Supreme Court Cases 1998-1999 Term.

During the 1998-1999 term, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on eight cases in the area of criminal procedure that are of particular importance to law enforcement officers and the agencies for which they work. Specifically, the Court ruled on 1) whether a visitor within another individual's dwelling may challenge governmental action, alleging the action violated the Fourth Amendment; and 2) whether law enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment when it allows third parties access into areas where individuals enjoy privacy when the third parties are not necessary to accomplish the government's objectives.

Additionally, the Court considered several vehicle search cases and ruled on the following: 3) the scope of the motor vehicle search and whether it extends to passenger belongings; 4) the constitutionality of a state statute permitting law enforcement to search a vehicle under circumstances where the officer could have made an arrest but instead chose to issue a citation; and 5) whether exigent circumstances are required in order to justify searching under the motor vehicle exception. The Court also ruled on 6) whether law enforcement must obtain a warrant prior to seizing property that is forfeitable, and the Court addressed 7) an evidentiary concern relevant to investigators, specifically the use of a nontestifying accomplice's confession. Finally, the Court, in City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), considered 8) the constitutionality of a Gang Congregation Ordinance. The September 1999 edition of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin includes a comprehensive discussion of this case.

Minnesota v. Carter, 119 S. Ct. 469 (1998)

In this case, the Supreme Court revisits the issue of whether, and under what circumstances, a visitor in another's dwelling is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990), the Court held that an overnight guest had a sufficient expectation of privacy in the host's dwelling to claim those protections. The question is whether those protections are available to one who is not an overnight guest but is present in the dwelling at the householder's invitation.

An informant advised a police officer that, while walking past an apartment window, he was able to see people putting a white powder into bags. The officer walked past the same window and, through a gap in the blinds, watched the same activity for several minutes. The officer advised police headquarters of his observations and returned to the apartment building, while preparations were begun to obtain a search warrant. When two men left the apartment building in an automobile, the police stopped the car. When the car door was opened, the officers saw a zippered black pouch and a handgun. Following the arrest of the two men, a search of the car disclosed pagers, a scale, and 47 grams of cocaine in plastic sandwich bags. After arresting the occupants of the car, the officers returned to the apartment and arrested the female occupant. A search of the apartment with a warrant disclosed cocaine residue on the kitchen table and plastic bags similar to those found in the car.

It was later learned that the woman was the lessee of the apartment and that the two men, who lived in Chicago, had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of packaging the cocaine. They had never been to the apartment before and had only been there for approximately 2 1/2 hours.

The two men appealed their convictions for violating the state controlled substances laws, contending that the evidence should have been suppressed because the officer's action of looking through the window into the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment proscriptions against unreasonable searches and seizures. The trial court had rejected the motion to suppress, holding that because the two men were not overnight guests but temporary, out-of-state visitors, they had no "standing" to claim Fourth Amendment protections inside the apartment. The state appellate court agreed and affirmed the convictions. However, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that the defendants did have standing to claim Fourth Amendment protections while inside the apartment because the lessee had invited them to be there. The state court then concluded that the officer's observations through the window constituted a search and that the search was unreasonable.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Although the Court declined to decide whether the officer's observation constituted a "search" - an issue the Court did not have to decide because the householder was not a party to the appeal - the Court held that "any search which may have occurred did not violate their [the defendants'] Fourth Amendment rights" (emphasis added). In reaching its conclusion, the Court cited the following factors: 1) the defendants in this case were not overnight guests; 2) they were essentially present for a business transaction; and 3) they were only in the apartment for a few hours. The Court concluded that while "an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment...one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not." While factors 1 and 3 reflect the relatively tenuous connection between the defendants and the house, factor 2 raises a somewhat different issue (i.e., the purpose of the defendants' presence in the apartment). Noting that any "expectation of privacy in commercial premises...is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home...," the Court observed that, while the apartment was a dwelling place for the lessee, "it was for these [defendants] simply a place to do business." The significance of this factor for future Fourth Amendment interpretation is not altogether clear. Presumably, had the defendants been overnight guests in the apartment, they would have been entitled to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment even if their purpose for being there was to transact business.

Wilson v. Layne, 119 S. Ct. 1692 (1999)

In a civil suit filed against federal and county law enforcement officers, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that allowing the media to enter private premises during the execution of a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. However, because the state of the law was not clearly established at the time of the complaint of action, the Court granted the officers qualified immunity.

Petitioners Charles and Geraldine Wilson filed the civil action against deputy U.S. marshals and officers of the Montgomery County, Maryland, Police Department who allowed a newspaper reporter and photographer to accompany them into the petitioners' home during the early morning execution of a warrant for the arrest of the petitioners' son. The law enforcement officers, arguing that they did not violate a clearly established law, moved for dismissal of the action on the basis of qualified immunity. The officers' motion was denied by the district court, but on interlocutory appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, a divided court granted the motion and dismissed the suit. The Supreme Court, recognizing that a split existed among the circuits on the issue of qualified immunity, granted certiorari.

