Supreme Court cases 2003-2004 term.

The 2003-2004 U.S. Supreme Court term included several cases addressing a variety of constitutional criminal procedural issues, some dealing with the most fundamental of law enforcement activities. One case resolved the constitutionality of a state's identify yourself statute, requiring individuals to identify themselves during an investigation detention. The Court also rejected a rigid approach to determining whether a reasonable period of time has lapsed prior to making a forcible entry. A few vehicle cases were reviewed, including one addressing the scope of the search incident to arrest when the individual already was out of the vehicle when the law enforcement encounter began and the other relating to highway checkpoints. The Court addressed the constitutionality of arresting several companions when information suggests at least one may be involved in criminal activity. Custodial interrogation matters also went before the Court, including the constitutionality of an interrogation technique described as the ask now, warn later approach and the admissibility of physical evidence derived from a confession obtained in violation of Miranda. Additionally, the concept of deliberate elicitation within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment was clarified. The following is a brief synopsis of these cases. As always, state and local law enforcement agencies must ensure that their own state laws and constitutions have not provided greater protections than the U.S. constitutional standards.

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United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521 (2003)

This case afforded the U.S. Supreme Court the opportunity to provide guidance to law enforcement officers in assessing how much time to wait prior to making a forcible entry after knocking and announcing their presence and demanding entry. Officers obtained a search warrant based on information that cocaine was being sold from an apartment. Officers at the front door of the apartment knocked and announced loud enough to be heard by officers located at the back. After waiting 15 to 20 seconds with no response, officers forcibly entered with a battering ram. They encountered the defendant walking out of the shower after he heard them enter. Evidence of drug dealing was found during the search, which the defendant sought to suppress, arguing that the officers failed to wait a reasonable time prior to the forcible entry.

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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the defendant and spelled out a detailed list of factors law enforcement must consider when deciding whether a reasonable period of time has lapsed prior to making a forcible entry. The factors included the location of the officers in relation to the main living or sleeping area of the residence, time of day, and the object of the search. (1) Additionally, the court of appeals divided the types of entries into categories, each supporting a different type of delay. For example, the court described the entry in this case as involving the destruction of property but with no exigent circumstances, therefore, requiring an even longer period of time before making entry. (2) The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear this case and ultimately rejected this approach.

The Court rejected the idea that the concept of reasonableness required law enforcement officers to consider a list of predetermined factors to justify their actions. Instead, reasonableness should be viewed under the totality of the circumstances confronting officers at the moment they decide to make forcible entry. The Court viewed the delay of 15 to 20 seconds in Banks as sufficient given that a reasonably objective law enforcement officer could conclude that the danger of disposal of the drugs had ripened.

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Thornton v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004)

In 1981 in New York v. Belton, (3) the U.S. Supreme Court described the scope of the search incident to arrest of an occupant in a vehicle as anywhere within the passenger compartment, including containers the officer discovers. The Court described containers as including "closed or open glove compartments, consoles or other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing and the like." (4) Recognizing the grave risk such encounters pose to officers, the Supreme Court was not concerned that the arrestee was removed from the vehicle and under control of law enforcement at the time of the search. In Thornton, the Supreme Court took this a step further. The Court held that police can search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest when the arrestee was a recent occupant of the vehicle.

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In this case, an officer became suspicious of how Thornton was driving. He appeared nervous and attempted to avoid contact with the officer. The officer checked the license plate and discovered that it belonged to a different vehicle. Before the officer could pull over the car, Thornton turned into a parking lot, parked his vehicle, and began walking away. The officer confronted him and asked whether he had any weapons or drugs on him or in his car, which he denied. Thornton consented to a limited search of his person, which revealed a suspicious item that he admitted to contain drugs. He then was arrested and placed in the back of the patrol car. The officer then searched the vehicle incident to arrest and found a handgun.

The defendant argued that the handgun should be suppressed as the search went beyond what can be done incident to arrest given he was not in the vehicle at the time the officer initially encountered him. The district court rejected this argument, and the defendant appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. (5) The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the case and held for the government, agreeing with the Fourth Circuit.

The Court viewed the arrest of a recent occupant of a vehicle as presenting the identical concerns regarding officer safety and destruction of evidence as the arrest of an individual when inside the vehicle. Considering whether someone is a recent occupant may turn on his temporal or spatial relationship to the vehicle at the time of the arrest and search; it certainly does not turn on whether he was inside or outside the car at the moment that the officer first initiated contact with him. (6)

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Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004)

In Groh v. Ramirez, the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to send a message to law enforcement on the importance of paying attention to detail. In this case, a warrant was obtained to search a residence. The application and affidavit contained a particular description of the items to be seized. However, the warrant itself did not contain such a description as required by the Fourth Amendment. The section in the warrant that was to contain a list of items to be seized instead described the place to be searched. The warrant was reviewed, signed by a judge, and executed.

