Synchronizing lethal and nonlethal effects in 1/25 SBCT: lessons learned from NTC 01-03.

On 6 October 2003, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1/25 SBCT) deployed from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California. The rotation was its first brigade-level training event on the path to its initial operational capability (IOC).

The focus of the training event was to conduct stability operations and support operations (SOSO) in a contemporary operational environment (COE) that reflected the current situation in Iraq. The training scenario combined the traditional characteristics of SOSO with elements of high-intensity conflict. This challenged the ability of the SBCT's fires and effects coordination cell (FECC) to employ its robust array of collection and delivery assets effectively throughout the area of operations (AO).

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This article describes tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) developed by the SBCT to synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects at the brigade and battalion levels as well as major lessons learned from the rotation.

Background Information. The NTC's notional country of Artesia that served as the AO included more than 1,000 multi-ethnic civilians. Individuals and entire towns were sensitive to the action or lack of action by the SBCT forces. A town that had been influenced positively would cooperate, offering information on known enemy locations, while a town that had been alienated would harbor terrorists, emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or riot against SBCT forces.

Within the SBCT's area of responsibility (AOR), enemy strength was estimated at a battalion-minus with 300 insurgents, terrorists and former military. The enemy rarely wore uniforms and traveled in civilian vehicles, presenting a challenge common in the COE.

Terrorists and insurgents were focused on disrupting US efforts to establish a new Artesian government and rebuild the country. Their objective was to promote anti-US sentiments and cause a level of casualties unacceptable to the American public to force the SBCT to withdraw. Enemy tactics included frequently conducting mortar raids on static locations, emplacing IEDs, directly attacking SBCT platoons and squads, and intimidating the local populace.

The brigade commander recognized the need to conduct effects-based operations and that force alone could not set the conditions for the eventual withdrawal of US forces. This was evident in the brigade mission statement and intent. (See Figure 1.)

To meet the commander's intent, the brigade no longer could plan direct action and traditional nonlethal engagements as separate operations. Every mission--from a raid on a terrorist training camp to the reconstruction of local infrastructure--required the staff to synchronize lethal and nonlethal assets down to the company level to achieve success.

FECC and the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). The SBCT is uniquely equipped to meet the challenges of the COE. By doctrine, it can achieve the goal of "see first," "understand first," develop the situation out of contact and finish decisively. The challenge for the FECC at the NTC was to ensure that the brigade's diverse detection, delivery and assessment assets were focused on the effects specified in the commander's intent.

Unlike a conventional fire support element (FSE), the FECC is manned with lethal and nonlethal experts to conduct crisis effects planning in detail and exploit the SBCT's unique capabilities. The deputy effects coordinator (DECOORD) and information operations coordinator (IOCOORD) worked closely under the supervision of the effects coordinator (ECOORD) to synchronize lethal and nonlethal effects.

During the MDMP, the first critical synchronization step for the FECC was the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) huddle. The ISR huddle was conducted immediately after the mission analysis briefing to maximize the robust capabilities of the reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron.

The meeting focused the RSTA squadron's collection assets, including tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs), squad-level human intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, a ground surveillance radar (GSR), the long-range advanced scout sensor system (LRA[S.sup.3]) and the remotely monitored battlefield sensor system (REMBASS), to help the brigade develop the situation out of contact with the enemy. The DECOORD and air liaison officer (ALO) ensured the RSTA squadron was resourced with artillery and close air support (CAS), if contact was made.

At the conclusion of the huddle, the FECC had completed the "decide" and "detect" portions of the target synchronization matrix (TSM), the draft of the essential effects tasks (EETs) and effects warning order two (WARNO2). (See Figure 2 on Page 20.)

The organization of the SBCT staff allowed the FECC to produce a detailed effects plan in a compressed timeline. During course-of-action analysis, the FECC developed the method for accomplishing the lethal and nonlethal essential effects tasks.

After collaborating with the ISR analysis platoon during the production of the brigade's collection plan, the target analyst worked with the terrain analysis team to produce accurate target grids using sub-meter imagery. He translated these targets into a brigade observation plan using the same analysis systems.

