Social policy in the Arab world: Iraq as a case study.

IN ITS ORIGINS, THE CONCEPT of social policy is related to a category of policies manifestly targeted at social (as opposed to political or economic) objectives. In the Arab world, social objectives were a high priority of the political ideologies in the post-WWII era, and social policy figured prominently in Nasserist, Arab Nationalist Movement and Arab Ba'ath Socialist programs. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the hegemony of the neo-liberal model of development, social objectives as goals in themselves dropped off the public agenda of policy debate; and throughout the non-Western world, national social policy programs were overridden by the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) structural adjustment agenda. Thus, social policy as a category of a state's principles or plans for action was essentially superceded by international agendas. Iraq is utilized as a case study of social policy in the Arab world to examine the parameters of social policy under the sway of international (as opposed to national) objectives.

As an exploration of a bounded system, a case study presents "a microcosm of the larger world we inhabit. It takes one problem, located at a particular point in space and time and explores it from every conceivable angle" (Cresswell, 1998, p. 15) to reveal "the inter-relationship and inter-connections present in the particular case" (Centre for Environmental Informatics, 2001). Iraq, as a case study of social policy in the Arab world, is explored to reveal the inter-relationship of and inter-connections between national and international social policy regimes. To locate Iraq in time and space, the contempary social conditions of the Iraqi people are described as they have been detailed in numerous reports by international agencies. These conditions are compared with their condition preceding the 1990-1991 Gulf war, an event that is generally recognized as a pivotal point in Iraq's social and economic development. The story of how Iraq traveled from point A to point B in time--a journey in social space from relative prosperity to absolute impoverishment--is explored from the angle of social policy.

As a result of United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iraq, assessed by the UN Security Council for Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the destruction wrought by the devastating 1991 U.S. led war against Iraq, a 1999 United Nations report on Iraq warned that "the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy which, in turn, cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts" (United Nations, March 1999). The report, prepared for the president of the Security Council, detailed the complete devastation of Iraqi society following the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the imposition of Security Council economic sanctions. It argued that Iraq's social and economic indicators wore generally above the regional and developing country averages prior to 1990, with Iraq's GDP in 1989 standing at 26.9 billion for a population of 18.3 million people. GDP growth had averaged 10.4 percent from 1974 to 1980, and by 1988, GDP per capita totaled $1,756. The report stated that "Iraq's GDP may have fallen by nearly two-thirds in 1991, owing to an 85 percent decline in oil production and the devastation of the industrial and services sectors of the economy. Per capita income foil from $2,279 US dollars in 1984 to $627 in 1991 and decreased to less than $700 in 1998. Other sources estimate a decrease in per capita GDP to be as low as $450 US dollars in 1995."

With oil accounting for 60 percent of the country's GDP and 95 percent of foreign currency earnings, Iraq's economy was heavily dependent on the external sector and sensitive to oil price fluctuations. In the early 1980s, Iraq was producing about 3.5 million barrels per day (BPD), but that amount declined to 2.8 million by 1989. The report found that although Iraq was exporting more oil than ever since the initiation of the 1996 'oil-for-food' program, "revenue remains insufficient due to a negative correlation linking low oil prices, delays in obtaining spare parts for the oil industry and general obsolescence of oil infrastructure." Even an increase in the amount Iraq could produce in 2,000 bpd was insufficient to overcome the low price for oil on the world market. In addition, production infrastructure continued to decline and, due to sanctions, Iraq was unable to repair lost production facilities to allow increased production. Thus, Iraq's production capacity was unable to meet the amount of money called for by the 'oil-for-food' program in order to meet the needs of the Iraqi population, as well as its international obligations. A panel of oil industry experts, convened by the Secretary General, found that it would take approximately "$1.2 billion US to ensure a gradual and sustainable increase in the production of crude oil in Iraq so as to allow for production levels to reach 3,000,000 barrels per day; the full rehabilitation of Iraq's oil industry," they argued, "would require several billion dollars" of investment (United Nations, June 2001).

