice of a company selling accounts receivables or other debts owed to it. The third party that buys the debt assumes ownership of it and the responsibility for collecting the debts, and keeps the repayments when made.
 the highly rated collateral on their balance sheets. At least until 2008, regulatory capital charges for structured product will remain onerous on·er·ous  
1. Troublesome or oppressive; burdensome. See Synonyms at burdensome.

2. Law Entailing obligations that exceed advantages.
. Further, most market participants The term market participant is used in United States constitutional law to describe a U.S. State which is acting as a producer or supplier of a marketable good or service. When a state is acting in such a role, it may permissibly discriminate against non-residents.  believe that even the new capital rules will be out of sync Out of Sync: A Memoir is the upcoming autobiography of American pop singer Lance Bass, set to be published on October 23, 2007. It features an introduction by Marc Eliot, a New York Times  with true economic capital requirements Capital requirements

Financing required for the operation of a business, composed of long-term and working capital plus fixed assets.
 and remain overly conservative. By retaining only a sliver sliver

in wool processing a continuous band of carded and combed wool which has not yet been twisted into yarn.
 of equity to support the low probability of default Probability of default (PD) is a parameter used in the calculation of economic capital or regulatory capital under Basel II for a banking institution. This is an attribute of bank's client.  in these highly rated structured assets, the bank is able to reduce capital requirements significantly. Generally, if certain conditions are met, a bank must hold dollar-for-dollar capital against the first loss position and an additional 1.6% against the senior loss position, which is calculated as the reference portfolio notional minus the notes, minus the retained first loss position.

Although regulatory capital has been the primary motivation behind synthetic issuance, increasingly arbitrage and funding have become the motivating factors. Whereas the collateral for most balance sheet CBOs is fairly passively managed with limited substitution Substitution

put her own son in place of Orestes; her son was killed and Orestes was saved. [Gk. Myth.: Zimmerman, 32]


robber freed in Christ’s stead. [N.T.: Matthew 27:15–18; Swed. Lit.
 rights, arbitrage transactions involve more active management. Although the arbitrage spread is a secondary consideration for balance sheet deals, it is a for more important driver for doing arbitrage deals. In arbitrage deals, relatively more equity must be sold requiring more excess spread in the deal to support the equity IRR. In the next section, we will show how the arbitrage spread is determined in a synthetic multi-sector CBO.


Synthetic multi-sector CBOs can be either funded, unfunded or a combination of the two. In a funded deal, the issuer or sponsor buys protection on each credit via a portfolio default swap and pays a premium to the trust, which issues rated or unrated CLNs with various degrees of exposure to losses incurred by credit events in the portfolio. The first loss, or a portion thereof, is typically retained by the issuer or sponsor. Then, the second and third loss exposures may be taken by respective BBB and AAA rated CLNs, for example. The highest part of the capital structure is referred to as the super senior tranche Tranche

One of several related securities offered at the same time. Tranches from the same offering usually have different risk, reward, and/or maturity characteristics.


A class of bonds.
 and typically represents greater than AAA protection. In a partially funded deal, some of these exposures--usually the super senior tranche--may be swapped out to a third-party entity through a credit default swap Credit Default Swap

A swap designed to transfer the credit exposure of fixed income products between parties.

The buyer of a credit swap receives credit protection, whereas the seller of the swap guarantees the credit worthiness of the product.
. Finally, in an unfunded transaction, all the exposures are swapped out, requiring no CLNs.

Whether the transaction is a fully rated balance sheet deal or a privately rated, unfunded tranched portfolio default swap, or something in between these two extremes, synthetic structures require less equity and note placement than traditional cash structures. Consequently, deal execution is more efficient. Often much, if not all, of the first-loss equity piece is retained by the sponsor, avoiding the time-consuming and expensive equity placement process.

In a synthetic transaction, the dealer or sponsor may simply retain the senior loss position, as it represents a de minimis An abbreviated form of the Latin Maxim de minimis non curat lex, "the law cares not for small things." A legal doctrine by which a court refuses to consider trifling matters.  risk. If the super senior loss position is swapped out on an unfunded basis, the payment is usually in a range of 6-20 bps, depending on the structure and collateral. Therefore, the arbitrage can be significantly more attractive than that seen in cash CBOs, whose AAA tranches require at least L+45 bps due to the complexity and liquidity premium demanded by traditional cash investors.

While cash multi-sector CBOs usually require a maximum WARF of BBB+ to achieve an attractive arbitrage, synthetic structures allow for a WARF as high as AAA/AA+, although some deals may have collateral WARFs as low as those seen in the traditional cash structure. A driver behind the higher WARFs in synthetic deals is regulatory capital arbitrage, which is greatest in AAA structured product held on balance sheet. That said, the synthetic format creates an arbitrage in AAA collateral.

In Exhibit 4, we present a generic synthetic structure with seven equally weighted asset sectors having a WARF of Aaa/Aa1- funded by a mix of Baa1 (3%), Aa2 (5%) and super senior liabilities (92%). The structured product sectors in the asset mix include Aa and Aaa rated CMBS, RMBS, home equity (HEQ HEQ Health Education Quarterly
HEQ High End Quartz (watches)
HEQ Hispanic Executive Quarterly (publication) 
) ABS and CDOs. The liability mix is that of the North Street 2001-3 synthetic multi-sector CBO issued in early 2001. This deal was among the first to not require an equity tranche per se, other than the Baa1 first loss tranche.

The arbitrage spread for this generic structure is 55 bps (82 bps asset yield minus 27 bps funding cost based on actual North Street pricing for rated tranches). Whereas we estimate the typical cash multi-sector CBO with a WARF of BBB has had an arbitrage spread in the 100-150 bps range over the last two years, the Years, The

the seven decades of Eleanor Pargiter’s life. [Br. Lit.: Benét, 1109]

See : Time
 synthetic structure having a WARF of AAA/AA+ may require an arbitrage spread of only 50-60 bps. It is principally the relatively high leverage in the synthetic structure and the ability to bypass traditional cash investors for the higher rated funding that allows for such a low arbitrage spread. The major advantage of the higher WARFs in synthetic deals is that collateral sourcing risk is negligible This article or section is written like a personal reflection or and may require .
Please [ improve this article] by rewriting this article or section in an .
 because outstanding AAA structured product paper is plentiful plen·ti·ful  
1. Existing in great quantity or ample supply.

2. Providing or producing an abundance: a plentiful harvest.
. We estimate that AAA paper accounts for 85-90% of all structured product. On the other hand, there is a limited supply of subordinated paper, which traditional cash deals require to achieve a suitable arbitrage (for this reason, the cash CBO bid has driven subordinated paper to artificially tight levels in the past few years).