The counterfire officer also was integrated into the ISR platoon, collection platoon and terrain team, conducting pattern and terrain analyses to determine radar positioning and counterfire targeting. The assistant effects coordinator (AECOORD), with guidance from the DECOORD and input from the target analyst and counterfire officer, synchronized the details of the plan.

The information operations (IO) section and lethal effects section followed a similar format for EETs. Lethal EET methods followed the format developed by the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana: target/attack criteria, trigger, location, observer, delivery system, attack guidance, communications and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). Nonlethal EET methods were expressed as target, location, delivery system and message.

Nonlethal EETs also included measures of effectiveness (MOEs) in lieu of effects. The SBCT's MOEs attempted to quantify success for nonlethal engagements, giving the brigade a substantive method to evaluate the effectiveness of the IO plan. This also helped the FECC decide when to disengage from a particular high-payoff target (HPT).

EETs often included both lethal and nonlethal assets for detection and delivery in the same method. The major problem encountered during the planning process was receiving timely bottom-up refinement from the battalion fire support officers (FSOs) who served as both the lethal and nonlethal coordinators at their level. This improved as FSOs became more comfortable with their role as the battalion IOCOORDs.

SBCT rehearsals confirmed the maneuver and lethal effects plans and incorporated nonlethal detection and delivery. Each battalion FSO briefed the effects plan for his element, including the method for engaging key leaders, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the local populace. This allowed the brigade commander and ECOORD to confirm that the civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), public affairs and maneuver battalion nonlethal effects plans were integrated effectively into operations.

Synchronization Meeting. The synchronization meeting (formerly known as the targeting meeting) drove the brigade's daily operations and ended with the production of the daily fragmentary order (FRAGO). The intent of the meeting was to conduct HPT focused MDMP during daily operations. It allowed the FECC to continue to develop detailed, synchronized EET methods. The synch meeting provided the commander and staff a way to visualize the enemy's intent and capabilities in advance, anticipate requirements and position resources for upcoming operations. (See Figure 3 on Page 22.)

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Attendance at the synch meeting was not negotiable for all staff primaries. The meeting was chaired by the deputy commanding officer (DCO) or executive officer (XO). The brigade commander was present for several of the synch meetings, providing commander's guidance for each time period or event.

At this meeting, the staff conducted an intelligence update, assessed previously engaged targets, reviewed current operations and then wargamed the 24-48 hour period. The staff also developed the course-of-action (COA) for the 48-72 hour time frame. This cycle ensured that each day's events were fully developed and wargamed before execution.

The FECC facilitated the meeting by ensuring it remained HPT-focused as well as documented the targeting results for the next FRAGO. The tools used to facilitate the meeting were the effects synchronization matrix (ESM) produced by the brigade S3 and TSM produced by the FECC. Also referenced were the asset availability chart and the collection plan. The staff used overlays on the maneuver control system (MCS) to display graphics and the collection and fire support plans.

Battalion liaison officers (LNOs) attended each meeting to ensure their battalions could execute the tasks produced. In addition, their input contributed significantly to the staff's accurate assessment of previous engagements.

Immediately after the meeting, the S3 and DECOORD issued verbal FRAGOs, as required, to make critical changes to the 0 to 24 hour period. The S3 and FECC planners codified the results of the 24 to 48 hour and 48 to 72 hour periods into the daily FRAGO, Annex D and DD 1972 Close Air Support Requests.

The synchronization meeting was the critical event in the brigade's battle rhythm. With leadership involvement, it was the most productive meeting of the day.

The key to the synchronization of nonlethal effects in the synch meeting was the IO working group (IOWG), normally conducted the evening before the synchronization meeting. In the IOWG, the IOCOORD and IO cell staff, with participation from the DECOORD, S2 and S3, developed and refined the plan to accomplish each nonlethal EET for the time periods. See Figure 4 on Page 23 for a sample plan to accomplish several nonlethal EETs from the EET list in the TSM in Figure 2.

