Special Operations Forces and Engaging Them.

The period between the late 20th and early 21st centuries is marked by a transition to wars where the decisive role belongs to high-precision conventional and nontraditional weapons (including nonlethal weapons) based on new physical principles and to elite troops--special operations forces (SOF). Analysis of the experience in the employment of the latter shows that an independently operating SOF unit can, in a matter of twenty-four hours, locate and determine the coordinates of between three and five targets, effectively engage one major fixed target and destroy at least three mobile targets. One member of such a force can ambush at least 20 enemy troops. Furthermore, these units are designated to create belts of destruction, flood terrain, install booby traps, employ reduced-size nuclear weapons and contaminate sections of terrain and water sources. In NATO experts' evaluation, the probability of destruction by a commando unit of a standard facility is 0.7-0.8, which bears comparison with high-precision we apons' strike capabilities.

It is for a reason that the extensive changes to the structure of the US armed forces carried out in recent years did not result in downsizing SOF. On the contrary they were increased to 42,600 men. A Special Operations Command was established in Germany in 1996 and the number of special troops was increased by a factor of 4.3.

As a rule, the elements of the SOF are drawn from organic special large and small units of the major services together with command and control bodies in accordance with their operational employment. It is possible to include for the performance of special missions temporary (inorganic) Army and the Marines subunits and units specially trained under the "Commandos" program.

Unlike general-purpose, SOF elements purposefully train in peacetime for special operations in particular regions. Western analysts already regard them as the "third force" along with nuclear forces and conventional troops.

The experience of local wars has shown that actions of special operations forces were mainly of a secret nature. Their employment was directly controlled by the top military and political leaderships. Such operations involved on average 5,000 men a week. Beginning in 1991, there have been 17 operations to settle crises in various regions and 194 operations to combat drug trafficking. During 1997, SOF units were active in 144 states. Furthermore, they were in active combat training (they took part in 224 combined-arms exercises in 91 countries around the world).

The SOF leadership is trying to determine the sites of chemical, nuclear and biological facilities as well as the manufacturers of nontraditional weapons based on new physical principles and to compile data-books of important facilities. The US forces are developing a new SOF employment concept to guarantee an element of strategic surprise, high effectiveness of commando and subversive impacts, a broad maneuver along the frontage and in depth in some missions with the aid of secret agents, rebels and guerilla fighters.

The principal form of special troops employment in the world's leading countries is a special warfare. [*]

The objectives of a special warfare in peacetime conditions, to our mind, can be to undermine or wreck the economic potential (economic structure) of a country (region or a research center); to build operational and technical conditions (bases) on the enemy territory in advance of further operations; to disrupt advanced civilian and military R&D projects and tests of especially important high-precision weapons; to disrupt and capture individual economic branches (the banking system, information structure and their controlling bodies) through investments and the creation of transnational corporations.

At the same time the SOF seek the following objectives: the organization of antigovemment protests, rebel and guerilla movements to destabilize the situation in countries and bring down their governments; training and formation of guerilla and rebel units; gathering of intelligence data; subversive operations; raids; deployment and accumulation in appropriate regions of weapons and materiel for special wartime operations; erasure, garbling and stealing of data or delaying their passage; psychological operations, covert and overt sabotage of the operation of government bodies; the spreading of false information and so forth.

In wartime the SOF are to tackle the following additional missions: to cripple or capture important military or civilian facilities; disrupt communications lines, systems of government and military control and logistic services; adjust air and missile strikes and artillery fire; collect intelligence data for the benefit of groups of forces on the theater of military operations; raids behind enemy lines to capture documents, high-precision weapons and to demoralize the military personnel and the local population.

The foregoing makes it possible to conclude that the organization of effective resistance to SOF in modem conditions is becoming of paramount importance. This is especially important in guaranteeing security of one's own interior areas during the course of combat operations because special operations forces can threaten the troops' ability to resist the enemy in operations.

In our view, combating SOF in operations consists of a set of coordinated operations (related to reconnaissance, combat, guarding and security arrangements) conducted under the single guidance of specially assigned forces and weapons of large strategic formations in the zones or responsibility assigned to them in combined-arms operations and territorial defense in cooperation with large strategic formations and units of the other armed services and special troops, internal troops, the Federal Security Service (FSB), civil defense troops and border troops to resist pressure against them and against the region s economic facilities and infrastructure.

