Some aspects of information analysis in counterterrorist operations.

When analyzing military-political processes it is necessary to gain an insight of social phenomena with the aid of scientific methods and principles. Whatever the problems and whatever means and methods are used to solve them, it is important that thinking should be straight, consistent, non-contradictory and conclusive--in a word, it should be logical.

Among the elements of formal logic are notions, judgements and deductions; among the tools of thinking are definitions, rules (principles) of formulating such categories, methods of transition from some judgements to others seen as consequences of the former (rules of reasoning), laws of thinking, rules of combining laws of thinking and judgement into systems, methods of formalizing such systems, etc.

An idea is true if it corresponds with the subject reflected in it. Practice is an indisputable criterion of truth in any business. Therefore, to gain true knowledge of a situation, for example, it is not only necessary to follow the rules of formal logic in reasoning but also to constantly turn to practice to check against it every phase of the process to acquire knowledge.

Strict observance of fundamental laws of formal logic (first of all, the principle of identity, the laws of contradiction, the excluded middle and sufficient evidence) is absolutely essential for information experts. Failing that, it is impossible to learn the truth, substantiate the correctness of theoretical generalizations, draw accurate conclusions and demonstrate their practical significance. The standard of knowledge of these laws and the ability to use them in practice are evidence of professionalism of information service experts.

Information-analysis activities (IAA) of military agencies during the counterterrorist operation is a creative process aimed at getting to know the military-political situation and the way it may develop in the areas where unlawful armed bands operate, determining their strength, mission capabilities, military potential, location of their bases, possible nature of operations and timely reporting to the command the data and conclusions based on estimations of the situation.

IAA requires deep theoretical knowledge of many things of key importance among which are the laws and regularities of social development and formal logic, the laws and categories of dialectics, as well and methods of epistemology.

I should at the same time stress that in order to successfully accumulate and systematize material it is sufficient to be industrious, know certain technical methods and strictly follow the basic rules and sequence of operations, and summing up whereas analysis of available data is a highly creative process and it requires of information experts the presence of appropriate mental faculties, wide-ranging knowledge and sufficient experience.

The main requirements imposed on IAA are painstaking analysis and objectivity in estimating the procured data. Preliminary examination of materials and documents obtained from different sources, including open sources (mass media, reference books and encyclopedias), consists in getting familiar first of all with their contents to determine their importance, prioritize their examination, to see if they can be useful, as well as to determine methods of reporting them to the command and communicating them to interested parties.

Painstaking analysis means that all procured data, regardless of their importance, should be studied fully and in every detail. It often happens that reports that look most insignificant at first sight prove to be of great value. Conversely, information that appears to be valuable and plausible later proves to be insignificant and false. Therefore, the value of any piece of information can be determined only through in-depth and thorough analysis. Information experts are supposed to be able to promptly single out from all incoming information what is of principal and decisive value.

One happens to deal in IAA with extremely varied information reported by most diverse sources and owing to this the reports differ considerably in their volume, form and content. Objectivity in estimating information obtained plays an important part in information analysis because it is only by being objective that it is possible to come up with correct conclusions about the situation and probable course of action of the adversary. At the same time, a biased attitude toward available data and interpreting them to please someone else always result in fatal mistakes.

Some reports from the agencies involved in the counterterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus about preparations for major acts of terrorism and subversion in one or other area were not backed by any concrete facts. They could have been prompted by the sources' desire to provide themselves with excuses just in case. This resulted in an unjustifiably excessive dispersion of the reconnaissance resources and targeting them at secondary objectives.

In order to be able to correctly estimate the credibility of data, information experts should be highly trained in special military subjects and have hands-on experience of working with such materials, thorough knowledge of the current situation and they should have complete idea of the sources and their reliability. At the same time, they need to check whether data they are getting are confirmed by information from other independent sources, whether they differ from earlier data on the same subjects or contradict the current general situation, whether they are in line with the general trend of activities of the extremist organizations that are being tracked, the tactics of groups of terrorists in the region (zone of responsibility) and, finally, whether the data contradict common sense and laws of logic.

It should be noted that the above criteria of estimating incoming information are artificial enough and in the final analysis they aren't sufficient to make absolutely sure if the information is true or false. Using these criteria we can, in most cases, draw tentative conclusions about reliability of information, that is to say, to determine probability of its correspondence with the actual state of things.