The situation of the people of Iraq has severely deteriorated since the imposition of economic sanctions in 1990. In spite of reconstruction efforts by the Iraqi government and international NGOs following the 1991 Gulf War and the Oil-For-Food humanitarian program, begun in 1996, economic and social conditions of Iraq's population have continued to deteriorate. Numerous surveys and reports conducted by the government of Iraq and U.N. agencies since the initiation of sanctions in 1991, have detailed the continuing deterioration in specific areas--such as health, nutrition, and child and maternal mortality. Iraq's first Human Development Report (HDR) was issued in 1995 by the Iraqi Economists' Association, with the support of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), covering important socio-economic indicators directly related to human development, mainly during the period 1987-1993 (UNDP, June 2000). The data was collected through a household survey conducted in 1993 by the Central Statistical Organization of the Planning Commission. A second comprehensive survey was undertaken in 2001, Iraq National Human Development Report 2001, and is set to be released in the summer of 2002. Food production and availability have been major sources of controversy within all analyses of the social conditions currently experienced by the people of Iraq. Prior to 1990, domestic food production represented only one third of total consumption for most essential food items, with the balance covered by imports. Owing to its relative prosperity and Iraq's development focus on industrial development, agricultural development was virtually ignored, and increasing consumption was satisfied through increasing imports. Thus, although domestic development in agricultural production did not advance, food consumption advanced. The implementation of the embargo seriously curtailed the importation of food, resulting in a humanitarian crisis. The U.N. found that dietary energy supply had fallen from 3,120 to 1,093 kilo-calories per capita/per day by 1994-95, with women and children singled out as the most vulnerable members of Iraqi society. Against a U.N. target of 2,463 kilo-calories and 63.6 grams of protein per person per day, the nutritional value of the distributed food basket did not exceed 1,993 kilo-calories and 43 grams of protein. Prior to the start of the oil-for-food program, the government of Iraq had been distributing 1,300 kilo-calories per day.

The prevalence of malnutrition in Iraqi children under five almost doubled from 1991 to 1996 (from 12 percent to 23 percent). Acute malnutrition in the center and south regions rose from 3 percent to 11 percent for the same age bracket. Indeed, the World Food Program (WFP) indicated that by July 1995, average shop prices of essential commodities stood at 850 times the July 1990 level. While the humanitarian program in Iraq has successfully staved off starvation, the level of malnutrition within Iraq remains high and directly contributes to the morbidity and mortality. Together with malnutrition, the devastation of the national infrastructure of health care, sanitation and water purification has seen estimates of Iraqi deaths swell to exceed 2 million people beyond those expected to die before the imposition of the sanctions.

Thus, it is in the areas of education and health care provision, water purification and sanitation--services and infrastructure that the Iraqi government was largely successful in providing prior to 1990--to which U.N reports place much of the blame for the humanitarian crisis. Since its initiation in 1996, the oil-for-food program has increased in size and complexity. Relief goods no longer make up the major portion of its distribution efforts as items directly related to infrastructure rehabilitation have been required to stave off humanitarian disaster. The devastation of the national electrical grid during the 1991 Gulf War has hampered development efforts in all areas. Without electrical power, hospitals have been forced to abandon modern technology, medicines have been destroyed through lack of refrigeration, water purification plants have been forced to allow untreated water to enter the water supply, and industrial plants have been forced to abandon economic production. The government of Iraq, the UNDP and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) have established a joint venture focusing on the electricity sector. In the fifteen governates of central and southern Iraq, it aids in the implementation of the Government's electricity rehabilitation program. (1) Although the amount allocated for the rehabilitation of the national electrical grid has increased, becoming second only to the allocations for food, the increasing gap between supply and demand has yet to be reduced (UNDP, 1999-2000).

In spite of its obvious importance in any efforts to rebuild Iraqi society and improve the social infrastructure of the country, electrical goods needed to repair and rebuild the national infrastructure have the highest value of holds imposed by the 661 Security Council Committee. The amount of holds in this sector reached $500m US by the end of June 2001 (United Nations, 2000). In denying the requested purchases, the 661 Committee has undermined any positive lasting effects of the oil-for-food program. Daily power cuts of 12-20 hours a day have become common, and the continued decline of power stations has reduced the safety of the system itself.

Infant and child mortality rates are widely accepted as the most sensitive indicators of poverty, inequality and inequity. Comparative infant and child mortality rates reflect varying standards of living and social well being. A direct correlation between post-neonatal and child mortality and standard of living has been well established in the literature. While ostensibly health statistics, these mortality rates are deeply rooted in socio-economic and political development and provide direct indicators of the social welfare of a population at any given point in time. The main source of data for a discussion of mortality in Iraq should be UNICEF's 1999 Child and Maternal Mortality Survey. It reported that Iraq's infant mortality rate (deaths under one year of age) had climbed from 47 deaths per 1,000 live births in the period 1984-1989 to 108 deaths per 1,000 live births in the period 1994-1999. Similarly, the child mortality rate (deaths under five years of age) had increased from 56 in 1984-1989 to 131 in the period 1994-2000. The report concluded that "if the substantial reduction in child mortality throughout Iraq during the 1980s had continued through the 1990s, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of children under five in the country as a whole during the eight year period 1991 to 1998" (UNICEF, 1999).

