Strategic operation in the Far Eastern TO: problems of technical support.

The specific physical and geographic conditions in the Far Eastern TO (long coastline, numerous insular and peninsular zones) warrant the conclusion that an aggression by a potential adversary in this region is likely to assume the form of an air offensive operation, combat operations to block fleet forces, operations by special forces, and amphibious and airborne operations.

Insular and peninsular zones as well as the continental coast are the most likely areas for the employment of enemy amphibious and airborne forces in the Far Eastern TO. More likely than not, too, the said operations will be pursued in a successive manner. Upon launching an aggression, the adversary will direct his main efforts to the capture of insular zones, and later will proceed to take hold of peninsulas and the continental coast.

Under these circumstances, defense against amphibious or airborne assault may become for us the gist of warfare in that region. Basically an antiamphibious operation (particularly in its initial phase) will be about persistent retention of crucial likely avenues of amphibious approach, stretches of the sea coast, and insular and peninsular zones.

The outcome of operations in the initial period will be largely determined by the development level and state of the technical support system (TechS) as a crucial type of support for combat operations by troops (forces).

During preparations for and conduct of an antiamphibious operation, the aim of technical support is to maintain high combat readiness and combat capability of troops (forces) through a set of measures designed to provide them with weapons and military equipment (WME), rockets, ammunition, and military-technical equipment (MTE). To achieve this aim, a unified (integrated) technical support system is organized to cater to a grouping of troops (forces) in the TO, and a set of tasks is addressed, whose extent and content depend on a number of complex and diverse conditions and factors.

During preparations for and conduct of operations (combat operations), the technical support system of a grouping of troops (forces) is a totality of command and control agencies supervising TechS forces and assets, as well as research establishments and military educational establishments, which jointly pursue the same goal and function on the common principles. Its basis is formed by mobile TechS forces and assets and operations-zone permanent bases, depots, and arsenals with stocks of WME, rockets, ammunition, and MTE, ones echeloned front-wise and in depth in accordance with the operational disposition of troops.

The level of execution of technical support tasks will be determined primarily by the emerging military-political situation, the conditions under which groupings of troops (forces) are created and deployed, specific features of the TO, methods whereby the war was started, and the character of military operations. But the main level-evaluation criterion is the qualitative state and capabilities of the technical support forces and assets themselves.

Sea coast defense in the Far East has characteristic traits of its own. The Far Eastern TO is distinguished by weak infrastructure and operational organization. The peninsulas of Chukotka and Kamchatka, the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin, and the Maritime mainland are separated by huge transpolar and cispolar areas of tundra, taiga, mountain ridges, and immense water expanses. This creates additional difficulties in technical support, particularly materiel airlifts to cater to embattled troops (forces).

Advanced capabilities available to the enemy, ones enabling him to engage troops (forces) practically to any depth, destroy transport facilities and lines of communication, and create vast areas of destruction and inundation, form a rather complicated background for troop deployments in the TO and efforts to create the necessary force groupings.

Sea coast specifics and hydrometeorological conditions (limited visibility, prevailing winds, offshore depths, etc.) will place a significant impact on preparations for and conduct of operations in the Far East, determining enemy assault landing methods and the depth of ship artillery support for enemy landing forces, as well as distances to zones where ship-borne enemy landing forces can be engaged by army and navy weapons in an antiamphibious operation.

The conditions turn particularly difficult in winter. Low temperatures and icing will strongly affect the fleet, amphibious force and grouping of troops (forces) engaged in an antiamphibious operation. Ice cover will put an end to operations by weak-hulled ships. Ice fields on the high seas and ice edges off the coast will restrict naval maneuvering capabilities. Ice movements can reduce survivability of anchor barrier minefields. Hard frosts and deep snow on the shore will complicate to the extreme troop operations and the use of equipment; creating decent living conditions for the personnel will become quite a problem.

Other geographic features of naval theaters also have considerable influence on the nature of combat operations. Fogs, clouds and precipitation dramatically reduce the range of detection of the enemy and maximum range of aimed fire. All of that entails increased ammunition and fuel consumption.

It will be a problem to organize maintenance of all types of WME. As is obvious, it makes no sense to bring crippled military equipment and weapons from islands to the mainland for repairs and then bring them back. Moreover, in a number of cases it will be just impossible. Thus, we must establish in good time what maintenance and repair organizations, at least at a minimum strength level and with maintenance kits, should be redeployed to the islands in peacetime.

Considering the underdeveloped state of the local industry and the complexity (or impossibility in some cases) of organizing the evacuation of damaged WME, units and parts from irrecoverably lost weapons and equipment may become an important MTE replenishment source.