A civil action alleging a Fourth Amendment violation was brought against the affiant. The lower court agreed that a constitutional violation occurred and held that the affiant was not entitled to qualified immunity as any reasonable officer would have concluded from just a cursory look at the warrant that it was invalid. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.

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Maryland v. Pringle, 124 S. Ct. 795 (2003)

In Maryland v. Pringle, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of arresting a group of companions when the officer has reason to believe that at least one or more is involved in criminal activity but does not have information to identify with certainty who may be the culprit. In this case, an officer stopped a car occupied by three men for speeding. The officer requested and was provided consent to search the vehicle. During the search, he found over $700 of rolled-up cash and five plastic bags of cocaine. After the three occupants denied any knowledge of the money and drugs, the officer arrested all three, including Pringle.

Pringle later confessed that the cocaine belonged to him and the others were not aware that drugs were in the car. At trial, Pringle challenged the use of his confession, arguing that his arrest was not supported by probable cause. The Maryland state court agreed, holding that absent specific facts establishing Pringle's dominion and control over the drugs, the officer's mere finding that it was a car occupied by Pringle is insufficient to justify probable cause to arrest. (7)

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the officer had sufficient probable cause to arrest Pringle based on the information known to the officer at the time of arrest and the reasonable inferences the officer could draw therefrom. The officer could reasonably infer that one or all three of the individuals had knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine as all three were riding together in a relatively small vehicle and appeared to be engaged in a common enterprise. (8) The Court noted that a standard higher than probable cause is to be applied later in the criminal justice process and does not belong in the decision to arrest someone. (9)

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Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 124 S. Ct 2451 (2004)

A state statute requiring individuals to identify themselves as part of an investigative detention does not violate the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. In this case, a deputy sheriff responding to a call reporting an assault lawfully detained a man that later turned out to be Hiibel based on reasonable suspicion of his involvement in the crime. After numerous attempts to determine the man's identity, the deputy arrested him for failing to identify himself during an investigative detention pursuant to Nevada's stop and identify statute. (10) Hiibel was convicted and appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the stop and identify statute. The Nevada Supreme Court ultimately rejected Hiibel's efforts to overturn his conviction, and he petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court. (11)

The Court rejected Hiibel's claim that the statute violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures. Provided the stop is justified at its inception--in other words, based on reasonable suspicion--and the request for identity is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, the minimal intrusion into privacy by requiring the individual to identify him or herself is outweighed by important governmental interests in securing such information. (12) The Court noted that this would provide the officer critical information, such as whether the individual is wanted or has a prior criminal history involving violence. (13) Such information also could serve to remove the cloud of suspicion hovering over the individual and bring an end to the encounter. (14)

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The requirement to provide identify further was challenged on the grounds that it violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The Court rejected this challenge, but refused to resolve this issue on the grounds argued by the government. The government argued that the statements the "stop and identify" statute requires are nontestimonial and, therefore, do not implicate the Fifth Amendment. (15) While recognizing it would be the rare case, the Court refused to hold as a broad principle that the statement of one's name could never be incriminating. The Court left open the possibility that with different facts, identifying oneself may implicate the privilege against self-incrimination. However, in this case, Hiibel's refusal to provide his name was not out of concern that it would be used against him, rather he refused merely because he was not cooperative.

Illinois v. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004)

This case brought the issue of highway checkpoints once again to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1990, the Court held that brief, suspicionless seizures at highway checkpoints for the purpose of combating drunk driving are constitutional. (16) In 2000, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, (17) the Court ruled that a highway checkpoint designed primarily to locate narcotics is an unconstitutional seizure. In Lidster, the Supreme Court clarified that Edmond should not be read to condemn all highway checkpoints.

In Lidster, the police were investigating the hit-and-run death of a bicyclist. About a week after the fatal accident, police set up a highway checkpoint to locate witnesses at about the same time and place as where the accident occurred. Police stopped all vehicles approaching the checkpoint and asked the occupants whether they knew anything about the accident. As Lidster approached the checkpoint, his vehicle nearly struck an officer. The officer approached the vehicle and smelled alcohol on Lidster's breath. Lidster subsequently failed a field sobriety test and was arrested and eventually convicted for driving under the influence.