The IOWG followed a modified synch meeting agenda, assessing past events from the perspective of the tactical PSYOP detachment, CA Team B (CATB) and public affairs. The IOWG assessed the EETs by reviewing the MOE for each EET.

During an average day, the brigade conducted about 20 nonlethal engagements, requiring the IOWG be a consistent part of the brigade battle rhythm. This process ensured that the brigade employed its nonlethal assets effectively and focused the maneuver nonlethal engagements on the correct targets with the correct messages.

The ability to conduct true concurrent planning is a key tenet of SBCT doctrine. Although the FECC struggled with information dissemination initially, as training on the systems improved, so did the ability of the FECC to pass information to facilitate concurrent battalion MDMP.

The FECC used the "Send Plan" function on the advanced FA tactical data system (AFATDS) to push overlays and orders to subordinate FSEs early in the process. The organic digital systems within the brigade allow the FECC to produce overlays on AFATDS and transfer them through MCS to individual and Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBC[B.sup.2]) systems. These are organic systems, such as the near-term digital radio (NTDR), secure mobile anti-jam reliable tactical terminal (SMART-T) and FBC[B.sup.2]. This process ensures every observer on the battlefield can track the same FSCMs as his FSE.

Current Operations. The greatest challenge for lethal current operations during the rotation was clearance of fires. According to the "Organization and Operations of the SBCT" document, the RSTA squadron is intended to remain pure and conduct reconnaissance throughout the AO. This presented a challenge for the FECC: all missions had to be cleared through the RSTA and the infantry battalion that owned the terrain.

The FECC attempted to overcome this difficulty through the creative use of FSCMs. During the synchronization meeting, the FECC established zones of responsibility (ZORs), which translates into "on-call boundaries" for maneuver in specified time periods, and then inputted them into AFATDS. This allowed the FECC to clear fires for preplanned operations rapidly.

However, more than two units shared a majority of the brigade's battlespace. Clearance of fires in these areas was facilitated though the use of pre-cleared targets or areas. Based on the pattern analyses conducted by the target analyst, S2 and military intelligence commander (MICO), the FECC pre-cleared missions on certain targets and areas for a certain amount of time. Pre-Cleared areas and mission-specific ZORs also were input into MCS and transmitted to individual FBC[B.sup.2]s to ensure dissemination.

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Counterfire in the COE was another challenge that the FECC confronted at the NTC. The opposing force (OPFOR) employed the same indirect fire TTPs as the current threat in Iraq. Insurgents typically picked up mortars and ammunition from a cache, drove to a firing point, fired a minimal number of rounds and egressed within minutes. The speed with which the enemy exfiltrated after firing made it difficult to accomplish the objective of "destroy." The best effects we achieved on enemy mortars with lethal counterfire was suppression.

The brigade began to employ a mounted Stryker anti-tank variant quick-reaction force (QRF) at Ready Condition 1 (REDCON 1) during times identified by pattern analysis. The QRF monitored the fire support coordination net and responded immediately once a mission was sent by the radar. This technique resulted in the destruction of multiple enemy mortar teams caught in their vehicles driving away from the firing point.

Throughout the operation at the NTC, the SBCT had considerable difficulty receiving timely reports from nonlethal engagements. This made it difficult to ensure IO engagements were focused in accordance with the commander's intent. The tactical PSYOP and CATs attached to the brigade for combat operations are reservists and were not equipped with FBC[B.sup.2]. Their reports were too lengthy for the brigade command net.

The battalion FSO, also serving as the battalion IOCOORD, became the conduit for IO reporting. At the end of each day, the battalion FSEs sent the FECC a consolidated IO situation report, including a detailed summary of all nonlethal engagements. These engagements varied from the delivery of humanitarian assistance (HA) to conducting bilateral meetings (BILAT) or media encounters. This consolidation allowed the FECC to assess the engagements accurately during the IOWG and refocus or retarget future engagements, as necessary, during the synchronization meeting.

