Supreme Court upholds civil forfeiture in drug cases.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the government may prosecute drug dealers and seize their property without violating the Fifth Amendment's ban on double jeopardy.

The decision is widely viewed as a victory for federal prosecutors in their war on drugs.

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice William Rehnquist said that "civil forfeitures are neither 'punishment' nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause."

The decision came as a surprise to some, since recent High Court rulings have tended to view forfeitures as multiple punishments for the same crime. The lone dissenting justice, John Paul Stevens, said as much in his opinion. He wrote, "This term the Court has begun dismantling the protections it recently erected."

In an 8-1 ruling, the Court struck down two federal appeals court decisions in a consolidated case. (United States v. Ursery, 1996 WL 340815 (U.S. June 24, 1996) (Nos. 95-345 and 95-346).)

In one case, Michigan police found marijuana growing next to Guy Ursery's house and marijuana seeds, stems, stalks, and a growlight inside the home. Authorities instituted civil forfeiture proceedings on the house, alleging that it had been used to facilitate illegal drug transactions. Ursery ultimately paid the government some $13,000 to settle the forfeiture claim. Shortly before settlement was reached, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana and sent to prison.

In the other case, two California men were convicted of money laundering and manufacturing methamphetamine. Both were sentenced to life in prison. Prosecutors also seized more than $400,000 in drug profits from the operation under civil forfeiture.

All nine High Court justices agreed that the California forfeiture of drug money did not amount to double jeopardy because the money-which constituted proceeds from illegal activity-was not property the defendants had any right to retain.

But in the Michigan case, Stevens disagreed with the majority. He said there was no evidence that the house was purchased with the proceeds of unlawful activity and "the house itself was surely not contraband," so "none of the reasons supporting forfeiture provides a sufficient basis for concluding that the confiscation . . . was not punitive."

Stevens added that under the majority's argument, Prohibition-era police agents apparently could have seized "every home in which alcoholic beverages were served."