For investors, the advantages of the synthetic structure are equally compelling. Investors have exposure only to credit events as defined by specific language written into the credit default swap or CLN CLN Clean
CLN Community Learning Network
CLN Colon
CLN Celsion Corporation
CLN Class Library for Numbers
CLN Credit Linked Note
CLN Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale (Committee of National Liberation)
CLN Corn Lethal Necrosis
 agreement. Unlike cash CBOs, which have strict collateral performance tests affecting the waterfall waterfall, a sudden unsupported drop in a stream. It is formed when the stream course is interrupted as when a stream passes over a layer of harder rock—often igneous—to an area of softer and therefore more easily eroded rock; the edge of a cliff or  (e.g., priority of payments to rated tranches), synthetic investors are not affected by collateral trading losses The following contains a list of trading losses which eventually forced major corporations to go bankrupt or restructure parts of their organisation. This list is not exhaustive.  and spread widening unrelated to a credit event. Further, investors do not bear other risks associated with cash deals, such as ramp-up risk, interest rate risk, reinvestment risk Reinvestment Risk

The risk that future proceeds will have to be reinvested at a lower potential interest rate.

This term is usually heard in the context of bonds.
, currency risk, hedging risk or prepayment risk Prepayment Risk

The uncertainty related to unscheduled prepayment in excess of scheduled principal repayment.

This risk is generally associated with mortgage securities.
 on the assets in the reference pool.


A. Spread Performance

Spreads on structured product have maintained relatively high stability through all cycles. The reasons spreads have been stable are several: credit enhancement Credit Enhancement

A method whereby a company attempts to improve its debt or credit worthiness.

Credit enhancements take many different forms. An example of a credit enhancement would be conversion rights added on to a debt instrument in order to lower the issuing
 features (particularly subordination levels for all but the most junior tranche), low event risk, very few defaults on all outstanding deals to date, relatively few downgrades and, as of yet, an untested environment for a downturn Downturn

The transition point between a rising, expanding economy to a falling, contracting one.


A decline in security prices or economic activity following a period of rising or stable prices or activity.
 in credit for the collateral supporting the deals. However, regarding the last point, in the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, it is possible to imagine a spread contagion Contagion

The likelihood of significant economic changes in one country spreading to other countries. This can refer to either economic booms or economic crises.

An infamous example is the "Asian Contagion" that occurred in 1997 and started in Thailand.
 period similar to that experienced in the Fall of 1998 when spreads widened despite steady collateral performance. Rather than being a deterrent de·ter·rent  
Tending to deter: deterrent weapons.

1. Something that deters: a deterrent to theft.

 to future issuance, though, we think such spread widening would provide a window of opportunity for CBO managers to lock in wide spreads before they return to more normal levels once the crisis dissipates.

In Exhibit 5, we show how all investment grade tranches for CMBS have performed between December 1997 and August 2001. We chose CMBS as our sample asset class because this sector has the best price discovery over a full range of ratings due to the large number of outstandings for tranches rated below AAA. Through August 1998, 10-year AAA CMBS traded at an average spread of 29 bps, which is still below the 48 bp average for 2001 to date. During the LTCM LTCM Long Term Capital Management  crisis, AAAs widened to 106 bps on October 16 before returning to the 40- to 50-bp area. Since the 1998 spread contagion period, AAA CMBS have held in this tight range except for the month of October 2001, when they traded briefly in a range of 50-55 bps.


For tranches rated below AAA, we see a similar, although exaggerated, trading pattern Trading pattern

Long-range direction of a security or commodity futures price, charted by drawing one line connecting the highest prices the security has reached and another line connecting the lowest prices at which the security has traded over the same period.
. It is important to note that the spread widening during the Fall 1998 contagion period only lasted a few months. The CMBS spread widening was an indicator of temporary spread contagion and a permanent rise in the liquidity premium rather than the market's perception of potential losses. So if we consider how the average spread levels were changed by the Fall 1998 contagion period once volatility subsided in January 2000, we have some idea of how investor sentiment regarding liquidity changed permanently. In this regard, spreads were, on average, 33-44% wider from January 1999-August 2001 than they were in the first seven months of 1998, before the crisis.

There have been only two spread widening periods in CMBS since the Fall of 1998. The pre- pre- word element [L.], before (in time or space).

1. Earlier; before; prior to: prenatal.

2000 Y2K-related spread widening was only one-third of the size of the 1998 market contagion period. Subsequently, in early 2001, CMBS spreads widened temporarily due to a sector rotation Sector Rotation

The action of a mutual fund or portfolio manager shifting investment assets from one sector of the economy to another.

Not all sectors of the economy perform well at the same time.
 out of CMBS into corporates, whose spreads had risen substantially by the end of 2000 before tightening again in January 2001.

Wider spreads in contagion periods provide an opportune op·por·tune  
1. Suited or right for a particular purpose: an opportune place to make camp.

2. Occurring at a fitting or advantageous time: an opportune arrival.
 time for multi-sector CBOs to ramp up Ramp Up

To increase a company's operations in anticipation of increased demand.

A company might 'ramp up' operations if they just signed a contract creating substantially more demand for their product.
See also: Demand, Economies of Scale
. If structured product spreads widen wid·en  
tr. & intr.v. wid·ened, wid·en·ing, wid·ens
To make or become wide or wider.

widen·er n.
 meaningfully in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks as a result of spread contagion, we think it will be an opportunity for more CBO issuance to come to market. The wider arbitrage spreads should provide a more than adequate cushion Cushion

In the context of project financing, the extra amount of net cash flow remaining after expected debt service.


See call protection.
 needed to withstand possible defaults emanating from the events of September 11.

In Exhibit 6, we show new issue spreads for most structured product sectors in early September 2001, right before the terrorist attacks. We acknowledge spreads have widened since that period for the most part. But because levels are changing so much day to day, we believe the early September spreads better represent the levels where multi-sector CBOs have been headed over the last few months and where they will end up once certainty returns to the market. For each sector, we show the spread to LIBOR LIBOR

See: London Interbank Offered Rate


See London interbank offered rate (LIBOR).
 and spread to same-rated corporates as measured by our HG Broad Market Index and HY Large Cap Index. Much of the pickup Pickup

A gain in yield made by selling one bond and buying another. Also referred to as "yield pickup."

When the present yield is relatively low compared to the longer-term yields, pickups will be done by investors trying to increase the yield and duration of their
 in structured product derives from a liquidity and complexity premium. However, since synthetic CBOs are largely buy and hold investments with little trading, liquidity is not a significant risk. Further, complexity is not an issue because the CBO sponsor or manager presumably pre·sum·a·ble  
That can be presumed or taken for granted; reasonable as a supposition: presumable causes of the disaster.
 has expertise in structured product.