This is the only independent, comprehensive study carried out, and supersedes previous estimates. It is important to note that while the UNICEF report does not make any conclusions about causality, there was a section of the survey that included records of the 'cause of death' of individual samples, but this part of the study has not been released. Although the UNICEF estimate does not support crude causal attributions such as the statement "half a million children have died because of sanctions," the dramatic increase in infant and child mortality rates in Iraq since the imposition of sanctions, does indicate a direct causal link with socio-economic and political conditions in Iraq in which sanctions play a significant part. A Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) report concluded that the continued high incidence of malnutrition "supports UN findings that infant and child mortality have more than doubled since the end of the 1980s" (United Nations, FOA, 2000). Also, in the words of the 1999 humanitarian panel report: "Even if not all suffering in Iraq can be imputed to external factors, especially sanctions, the Iraqi people would not be undergoing such deprivations in the absence of the prolonged measures imposed by the Security Council and the effects of war" (United Nations, March 1999).

DEPLETED URANIUM AND IRAQ

Shortly following the second Gulf War, concerns were raised that the health and environmental problems experienced in Iraq may be linked to weapons used by U.S. and British forces. Weapons and munitions utilizing depleted uranium (DU) were used for the first time during the Gulf War as the US-led coalition drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait (Federation of American Scientists). DU is a radioactive by-product of the enrichment process used to make nuclear fuel rods and nuclear bombs. Due to its high density, which is about twice that of lead, and other physical properties, depleted uranium is used in munitions designed to penetrate armour plate. It also reinforces military vehicles, such as tanks. Allied forces fired an estimated 300 metric tons, littering the battlefield with residue that could remain radioactive for millions of years (FAS, June 1999).

Although health and environmental concerns were documented prior to 1990, DU munitions were seen as cheap and were virtually guaranteed to pierce any armour. However, when depleted uranium is blown up, it burns at high temperatures and is altered into uranium oxides--tiny, hard particles that are microns in size. They can stay airborne as aerosols, be blown around by the wind and fall down as dust. Due to their microscopic size, people can inhale or ingest the particles, easily allowing organs, bones and body fluids to long-term and direct exposure to the radioactive properties of the particles (Simons, 2001). Possible health consequences to combatants and populations residing in conflict areas where depleted uranium munitions were used have raised many important environmental health questions. The contaminated battlefields of southern Iraq, the location of much of the heavy fighting that saw the United States and its coalition allies destroy hundreds of Iraqi tanks and military armoured vehicles was--and has remained--home to Iraqi civilians who grow vegetables near contaminated areas, breath air and drink water that could be polluted with the radioactive particles.

The sanctions regime imposed by the UN Security Council in the aftermath of the war has made a clean-up of the hazardous by-products of the war impossible. Growing health problems in Iraq, including a dramatic rise in cancer and birth defects and other diseases associated with exposure to radiation, have been evident, especially in children. Cases of lymphoblastic leukemia have more than quadrupled, with other cancers also increasing at an alarming rate. In men, lung, bladder, bronchus, skin, and stomach cancers show the highest increase. In women, the highest increases are in breast and bladder cancer, and non-Hodgkin lymphoma. Diseases, such as osteosarcoma, teratoma, nephroblastoma, and rhabdomyosarcoma, are also increasing with the most affected being children and young men (Birchard, 1998). Exacerbating the crisis U.N. sanctions have also devastated the Iraqi medical system. Requested radiotherapy equipment, chemotherapy drugs, and analgesics are consistently blocked by the Security Council's '661 Committee'. The basis of withholding such life saving drugs and technology are charges that the chemical agents making up such drugs could be converted into chemical or biological weapons (Sikora, 1999). In spite of such dramatic outbreaks, the United States and United Kingdom governments have repeatedly denied there are any links between depleted uranium and cancer. They have commissioned studies of the existing literature that have found little or no effect, debunked preliminary research conducted by independent researchers and foreign governments, and stated that the issue is a propaganda tool of the Iraqi regime (Harley, Foulkes, Hilbourne, Hudson & Anthony, 1999).

However, the US Army expressed concern about the use of DU in July 1990, some six months before the outbreak of the Gulf War (Richardson, 1999). Significant concerns about health and environmental risks were included in the appendix of a report comparing the effectiveness of tungsten alloy and DU in armour-piercing ammunition (Fabey, 1999). While the scientific basis for health and environmental concerns were largely ignored, the report kept from public consideration concern that the use of DU weapons might cause public controversy. Such 'controversy' and the political and potential legal ramifications are sufficient motivation for the issue receiving a full public review. However, some of the illnesses observed in Iraq have also been seen in Persian Gulf War veterans in many countries including the United States. Investigations examining the link between depleted uranium and "Gulf War Syndrome" were expanded when the government of Italy--following the deaths from leukemia of at least seven of its Balkan veterans--asked NATO to conduct its own investigation. Finally, in 2002, a World Health Organization (WHO) delegation visited Iraq to study the possible health effects of depleted uranium (WHO, 2001).