Another problem common in SOSO that confronted the FECC is the confusion caused by multiple engagements of the same local official from different delivery assets, for example, a company commander, tactical HUMINT team (THT) and CAT-A. This sent mixed messages to local officials and, at times, resulted in promises that were not kept. In some instances, this failure to "clear effects" was responsible for turning neutral towns into hostile towns.

To correct this, the brigade designated that certain HPTs within the local populace would only be engaged by one asset. Other SBCT elements had to coordinate with that asset if they needed to meet with the target.

Refining the SOP. Since our NTC rotation and recent Warfighter in December 2003, the brigade effects planners further refined the effects standing operating procedures (SOPs). The first major change was to incorporate the development of an IO intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) into the initial MDMP. The COE often dictates that maneuver boundaries be based on population centers rather than the more commonly used geographical boundaries, such as rivers or main supply routes (MSRs). Second, we further defined measures for improving the early information flow to the FSEs and bottom up refinement--to include correct reporting procedures for CATs and tactical PSYOP teams.

The FECC also switched from a paper map to a projection of the AFATDS effects management tool (EMT) for battle tracking and clearance of fires. The paper map remains as a backup. We will continue to look for ways to refine those systems and planning processes that proved invaluable to us at the NTC.

At the NTC, 1/25 SBCT's FECC operated in the COE, the environment in which it was designed to operate. In this complex, asymmetrical battlespace, success required the coordinated employment of all the SBCT's detection, delivery and analysis assets. The FECC was forced to rethink SBCT doctrine, revise roles and responsibilities, and maximize the capabilities of its systems.

Although the brigade never reached complete situational understanding as our doctrine dictates, the lessons learned will serve the brigade well as it continues to prepare to deploy into a combat theater.

Brigade Commander's Intent

Key Tasks:
1. Promote a transition from military to civil implementation with the
   local government assuming increased responsibility.
2. Maximize civilian contracts that support information operations (IO)
   and minimize negative contact through a proactive presence in the
   area of operations (AO).
3. Isolate and remove the influence of the insurgents through an
   aggressive IO campaign and other SOSO operations.

End State: Prepare to return control of the AO to the local authorities
and government and reduce insurgent actions to a level local authorities
can control.

Brigade Commander's High-Payoff Targets (HPTs):
Local Population
Key Leaders
Logistics
Command and Control
Mortars

Figure 1: 1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) Commander's Intent,
based on the SBCT's Mission: "Conducts stability operations and support
operations (SOSO) to enable the local government to secure its
environment, establish control, remove the need for US-led forces and
progress to a lasting consolidation of peace."

DCO or XO chairs the meeting. He states the purpose of the meeting,
directs the process and keeps the members focused on the unit's mission
and commander's intent, setting the conditions to achieve the
commander's decisive point(s).
DCO/XO conducts roll call--Commander (if available), ECOORD (if
available), DCO, XO, DECOORD, IOCOORD, S2, S2x, S3, S4, S6 (SIGO), ALO,
EA, EN/terrain analysis, ADAM, AV, CHEMO, PSYOP, CA, SOCCE, MICO, SJA,
TA, and TF LNOs
DCO/XO states the purpose of meeting; directs its focus and time periods
for meeting.
DECOORD reviews due-outs from previous synchronization meeting.

0 to 24 Hour Review (Set the Conditions 24 to 48 Hours Out)

DCO/XO Briefs: Commander's guidance and Intent (End State, Friendly/
Enemy and Terrain) for Key Events or During a Time Period
S2 Briefs Current:
 * Population Assessment for (IO-CA-PSYOP and S2x), Including Intended/
   Unintended Outcomes and their Exploitation or Mitigation
 * Enemy Disposition, Including HUMINT
 * Enemy Capabilities (Adjusted by BDA to Date); Kill Board
 * MPCOA and MDCOA, Including What to Expect During This Time Period
 * PIRs/Proposed Changes and HVT Changes
 * Enemy HPTs' BDA in the Last 24 Hours (Kill Board)
 * IO: Nonlethal HPTs (by Exception)
 * Status of Collection and ISR Plans
S3 Briefs:
 * Higher Mission and Intent, to Include SBCT Tasks
 * SBCT Mission: Key Events/Tasks and Review of Commander's Decision
   Points
 * Friendly Situation (Locations, Subordinate Unit Key Tasks)
 * Convoy Operations (S4)
 * Key Events (BOS Input by Exception: S2x, IO-CA-PSYOP and EN/terrain
   analysis)
DECOORD & IOCOORD Brief: HPTL, EETs, TGTs and ESM