In ABS, we see the largest spreads to LIBOR and same-rated corporates in HEQ paper. AAA and BBB HEQ paper are 103 bps and 55 bps, respectively, wider than same-rated corporates. This significant pickup is mostly attributable to the negative convexity Negative convexity

A bond characteristic such that the price appreciation will be less than the price depreciation for a large change in yield of a given number of basis points. For example, a fixed-rate mortgage may lose value as rates go down because of prepayments.
 (discussed in a later section) in HEQ paper. Whereas non-mortgage ABS--which has relatively high average life stability--has traded wide to same-rated corporates in years past, the CBO bid and general corporate spread widening has resulted in convergence between spreads of subordinated non-mortgage ABS and same-rated corporates.

In CMBS, the major pickup to corporates is in AAA and AA tranches--the focus for synthetic multi-sector CBOs. Subordinated CMBS paper trades slightly through same-rated corporates. Interest only (IO) CMBS tranches, which are AAA rated, trade extremely wide to same-rated corporates due to the credit-related prepayment Prepayment

1. The payment of a debt obligation prior to its due date.

2. The excess payment over a scheduled debt repayment amount.

1. Examples include deferred expenses such as rent and early loan repayments.

 sensitivity in these structures. IO CMBS issues are very sensitive to prepayments Prepayments

Payments made in excess of scheduled mortgage principal repayments.
 induced induced /in·duced/ (in-dldbomacst´)
1. produced artificially.

2. produced by induction.

adj artificially caused to occur.


 by credit losses in the underlying collateral. Nevertheless, small allocations to IO CMBS are often used to boost the arbitrage spread in multi-sector CBOs.

In RMBS, there is a substantial arbitrage to same-rated corporates across subsectors and ratings due to additional spread to account for negative convexity. Prime home mortgage borrowers are more likely to refinance Refinance

1. When a business or person revises their payment schedule for repaying debt.

2. Replacing an older loan with a new loan offering better terms.

When a business refinances they typically extend the maturity date.
 their mortgages with minimal rate declines. In AAA subsectors, the arbitrage to corporates ranges from 81-133 bps. In subordinated private CMOs, there are pickups to same-rated corporates of 56-162 bps. However, unfortunately for CBO managers, there is relatively little outstanding supply of subordinated private CMOs.

In new issue high yield bond CDOs, we also see substantial gains to same-rated corporates: AAAs have a pickup of 53 bps, while BBs have a pickup of a full 312 bps. Secondary CDOs on credit watch trade at significantly wider spreads than these levels, and the pickup is even more attractive to same-rated corporates on credit watch. The idea of CBOs buying CDOs as collateral seems complex. However, in our opinion, if the manager is an experienced CDO buyer and picks healthier vintages (not 1997, 1998 or 1999) with the best managers, the strategy makes sense.

In a traditional cash multi-sector CBO, spread gapping in the absence of defaults can have significant negative ramifications ramifications nplAuswirkungen pl , particularly for subordinated tranches. As spreads in the underlying collateral gap, the first impact is normally felt on the WARF tests and the rating bucket tests (e.g., the <Bal bucket must be greater than x). Then, as it becomes clearer these tests may result in a downgrade Downgrade

A negative change in the rating of a security.

For example, an analyst may downgrade a stock from strong buy to buy, or a bond rating agency may downgrade a bond from AAA to AA.
 to the rated tranches, the manager may begin trading out of losses. It is at this point that O/C and I/C I/C Including (nursing; medical notes)
I/C In Charge
I/C In-Coming
I/C Integrated Circuit
I/C Industrial/Commercial
I/C Inter company
I/C Instructor/Coordinator
I/C Intercommunications
I/C Implementation/Conversion
 tests can be breached. The stringent cash CDO tests direct the waterfall--i.e., allow principal to be paid to senior tranches at the exclusion of junior tranches--and impact the rating migration of the rated notes. By contrast, synthetic multi-sector CBOs normally have far less stringent waterfall rules and expose the investor only to defaults. Therefore, synthetic deals are not as vulnerable as cash deals to temporary spread gapping as occurred during the 1998 spread contagion period.

B. Default and Recovery Performance

The merits of structured product (e.g., ABS, CMBS, RMBS and CBOs, which, combined, represent most of the collateral in multi-sector CBOs) from a historical default perspective are compelling. According to according to
1. As stated or indicated by; on the authority of: according to historians.

2. In keeping with: according to instructions.

 Fitch data, average annual defaults since 1989 for all structured product are less than 0.01% and have a cumulative default rate of 0.05% by original principal balance. When viewed in contrast to same-rated corporate securities, whose default rate averages 0.23%, the advantages for structured product are clear.

Fitch's January 8, 2001 report, Structured Finance Default Study, covers default performance through June 30, 2000. The data thus excludes the recent high-profile ABS defaults such as Heilig-Meyers and Hollywood Funding, which, although considered isolated events by the rating agencies, both went from AAA to near-default ratings in one day. According to Fitch research, there is no significant difference between the three agencies' default experience. Further, with an overall annual default Exhibit below 0.01%, any differences are statistically insignificant. In addition, an S&P study through June 2001, which is detailed below, reports that the total number of defaulted structured product bonds is 116 in the period 1978-2001, whereas Fitch counts 89 defaults in the period 1989-2000. Nonetheless, it is dangerous to compare rating agency default statistics, as they define default differently. For instance, for CMBS and RMBS, whereas Fitch defines default as a loss of principal, S&P and Moody's also count impairment Impairment

1. A reduction in a company's stated capital.

2. The total capital that is less than the par value of the company's capital stock.

1. This is usually reduced because of poorly estimated losses or gains.

 of interest as default. Fitch's cumulative default rate of 0.05% (by original principal balance) for all structured product means that 99.95% of all rated structured finance securities have not defaulted. According to Fitch, "This high rate of success supports the concept that isolating i·so·late  
tr.v. i·so·lat·ed, i·so·lat·ing, i·so·lates
1. To set apart or cut off from others.

2. To place in quarantine.

 a pool of assets from an originator Originator

A bank, savings and loan, or mortgage banker that initially made a mortgage loan that is part of a pool. Also, an investment bank that has worked with the issuer of a new securities offering from the beginning and is usually appointed manager of the underwriting
 or seller significantly reduces default risk." Despite the less-than-favorable economic environment we are entering, there are several factors that protect structured product from defaults:

* Securitization of a diversified diversified (di·verˑ·s  pool of assets avoids event risk associated with corporate bonds. By isolating assets in a bankruptcy-remote SPV SPV

sheeppox virus.
, default risk is strictly a function of the underlying assets.