Lidster challenged his arrest and conviction, arguing that the information leading to his arrest was derived from an unlawful seizure, asserting that the checkpoint violated the Fourth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Edmond controls and, therefore, the evidence against Lidster must be suppressed. (18) The government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which reversed, concluding that the use of the checkpoint in Lidster differed greatly from that in Edmond. The Court noted that the purpose of the checkpoint in Lidster was not to determine whether the occupants were engaged in criminal activity but, rather, to solicit information about a fatal accident. (19) In Edmond, the Court concluded that the purpose of the checkpoint was general crime control, requiring law enforcement to have individualized suspicion to seize an individual. The information-seeking purpose in Lidster furthered the significant public interest of attempting to identify the driver who fled the scene of a fatal hit-and-run.

Once it determined there was sufficient public interest at stake, the Court then considered whether the government's actions during the stop were reasonable. The Court noted that the stop was brief, typically no longer than 15 to 20 seconds; the officers engaged in voluntary questioning focused on the accident; and all vehicles were stopped, eliminating subjectivity on the part of the officers. (20) The purpose and scope of the checkpoint satisfied the Fourth Amendment.

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Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004)

This case provided the U.S. Supreme Court with an opportunity to address a controversial interrogation technique involving the intentional deprivation of Miranda rights in a custodial interrogation. This technique, sometimes referred to as "beachheading," took advantage of the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court holding in Oregon v. Elstad (21) allowing the use of statements obtained in a follow-up interrogation despite an earlier violation of Miranda, provided there was compliance in the follow-up interrogation. While the initial statements could not be used, those made in response to questioning after Miranda was provided and a waiver was obtained could be used in the criminal proceeding. This technique was a way to "work around" Miranda.

In Seibert, the defendant's young son, afflicted with cerebral palsy, died in his sleep. The defendant feared that she would be charged with neglect. In her presence, two of her other sons and their friends concocted a scheme to conceal the true cause of death by setting the trailer they lived in on fire with the boy's body inside. The fire was set with teenager, who was mentally ill, inside in the trailer so it would appear that the deceased had not been left alone.

Ultimately, Seibert was arrested for the crime. At the station, the officer who was to interview her was instructed to begin talking with her without regard to Miranda. She made several admissions during the conversation. Following a 20-minute break, the officer returned, turned on the tape recorder, administered Miranda warnings, and obtained a waiver. During this interview, the officer reminded Seibert of her earlier admissions. She confessed and was charged with first-degree murder. Seibert sought to suppress her pre- and postwarning statements. (22) At the suppression hearing, the officer testified thatthe initial failure to provide Miranda warnings was intentional and based on an interrogation technique he was taught. The lower courts suppressed the pre-warning statements but allowed the post-warning statements to be used against her. A jury convicted Seibert, and, on appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. (23) On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, ruling that both the pre- and postwarning statements should be suppressed due to the initial failure to provide Miranda warnings. (24) The U.S Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.

The Court determined that when interrogators question first and warn later, the warnings and waiver do not function as Miranda requires. The Court pointed out that "telling a suspect that 'anything you say can and will be used against you,' without expressly excepting [a] statement just given, could lead to an entirely reasonable inference that what he has just said will be used, with subsequent silence being of no further avail." (25) The Court expressed concern that inserting the warnings and waiver in the midst of an ongoing interview, as opposed to at the start, would likely deprive the subject of the ability to understand the nature of the rights and the impact of waiving those rights. (26)

The Court's emphasis on the timing of the advice of rights relative to the interview is worth noting. The fact that the interview in Seibert was continuous and conducted by the same officer led the Court to conclude that it would be difficult for the defendant to understand the nature of the protections afforded by the Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving those rights. The Court distinguished this case from its previous ruling in Oregon v. Elstaa (27) where the Court allowed the use of statements obtained during a lawful custodial interrogation despite an earlier interview of the defendant in which the officers unintentionally deprived the defendant of his Miranda rights. In Elstad, statements were obtained at the defendant's house that were determined to be in violation of Miranda. Officers transported the defendant to the office and interviewed him later in compliance with Miranda. The Court viewed the problem with the statements obtained initially as a good faith mistake, correctable by complying with the dictates of Miranda. The Seibert ruling should prompt departments to evaluate their interrogation tactics and assess the continued viability of so-called "beachheading" tactics.

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United States v. Patane, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004)

In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the failure to provide Miranda warnings prior to engaging in custodial interrogation does not require suppression of physical evidence discovered as a result of the person's unwarned but voluntary statements. The Court recognized, however, that the unwarned statement itself was inadmissible. After the arrest of Patane, officers sought to question him about his alleged possession of a handgun and began reading him his Miranda rights. (28) Patane interrupted right after he was advised he had the right to remain silent and told the officers they did not need to go any further; he understood his rights. (29) In response to the questioning, Patane told the officers where the gun was located and gave them permission to retrieve it. He was charged with being a felon in possession.

