Somalia: 30,000-strong UN force steps in to 'Restore Hope.' (United Nations)

Citing its concern over the "crippling famine and drought in Somalia" compounded by civil strife, the Security Council decided on 26 March to transfer the task of securing humanitarian aid deliveries from a United States-led international force to a UN peace-keeping operation. The expanded UN Operation in Somalia-UNOSOM II--is also to help that nation take its first steps toward rebuilding its economy and government.

With 30,000 troops and civilians, UNOSOM II will be the largest peace-keeping force in UN history, surpassing the 1960-1964 UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the ongoing UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). ONUC had 26,000 personnel; UNTAC has 22,000. UNOSOM II is also the first operation authorized to use force under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

By unanimously adopting resolution 814 (1993), the Council endorsed the Secretary-General's recommendation that UNOSOM II formally take over from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) on the target date of 1 May, and authorized its mandate for an initial period through 31 October 1993.

UNOSOM was established by the Council on 24 April 1992 to monitor a cease-fire in Somalia and to escort humanitarian aid deliveries. Faced with the fact that the original, smaller UNOSOM contingent in the country's capital, Mogadishu, lacked the strength and mandate to stop widespread looting of relief convoys by armed factions and bandits, the Council on 3 December authorized Member States to send troops to escort the deliveries. Thousands of troops from the United States and other countries landed in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992 to launch "Operation Restore Hope", fanning out across famine-stricken areas of Somalia to accomplish their mission.

|First of its kind'

Like UNITAF forces, UNOSOM II will operate under the provisions of Chapter VII, a mandate not given initially to UNOSOM. Chapter VII outlines action with respect to threats to the peace and authorizes the Council to take such action involving the use of armed forces "as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security".

The Secretary-General reported (S/25354) on 3 March that UNOSOM II would be the "first operation of its kind to be authorized by the international community". The consequences of adopting resolution 814 were "far-reaching for political, legal and logistical reasons and would entail a major financial commitment", he said.

That sentiment was echoed by many delegates in Council debate. Among them, the United States said the Council had embarked on an unprecedented enterprise, aimed at the restoration of an entire country as a functioning member of the community of nations. The world community had been engaged to provide the most comprehensive assistance ever given to any country, with no models to guide its work.

New Zealand said that by empowering the Secretary-General and Member States to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment, UNOSOM II was a "landmark step" in the evolution of UN peace-keeping operations.

China said the decision to authorize UNOSOM II to use enforcement actions was unique in the history of UN peace-keeping. It was China's understanding that that was based on the unique needs of the situation in Somalia and should not constitute a precedent.

A smooth transition

Stating there was a "need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition" from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the Council, in resolution 814, cited with regret the threat that "continuing incidents of violence" posed to the reconciliation process, the "continuing reports of widespread violations of international humanitarian law and the general absence of the rule of law in Somalia".

Defining UNOSOM II's mandate, the Council requested the Secretary-General to "provide humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia in rehabilitating their political institutions and economy and promoting political settlement and national reconciliation".

The Council specifically requested UNOSOM II to assist in relief provision and economic rehabilitation, repatriation of refugees, removal of mines, and political reconciliation and reestablishment of national and regional institutions, including Somali police. The force was also to help develop appropriate public information activities and "create conditions under which Somali civil society may have a role, at every level, in the process of political reconciliation and in the formulation and realization of rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes".

Disarmament |crucial'

Also by resolution 814, the Council emphasized the "crucial importance of disarmament" and demanded that all Somali parties comply fully with commitments they had undertaken at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 4 to 15 January, in particular with their "Agreement on implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament", reached on 8 January.

The continuing implementation of the arms embargo against Somalia, established in resolution 733 (1992), was demanded. All Somali parties were to "take all measures to ensure the safety of the personnel" of the UN and its agencies, as well as the staff of the international Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations engaged in humanitarian and other assistance to the people of Somalia. Those responsible for breaches of international humanitarian law would be "held individually accountable".

The Secretary-General was requested to maintain the fund established in December 1992 pursuant to resolution 794 (1992) for the "additional purpose of receiving contributions for the maintenance of UNOSOM II forces" and for the establishment of Somali police.

The Council commended the efforts of Member States which had acted to "establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia", as well as the efforts of the initial UNOSOM. UN agencies, the ICRC and other organizations were asked to continue their support to the Somali people, and their assistance was appreciated.

Four phases of UNOSOM II

A blueprint for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II was contained in the Secretary-General's 3 March report which the Council approved. It discussed humanitarian activities, efforts toward political reconciliation, and the Secretary-General's views on the modalities for effecting the transition, among other things.

UNOSOM II's military operations were to be conducted in four phases: transition from UNITAF; consolidation and expansion of security: transfer to civilian institutions: and redeployment.