* Structured product withstands multiple levels of due diligence Research; analysis; your homework. This term has caught on in all industries, because it sounds so "wired." Who would want to do analysis or research when they can do due diligence. See wired.  and outside review by underwriters, auditors, rating agencies, counsel and investors before issuance.

* In many instances, the originator has stepped in to support a transaction to maintain access to the securitization market. Correction techniques have included trapping trapping, most broadly, the use of mechanical or deceptive devices to capture, kill, or injure animals. It may be applied to the practice of using birdlime to capture birds, lobster pots to trap lobsters, and seines to catch fish.  residual interest Residual Interest

A type of interest payment received by investors in a real estate mortgage investment conduit (REMIC).

Investors receive interest payments after all required regular interest has been paid to investors within higher priority tranches.
 to build up reserves, purchasing underperforming collateral from the trust, subordinating servicing fees and simply adding more credit enhancement.

According to its report, "Since these factors are naturally inherent in structured finance securities, Fitch believes that default rates for structured finance securities will remain below those of similarly rated corporate bonds." Further, we note that in sequential pay structures, when collateral quality triggers are met, principal is accelerated to senior tranches at the exclusion of subordinated tranches until the collateral test requirements are corrected.

Of the 89 defaulted bonds, RMBS accounted for 52 from 34 deals; CMBS, only two from one deal; and ABS, 38 from 21 deals. Although it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions from such a dearth of default experience, a few generalities are clear. According to Fitch, with no exceptions, poor collateral quality was the reason for RMBS defaults. However, the 0.04% cumulative default rate for RMBS is still extremely low, principally due to the strong economy and stable housing market during the study period. The vast majority of defaulted RMBS started out as noninvestment grade and were originated in 1993-95, when competition between originators was fiercest.

The two classes of CMBS that defaulted were rated B- and BB- by Fitch originally in 1993. In a separate study up to December 1999, Fitch found that among all rated US CMBS, only 12 classes within six deals have defaulted, resulting in a cumulative default rate of 0.21% by original principal balance.

As opposed to RMBS and CMBS, the ABS market has traditionally structured a large majority of classes to the AAA and A rating category, with only 2-3% of new issuance in the noninvestment grade categories. Thus, defaults are more heavily weighted to classes rated in the 'A' and 'BBB' categories. It is clear from Fitch's statistics that when one originator gets into trouble, several of their deals are impacted: of the 35 defaulted classes, 22 came from three originators: Aegis, AMN Amn
, and NAL NAL National Agricultural Library (Agricultural Research Service; US Department of Agriculture)
NAL New American Library
NAL National Accelerator Laboratory
NAL National Aerospace Laboratory (Japan) 
. On a sector basis, 71% of the 35 defaulted classes were in subprime auto deals originated in 1995 and 1996. The root causes for the subprime auto losses were looseunderwriting standards and poor servicing amid a highly competitive and saturated saturated /sat·u·rat·ed/ (sach´ah-rat?ed)
1. denoting a chemical compound that has only single bonds and no double or triple bonds between atoms.

2. unable to hold in solution any more of a given substance.
 marketplace. The other three sectors suffering defaults were HEQ, rental car fleet and franchise ABS. Fitch expects the sectors most exposed to defaults in the coming years to be franchise, equipment, HEQ and manufactured housing Manufactured housing (also known as prefab housing) is a type of housing unit that is largely assembled in factories and then transported to sites of use.

In the United States, the term "manufactured home" specifically refers to a house built entirely in a protected

The low occurrence of structured product defaults is particularly impressive when we compare them to same-rated corporate bonds. An average annual default rate of 0.01% for structured product is substantially lower than both IG corporate bonds (0.08%) and HY corporate bonds (3.07%). Even if we weight the ratio of HG to HY corporate bonds to correspond with the ratio for structured product, the comparison remains remarkable (Exhibit 8). Taking into consideration the actual 77/23% split between HG and HY corporate bonds outstanding, the average annual default rate for all corporate issuance is 0.77%. However, when we weight the corporate bond default statistics to correspond with Fitch's estimate of a 95/5% split between HG and HY rated bonds in structured product, the adjusted average annual corporate bond default rate becomes 0.23%.

S&P's September 4, 2001 report, Life After Death: Recoveries of Defaulted US Structured Finance Securities, indicates in the last 23 years up to June 30, 2001 there have only been 116 defaults out of 13,538 rated classes. Accordingly, S&P's cumulative and average annual default rates for structured product are 0.86% and .04%, respectively, on a per bond basis. Of the 116 defaulted bonds, RMBS accounted for 83 of those defaults; CMBS, 14; and ABS, 19. According to the S&P report, "Not only do [structured securities] rarely experience default, but they also recover a major portion of their original principal even after default." Defaulted structured product has generally managed to recover more than 50% of principal. Of the 116 defaults, recoveries for RMBS (in contrast to Fitch's definition, this includes HEQ ABS and other subprime mortgages), CMBS and ABS averaged 61%, 66% and 29%, respectively. Unlike RMBS, there was no clear relationship between recovery and original credit ratings among CMBS classes. Charged-off credit cards and franchise loans accounted for 17 of the 19 total ABS defaults.

C. Downgrade Performance

From a rating migration standpoint The Standpoint is a newspaper published in the British Virgin Islands. It was originally published under the name Pennysaver, largely as a shopping-coupon promotional newspaper, but since emerged as one of the most influential sources of journalism in the , structured product is superior to same-rated corporates. According to Moody's data, ABS and CDOs have a 7.8% average one-year downgrade rate for all ratings between B3 and Aaa since 1986, whereas the comparable downgrade statistic statistic,
n a value or number that describes a series of quantitative observations or measures; a value calculated from a sample.


a numerical value calculated from a number of observations in order to summarize them.
 for corporate bonds is 13.6%--a difference of 5.8 percentage points. Over the same period, according to S&P data, the average rate of annual downgrades for CMBS and RMBS rated between B and AAA is 1.8% and 3.2%, respectively, versus 7.5% for corporates.

Exhibit 9 summarizes Moody's one-year average rating migration data for ABS (mortgage and non-mortgage) and CDOs between 1986 and 2000. On average, ABS ratings overall have been quite stable, with over 90% of ratings staying the same over one-year periods for most rating categories. Conversely con·verse 1  
intr.v. con·versed, con·vers·ing, con·vers·es
1. To engage in a spoken exchange of thoughts, ideas, or feelings; talk. See Synonyms at speak.

, less than 80% of corporate bond ratings have stayed the same over a year. Further, in most cases, any rating changes in ABS were due to changes to entities related to the transactions (servicer or corporate guarantor guarantor n. a person or entity that agrees to be responsible for another's debt or performance under a contract, if the other fails to pay or perform. (See: guarantee)

GUARANTOR, contracts. He who makes a guaranty.
) rather than collateral deterioration de·te·ri·o·ra·tion
The process or condition of becoming worse.