The employment of heterogeneous forces in such struggle makes it important to develop a special system of planned and organized (on the basis of zones, belts and areas of responsibility) large strategic formations, combined units and units of reconnaissance, combat guarding and security actions of troops, operational groups, forces and fires of the branches of the RF Armed Forces and other troops in accordance with the concept of operations to crush assault forces and irregular units. It is also important to develop measures to frustrate enemy raiding and reconnaissance activities in order to uphold security in the interior regions and permit the required level of functioning of their economic facilities.

Experience of combating SOF in operations has confirmed the fact that the observance of the following principles is essential for success: efficiency-the ability to discover enemy plans and take timely countermeasures to crush (eliminate) SOF during periods needed for the successful performance of operational missions; initiative-the taking by all echelons (within the scope of their powers) of active measures to effectively engage SOF in their staging areas, disrupt the enemy's attempts to use the planned landing and disembarkation areas and to prohibit access to the assault (strike) objectives; coordination of efforts in the performance of missions in the zones of responsibility with retaining the possibility to move forces and weapons across the zones to the threatened areas; echelonment-the deployment of forces and weapons along the entire depth of the disposition of forces.

The possible main methods of combating SOF are: the reconnoitering of enemy SOF bases and their destruction by missile and air strikes; the detection of infiltrated commando parties and organization of ambushes; the remote and controlled mining of routes of advance; the detection of operations bases in the front zone and their elimination; the holding of special operations to free operationally important areas of terrain and lines of communication from bandit squads and enemy agents; the setting up of checkpoints at important positions; the crushing of irregular force elements (or blocking them) in certain areas and stationing of garrisons (security detachments); the protection by troops of zones and facilities and concealment of practically all main military, administrative and industrial facilities through the use of technical protection facilities and artificial obstacles; the imposition of marshal law and dissemination of special propaganda information among the SOF personnel.

It is advisable to have a special command and control element to provide high-quality organization in the joint combating of special operations forces, maintenance of cooperation and command and control of personnel and weapons in destroying these forces. This is not hard to do in wartime since wartime military district headquarters are set up anyway and the combating is conducted in the wide-area defense context. In peacetime this matter calls for immediate solutions. In our view, there is pressing need for the creation in every federation component their own security councils that could be charged with coordinating functions in countering the adversary.

The successful combating of SOF and irregular force elements in critical situations will largely depend on the correct assessment of the threats, coordination of efforts of all the echelons involved in these efforts, the planning of a joint set of measures to prevent such an enemy from attacking facilities in some or other region, and measures aimed at the elimination of the aftermath of attacks and getting those facilities running again.

It is sensible to regard combating SOF as an important component part of military actions and any other warfare (for example, political, information, economic or ecological warfare) conducted by a state and all its power structures and departments. Unfortunately, the RF Armed Forces do not pay sufficient attention to it yet. Special combined units and units are organizationally subordinated to the chiefs of intelligence directorates (sections) and, correspondingly, they perform intelligence functions. The main feature of special operations is, however, that they are attack-oriented (they attack reliably reconnoitered objectives) and they are in constant readiness for combat employment in surprise and swift action operations to inflict on the adversary direct damage in peacetime, in the period of threat preceding outbreak of war when the employment of conventional forces is regarded politically impossible or premature.

In our opinion, it is necessary to add to the national security concept a provision on the use of special forms and methods of warfare that should be given suitable legal grounds in the Law on Special Actions of the Armed Forces and Other Troops. We think this idea can be put into effect by forming special operations forces of the RF Armed Forces or by reforming the special troops.

This will make it possible, during the course of military conflicts, to inflict on the enemy troops with the aid of special methods highly effective massive and purposeful punishment and to do damage to its communications zone, economic facilities and infrastructure pressure in a bid to attain operational and strategic objectives.

(*.) According to the NATO command, the term "special warfare" stands for a set of measures of combat employment of large units, units and subunits of special operations forces and irregular elements to implement NATO members' policy: direct action operations, special reconnaissance, operations with the use of special arms and tactics, psychological operations, antiterrorist operations, humanitarian aid, search and rescue operations behind enemy lines, and some others.