Isolating depleted uranium as the sole cause of any illness is difficult because the battlefield in southern Iraq was exposed to a toxic soup of dangerous pollutants including munitions used by the opposing forces, oil fires from Kuwait and potentially the use or destruction of Iraq's store of chemical and biological weapons. Although current research indicates that the risks of DU to the general population are small, the research is based on relatively short-term exposure of adults. It is insufficient to conclude that Iraqi citizens residing in or near contaminated areas could not suffer from chemically toxic effects associated with long term uranium radiation exposure or poisoning. The U.S. removed the small number of its armored vehicles that had been struck by "friendly" DU munitions and either decontaminated them or buried them. Iraqi vehicles have been left in place for over a decade (Fetter & yon Hippel, 1999).

SOCIAL WELFARE BEFORE THE 1990-91 GULF WAR

Between 1927 and 1977, a span of just fifty years, Iraq's population increased four fold, from just under 3 million to just over 12 million. Social, political and economic changes in this period were as dramatic as the population explosion. From a primarily rural, agricultural society with a quasi-feudal, quasi-tribal social structure in 1927, by 1977, Iraq had been transformed into a modern urban-based society (Ismael, 2000). In 1977, largely due to its immense oil wealth, Iraq's GNP per capita was $1,594. This can be compared to a world average GNP per capita of $1,838, with the developed world GNP per capita of $5,853, and the developing world GNP per capita of $548 (Sivard, 1980). Basic social indicators reflected the level of public investment in the social well-being of the population. Life expectancy had increased from less than 37 years in 1927 to 55 in 1977. By 1977, 76 percent of the Iraqi population had access to safe drinking water (well above the world average of 53 percent and the developing world average of only 39 percent); 60 percent of school age children were enrolled in school (compared to the developing world average of 50 percent and the developed world average of 69 percent) (Sivard, 1980).

As indicated earlier, infant mortality rates are considered the most sensitive indicator of social well-being as infants are the most vulnerable to the social conditions they are born into (and the most innocent of responsibility for those conditions). Table 1 provides a comparison of Iraq's infant mortality rate between 1977 and 1990 with the infant mortality rates of other oil rich states in the developing world for the same period.

The infant mortality rates in Table 1 reflect the decline of the infant mortality rate (IMF) throughout the world--from 99 per 1,000 lives births in 1977 to 67 in 1990. Given major advances in the fight against infectious and contagious diseases, they fell most dramatically in the developing world, from 111 per 1,000 live births in 1977 (Sivard, 1980) to 75 in 1990 (Sivard, 1993). As Table 1 reflects, Iraq's IMF declined even more dramatically, from 104 in 1977 to 47 in 1990. Because of their oil wealth, other OPEC states, like Iraq, were more affluent than other states in the developing world and generally were able to invest more in social infrastructure development. Thus, they provide an apt comparison with Iraq. In the light of this comparison, Iraq's progress on IMF appears less dramatic.

Rank rather than rate may provide a better indictor of the comparative social progress indicated by IMF rates. The rank order provides an indicator of where a state falls on the distribution of IMF (with rank order number 1 indicating the lowest IMF rate in comparison with all states in the world). In this comparison, nine of the 13 OPEC states improved their rank order while five of the states declined. Iraq's 1984 and 1987 rank order declined from its position in 1977 but recovered to its 1977 position in 1990. In other words, while Iraq's IMF fell dramatically in the period 1977 to 1990, this may be attributed more to the general phenomenon of disease control throughout the world and socioeconomic development in the OPEC group than to a political will in Iraq to commit resources to social welfare progress. A comparison of resource investments made by OPEC members sheds more light on this.

As Table 2 reflects, Iraq's expenditure in 1977 on health represented only six percent of its expenditure on the military--far lower than any other OPEC state; indeed, far lower than the average of 30 percent in the developing world. In addition, its expenditure on education represented 40 percent of its expenditure on the military, also lower than all the OPEC states except Nigeria and Ecuador; and lower than the average of 210 percent for the developing world. In the eighties, with the on-set of the Iraq-Iran war, social expenditure declined even further. In 1987, expenditure on health represented less than 1 percent of GNP while military expenditure represented 30 percent; and education, only 4.6 percent. By comparison, public expenditure on the military in the developing world in 1987, on average, represented 5.2 percent of GNP (Sivard, 1991).