The plans of operations made by the country's military-political leadership and its military, as well as the essential prerequisite of appropriateness and substantiation of measures taken by them are based on estimations of the current and future situation. Practice shows that the higher the body of government and military control, the more independent work it has to do in this area and take corresponding responsibility for its results.

Thus, the constant duty and the most important task of staffs of all ranks involved in the counterterrorist operation is to continuously collect, process, analyze, estimate, store and sum up data about the situation in the areas where unlawful armed formations and groups of terrorists are active, predict its development and timely report their proposals and conclusions along the chain of command. It should be stressed at the same time that solving this problem under today's conditions is characterized by the presence of two opposing tendencies: on the one hand, there is a constantly growing number of factors that have their impact on the shaping of the situation; on the other hand, the time limit allowed for analyzing the situation is steadily shrinking.

The analytical component in the process of studying the situation holds a special place because it is analysis of available data and the formulation of accurate conclusions that are the crowning result of all activities of information agencies enabling the leadership to make correct decisions.

It should also be noted that any estimation, no matter on which reliable data it is based, needs further attention and refinement. Ignoring this requirement is likely to result in a mistaken estimation of the state of things. It should be complied with because the leaders of extremists develop their plans of armed attacks and these plans get often amended especially if the opposing side's reconnaissance gets to learn about them.

In the summer of 2004, Aslan Maskhadov planned a major armed attack to seize a town in the republic. With this purpose in mind, he gathered nearly 300 gunmen in the Shelkovskoi and Gudermes districts, but learning that the federal forces had discovered his plan, he preferred to abandon it.

Estimating the situation in areas (zones) where the antiterrorist operation is being held is special in that we do not deal with a conventional type of military-political leadership and armed forces with a certain table of organization and trained in accordance with standards of military regulations and field manuals. We deal with groups of extremists (terrorists) that are sometimes uncoordinated and belong to no constant paramilitary units and they are mainly operating using guerrilla warfare methods. In addition, it is no longer necessary to determine the potential adversary and the possible timing of its attacks because the opposing sides are already in confrontation and there is no line of contact between them. Given a situation like this, military and political aspects are gaining prime importance. They take shape as a result of interaction between various military-political forces (ethnic communities, parties, various movements, religious, ethnic and other groups that have armed units).

If the factor of religion is having a tangible effect upon the way the situation is shaping up, it is necessary to estimate the religious and ethnic component which includes giving it a general characteristic, analyzing the positive and negative aspects and making conclusions relating to the situation, condition, and potentials of the religious forces found in the region. Attention can be focused on adherents of the principal religions, their branches, movements and sects, as well as organizations and communities formed by the believers, first of all those of radical types. It is necessary to get to know their views and how they relate to the atheist part of the population and members of the other religions.

Like any other process of cognition, the sequence in estimation of the situation has two phases, each of which has empirical and theoretical contents.

The essence of the empirical phase is to procure data from all sources and preliminarily process them. The theoretical phase, which uses scientific methods, consists of in-depth analysis of the initial data and formulation of conclusions element by element and in a general form. This involves the construction of models of the situation, their study to identify trends in the changing situation in short and long terms.

While both phases are important and labor-consuming, phase two calls for much greater analytical efforts for which reason let us examine it in greater detail.

The main object of examining the situation in the zone of the counterterrorist operation mainly consists in identifying the sources of military threat, determining the nature and degree of threat to the state, its interests and to the allies, as well as factors that are likely to decisively impact the course and outcome of the armed conflict.

This calls for solving in succession the following problems: first -- to determine the strength, condition and disposition of the opposing forces in the zone of the armed conflict, the extent of internal and external support given to the extremists; second -- to analyze the ideology, goals and plans of the leaders of the unlawful armed units; third -- to discover the positions and subjective qualities of the extremist leaders; fourth -- to ascertain the nature and state of relations between the military-political forces (the extent of their stability or tension); fifth -- to estimate the nature of scale of military-political activities of the sides, determine the correlation of their military might and level of terrorist activity of the extremist units; sixth -- to ascertain the reasons (factors) influencing changes of the situation and determine (predict) patterns in which it can shape up.

Finding solution to these problems enables certain conclusions. To formulate these conclusions in the final form, however, calls for a lot of analytical work.