From a downgrade standpoint, the best performance in ABS and CDOs relative to corporates is in the A3 and above rating categories. On average, one-year average downgrades for ABS and CDOs is 10.1 percentage points less than that for corporates. Interestingly, Baa2 rated ABS and CDO paper has performed substantially better than Baal or Baa3. Noninvestment grade paper is difficult to compare, as the number dABS and CDO issues for these ratings is limited.

Whereas Moody's has the most recent comprehensive data on ABS and CDO rating migration, we have to look to S&P for migration data on CMBS and RMBS versus corporates. In contrast to Moody's data, which evaluates each rating notch notch (noch) incisure; an indentation on the edge of a bone or other organ.

aortic notch  dicrotic n.

cardiac notch 
, the S&P data evaluates groups of three notches. For instance, whereas Moody's provides data for A1, A2 and A3 collateral, S&P groups all the data into an A bucket.

Exhibit 10 summarizes S&P's average one-year rating migration data for CMBS and corporates between 1985 and 2000. CMBS ratings are extremely stable, with slightly more upgrades than downgrades on average. Reflecting the high subordination in each rated tranche, only 1.8% of CMBS tranches are downgraded each year on average versus 7.5% for corporate bonds. The CMBS tranches most sensitive to downgrade are the BBB and B tranches.

The rating migration statistics for RMBS (defined by S&P to include all mortgage ABS as well as prime MBS) are also remarkable. Exhibit 11 summarizes S&P's average one-year rating migration data for RMBS and corporates between 1980 and 2000. As similar to the performance of CMBS, there have been slightly more upgrades than downgrades of RMBS on average. The BBB and noninvestment grade tranches of RMBS have been the most susceptible to downgrades. Nevertheless, whereas average one-year rating downgrades for corporates are 7.8%, they are only 3.2% for RMBS.

D. Average Life Variability

Unlike traditional cash deals, in the typical synthetic multi-sector CBO, the investor is not exposed to market risks, including prepayment risk. Instead, the manager or sponsor bears this risk. All structured product has some average life uncertainty--the question is the degree of uncertainty. Generally, prime RMBS has the most average life uncertainty while CMBS has the least. After RMBS is subprime mortgage ABS. Next comes non-mortgage ABS, which varies by sector.

In general, for sequential structures, senior classes are more sensitive to collateral prepayment than junior classes because prepayments are allocated first to senior classes. Since synthetic multi-sector CDOs tend to reference predominately senior tranches, average life variability is more of a concern for synthetic CDO managers
See also:
  • Aladdin Capital Management
  • Alcentra Capital
  • Ares Management
  • Ambac Financial Group
  • Avoca Capital
  • AXA Investment Managers
  • Babson Capital Management
 vis-a-vis cash CDO managers. Therefore, it is important to have ample diversification Diversification

A risk management technique that mixes a wide variety of investments within a portfolio. It is designed to minimize the impact of any one security on overall portfolio performance.

Diversification is possibly the greatest way to reduce the risk.
 across asset classes to mitigate mit·i·gate
To moderate in force or intensity.

miti·gation n.
 average life variability.

In prime RMBS, borrowers have a free option to prepay pre·pay  
tr.v. pre·paid, pre·pay·ing, pre·pays
To pay or pay for beforehand.

pre·payment n.
 their mortgages when rates fall. In today's environment of widely disseminated disseminated /dis·sem·i·nat·ed/ (-sem´i-nat?ed) scattered; distributed over a considerable area.

Spread over a large area of a body, a tissue, or an organ.
 data, even the most unsophisticated mortgage borrower will likely prepay if mortgage rates fall 75 bps or more, which more than covers the cost to refinance. In a falling rate environment when RMBS mature faster than expected, the manager must reinvest re·in·vest  
tr.v. re·in·vest·ed, re·in·vest·ing, re·in·vests
To invest (capital or earnings) again, especially to invest (income from securities or funds) in additional shares.
 in a lower rate environment. Conversely, in a rising rate environment, the manager faces extension risk. Fewer RMBS than expected mature when the manager would like to reinvest in the higher prevailing rates of the market. This so-called "negative convexity," or option cost, is no two models produce the same estimate of the prepayment option's cost.

In subprime RMBS (mortgage ABS such as HEQ, manufactured housing and high loan-to-value (HLTV HLTV High Loan to Value
HLTV Half-Life Television
HLTV Half Life True Voice
) ABS), borrowers are typically less astute as·tute  
Having or showing shrewdness and discernment, especially with respect to one's own concerns. See Synonyms at shrewd.

[Latin ast
 and have fewer options to prepay. In fact, most HEQ loans have stiff" prepayment penalties Prepayment penalty

A fee a borrower pays a lender when the borrower repays a loan before its scheduled time of maturity.
. Further, there are fewer lenders to subprime borrowers than to prime borrowers, particularly in recent years after many lenders have exited the business. As in prime RMBS, this prepayment option is priced into the bond and can be quantified by a model. However, this option cost is not easily found from a commercially available source such as Bloomberg Bloomberg

A major global provider of 24-hour financial news and information including real-time and historic price data, financials data, trading news and analyst coverage, as well as general news and sports.
. For the most part, Wall Street firms have the best models for quantifying the option cost. Therefore, the manager must be particularly specialized in these sectors to determine value.

For non-mortgage ABS (e.g., credit cards, autos and equipment), there is substantially less average life uncertainty. In fact, many credit card ABS are issued as bullet or soft bullet structures. With trustee reports coming up shy on the necessary data, it is difficult to quantify Quantify - A performance analysis tool from Pure Software.  even historical--much less future--prepayment patterns for auto and equipment ABS. Due to this lack of information and the negligible average life uncertainty in non-mortgage ABS, there are no standard prepayment models for these sectors.

Apart from the IO strips, all tranches of CMBS are well protected from prepayments due to substantial call protection in the form of lockouts, defeasance defeasance n. an antiquated word for a document which terminates the effect of an existing writing such as a deed, bond, or contract if some event occurs.

DEFEASANCE, contracts, conveyancing.
, yield maintenance and prepayment penalty points. The only non-IO tranche to have ever suffered spread widening due to rapidly falling prepayment rates has been the AAA rated five-year tranche because it is the first tranche in the waterfall. However, this tranche will only prepay if there are credit losses in the underlying collateral, which would start prepaying this first tranche in the waterfall at the exclusion of the most junior tranches. For this reason, spreads on AAA rated five-year CMBS tranches have widened out to those of the AAA rated 10-year tranches in recent months. As discussed previously, the only tranche to be significantly impacted by falling interest rates is the CMBS IO, whose principal on which the interest payments are based quickly disappears on credit losses in the underlying collateral. In this regard, CMBS IOs are as sensitive to rising credit losses as RMBS IOs and mortgage servicing Mortgage servicing

The collection of monthly payments and penalties, record keeping, payment of insurance and taxes, and possible settlement of default , involved with a mortgage loan.
 portfolios are to falling interest rates.