Patane sought to have the firearm suppressed. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the U.S. District Court's ruling suppressing the firearm, concluding it was the fruit of the unwarned statement. (30) The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve the conflict that existed on this issue among several circuit courts. (31)

The Court concluded that suppression of the physical evidence derived from a statement is not required as the statement, albeit unwarned, was voluntary. It is worth noting that while the physical evidence is admissible, the response to the questions are not. Also, establishing voluntariness may be difficult in the absence of the complete set of Miranda rights and a waiver.

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Fellers v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1019 (2004)

The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated that the concept of deliberate elicitation of incriminating information within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses more than interrogation. The accused, John Fellers, was formally charged by a grand jury for distribution of narcotics and conspiracy. Officers went to his residence and advised him that he had been indicted and a warrant was issued for his arrest. They explained that the indictment referred to his involvement with others. Fellers admitted to knowing the individuals and using narcotics with them. (32) Fellers was taken into custody and transported to jail. Once at the jail, he was advised of his Miranda rights for the first time. He waived them and provided additional inculpatory details. Fellers later sought to have all of his statements suppressed.

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The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision to allow the use of the postwarning jailhouse statement, concluding that there was no interrogation at Fellers' residence. Accordingly, the statements obtained later at the jailhouse are admissible under the reasoning of Oregon v. Elstad. (33) The case was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The Court took issue with the circuit court's reasoning because it rested on the "erroneous determination that [Fellers] was not questioned in violation of Sixth Amendment standards ...." (34) The Court pointed out that it has long held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches after judicial proceedings have commenced against an individual and applies during deliberate elicitation of information about the crime for which the person has been charged. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the circuit court to determine whether the Sixth Amendment requires the suppression of the statements made at the jailhouse after Miranda was complied with on the ground that they were the fruit of the earlier elicitation of information in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

Case Granted Next Term for Review

The U.S. Supreme Court carried over a case of particular interest to law enforcement. During the 2004-2005 term, the Court will consider Illinois v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202 (2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004). In this case, the Supreme Court will consider whether specific and articulable reasonable suspicion is needed to conduct a canine sniff of a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation.

Endnotes

(1) 282 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2002).

(2) Id.

(3) 453 U.S. 454 (1981).

(4) Id. at 460, n.4.

(5) 325 F.3d 189 (4th Cir. 2003).

(6) Thornton at 2131-2132.

(7) 805 A.2d 1016 (2002).

(8) The Supreme Court also disagreed with the lower court's view that the cash should not be considered when determining whether probable cause existed as possessing money, without more, is not criminal. The Supreme Court stated "[t]he court's consideration of the money in isolation, rather than as a factor in the totality of the circumstances, is mistaken in light of our precedents." See 124 S. Ct. at 800, fn 2.

(9) 124 S. Ct. at 800.

(10) NRS [section]171.123 (2003), defining the rights and duties of a police officer during an investigative detention.

(11) 59 P.3d 1201 (2002).

(12) Hiibel at 2458.

(13) Id.

(14) Id.

(15) Id. at 2460.

(16) Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).

(17) 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000).

(18) 779 N.E.2d 855 (2002).

(19) Lidster at 885.

(20) Id. at 891.

(21) 470 U.S. 298 (1985).

(22) Id. at 2605-2611.

(23) Id. at 2606. The appellate court found the case undistinguishable from Oregon v. Elstad.

(24) Id. The Missouri Supreme Court distinguished this case with Elstad as that case involved the unintentional withholding of Miranda warnings. See State v. Seibert, 93 S.W.2d 700 (Mo. 2002).

(25) Id. at 2611.

(26) Id.

(27) 470 U.S. 298 (1985).

(28) 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2625 (2004).

(29) Id. at 2625.

(30) 304 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 2002). The lower court suppressed the firearm after concluding that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Patane initially. The circuit court of appeals decided to base its ruling on the Miranda violation. It was the Miranda issue that went to the Supreme Court.

(31) See United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216 (4th Cir. 2002) and United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176 (3rd Cir. 2001) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations).

(32) Fellers at 1021.

(33) 470 U.S. 298 (1985). See United States v. Fellers, 285 F.3d 721 (8th Cir. 2002).

(34) Fellers at 1023 (emphasis added).

By the FBI ACADEMY LEGAL INSTRUCTION UNIT