0 to 24 Hours Review to Set the Conditions for 24 to 48
Hours Out: Review decisive, sustaining operations and shaping operations
that influence 24 to 48 hours decisive operations; review conditions for
the next time frame IAW the commander's guidance (BOS input by
exception).

S3 Briefs: Quick Review of Changes to the Time Period; Final Plan; and,
if Necessary, a Verbal FRAGO for the Changes to the 0 to 24 Hour Period
(Asset Availability Chart)

24 to 48 Hours Out

DCO/XO Brief: Commander's Guidance and Intent (End State, Friendly/Enemy
and Terrain) for Key Events or During a Time Period
S2 Briefs Projected:
 * Population Assessment for (IO-CA-PSYOP and S2x), Including Intended/
   Unintended Outcomes and their Exploitation or Mitigation
 * Enemy Disposition, Including HUMINT
 * Enemy Capabilities (Adjusted by BDA to Date); Kill Board
 * MPCOA and MDCOA, Including What to Expect During This Time Period
 * PIRs/Proposed Changes and HVT Changes
 * Enemy HPT's BDA in the Last 24 Hours (Kill Board)
 * IO: Nonlethal HPTs (by Exception).
 * Status of Collection and ISR Plans
S3 Briefs:
 * Higher Mission and Intent, to Include SBCT Tasks
 * SBCT Mission: Key Events (BOS Input by Exception S2x, IO-CA-PSYOP and
   EN/terrain analysis) and Current/Proposed Friendly Situation
   (Locations)
 * Convoy Operations (S4)
 * Review of Commander's Decision Points
DECOORD & IOCOORD Brief: Current HPTL, EETs, TGTs and review of ESM

Rehearsal of Key Event(s)/Time Period Using ESM and Vignettes:
 * Enemy Action or Reaction: S2 Executes Enemy MPCOA
 * Friendly Action or Reaction = Scheme of Maneuver--BOS Input: Confirm
   Personnel and Assets in Position to Act/React; Reallocation/
   Repositioning, as Necessary
 * Counteraction (Friendly or Enemy)

S3 Briefs:
 * Review of Time Period/Key Events, Including AS3's Review of E
   N/terrain analysis; MICO/AS2's reviews of the Collection/ISR Plan;
   and TA's review of ESM for HPT Issues Only (i.e., Targets Not
   Addressed, Assets Over- or Under-Tasked)
 * Final Plan and FRAGO

48-72 Shaping Operations (Discuss Decisive and/or Shaping Operations for
48- to 72-Hour Period, by Exception)

DCO/XO Brief: Commander's Guidance and Intent (End State, Friendly/Enemy
and Terrain) for Key Events or During a Time Period
S2 Briefs Projected:
 * Population Assessment for (IO-CA-PSYOP and S2X), Including Intended/
   Unintended Outcomes and their Exploitation or Mitigation
 * Enemy Disposition, Including HUMINT
 * Enemy Capabilities (Adjusted by BDA to Date); Kill Board
 * MPCOA and MDCOA, Including What to Expect During This Time Period
 * PIRs/Proposed Changes and HVT Changes
 * Enemy HPTs' BDA in the Last 24 Hours (Kill Board)
 * IO: Nonlethal HPTs (by Exception).
 * Proposed Collection and ISR Plans
S3 Briefs:
 * Higher Mission and Intent, to Include SBCT Tasks
 * SBCT Mission: Key Events/Tasks
 * Friendly Situation (Array of Forces, Key Tasks for Subordinate Units)
 * Assets Available (Assets Availability Chart)
 * Convoy Operations (S4)
DECOORD & IOCOORD Brief: Proposed HPTL, EETs, TGTs and the Assessment/
Update of TGTs Engaged (ESM)