It is necessary in the first place to gain a clear understanding of the situation and disposition of forces at the present moment because it is impossible to make sense of either separate events or a set of events without considering the balance of forces in the region of conflict or a separate region. In addition, there should be a preliminary analysis of military, economic, political, ideological, ethnic, religious and social relations the combination of which has the greatest effect upon the overall situation in the area in question.

Following this, there comes the estimation of the state of each separate element of the situation in the course of which it is necessary to establish: which military and political entities, groups and organizations oppose each other, how they, operate, what is their influence and who supports them. Answering these questions calls for constructing a number of structural-logical models, that is to say, it is necessary to make a list of factors favorable to the extremists, to understand who their allies are and who and how consistently support the official authority or adhere to neutral positions.

Next it will be necessary to find out especially carefully: in what state and where there are the main forces of the extremists, their bases, training camps and other facilities, as well as the most frequently used supply routes and what types of heavy and unconventional weapons they may have at their disposal. It is also necessary to find out their dependence on foreign arms supplies and which type of weapons they prefer. It is important in comprehensively estimating the unlawful armed units to rely not only on logical conclusions but also on operational and tactical calculations drawn with the use of computers.

Continuing to scrutinize the situation, it is necessary to thoroughly analyze the aims, ideological guidelines, positions and personal qualities of extremist leaders, especially the leaders of the military wing and forces behind them.

As a rule, the aims of terrorists are proclaimed by their leaders in various statements and spread through mass media outlets. One should keep in mind that media sources often announce, for propaganda purposes, the so-called declaratory aims, rather than real aims. In the given case, it is necessary to closely examine whether they correspond with their true intentions. To discover the extremist leaders' true plans it is desirable to procure closed documentary materials: secret orders, instructions, secret sermons in hard copy or in audio, video or electronic form.

Early in 2005, the heads of Chechen units of militants, Maskhadov and Basayev were using Internet resources and their emissaries in other countries to announce they were halting combat operations until the end of February and called upon the federal government to follow suit ostensibly to create conditions for a negotiating process. Analyzing the situation, military intelligence specialists concluded that the only reason for such statements on the part of the extremist leaders was their intention to preserve their gangs in combat trim until the arrival of the warm season. This conclusion was reported to the top military command and communicated to the cooperating agencies. Later intelligence fully confirmed the analysts' conclusion: the bands needed a respite to beef up forces for stepping up their raid and terror activities with the arrival of spring and summer.

The presence of differences, hostility or, conversely, strong friendly or family and other ties between the heads of militant bands may have some effect on the situation. It is especially important to take account of this if the extremist organization's command and control body is made up of members of different clans or religious movements. It is important to find out the leaders' ability to make decisions by fiat.

Next comes an analysis of practical activities of terrorist groups, their character and scale. Based on available data, it is necessary to examine the system of measures the leaders carry out in three spheres: military, economic and political.

Estimation of measures in the military sphere (recruitment, manning and training of unlawful armed bands, their strength, size and distribution of supplies, scale and nature of intelligence, raid and terrorist activities, dissemination of false information, the creation of infrastructure: training camps, bases, caches, dead drops, secret addresses and so on) is one of the most important. Special attention should be paid in the process to the condition of command and control and communications systems, discovering plans for the employment of gangs in the zone of the counterterrorist operation and outside it.

Estimation of economic measures (organization of financial and logistic support, search for supplementary sources of income, creation of money reserves, stocks of weapons and ammunition, organization of facilities to deliver and manufacture them) is carried out to learn about the potentials of raiding and terrorist activities (in terms of their intensity and duration). It is also very important to consider not only the terrorists' internal potential, but whether they are getting international assistance.

Estimation of measures in the political sphere should by all means include reactions of the local population to actions of both the official authorities and the terrorists, as well as the positions of leading states of the world (international organizations) toward the conflicting sides, the effectiveness of activities of foreign accomplices and emissaries of the leaders of the armed bands. Of certain interest is the nature and targets of internal and external propaganda moves by supporters of the extremists. In addition, it is also important to analyze their leaders' preparedness for participating in the peace settlement negotiations.