This last section provides a wealth of figures addressing the supply of structured product in the market. Based on Bond Market Association data as of June 30, 2001, there is over $5 trillion in supply to source for synthetic multi-sector CBOs in US collateral alone (Exhibit 12). This is an astounding a·stound  
tr.v. a·stound·ed, a·stound·ing, a·stounds
To astonish and bewilder. See Synonyms at surprise.

[From Middle English astoned, past participle of astonen,
 amount of eligible collateral, considering structured product represents 37% of the total US taxable bond Taxable Bond

A debt security whose return to the investor is subject to taxes at the local, state or federal level, or some combination thereof.

The majority of bonds issued are taxable bonds.
 market with the remainder being in treasuries, agencies and corporates.

The remaining exhibits in the appendix provide detail by sector, domicile domicile (dŏm`əsīl'), one's legal residence. This may or may not be the place where one actually resides at any one time. The domicile is the permanent home to which one is presumed to have the intention of returning whenever the purpose  and time for structured product issuance including ABS, CMBS, cash CDOs and RMBS.


LANG GIBSON is responsible for the research and strategy group for Structured Credit Products (SCP (1) (Service Control Point) A node in an SS7 telephone network that provides an interface to databases, which may reside within the SCP computer or in other computers. ), whose product areas include credit derivatives Credit Derivative

Privately held negotiable bilateral contracts that allow users to manage their exposure to credit risk. Credit derivatives are financial assets like forward contracts, swaps, and options for which the price is driven by the credit risk of economic agents (private
, synthetic CDOs and cash CDOs. He writes and publishes the only extensive credit derivative/CDO weekly in the industry as well as numerous topical topical /top·i·cal/ (top´i-k'l) pertaining to a particular area, as a topical antiinfective applied to a certain area of the skin and affecting only the area to which it is applied.

 and primer prim·er
A segment of DNA or RNA that is complementary to a given DNA sequence and that is needed to initiate replication by DNA polymerase.
 reports covering SCP's three product areas. Prior to Bane BANE. This word was formerly used to signify a malefactor. Bract. 1. 2, t. 8, c. 1.  of America Securities, Lang was the structured product strategist strat·e·gist  
One who is skilled in strategy.

Noun 1. strategist - an expert in strategy (especially in warfare)

market strategist - someone skilled in planning marketing campaigns
 at First Union Securities. Prior to joining First Union in January, 1999, Lang brought eight additional years of structured product research and risk management advisory experience from Goldman Sachs The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., or simply Goldman Sachs (NYSE: GS) is one of the world's largest global investment banks. Goldman Sachs was founded in 1869, and is headquartered in the Lower Manhattan area of New York City at 85 Broad Street. , J.P. Morgan Morgan, American family of financiers and philanthropists.

Junius Spencer Morgan, 1813–90, b. West Springfield, Mass., prospered at investment banking.
 and Ferrell Capital Management. In addition to firm research, Lang has published numerous articles and chapters in well-known trade journals and Frank Fabozzi publications. Lang holds an M.B.A. in Finance from the NYU NYU New York University
NYU New York Undercover (TV show) 
 Stern School of Business and a B.A. from the University of Virginia.
Exhibit 2. Publicly Rated Synthetic Multi-sector CBOs

Offered    Deal name                    Manager         Collateral

5/8/00     Equinox Funding             Rabobank         Diversified
                                                        pool of ABS

5/30/00    North Street Ref.          UBS Brinson           ABS
           Linked Notes

8/31/00    PARIS CDO                Natexis Banque    60% CC, 40% CBO

10/2/00    Stuyvesant CDO I, Ltd.      Rabobank          100% CDOs

10/16/00   Natexis                  Natexis Banques         ABS
           ABS-Backed                 Populaires

10/27/00   North Street Ref.              UBS         60% Structured
           Linked Notes 2000-2                        40% Corp. bond

12/7/00    CORVUS                      Barclay's         COS, ABS

12/22/00   Hector Funding Ltd.         Barclays         CDOs, ABS,
           Series I                                     CMBS, RMBS

1/9/01     Structured Finance          Barclays        25% CDOs, ABS
           Asset Ltd - I                                CMBS, RMBS

3/12/01    Hector Funding II Ltd.      Barclays         CDOs, ABS,
           Series I                                     CMBS, RMBS

4/17/01    NorthStreet CDO-III       UBS Principal      AAA/AA ABS

5/16/01    Savannah - II               Barclays       60% Struc, 20%
           CDO Ltd.                                    LM, 20% other

6/30/00    Nerva Ltd.                  Barclays         CDOs, ABS,
                                                        CMBS, RMBS

8/6/01     Taunton CDO Ltd.            Barclays         CDOs, ABS,
                                                        CMBS, RMBS

Offered    Deal name                   Class         Size

5/8/00     Equinox Funding               A            $37.50
                                         B             22.50
                                         C             16.88
                                         D             30.00
                                      Equity           15.00

5/30/00    North Street Ref.             A             36.00
           Linked Notes                  B             40.00
                                         C             31.00
                                        D-1            14.00
                                        D-2            20.00
                                      Equity           43.00
                                     Lev. Amt       1,344.00

8/31/00    PARIS CDO                     A             30.00
                                         B             40.00

10/2/00    Stuyvesant CDO I, Ltd.                      25.00

10/16/00   Natexis                     Snr.           336.90
           ABS-Backed                    A             25.00
                                         B             40.00
                                      Equity           10.00

10/27/00   North Street Ref.             A             60.80
           Linked Notes 2000-2           B             32.60
                                         C             29.00
                                         D              7.50
                                         E             36.10
                                         F             43.00

12/7/00    CORVUS                       A-1           550.00
                                        A-2           200.00
                                         B             65.00
                                         C             60.00
                                         D             40.00
                                         E             25.00
                                         F             10.00

12/22/00   Hector Funding Ltd.           A             50.00
           Series I

1/9/01     Structured Finance            A         JPY 15000
           Asset Ltd - I                 B               430
                                         C               260
                                         D               690
                                         E               350
                                      Equity             520
                                                   JPY 17250

3/12/01    Hector Funding II Ltd.        A        Euro 50.00
           Series I

4/17/01    NorthStreet CDO-III      Credit Swap     1,840.00
                                         A            100.00
                                         B             60.00

5/16/01    Savannah - II                 A            300.00
           CDO Ltd.                      B             18.45
                                         C             22.50
                                         D              6.75
                                         E              5.25
                                      Equity           22.05

6/30/00    Nerva Ltd.                    A            528.00
                                         B             12.00
                                         C             30.00
                                         D             12.00
                                         E             18.00

8/6/01     Taunton CDO Ltd.             A-1           220.00
                                        A-2            80.00
                                         B             26.00
                                         C             24.00
                                         D             16.00
                                         E             10.00
                                         F              4.00
                                         G             20.00

Offered    Deal name                Senior   Moody's     S&P

5/8/00     Equinox Funding                     Aaa

5/30/00    North Street Ref.         86%
           Linked Notes

8/31/00    PARIS CDO

10/2/00    Stuyvesant CDO I, Ltd.