48 to 72 COA Development & Wargaming Processes (Mission-Dependent COA
Development & Wargaming for Specific Events, as Required)
 1. Discuss decisive, sustaining operations for 48-72 period, shaping
    operations for 48-72 hours out that influence 72-96 hour decisive
    operations.
 2. Analyze relative combat power.
 3. Generalize options: develop COAs to defeat enemy MPCOA and, if not
    given, determine the decisive point (ME).
 4. Array initial forces.
 5a. Develop the Scheme of Maneuver (Input by each BOS):
      - State purpose of operation and tactical risks.
      - State critical friendly events or phases (decisive, shaping/
        exploiting and sustaining operations).
      - Designate ME along with task and purpose.
      - Designate SE along with task and purpose.
      - Designate reserves, to include location.
      - Outline movements of force composition, task and purpose.
      - Identify maneuver operations that may develop.
      - Integrate obstacle effects with maneuver and effects.
      - Assign AO responsibilities.
      - Locate engagement areas or attack objectives and counterattack
        objectives.
      - Consider enemy WME.
 5b. Refine HPTs and determine attack guidance to ensure success of each
     critical event or phase (HPTs for each critical event or phase), to
     include command and control-attack priorities; determine ISR based
     on CCIRs and HPT attack; and define the concept of effects (lethal
     and nonlethal).
 5c. Determine who, with what, how and when will attack HPTs identified
     during ISR (shaping operations), including prescribed formations or
     dispositions, when necessary, and priorities of CS and CSS.
 6. Assign headquarters.
 7. Prepare COA statements and sketches.

S3 conducts a review of the time period by event or phase.
AS3-Plans reviews maneuver synchronization matrix.
AS2 reviews collection/ISR plan.
DECOORD/ICOORD/TA review ESM for HPT, issues only (i.e., targets not
addressed, assets over- or under-tasked).
S3 issues FRAGO.
FRAGO to Include:
 * Scheme of Maneuver and Scheme of Effects, Tasks to Subordinate Units,
   Task Organization and Graphics
 * Updated ISR/Collection Plan, to Include Request for EAB Collection
   Assets
 * Updated ESM/EEM, Including Detailed EETs, AGM and TSS
 * Updated Target List Schedules
 * Target Nominations and/or CAS Requests to Higher
DECOORD/DCO/XO review the due-outs.

Legend:
ADAM = Air Defense Airspace Management
AGM = Attack Guidance Matrix
ALO = Air Liaison Officer
AV = Aviation
BDA = Battle Damage Assessment
BOS = Battlefield Operating Systems
CA = Civil Affairs
CAS = Close Air Support
CCIRs = Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CDR = Commander
CHEMO = Chemical Officer
COA = Course-of-Action
CS = Combat Support
CSS = Combat Service Support
DCO = Deputy Commanding Officer
DECOORD = Deputy Effects Coordinator
EA = Electronic Attack Officer
EAB = Echelons Above Brigade
ECOORD = Effects Coordinator
EEM = Essential Effects Matrix
EETs = Essential Effects Tasks
EN = Engineer
ESM = Effects Synchronization Matrix
FRAGO = Fragmentary Order
HPTs = High-Payoff Targets
HPTL = HPT List
HUMINT = Human Intelligence
HVT = High-Value Target
IOCOORD = Information Operations Coordinator
ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
MDCOA = Most Desired COA
ME = Main Effect
MICO = Military Intelligence Commanding Officer
MPCOA = Most Probable COA
PIRs = Priority Intelligence Requirements
PSYOP = Psychological Operations
S2x = HUMINT Section
SE = Secondary Effect
SIGO = Signal Officer
SJA = Staff Judge Advocate
SOCCE = Special Operations Command and Control Element
TACSOP = Tactical Standing Operating Procedures
TA = Targeting Analyst
TF LNOs = Task Force Liaison Officers
TGTs = Targets
TSS = Target Selection Standards
XO = Executive Officer
WME = Weapons of Mass Effects

Figure 3: Effects Synchronization Meeting Agenda. (Appendix I to Chapter
1 of the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division (Light)
(1/25 SBCT) Tactical Standing Operating Procedures, or TACSOP.)

