Supreme Court Cases 1999--2000 Term.

During the 1999-2000 term, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on three Fourth Amendment cases relating to criminal procedure and a Fifth Amendment case involving the constitutionality of the Miranda rule. Law enforcement officers and their agencies may find these cases particularly important and interesting. Specifically, the Court ruled on 1) whether a law enforcement officer conducts a Fourth Amendment search when physically manipulating a bus passenger's carry-on luggage; 2) whether a law enforcement officer's initial stop is supported by reasonable suspicion when the suspect is both present in an area of expected criminal activity and flees upon seeing the police; 3) whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more information, justifies a police officer's stop and frisk of that person; and 4) whether the Miranda rule is a constitutionally based rule.

Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462 (2000)

The Supreme Court held that a law enforcement officer's physical manipulation of a bus passenger's carry-on luggage was a search and therefore governed by the Fourth Amendment. Steven Dewayne Bond was a passenger with carry-on luggage on a bus. When the bus stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint, a Border Patrol agent boarded the bus to check the passengers' immigration status. In an effort to locate illegal drugs, the agent began to squeeze the soft luggage, which some passengers had placed in the overhead storage space above their seats. The agent squeezed the canvas bag above Bond's seat and noticed that it contained a "brick-like" object. Bond admitted that the bag was his and consented to its search. When the agent looked inside the bag, he discovered a "brick" of methamphetamine.

Bond was indicted for federal drug charges. Bond moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the agent conducted an illegal search when he squeezed the bag. The District Court denied his motion to suppress and convicted Bond. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding that the agent's manipulation of the bag was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agent's manipulation of the bag was a search and that it violated the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...." What constitutes an unreasonable search that violates the Fourth Amendment? The Court's analysis involves two considerations: 1) Did the police conduct at issue constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment? and 2) If the conduct constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, then was the search "reasonable"?

Under the first consideration, the Court defines a search as a government infringement of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. [1] A reasonable expectation of privacy exists when the person's subjective expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable. [2] According to the Court, Bond had a subjective expectation of privacy in his bag [3] because he used an opaque bag and placed it directly above his seat. Bond's expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable because although a bus passenger expects other passengers or bus employees to handle or move his bag when he places it in an overhead storage area, he does not expect that they will feel the bag in an exploratory manner. In this case, the agent's manipulation of Bond's bag was an infringement of Bond's reasonable expectation of privacy because he felt Bond's bag in an exploratory manner when he squeezed it. Thus, the agent's manipulation of the bag constituted a search.

Under the second consideration, any government search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the search falls under a few recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement (e.g., consent searches, emergency searches, motor vehicle searches, inventory searches, and searches incident to arrest). [4] In this case, the agent's search was unreasonable because he conducted the search without a warrant and the search did not fall under any of the recognized exceptions. Although Bond consented to a search of his bag, his consent was not at issue. The agent's squeezing of Bond's bag was at issue--Bond argued that the agent's squeezing of his bag was an illegal search and the government did not assert Bond's consent as a basis for admitting the evidence.

Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000)

The Supreme Court held that a police officer's initial stop of a suspect was supported by reasonable suspicion because the suspect was both present in an area of expected criminal activity and fled upon seeing the police.

Two police officers were investigating drug transactions while driving in an area known for heavy drug trafficking. As they were driving, they noticed Wardlow holding a bag. When Wardlow saw the two officers, he fled. The officers pursued and stopped him. One of the officers conducted a protective pat down search for weapons because, in his experience, it was common for weapons to be in the vicinity of drug transactions. During the pat down, one of the officers squeezed Wardlow's bag and felt a heavy, hard object in the shape of a gun. When the officer opened the bag, he discovered a handgun with ammunition. The officers subsequently arrested Wardlow.

Wardlow moved to suppress the gun. The Illinois trial court denied Wardlow's motion to suppress, finding that the officers performed a lawful stop and frisk. At the bench trial, Wardlow was convicted for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Wardlow's conviction, finding that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop under Terry v. Ohio. [5] The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari solely on the question of whether the initial stop was reasonable and reversed, holding that the initial stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.

Under Terry, an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. [6] When reviewing an officer's decision to stop an individual, the Court does not expect scientific certainty. The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on common sense judgments and inferences about human behavior. [7] However, several factors can be used to determine whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop, including 1) whether the stop occurred in a "high crime area"; [8] 2) a suspect's nervous, evasive behavior; [9] and 3) a suspect's unprovoked flight upon noticing the police. [10]

Each factor alone may not be enough to support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. For example, an individual's presence in a high crime area, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable suspicion that he is committing a crime. And although headlong flight is not necessarily indicative of ongoing criminal activity, it is suggestive of such because it is an act of evasion. However, these factors, taken together, may be sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. In this case, the Court concluded that the officer was justified in suspecting that Wardlow was involved in criminal activity and investigating further because Wardlow was both present in an area of expected criminal activity and fled upon seeing the police.

Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375 (2000)

The Supreme Court held that an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more information, does not justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. [11] An anonymous caller reported to the police that a young black man standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. According to the record, there was no audio recording of the tip and nothing was known about the informant. Officers went to the bus stop and saw three black men. One of the men, J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Aside from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect the three of illegal conduct. The officers did not see a firearm or observe any unusual movements. One of the officers frisked J.L. and seized a gun from his pocket.

J.L, who was 15 years old at the time of the frisk, was charged under state law with carrying a concealed firearm without a license and possessing a firearm while under the age of 18. J.L. moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search. The trial court granted his motion. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court of Florida quashed that decision, holding the search invalid under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed.