The work done along the above lines makes it possible to go over to the next phase, viz., the formulation of conclusions based on estimations of the situation. Careful formulation of conclusions is especially important in today's dynamic conditions where time is the key factor in decision-making. The main points are expected to be presented clearly and briefly but so as the brevity should not twist the essence of the problem and suggest wrong ideas. Another criterion of high quality in formulating conclusions is their cogency. Therefore, valid conclusions can only result from in-depth and thorough analysis of the activities of extremist groups in all components that are being estimated.

The difficulty of this work consists in the fact that intelligence agencies are not going to always have accurate data about the terrorist leaders' intentions. More often than not, they will have to make do with only fragmentary or indirect information in matters that interest them. In addition, the adversary will be trying to feed false information. For example, in early October 2002, the militants spread rumors that field commander M. Barayev was dead. On 23 October, he took hostages in Moscow's Dubrovka theater. Other extremist leaders like Khattab, R. Gelayev, Abu al-Valid and A. Barayev used exactly the same stratagem.

IAA should not be based exclusively on instructions issued "from above." All senior officers of the information analysis services are expected to constantly monitor the situation in their zones of responsibility

and instantly report to the higher echelons all worrying symptoms of its possible sharp deterioration.

I should in this connection draw your attention to yet another important aspect. It is very important to constantly cultivate in those employed in the information structures, especially those in managerial positions, the ability to firmly defend their estimates and conclusions related to the situation if they are confident of them. An analyst who can make a realistic estimation of the situation and come up with a relatively accurate forecast but who does not have the courage of his convictions is spinning his wheels. Before the boss makes the final decision, the analyst should stand his ground and object to him if need be. Catherine II used to say: "Trust only those people who have the temerity to contradict you." Analysts should report their conclusions about the situation and its projected development and care not about possible reactions from the higher command. It is also important to offer the bosses possible options for solving the problem instead of leaving the boss one on one with it.

The art of analyzing and estimating situations consists in discerning as soon as possible the direction of changes in military-political relationships that can threaten the country's national security or sharply aggravate the situation in the region of conflict. Therefore, based on estimations of the current situation, one can determine possible directions of its change in the future and formulate predictions of its development.

By studying the impacts of various factors on the situation over a certain span of time, comparing and correlating possible consequences, it is possible to come up with the most probable scenario of events. For instance, the mounting tensions in the religious sphere in Dagestan in late 1998 and early 1999 was detected early on, but owing to perhaps the insufficient cogency of arguments or indecision on the part of federal and republican leaders, there appeared the so-called Kadarskaya zone controlled by supporters of Wahhabism. At the same time, an in-depth and detailed analysis of attitudes among the Moslem population of this republic made it on the whole possible to conclude that a vast majority of people in Dagestan did not support the extremists. When in August and September 1999, the population of the republic's areas bordering on Chechnya offered vigorous resistance to the gangs led by Khattab and Basayev, this confirmed the correctness of the military analysts' conclusions and showed that the Islamist leaders' hopes were fallacious.

The process of forecasting military-political situations usually consists of two phases. Phase one produces possible versions of the general outlines of future situations and their characteristic and special features. Phase two checks up on these versions to see how events may evolve according to each of these versions.

Developing possible versions of changes in the overall situation in the region (zone) of operations of the unlawful armed units, analysts as a rule make long-term (one year to two years) and short-term (one month to three months) predictions.

They first of all should identify the factors that bring about changes in the situation in one or other direction. They can be internal and external, based on economic, political, religious, ethnic, social, military and other lines: participation (intervention) of international forces both direct and indirect and aimed at altering the balance of forces between the opposing sides, or mass unrest in the region on whatever grounds. Analysts should take into account the fact that the greatest impact can be made by sudden developments to change the situation in short order, like a large-scale provocation, a takeover among the extremist staged by a supporter of liberal or, conversely, radical measures.

It is important to timely discern changes in the intentions and objectives of the opposing side that can take place in short or long term. Thus, fluctuations in the balance of forces in favor of one of the sides involved in the conflict can lead to modification of objectives while its leaders remain the same. If the change is in favor of the extremists, their leaders may be tempted to set themselves more ambitious and far-reaching aims. Conversely, a change in the balance of forces to the detriment of the terrorist groups will certainly restrain the ardor of their leaders or at least make them forget their ambitions.