Before reaching the question of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court first considered whether the underlying action of inviting the media to enter private premises to observe the execution of a warrant amounted to a constitutional violation. In doing so, the Court reviewed the historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment and reflected upon the intent of its framers to embody the "centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home"(Id, at 1697). Out of this respect for privacy, the Court traditionally has required law enforcement officers who enter premises under the authority of a warrant, to constrain their actions in execution of the warrant to those that are reasonably "related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion" (Id. at 1698).

In the case under consideration, the Court recognized that the law enforcement officers entered the petitioners' residence under the lawful authority of an arrest warrant. However, the Court found that the reporters were not present for any purpose reasonably related to the execution of the warrant and, thus held, that the presence of the media at the invitation of the law enforcement officers constituted a violation of the petitioners' Fourth Amendment rights.

The Court next considered whether in 1992, the time the officers invited the media into the petitioners' home, the law prohibiting such conduct was "clearly established." This inquiry required the Court to determine whether a "reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of an arrest warrant was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the officers possessed" (Id. at 1700).

Recognizing that a reasonable officer could have believed that bringing members of the media into a home during the execution of a warrant was lawful because it served the important purpose of keeping the public informed, and that in 1992, there were no judicial opinions to the contrary, the Court concluded that the contours of the Fourth Amendment in this area were not clearly established. Moreover, the Court pointed out that the officers involved in the suit relied on their own agency policies when issuing the invitation to the media to participate in the execution of the warrant. Thus, the Court granted the officers qualified immunity.

This case makes it clear that officers may not invite representatives of the media, or any other individuals, to take part in law enforcement activities that occur inside private premises unless the presence of the third parties relates to the objectives of the authorized governmental intrusion. Although the officers involved in the suit were granted qualified immunity, the decision of the Court in this case makes the law in this area "clearly established," and thus, the defense of qualified immunity will not be available to officers involved in similar conduct in the future.

Because the public appears to be genuinely interested in law enforcement activities, it is likely that the media will want to continue its past practice of participating in ride-alongs with officers. It is important to note that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case only prohibits law enforcement officers from inviting representatives of the media or others into private areas protected under the Fourth Amendment. This case does not preclude the media from witnessing and filming law enforcement activities that take place in public areas.

If media representatives are not satisfied with filming only in public places, they may attempt to use waivers of liability to justify intrusions into private areas. Law enforcement officers and agencies contemplating a cooperative operation with the media should be cautioned against reliance on such waivers. Waivers signed by individuals as law enforcement officers are making an entry into their premises to search for evidence of a crime or to make an arrest are likely to be viewed by courts as contracts under duress and unenforceable.

Motor Vehicle Search Cases

The Court provided further clarification of the constitutionality of searching a motor vehicle without a warrant in three separate opinions. One opinion held that a state statute that permitted an officer to search the interior passenger area of a vehicle under circumstances where the officer could have arrested an occupant in the vehicle but chose instead to issue a citation violated the Fourth Amendment. This case was discussed in the May 1999 edition of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin under the title "Search Incident to Arrest: Another Look." In a second motor vehicle search case, the Court once again considered whether the motor vehicle exception requires the existence of exigent circumstances. Finally, in Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999), the Court held that when an officer has probable cause to search a vehicle, the officer may search objects belonging to a passenger in the vehicle provided the item(s) the officer is looking for could reasonably be in the passenger's belongings. "The Motor Vehicle Exception: When and Where to Search," published in the July 1999 edition of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin discussed this case.

Maryland v. Dyson, 119 S. Ct. 2013 (1999)

Consistent with prior rulings on this issue, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted when officers have probable cause that a motor vehicle contains evidence or contraband, even in the absence of exigent circumstances. In this case, a Maryland sheriff's deputy received a tip from a reliable source that an alleged drug dealer was en route to New York to purchase drugs and would be returning to Maryland in a rented red Toyota, license number DDY 787, later that day with a large quantity of cocaine. The deputy investigated the tip and found that the license number given to him by the informant belonged to a red Toyota Corolla that had been rented to the alleged drug dealer.

When the alleged drug dealer returned in the rented car as predicted by the informant, deputies stopped and searched the vehicle, finding 23 grams of crack cocaine in a duffel bag in the trunk. Kevin Dyson, the alleged drug dealer, was convicted of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute. He appealed, arguing that the trial court had erroneously denied his motion to suppress the cocaine on the alternate grounds that the police lacked probable cause, or that even if there was probable cause, the warrantless vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was sufficient time after the informant's tip to obtain a warrant.

The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that in order for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement to apply, there must not only be probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime is contained in the automobile but also a separate finding of exigency precluding the police from obtaining a warrant. Applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that although there was "abundant probable cause," the search violated the Fourth Amendment because there was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Court of Special Appeals ruling.

The Supreme Court explained that the Fourth Amendment generally requires police to secure a warrant before conducting a search. The Court, however, recognized nearly 75 years ago in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) that there is an exception to this requirement for searches of vehicles. Under this established precedent, the "automobile exception" has no separate exigency requirement. The Court advised that this was made clear in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982), where the Court ruled that in cases where there was probable cause to search a vehicle "a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained." In a case with virtually identical facts to this one, Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam), the Court repeated that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: "If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the vehicle without more." In the present case, the Court of Special Appeals found that there was "abundant probable cause," that the car contained contraband. The Supreme Court determined that this finding alone satisfied the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a conclusion the Court stated was correctly reached by the trial court when it denied the respondent's motion to suppress. The Court went on to state that the holding of the Court of Special Appeals that the automobile exception requires a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable cause is squarely contrary to the Court's holdings in Ross and Labron. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999)

In a forfeiture case brought by a defendant whose vehicle was seized while parked in a public place, the Supreme Court refused to impose a requirement on the government that it obtain a warrant prior to seizing the vehicle. In this case, officers had previously observed the defendant using his car to deliver cocaine. He was later arrested at his workplace on unrelated charges. At that time, the arresting officers seized his car without securing a warrant because they believed that it was subject to forfeiture under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. During a subsequent inventory search, the police discovered cocaine in the car. The defendant was then charged with a state drug violation. At his trial on the drug charge, he moved to suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that the car's warrantless seizure violated the Fourth Amendment, thereby making the cocaine the "fruit of the poisonous tree." After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court denied the motion, and the Florida First District Court of Appeals affirmed. It also certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question whether absent exigent circumstances, a warrantless seizure of an automobile under the act violates the Fourth Amendment. The latter court answered the question in the affirmative, quashed the lower court opinion, and remanded.

The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Florida Supreme Court's ruling. The Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require that the police obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when they have probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband. In deciding whether a challenged governmental action violates the amendment, the Court inquired as to whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure when the amendment was framed. The Court has held in the past that when federal officers have probable cause to believe that an automobile contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment does not require them to obtain a warrant prior to searching the car for and seizing the contraband. Although the police here lacked probable cause to believe that the respondent's car contained contraband, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicle itself was contraband under Florida law. A recognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband before it is spirited away  undoubtedly underlies the early federal laws relied upon in Carroll. This need is equally weighty when the automobile, as opposed to its contents, is the contraband that the police seek to secure. In addition, the Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has consistently accorded officers greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places. The Court reversed and remanded the case.

Lilly v. Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 1887 (1999)

In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the difficult issue of the admissibility of a statement given to police by an accomplice in a criminal trial when the accomplice refuses to testify. The Supreme Court expressed concern with the reliability of statements made by an accomplice following a 2-day crime spree by the defendant, Benjamin Lilly, his brother Mark Lilly, and Gary Barker. The three men stole liquor and guns and abducted and killed Alex DeFilippis. All three were arrested. Under police questioning, Mark Lilly admitted stealing the liquor but claimed that Benjamin and Gary Barker stole the guns and that Benjamin shot DeFilippis.

All three men were tried separately. At Benjamin's trial, the state prosecutor called Mark as a witness. Mark invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court admitted Mark's confession as a declaration against penal interest of an unavailable witness. The judge overruled the defense objection that the statement was not against Mark's penal interest because it merely shifted blame to the other two men, and its admission violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, requiring that witnesses against the accused be subject to cross-examination in court. Benjamin was convicted.

He appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court. In affirming the conviction, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because Mark's confession fell within a "firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule. In addition, the court held the statement reliable because he implicated himself in criminal activity, and there was independent corroboration by other trial evidence.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Virginia Supreme Court and remanded the case. It reasoned that the Confrontation Clause ensures the reliability of courtroom testimony by subjecting it to testing through rigorous cross-examination of the witness. Hearsay statements of unavailable witnesses, such as Mark's statement in the present case, should be admitted only when they fall within a "firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule, or they contain sufficient "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" that additional testing through cross-examination would add little or nothing to their reliability.

Accomplice statements, such as Mark's, that shift or spread the blame to a criminal defendant are presumptively unreliable and fall outside any "firmly rooted exception" to the hearsay rule. That is true even if the statement incriminates the maker as well as the criminal defendant. The Supreme Court also found that the state court's particularized guarantees of trustworthiness were insufficient. The state court found that Mark knew he was implicating himself in criminal activity and that his statement was corroborated by other trial evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed that view because he was in police custody at the time the statement was made, and it was made under police supervision and in response to officers' leading questions. Also, he was under the influence of alcohol at the time and had a natural motive for spreading or deflecting blame for his criminal acts. All of those factors mitigated against a finding that the statement was so inherently reliable that cross-examination was rendered superfluous.

Case Granted Next Term Review

The Supreme Court carried over one case of particular interest to law enforcement. During the next term, the Supreme Court will consider Illinois v. Wardlow 701 N.E. 2d 484, cert. granted, 98-1036 (1999), involving law enforcement use of the temporary detention. Specifically, the Court will determine whether an individual's flight upon approach of a uniformed police officer is, standing alone, sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

Instructors in the Legal Instruction Unit at the FBI Academy prepared this article.