In Phase I, military support of relief activity and the disarming of factions would continue. In Phase II, operations would be extended into northern Somalia, based on the port cities of Berbera and Bossasso, then moved to Hargeisa and Garoe. It would conclude when UNOSOM II was operating effectively throughout Somalia and the border regions. In Phase III, military presence might be scaled down in the more stable areas to give way to Somali civilian authorities. When major UN military operations were no longer required, the Secretary-General would make recommendations to the Council under Phase IV to redeploy or reduce forces.

The military tasks of UNOSOM II were to: monitor that all factions cease hostilities and respect agreements; prevent any resumption of violence and, if necessary, take action against factions violating the cease-fire; maintain control of the organized factions' heavy weapons and seize small arms of unauthorized armed elements; continue the mine-clearing programme; assist in the repatriation of refugees; secure all ports, airports and lines of communications for the delivery of humanitarian aid; and protect personnel and installations of the UN and other organizations, and take forceful action, as may be required, against those attacking or threatening them.

It was estimated that a military component of 20,000 of all ranks was needed to carry out those tasks and an additional 8,000 personnel to provide logistical support. A civilian staff of approximately 2,800 was also needed.

Substantial strength

The strength of the forces had to be "substantial in the early stage in order to minimize the risk of any deterioration in the security conditions", the Secretary-General said. That "could be reduced progressively as the political process advances and the new police force becomes operational". It was pointed out that UNITAF, which had an initial strength of 37,000, was already deployed in 40 per cent of the territory; the somewhat smaller UNOSOM II force would be considered for deployment in the entire territory of Somalia.

That, however, should not cause unnecessary security risks. The large UNITAF force had been necessary to break down resistance and take control of the situation, the Secretary-General stated. It had been scaled down to approximately 28,400 forces ashore in early March. An auxiliary Somali police force and a tactical quick reaction force to be made available to the UNOSOM II Force Commander would enable a smaller force to police a bigger territory.

In a 16 January report (S/25126) to the Security Council, the United States stated that the "efforts of UNITAF to accomplish its objective have for the most part been welcomed by the Somali population", but on some occasions "segments of the Somali population have attempted to interfere with UNITAF forces". When no other recourse was possible, UNITAF forces "engaged in action against those elements", the United States stated.

As of 7 January, UNITAF included 2 1,000 United States military personnel deployed in support of "Operation Restore Hope", and 9,995 troops from other countries (in order of decreasing force strength): France, Italy, Morocco, Canada, Saudi Arabia, Belgium, Turkey, Botswana, Egypt, United Kingdom, Germany, Kuwait and New Zealand. The military component of UNOSOM, which had been "frozen" with the deployment of UNITAF, had a strength of 715 of all ranks.

In a 31 March report (A/47/916), the Secretary-General requested the General Assembly to approve an appropriation of $327.2 million to cover requirements for the first two months of UNOSOM II.

Commanders, envoys

Crucial in preparing the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II were military commanders and special envoys appointed by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

On 16 February, Lieutenant-General Cevik Bir of Turkey was named Force Commander of UNOSOM II. On 19 February, two more appointments were made: Major-General Thomas Montgomery of the United States as Deputy Force Commander and General James Cox of Canada as Chief of Staff.

Admiral Jonathan Trumbull Howe of the United States was appointed the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Somalia, effective 9 March, for three months, succeeding Ismat Kittani, who had been Special Representative since 30 October 1992. His mandate was to oversee the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II and continue coordinating humanitarian assistance and promoting the political reconciliation and reconstruction of Somalia.

Admiral Howe arrived in Addis Ababa on 17 March to participate in the Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia, where he held a series of meetings with UNOSOM staff, representatives of regional organizations and Somalian non-governmental organizations and women's groups.

Other high-level appointments included Lansana Kouyate of Guinea, the Secretary-General's Deputy Special Representative for Somalia; and Hugh Cholmondeley, UN Relief and Rehabilitation Coordinator in Somalia, succeeding Philip Johnston, President of CARE.

Reconciliation process

At the centre of Somalia's problems was the absence of formal government, many agreed. The country was a "modern anomaly" having no effective means of governance, in effect a "non-State", in the words of Djibouti's representative in Council debate on 26 March.

To address that problem, the UN helped facilitate reconciliation meetings between Somali factions to encourage peace. Its importance was acknowledged in resolution 814 which stated that there was a "need for broad-based consultations and deliberations to achieve reconciliation, agreement on the setting up of transitional government institutions and consensus on basic principles and steps leading to the establishment of representative democratic institutions".

The Secretary-General and his Special Representative were encouraged to intensify their work at all levels to promote political settlement in Somalia, and the Council expressed its readiness to assist Somalis to hold free and fair elections.