The participation in operations in the Far East of practically all AF services, combat arms, and units of other agencies places higher demands on organization of coordination between them and their joint command and control. Establishing a unified technical support control agency is likely to be a way of addressing these problems.

In view of its incompleteness and the lack of state-of-the-art control equipment, the existing command and control system cannot assure the necessary promptness, stability and security of command and control. In the absence of a regulatory and legal framework enabling peacetime creation and functioning of a unified (integrated) system for technical support of groupings of troops (forces), it will be more difficult to control technical support in a period of transition from peacetime to wartime footing and during preparations for and execution of operational (combat) missions.

The great spatial scope and isolation of sectors where groupings of troops (forces) will pursue combat operations are reasons requiring that technical support control agencies be provided with state-of-the-art equipment and automated systems.

Assignment of tactical command and control teams staffed with officers from rocket-and-artillery, armor and motor services is needed if control of technical support forces and assets in isolated operational sectors is to be secured.

Technical support during preparations for and pursuance of an antiamphibious operation requires that the theater of operations be organized in good time to suit the existing conditions, bigger stocks of rockets, ammunition, and military-technical equipment be created, and maintenance and repair organizations be deployed to provide for protracted and self-reliant combat operations in isolated, scattered and mutually remote coastal sectors, islands and peninsulas.

Full self-reliance of groupings of troops (forces) implies early concentration in operational sectors (areas) of such an amount of technical support forces and assets as in the course of an operation (combat operations) will enable support for relevant groupings of troops (forces) amid a most difficult situation where a temporary disruption of supply and evacuation has occurred and a maneuver of forces and fires from other sectors (areas) is impossible.

Under self-reliant conditions, TechS organizations of the grouping of troops (forces) in the Far Eastern TO must possess peacetime stocks of rockets and ammunition exceeding two to three times those created, for example, in the Western TO.

The District's current amount of WME and its qualitative state are disincentives to fully preparing them for combat employment within minimal timeframes. Not less than 25 to 30 days will be needed to bring combined units and units to wartime strength in WME, to fill and fuse operational ammunition stocks, to obtain motor vehicles from enterprises and organizations, and to bring to the working state the storage batteries of equipment in the emergency reserve.

There are also discrepancies between the needs for new ammunition and MTE to replace whatever was used or lost, as felt by troops engaged in combat operations, and the established levels of stocks and the upkeep capacities; between ammo and MTE delivery amounts and transportation capacities of supply combined units and units; between timeframes of mobilization deployment of technical support forces and assets and those within which rockets, ammunition and MTE can be delivered and WME restored.

An analysis of the state of the technical support system, and the opportunities for supplying WME, rockets, ammunition and military-technical equipment, restoring weapons and military equipment, and controlling technical support shows that currently there is a number of problems affecting the timely preparation and pursuance of an operation by a grouping of troops (forces) in strategic and operational sectors. All these problems can be addressed via creating a joint (unified) technical support system designed for a grouping of troops (forces), drawing up unified regulatory documents on technical support, introducing a unified technical support planning and control system for peacetime and wartime, and accumulating in the peacetime stocks of WME, rockets, ammunition and MTE for troops (forces) in accordance with a unified plan and unified upkeep standards.

The actual availability in the District and qualitative state of the WME disenable their full preparation for combat employment within a minimal timeframe. Forecasts put the time necessary for that at not less than 25 to 30 days. Besides, it is necessary to bring combined units and units to wartime strength in WME, fill and fuse operational stocks of ammunition, obtain motor vehicles from organizations and enterprises, and bring to the working state storage batteries of equipment in emergency reserve.

Thus, Far Eastern TO specifics call for the creation of self-reliant groupings of technical support forces and assets in sectors where troops (forces) are likely to operate; a build-up in stocks of rockets, ammunition and MTE directly in line units and at all echelons of the technical support system; constant keeping of a mobile stock of ammunition; dispersed disposition of maintenance and repair agencies, ammo and MTE depots (in isolated operational sectors) along roads, near water supply sources with the maximum use of terrain and its concealing features; the use of sea (river) and air transport for the delivery of rockets, ammunition and MTE.

Lt. Gen. O.S. RAIKHMAN

Deputy Commander of Forces of the Far Eastern Military District for Weapons

Candidate of Military Sciences

Oleg Semyonovich RAIKHMAN was born in the city of Starokonstantinov, Khmelnitsky Region, Ukrainian SSR, on September 13,1956. He graduated from Chelyabinsk Higher Military Motor Command School (1977), Military Armor Academy (1987), and General Staff Academy (1996). Held positions ranging from platoon commander to Weapons Chief--Deputy Commander of Forces of the Far Eastern Military District for Weapons. Participated in combat operation in the DRA.