10/16/00   Natexis                   82%       Aaa       AAA
           ABS-Backed                           NR       NR
                                                NR       NR
                                                NR       NR

10/27/00   North Street Ref.
           Linked Notes 2000-2

12/7/00    CORVUS                    79%

12/22/00   Hector Funding Ltd.
           Series I

1/9/01     Structured Finance        87%
           Asset Ltd - I

3/12/01    Hector Funding II Ltd.
           Series I

4/17/01    NorthStreet CDO-III       92%

5/16/01    Savannah - II             80%
           CDO Ltd.

6/30/00    Nerva Ltd.                88%

8/6/01     Taunton CDO Ltd.          75%

Offered    Deal name                Fitch    Pricing

5/8/00     Equinox Funding                   6mL + 47
                                             6mL + 80
                                            6mL + 130
                                            6mL + 690

5/30/00    North Street Ref.         AAA     3mL + 70
           Linked Notes              AA     3mL + 105
                                      A     3mL + 175
                                     BBB    3mL + 260

8/31/00    PARIS CDO                 A+

10/2/00    Stuyvesant CDO I, Ltd.    AA

10/16/00   Natexis                   AAA
           ABS-Backed                A+     3mL + 125
                                     BBB    3mL + 240

10/27/00   North Street Ref.         AAA     3mL + 70
           Linked Notes 2000-2       AA     3mL + 105
                                      A     3mL + 175
                                     A-     3mL + 260

12/7/00    CORVUS                    AAA     6mL + 65
                                     AA      6mL + 90
                                      A     6mL + 130
                                     BBB    6mL + 250
                                     BB     6mL + 625

12/22/00   Hector Funding Ltd.       AA      3mL + 90
           Series I

1/9/01     Structured Finance        AAA     6mL + 35
           Asset Ltd - I             AA      6mL + 55
                                      A      6mL + 90
                                     BBB    6mL + 155
                                     BB     6mL + 355
                                     NR      Residual

3/12/01    Hector Funding II Ltd.    AA     6mEL + 135
           Series I

4/17/01    NorthStreet CDO-III
                                            3mL + 100
                                            3mL + 375

5/16/01    Savannah - II             AAA
           CDO Ltd.                  AA

6/30/00    Nerva Ltd.                AAA     3mL + 75
                                     AA      3mL + 95
                                     BBB    3mL + 275
                                     BB     3mL + 475
                                     NR      Residual

8/6/01     Taunton CDO Ltd.          AAA     6mL + 75
                                     AAA      8.15%
                                     AA     6mL + 110
                                      A     6mL + 150
                                     BBB    6mL + 300
                                     BB     6mL + 750
                                      B        16%
                                     NR      Residual

Exhibit 3. Risk Weightings for US Banks

Private HEQ                50%
Other ABS                 100%
CMBS                      100%

GNMA Passthroughs           0%
FNMA/FHLMC Passthroughs    20%
Private Passthroughs       50%
CMOs                      100%
CDOs                      100%

Source: Federal Reserve, BIS.

Exhibit 4. Arbitrage Spread--Synthetic
Multi-Sector CBO

                        Sept. 3, 2001
                               Spread   Weight

AAA-rated 10-Yr HEQ                95      14%
AAA 10-Year CMBS                   44      14%
30-year Passthrus                  82      14%
10-Yr Agcy CMOs                   103      14%
AA-rated CMBS                      58      14%
AA-rated Private CMOs             120      14%
AA-rated CDOs                      74      14%
  Weighted Avg. Yield              82

Super Senior                       12      92%
Aa2                               100       5%
Baa1                              375       3%
  Weighted Avg. Cost               27

Arbitrage Spread                   55

Source: Banc of America Securities LLC.

Exhibit 6. Structure Product Spreads to LIBOR and Corporates

                                                            Pick-up to
                                            Sept. 3, 2001   same-rated
Sector         Subsector                        Libor Spd   Corporates

ABS            AAA-rated 10-Yr HEQ                     95          103
               AAA-rated 10-Yr Cards                   24           32
               A-rated 3-Yr Prime Autos                34         (50)
               A-rated 3-Yr Equipment                  70         (14)
               BBB-rated Top-Tier Cards               105         (45)
               BBB-rated Equipment                    135         (15)
               BBB-rated HEQ                          205           55

CMBS           AAA                                     44           52
               AA                                      58           11
               A                                       74         (10)
               BBB                                    133         (18)
               BBB-                                   178         (23)
               AAA-rated 10                           400          408

RMBS           AAA-rated:
               15-year                                 73           81
               30-year                                 82           90
               ARMS                                    74           82
               3x1 Hybrids                            109          117
               10-Yr Agcy CMOs                        103          111
               10-Yr Priv CMOs                        125          133

               Subordinate Privates CMOs:
               AA                                     120           73
               A                                      140           56
               BBB                                    210           60
               BB                                     515          162

HY Bond CDOs   AAA                                     45           53
               AA                                      74           27
               A                                      130           46
               BBB                                    218           68
               BB                                     665          312

Corporates     AAA                                   (8)
               AA                                      47
               A                                       84
               BBB                                    150
               BB                                     353
               B                                      817

Source: Banc of Securities LLC.

Exhibit 7. Structured Product Annual Default Rates, 1989-2000 (a)

                                  ABS      RMBS      CMBS

Defaults ($MM)                    668       116        69
Total Issuance ($MM)          892,352   497,874   172,338
Cumulative Default Rate (%)      0.07      0.02      0.04
Annual Default Rate (%)          0.01    < 0.01    < 0.01

                              All Structured

Defaults ($MM)                           853
Total Issuance ($MM)               1,562,565
Cumulative Default Rate (%)             0.05
Annual Default Rate (%)                 0.01

(a) Includes public, 144A and privates; includes international
as well as US

Source: Fitch and Banc of America Securities LLC.