The Council commended the progress made in the meetings of faction leaders and declared that the "people of Somalia bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation and reconstruction of their own country".

The importance of political reconciliation was further stressed in the Secretary-General's 3 March report: "Ultimately, all the efforts being undertaken by the United Nations in Somalia are directed towards one central goal: to assist the people of Somalia to create and maintain order and new institutions for their own governance."

14-party talks

Representatives of 14 Somali political movements met for the first time in an "informal preparatory meeting" in Addis Ababa (4-15 January). Three agreements calling for an immediate cease-fire and disarmament were concluded and signed at the meeting. The movements agreed to hand over all heavy weaponry to a cease-fire monitoring group until a legitimate Somali Government could take over. An Ad Hoc Committee to prepare a national reconciliation conference, scheduled to begin on 15 March, was established.

The reconciliation process was repeatedly threatened by sporadic fighting in Somalia in early 1993. The Ad Hoc Committee could not meet in Addis Ababa on 22 January because one of the factions--the Somali National Alliance--refused to participate, alleging that two other factions--the Somali National Front and the Somali Patriotic Front--had violated the cease-fire agreement by attacking its forces in Kismayo.

When the Ad Hoc Committee did manage to hold its first meeting on 23 February in Mogadishu, it was interrupted by three days of rioting and fighting in the city. It did, however, agree on an agenda. Progress was reported in the following weeks on disarmament, as the factions submitted information on sites where they had stored weapons.

Agreement in Addis Ababa

A Conference on National Reconciliation for Somalia was held in Addis Ababa from 17 to 27 March, but was disrupted by renewed fighting in Kismayo. It was resumed after a fact-finding mission was deployed to that city, and on 27 March an agreement was signed among the leaders of 15 Somali factions, which the Secretary-General described as an "important achievement of the Somali people".

The agreement comprised four parts: disarmament and security; rehabilitation and reconstruction; restoration of property and settlement of disputes; and the establishment of a Transitional National Council vested with administrative and executive authority. The National Council was to consist of 74 members: three (two men and one woman) from each of the 18 regions of the country; one from each of the 15 political movements; and five from Mogadishu.

The signatories resolved to put an end to armed conflict and to reconcile their differences peacefully, and reaffirmed their commitment to hand over all their weapons and ammunition to UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

Stating that the deployment of UNOSOM II would "have to cover the whole country", the Secretary-General said that he was "aware of the very delicate question of the secession proclamation in the north". A deployment of UNOSOM troops in northern Somalia "would not prejudice in any way the decision of the Somali people on their national future".

A problem of a different nature was reported in the southernmost part of Somalia, on the border with Kenya, the home of over 300,000 Somali refugees. After 18 people, including several Kenyan guards, had been killed in cross-border raids by armed bandits searching for food and vehicles in refugee camps, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) started discussions with Kenyan officials on 20 January. UNHCR had asked Governments involved in "Operation Restore Hope" to speed up deployment of forces to the border areas in order to halt such raids.

From |almost impossible' to |very difficult'

The effect of the arrival of UNITAF forces on the humanitarian situation in Somalia was summed up by Special Representative Kittani in an 18 January statement: "We have moved from an almost impossible situation to a very difficult situation--which is a great improvement."

Aid delivery had "improved enormously" shortly after the arrival of the first United States troops in Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, Mr. Kittani said. When he arrived in Somalia in November, nothing had been moving, as the ports and the Mogadishu airport had been closed.

In January 1993, the Secretary-General reported that between 10 December and 20 January, 13 vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other relief organizations carrying humanitarian supplies had berthed in Mogadishu port and some 40,000 tons of humanitarian aid supplies had been delivered. On 22 January, 3,000 tons of food arrived in Kismayo--the first shipment since the port was closed in September 1992. An increase in commercial activities was also reported, with markets functioning again and commercial vessels using the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayo.

The Secretary-General stated that the "level of malnutrition and death from starvation has fallen dramatically in many areas". However, the security situation for aid workers remained unstable, especially in rural areas and along the borders with Kenya and Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the murders in January and February of relief workers from ICRC and the UN Children's Fund. Channeling members of militias and armed gangs into useful jobs, in activities such as road repairs and sanitation, was "essential if Somalia is ever to become stable", the Secretary-General declared.

On 4 March, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs appealed to the international community for $166.5 million to cover the relief and rehabilitation programme in Somalia in 1993. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson said that the major issues to be addressed by the relief programme were the repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and the rebuilding of local institutions and the local economy.

A three-day Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia (Addis Ababa, 15-17 March) concluded with pledges totalling some $130 million towards the relief programme. Mr. Eliasson termed the response of donors "very positive" and said it was expected that further resources would be forthcoming.