Replacement of the dominant leader of the extremists for whatever reasons, including his death, also can lead to a sharp change in the objectives and plans while the balance of forces between the opposing sides remains the same. This is only natural because new leaders have different perceptions of both their potentials and what can be achieved with their help.

A still greater probability of a radical or appreciable change of the situation may arise if simultaneous changes should occur in both the balance of forces and the composition of the main leaders. Therefore, all these factors should be considered in their interconnection in making long-term or shorter-term forecasting.

Among some other possible causes of appreciable changes in the situation in the area, where the unlawful armed units are active, are changes in the volume of all-around support for the extremists. Experience shows that we should invariably expect spurts of raids and terrorist activities of the militants in the wake of increased financial aid, supplies of weapons and ammunition and other materiel.

The intensity of extremist activities appreciably changes with the change of seasons, weather and climatic conditions. In summer when the screening properties of terrain improve, the living in field camps becomes easier and it is easier to move around in the mountains, the armed bands' activity grows sharply. In winter, those with legal papers hole up in populated centers living with their relations and friends while the others try to temporarily pull out of the zone of the counterterrorist operation, or hide in the earlier built bases making periodic raids to carry out acts of subversion and terrorism.

There is recurrent annual evidence of this in the zone of the counterterrorist operation in Chechnya. Analysis of intensity of acts of terrorism committed by the armed bands shows that the number of acts of terrorism and subversion increases three- or four-fold during the warm season.

Since changes in the situation in the unstable regions may be multi-variant, phase two is devoted to checking out every possible variant. The objectives are as follows: first, to determine as accurately as possible the extent to which they are possible (realizable) and, second, to determine factors (tendencies) conducive to realization of the most likely of them, which makes it possible to see the nature of these changes--long-term or short-term--and, correspondingly facilitate forecasting prospects of change in the situations.

An especially close attention should be paid, most certainly, to factors that can lead to deterioration of the situation in the zone of conflict. We think we should include among them the following:

* The desire of the world's leading countries (their special services) to use the radical circles to bring pressure to bear on leaders of the country in the zone of the conflict and step up, on this basis, the activities of ethnic and religious extremist movements;

* The stepping up by powerful and influential forces of transnational and religious nature of pressure on the country combating terrorists on its soil;

* Attempts by the extremists to employ new information and other technology for their expansionist purposes.

* The stepping up of propaganda activities of extremist leaders and their accomplices, including the use of information space of foreign states.

* The widening of hidden (or under the pretext of permitted "humanitarian" intervention in the affairs of a sovereign state) foreign military-technical and financial aid to the separatists.

* The readiness of one of the opposing sides to violate existing cease-fire (cessation-of-hostilities) treaties and derail the negotiating process.

* The turning of terrorist organizations into professional institutions used to promote their own interests by states and twilight players of the world politics and economics.

* The rise of crime and greater consolidation of groups of criminals in the region with pockets of the armed conflict.

* The growth in the number of provocative actions against the population of the conflict region (zone) initiated by emissaries of the heads of the armed bands and their accomplices.

Based on data obtained through studying the ways the situation may tend to evolve using expert examinations and other methods, we formulate a generalized prediction which reflects the following what we see as the most important points.

* One. What further change in the situation can lead to--its worsening or easing?

* Two. How can the balance of forces change and how realistic is a sharp deterioration of the situation?

* Three. Which are the most dangerous extremist groups and their most realistic allies among the population?

* Four. From whom and what external assistance can the extremist leaders receive?

* Five. From what quarters and from which groups military threat can come?

* Six. Where, when and from whose side it is possible to expect an armed attack, a subversive or terrorist act?

Depending on the situation and the required urgency of decision-making, its estimation and prediction can take various lengths of time. It can take between two weeks and one month if the situation is relatively calm; when the situation is exacerbated and crisis-like, it should take between two and five days; during the active phase of the counterterrorist operation (phase of conflict) the situation is so dynamic that it should be analyzed, estimated and forecast on a continuous basis.

Predictions are the basis for developing proposed measures that are likely to force the extremist leaders to change their plans so as to ease the tense situation or to neutralize their attempts to destabilize it.

Thus, analysis of the situation and prediction of the ways in which it may change during the counterterrorist operation are central to information analysis activities and require of information experts showing a creative approach, extensive knowledge and appropriate experience.

Col. V.A. ROSTOVTSEV