Exhibit 8. Structured Product vs. Corporate Bond Defaults, 1989-2000

                                   Annual     IG/HY
                             Defaults (%)       Mix

Structured Products                  0.01    95%/5%
IG Corporate Bonds                   0.08       77%
HY Corporate Bonds                   3.07       23%
All Corporate Bonds                  0.77   77%/23%
Adjusted Corporate Weights           0.23    95%/5%

(a) Includes public, 144A and privates; includes international
as well as US

Source: Fitch and Banc of America Securities LLC.

Exhibit 9. Average One-Year Rating Upgrades/Downgrades, 1986-2000

                ABS & CDOs             Corporates

          Upgrades   Downgrades   Upgrades   Downgrades

Aaa           0.0%         0.3%       0.0%         9.5%
Aa1           3.6%        10.8%       3.0%        16.5%
Aa2           2.5%         1.6%       3.2%        15.0%
Aa3           2.7%         3.6%       3.0%        14.4%
A1            2.8%         1.0%       5.5%        12.0%
A2            4.7%         0.5%       6.2%        11.8%
A3            3.1%         3.6%      10.0%        12.8%
Baa1          2.2%        10.3%      10.8%        12.7%
Baa2          1.6%         2.7%      11.6%        10.8%
Baa3          1.7%        12.0%      14.7%        12.2%
Ba1          50.0%        12.9%      14.1%        12.0%
Ba2           1.6%         8.1%      13.9%        12.7%
Ba3           0.0%        12.7%      10.7%        15.5%
B1            0.0%        17.9%      10.4%        14.1%
B2            0.0%         7.7%      11.9%        16.7%
B3            0.0%        19.0%      11.9%        18.4%
Average       4.8%         7.8%       8.8%        13.6%


          Upgrades   Downgrades

Aaa           0.0%       (9.2)%
Aa1           0.6%       (5.7)%
Aa2         (0.7)%      (13.4)%
Aa3         (0.4)%      (10.8)%
A1          (2.7)%      (11.0)%
A2          (1.5)%      (11.4)%
A3          (6.9)%       (9.2)%
Baa1        (8.6)%       (2.4)%
Baa2       (10.1)%       (8.1)%
Baa3       (13.0)%       (0.2)%
Ba1          35.9%         0.9%
Ba2        (12.3)%       (4.6)%
Ba3        (10.7)%       (2.8)%
B1         (10.4)%        3.80%
B2         (11.9)%       (9.0)%
B3         (11.9)%         0.6%
Average     (4.0)%       (5.8)%

Source: Moody's and Banc of America Securities LLC.

Exhibit 10. Average One-Year Rating Upgrades/Downgrades, 1985-2000

                  CMBS                 Corporates

          Upgrades   Downgrades   Upgrades   Downgrades

AAA           0.0%         0.9%       0.0%         6.3%
AA            1.9%         1.3%       0.6%         7.6%
A             2.9%         1.6%       2.3%         5.9%
BBB           3.0%         3.3%       5.1%         5.6%
BB            2.4%         1.1%       7.2%         9.6%
B             2.6%         2.8%       6.6%         9.8%
Average       2.1%         1.8%       3.6%         7.5%


          Upgrades   Downgrades

AAA           0.0%       (5.5)%
AA            1.3%       (6.3)%
A             0.6%       (4.4)%
BBB         (2.2)%       (2.4)%
BB          (4.8)%       (8.4)%
B           (4.0)%       (7.0)%
Average     (1.5)%       (5.7)%

Source: Standard & Poor's and Banc of America Securities LLC.

Exhibit 11. Average One-Year Rating Upgrades/Downgrades, 1980-2000

                  RMBS                  Corporates

          Upgrades   Downgrades   Upgrades   Downgrades

AAA           0.0%         0.2%       0.0%         6.3%
AA            4.7%         2.4%       0.6%         7.6%
A             5.6%         2.4%       2.3%         5.9%
BBB           5.7%         4.0%       5.1%         5.6%
BB            4.2%         5.4%       7.2%         9.6%
B             3.4%         4.6%       6.6%         9.8%
Average       3.9%         3.2%       3.6%         7.5%


          Upgrades   Downgrades

AAA           0.0%       (6.1)%
AA            4.1%       (5.3)%
A             3.2%       (3.6)%
BBB           0.6%       (1.7)%
BB          (3.0)%       (4.2)%
B           (3.2)%       (5.2)%
Average      0.30%       (4.3)%

Source: S&P and Banc of America Securities LLC.

Exhibit 12. Outstanding US Taxable Bond Market Debt
(Dollars in Billions)

ABS & CDOs         1.2
Treasury & Agcy    4.8
Mortgage-Related   3.8
Corporate          3.6

Source: Banc of America Securities & Bond Market Association

Note: Table made from pie chart.

Exhibit 14. Year-to-Date Volume Composition (Dollars in Billions)

             2001   2001 (%)   2000   2000 (%)

US Public     170        62%    132        62%
US 144A        28        10%     24        11%
US Private      2         1%      1         0%
Non-US         73        27%     55        26%
Total         273               212

Source: Banc of America Securities & ABS Alert.

Exhibit 15. US ABS Sector Composition

Home Eq.        10%
Other           27%
Auto            22%
Cards           25%
Subprime Res.   16%

Source: Banc of America Securities & ABS Alert.

Note: Table made from pie chart.

Exhibit 16. Non-US ABS Domicile

UK            36%
Italy         14%
Australia     10%
Japan          8%
Netherlands    8%
Other         24%

Source: Banc of America Securities & ABS Alert.

Note: Table made from pie chart.

COPYRIGHT 2001 Financier, Inc.
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2001, Gale Group. All rights reserved. Gale Group is a Thomson Corporation Company.

 Reader Opinion




Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Title Annotation:collateralized bond obligations
Author:Gibson, Lang
Publication:The Securitization Conduit
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Mar 22, 2001
Previous Article:Introducing the BAS CDO ROE barometers.
Next Article:US MBS market.

Related Articles
Arbor National Commercial Mortgage, LLC.
S&P: Banca di Roma Retaps CBO Market; Signals Growth.
Fitch Takes Rating Action on Pacific Life CBO 1998-1 Ltd./Corp.
Trimaran Capital Partners Hosts Dr. Henry Kissinger At Annual Investor Update.
S&P: Enron Bnkrptcy Has Limited Effect on Global CDOs.
Fitch Ratings Places 2 Tranches Of CAM CBO I On Rtg Watch Negative.
Fitch Ratings Publishes CDO Transition Study & First Half 2002 Review.
Fitch: More Stable Performance for Most CDO Sectors in 2005.
Fitch Releases 2005 U.S. Structured Finance Rating Transition Study.
A Large Part of Financial Innovation in Recent Years Has Been Related to Securitization, Credit Derivatives, or a Combination of the Two -...

Terms of use | Copyright © 2014 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters