Solutions to the terrorist threat: there are a number of practical steps that can be taken, from securing our borders to restoring multiple layers of defense.

On September 11,2001, the federal government failed in the most important of its few constitutionally enumerated functions--protecting our homeland from attack. The only effective defense of our country on that day came from a handful of desperate private citizens on United Flight 93, and the heroic efforts of state and local police, firemen, and emergency response personnel. Despite spending trillions of dollars on a globe-spanning military establishment, and an intelligence apparatus consisting of no fewer than 15 separate agencies, Washington left our country vulnerable to an unprecedented, murderous attack on our home soil.

Rational people would assume that addressing Washington's failure on 9/11 would require fundamental changes in the foreign, military, and intelligence policies that contributed to that debacle, as well as stern measures to hold accountable those officials who presided over it. After all, since the government failed the people, it is government, and not the people, that should bear the burdens and make the necessary changes.

Yet the independent 9/11 Commission recommends exactly the opposite course. It calls for radically enhancing the power of the federal government, and imposing expanded burdens on the rights and liberties of the people whom the government failed to protect on that dreadful morning three years ago.

Practical Steps

But we don't need "the government to increase its presence in our lives," as the 9/11 commissioners openly advocated. Here are a few simple measures that should be implemented:

* Secure our borders: The 9/11 Commission report incorrectly stated that "better technology and training to detect terrorist travel documents are the most important immediate steps to reduce America's vulnerability to clandestine entry," Of course, a person who simply wades across the poorly monitored Rio Grande doesn't need to worry about secure biometric travel documents at all. When the overwhelming majority of terrorists committing acts against the United States are foreign nationals, it is more important than ever to secure our nation's borders.

The 9/11 commissioners were right about one thing: it is elemental to national "security to know who is coming into the country." Though the 9/11 commissioners bad nothing to say about closing down illegal immigration from our southern border, this is perhaps the highest priority for national security. Monitoring and enforcing the time limits on the millions of visas issued to foreign tourists, students and business persons is a must. All of the 9/11 hijackers had been legally admitted into the U.S. at one time or another.

* More federalism, less federalization: "No single layer of security is foolproof," the 9/11 commissioners correctly stated--while calling for broad-based federalization of police powers and identification papers. Instead of proposing multiple layers of security at all levels of government (local, state and federal), the 9/11 commissioners have essentially recommended merging all security within a single layer of protection: the federal government. Yet the information in the 9/11 Commission's own report reveals that the federal government was the biggest failure on 9/11 and that state and local police agencies posed the greatest obstacles to the terrorists carrying out a wider path of destruction.

Congress should require intelligence agencies to share foreign intelligence with state and local officials on an advisory basis, thereby strengthening the other layers of law-enforcement protection against terrorism.

* More legislative oversight, not less: The 9/11 Commission report recommended reducing congressional oversight of the intelligence function of the federal government. But Congress needs more committees and subcommittees investigating the threat of terrorism, not fewer, as the 9/11 commissioners recommend.

* Restore genuine intelligence collection: A new "national intelligence direction: Cabinet agency and new bureaucracies are not needed in order to correct the shortcomings that became evident on September 11, 2001. Congress needs to pass legislation overcoming the Ford administration-era regulations banning the collection of information on organizations and individuals that threaten to break the law, or that have ties to foreign governments, foreign intelligence agencies, subversive movements or groups with records of support for terrorism and totalitarian ideologies,

* Focus on Islamic immigrants: "The enemy is not just 'terrorism,' some generic evil," the 9/11 commissioners stated. "The catastrophic threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by Islamist terrorism--especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology." The 9/11 commissioners even singled out specific geographic bases where terrorists would likely locate them selves: Afghanistan, Western Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Nigeria and Mall. As long as most terrorists originate from these countries, immigration officials should begin by focusing additional scrutiny upon immigrants from there and ignore the politically correct dogma that bans "racial profiling."

* An end to empire: The 9/11 commissioners argue that "the American homeland is the planet," requiring decades of troop deployments, foreign aid and nation-building to secure. But the premise is not true. America's security interests do not encompass the entire planet. In fact, American military adventurism abroad has stirred up a hornet's nest of resentment against the United States, providing fuel for terrorist recruiting.

Al-Qaeda itself was created in reaction to the creation of U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia (where the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located) after the first Gulf War restored the Kuwaiti emirs to power. Muslim terrorism against the United States was virtually un heard of before American troops were sent to occupy Beirut in the early 1980s, an occupation that resulted in the bombing of the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in the city. Bringing American troops home from abroad, except those making specific reprisals for terrorist actions, would do a lot to quiet resentment against the United States and make terrorist attacks against Americans far less frequent.

Being Prepared

"To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace," George Washington warned in his first annual address to Congress. That advice is as true today as it was then. And it is as apropos to intelligence preparedness as it is to military preparedness.

It is now fairly widely known that Washington had prior knowledge of the Japanese attack against Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, but had failed to alert our commanders in Hawaii. The publicly available evidence of intelligence failures connected to the more recent 9/11 attacks indicates that three of the 9/11 co-conspirators could have been apprehended prior to 9/11 --possibly reducing the number of attacks on that day, and perhaps even foiling the plot altogether. *

But preparedness should extend not only to the U.S. military, and to intelligence and law enforcement agencies at all levels of government, but to the people themselves. During World War II, Switzerland's preparedness, based largely on an armed citizenry ready to mobilize at a moment's notice, dissuaded the Nazis from attacking. Hitler recognized that, by attacking Switzerland, he would have to defeat not just a military force but an entire armed population. He decided it wasn't worth the cost.

* For information regarding Washington's foreknowledge of the impending Pearl Harbor attack, go to www.thenewamerican.com/focus/pearl_harbor/. For information about the 9/11 attacks, see "Foreknowledge and Failure" in the June 17, 2002 issue of THE NEW AMERICAN. This article is available at www.thenewamerican.com and can most easily be located by clicking on "back issues" and going to the date.