Success Is All That Was Expected: the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War.

Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. By Robert M. Browning Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, Inc., 2002. Pp. xii, 497. $34.95, ISBN 1-57488-514-6.)

With the publication of this volume, Robert M. Browning Jr. completes the best and most thorough history of the U.S. naval squadrons on the Atlantic coast during the American Civil War. His first volume, Front Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War (Tuscaloosa, 1993), won the North American Society of Oceanic History's John Lyman Book Award. The present work, more analytical, sustains the high standards of scholarship established by the first.

Once again, the explication of logistics forms one of the real strengths of Browning's work. Administrative organization, provisioning ships with food and coal (including the adverse effect of Gettysburg on coal supplies), difficulties of securing sufficient crew members, creation of repair facilities, and the changes in ships" armament are only some of the usually overlooked topics that are covered here in abundant detail. In addition, Browning provides a comprehensive study of the duties, responsibilities, and actions of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, a command that stretched from Key West, Florida, to the northern border of South Carolina. A real help in following strategy and naval actions are the modern, clear, and concise maps of a complicated coastline and river system.

While historians of the war will be grateful for the operational details, the larger themes that Browning addresses are also important, especially in his concluding chapter. The army and navy never overcame interservice rivalries or developed cooperative command structures so that the two branches could effectively carry out combined operations. The naval high command, especially Assistant Secretary of the Navy Gustavus Vasa Fox, never gave up wishfully thinking that ironclads could bombard fortifications into submission. The Navy Department undermined the ability of both squadron commanders, Samuel F. DuPont and John Dahlgren, to capture Charleston. While they urged the capture of the city, they also required a guarantee of victory as a condition of attack. More importantly, according to Browning, the Union command never developed a larger strategy for exploiting their superiority in men and materiel on the South Atlantic coast. Beyond strategic matters, Browning offers astute assessments of commanders. Acknowledging throughout the book that there were a variety of factors and personnel that hampered naval efficiency, Browning finds significant weaknesses in the leadership of both Fox and Dahlgren.

Having conducted exhaustive research in every pertinent record group of the National Archives (from ships' logs to official correspondence with the Navy Department), the personal papers of most of the major players, and a host of collections of diaries and letters (both manuscript and published), Browning has demonstrated his command of the primary materials. Coupled with his previous volume, he has produced what will be considered the standard account of Union naval activities on the Atlantic coast during the American Civil War.

Missouri Southern State University 

VIRGINIA J. LAAS