Task: Limit civilian interference with SBCT operations.
Purpose: Allow 1/25 freedom of maneuver to establish a safe and secure
environment within the country of Artesia.
Methods:
 * Red Pass Ranch: 3-21 will influence the local populace and Mayor
   Gabriel Mendoza to support US presence in Artesia. 3-21 will
   coordinate for water testing and conduct a medical visit and
   generator maintenance within the town of Artesia. CA will coordinate
   with Barnes and Rudy for building materials and a new bookstore. 3-21
   Commander will conduct a BILAT with Gabriel Mendoza on 11 Oct. 3-21
   also will coordinate for a combined sporting event.
 * Tiefort City: 3-21 Cdr will meet with the religious leaders (see TSM)
   to influence their support for US goals. 3-21 will provide generator
   maintenance and medical assistance to the town. CA will coordinate
   with the UN for support for improving well water within the city.
 * Throughout AOR: After successfully completing humanitarian assistance
   tasks, IO will publish a press release and radio spots exploiting US
   assistance. PSYOP will produce posters emphasizing cooperation
   between US and Artesian civilians and government.
Desired Effects: Civilians do not actively impede SBCT operations in
towns or on main supply routes.

Figure 4: Examples of a Nonlethal Essential Effects Tasks (EETs)

RELATED ARTICLE: 75th Rangers Want 13As, 131As and 13Fs

The 75th Ranger Regiment is seeking 13A lieutenants and captains as well as 13F Fire Support Specialists, Skill Levels 2 and 3, for service in the Regiment.

The Ranger Regiment has assumed a leading role in America's Global War on Terror. In October 2001, it conducted the nation's first strike on terrorism via a night combat parachute assault into Afghanistan. During the last year, the Ranger Regiment has conducted combat operations with almost every deployed special operating, conventional and coalition force in both Afghanistan and Iraq. It conducted a wide range of operations, including airborne and air assaults in Afghanistan and Iraq, mounted infiltrations behind enemy lines, complex urban raids and rescue operations.

Ranger fire supporters plan and execute a variety of direct action, reconnaissance and special operations missions. A Ranger fire supporter can expect to work with all conventional and special operations fire support assets while gaining a wealth of experience in a short period of time.

Any Field Artilleryman interested should contact one of the following for the selection requirements: officers--Lieutenant Colonel Charlie Evans, Regimental Fire Support Officer, at DSN 835-4544/commercial 706-545-4544 or [e-mail]; warrant officers--Chief Warrant Officer Three Robert Buck, Regimental Targeting Officer, at DSN or commercial 1347 or [e-mail]; 13Fs--Sergeant First Class Charles Mallow, Regimental Fire Support NCO, at DSN or commercial 1260 or [e-mail].

Major David M. Hamilton, until recently, was the Deputy Effects Coordinator (DECOORD) for the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 25th Infantry Division (Light), at Fort Lewis, Washington. Currently, he is a student at the Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia. He previously served as the Executive Officer and then S3 of 2d Battalion, 8th Field Artillery (2-8 FA) in the SBCT. He commanded two batteries in 1-6 FA, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), in support of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) during Operation Joint Guard in Bosnia. He also was a Platoon Leader in the 1-39 FA, part of the 18th FA Brigade, during Operations Desert Shield and Storm.

Captain Ryan C. Gist is the DECOORD for the 25th Division's Stryker Brigade; he also served as the brigade's Assistant Effects Coordinator (AECOORD) at Fort Lewis. Among other assignments, he was the Company Fire Support Officer for B/1-75 Rangers, including a deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). In the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), he was the Information Operations Coordinator for 3-15 IN during Operation Joint Forge in Bosnia, and Fire Direction Officer for 1-9 FA.