If an officer is relying on an anonymous tip to make a Terry stop, then the tip must be sufficiently reliable to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Generally, an anonymous tip alone is not sufficiently reliable because it "seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity." [12] For example, an anonymous tip that a suspect is carrying cocaine and predicts her movements, standing alone, would not justify a Terry stop.

However, an anonymous tip that is suitably corroborated may be sufficiently reliable to provide the officer with reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop. [13] The Court considers two factors: 1) what the officers knew--either by their own observations, their experience, or prior knowledge of the suspect or area--before they conducted their stop; [14] and 2) whether the anonymous tip showed that the informant had predicted accurately the suspect's movements [15] or had knowledge of concealed criminal activity. [16] A tip that merely identifies a specific person is not reliable enough to show knowledge of concealed criminal activity. [17]

Will an anonymous tip, standing alone, ever provide enough reasonable suspicion to make a Terry stop? In a concurring opinion, two of the justices noted that an anonymous tip with certain features or in certain situations may make it more reliable, justifying police action. Such features or situations could include 1) caller identification of anonymous tips; 2) voice recording of anonymous telephone tips; 3) an unnamed person giving the information, face to face, to the police; and 4) an unnamed caller with a voice that sounds the same each time he tells the police on two successive nights about criminal activity, which, in fact, occurs each night--a similar call on the third night should not be treated like an unreliable anonymous tip. [18] The first three factors relate to the informant's credibility since the police officer is able to locate the informant, while the last one relates to the predictability of the situation.

In this case, the tip was not sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. First, the officers' suspicions that J.L. was carrying a weapon did not stem from any of their own observations, but solely from a call by an unknown, unaccountable informant. Second, the informant's call did not provide any information predicting J.L.'s movements, leaving the police without a way to test the informant's knowledge or credibility. In addition, the informant did not disclose any basis for his knowledge of concealed criminal activity, but merely identified J.L.'s appearance and location.

Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)

The Supreme Court held that the decision of Miranda v. Arizona [19] is a constitutional decision of the Court that may not be overruled by any Act of Congress (i.e., 18 U.S.C. SS 3501) and reaffirmed that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.

Charles Thomas Dickerson was charged with conspiracy to commit bank robbery and other offenses. Before trial, Dickerson moved to suppress a statement he had made to the FBI on grounds that he had not received Miranda warnings before being interrogated. The District Court granted his motion to suppress. The government appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order, holding that since Miranda was not a constitutional holding, Congress could supersede Miranda by enacting 18 U.S.C. SS 3501. The Supreme Court reversed.

In order to protect an individual against compelled self-incrimination during police custodial interrogations, Miranda established four warnings, or Miranda rights. A suspect must be told that he "1) has the right to remain silent; 2) that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; 3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and 4) that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." [20] Whether a suspect's statement during his custodial interrogation will be admissible in evidence depends on whether the police provided him with these four warnings and obtained an appropriate waiver.

Two years after Miranda, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. [ss] 3501, providing that a confession shall be admissible in federal court if it is voluntarily given. [21] The Court determined that Congress intended to overrule Miranda because [ss] 3501 requires merely voluntariness--not the four warnings--as the determining factor as to whether a statement will be admissible.

The Court held Miranda to be a constitutional decision--that is, a decision which interprets and applies the Constitution--that cannot be overruled by an Act of Congress, such as 18 U.S.C. [ss] 3501. While conceding that Congress may modify or set aside the Court's rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution, the Court emphasized that Congress may not overrule the Court's decisions that interpret and apply the Constitution.

The Court cited various other reasons for reaching its conclusion that Miranda is a constitutionally based rule. Among them, the Court noted that Miranda had become part of our national culture because the warnings were embedded in routine police practice. Furthermore, [ss] 3501 is more difficult than Miranda for law enforcement officers to conform to and for courts to apply in a consistent manner. [22]

By holding Miranda to be a constitutional decision, the Court reaffirmed that Miranda governs the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. If the Court had upheld [ss] 3501, then Miranda would have been inapplicable in federal courts, but would have still applied in state courts. In light of the Dickerson decision, a violation of Miranda is now clearly a violation of the Constitution, which can result in suppression of statements in both federal and state courts.

Ms. Kil, a third-year law student. recently served as an honors intern in the Legal Instruction Unit at the FBI Academy.

Endnotes

(1.) Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (J. Harlan, concurring).

(2.) Bond v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1462, 1466 (2000), citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (J. Harlan, concurring).

(3.) Bond, 120 S. Ct. at 1464. The Court noted that a traveler's personal luggage is an "effect" protected by the Fourth Amendment.

(4.) Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.

(5.) 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

(6.) Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000), citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.

(7.) Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 676.

(8.) Id. at 673, quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972).

(9.) Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. at 673.

(10.) Id.

(11.) An officer's authority to make the initial stop was at issue, not the officer's authority under Terry to conduct a frisk of a person who already has been stopped legitimately. Obviously, if the initial stop is unreasonable, then any resulting frisk would likewise be unlawful.

(12.) Florida v. J.L., 120 S. Ct. 1375. 1378 (2000), quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990).

(13.) Id. at 327.

(14.) J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379.

(15.) Id. at 1378, citing White, 496 U.S. at 332.

(16.) J.L., 120 S. Ct. at 1379.

(17.) Id.

(18.) Id. at 1381.

(19.) 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

(20.) Id. at 479.

(21.) 18 U.S.C. [ss] 3501(a).

(22.) Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.