What this reflects is that social policy in Iraq in the eighties played a marginal role at best in public policy. The marginality of this role is reflected in Table 3, which provides a comparison of Iraq's resource commitments under the Saddam Hussein regime with the state's commitments in 1960.

Table 3 reflects the relative stability of social spending as a proportion of GNP over three decades and the dramatic increase of military spending under the Saddam Hussein regime. What it does not reflect is the substantial increase in GNP which increased from about $15 billion in 1960 to $31 billion in 1987 (Sivard, 1991). By comparison, average GNP in the developing world increased from $740 million in 1960 to $3 billion in 1990 (Sivard, 1993). It may be inferred then that while education and health care programs benefited from the substantial increases in spending oil wealth made possible, the increases were marginal in comparison with military spending which greatly increased in both relative and absolute terms. Writing on social policy in Iraq in the late seventies, I observed "the subordination of social policy to political and economic objectives" and noted that this was "consistent with Ba'ath ideology" (Ismael, 1980). In fact, they were subordinated to the militarization of Iraq and occurred against a backdrop of flagrant human rights abuse and in the context of the support of the U.S. and its western allies. The international support given to the Saddam Hussein regime, reflected in international neglect of its appalling human rights record, must be considered in the context of international social policy (Ismael & Ismael, 2000).

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL POLICY AND IRAQ

The context of international social policy refers to the social policy role and function of the United Nations (UN) and its constellation of organizations and agencies whose primary formal mandate is social (as opposed to economic or political). The UN's mandate covers five functional areas--peace and security, human rights, humanitarian affairs, economic and social development and international law. Three of these functional areas (human rights, humanitarian affairs and economic and social development) relate directly to social issues (that is, issues that are defined in terms of human rights and/or basic social needs). International economic and social policy functions are administered by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)--which is one of the UN's six principal organs (the other five being the International Court of Justice, Security Council, General Assembly, Trusteeship Council and Secretariat). ECOSOC constitutes a complex bureaucracy composed of nine functional and five regional commissions, and eighteen specialized agencies that all have overlapping mandates, functions, activities and/or jurisdictions.

Iraq was admitted to the U.N. in 1945 and, in the late sixties/early seventies, became signatory to the major human rights treaties that proceeded from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Nevertheless, throughout the seventies and eighties, in the full light of the international community, Iraq systematically violated human rights. Human rights activists regularly reported that "the victims of repression [in Iraqi ... from a broad range of groups ... were arrested, executed or disappeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s" (Korn, 1990, p. 3). With the onset of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, the toll of human rights abuse in Iraq dramatically escalated. Forged expulsion and mass ethnic cleansing were added to the human rights abuse record of torture, disappearance, and assassination. In 1987, a program of ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish population of northern Iraq was initiated with the destruction of Kurdish villages near the Iraq-Iran border and forced resettlement of their inhabitants in southern Iraq. By early 1988, the program had expanded into a project of genocide as a final solution of the Kurdish problem (Ismael, 2000). The international community--represented by the major actors in the United Nations--remained silent on Iraq's abuses. Throughout the eighties, human rights abuse by the Saddam Hussein government and the humanitarian disaster unfolding for the Kurdish people of Northern Iraq were ignored by the organs and agencies of ECOSOC and the Human Rights Commission.

This is in stark contrast with the state of affairs after the 1990-1991 Gulf War and the Security Council's imposition of a harsh sanctions regime on Iraq. Following the end of what was essentially a world war against Iraq with the passage of Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687, the cease-fire resolution, the Security Council passed 27 additional resolutions on Iraq. Thirteen dealt with procedural matters related to implementation of earlier resolutions (primarily SC 687); nine with humanitarian aid; and five with condemnation of Iraq. Under the cease-fire regime, a complex bureaucracy emerged within the UN Secretariat to administer the sanctions. With the burden of all the costs for the administration of sanctions and the cease-fire to be borne by Iraq, the ten different commissions or committees set up in effect had a vested interest in perpetuating their mandate. This was clearest with UNSCOM (the United Nations Special Commission) established under the aegis of SCR 699 to supervise the disarmament of Iraq of non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (Ismael, 1999). By 1998, UNSCOM had spent an estimated $200 million in operating costs. Amidst disclosure that UNSCOM was engaged in covert spying activities in Iraq, in 1999 Iraq declared UNSCOM persona non grata.

In 1995, the Security Council passed resolution 986 authorizing an "oil for food" formula as "a temporary measure to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, which is being implemented within the context of a sanctions regime with all its attendant political, psychological and commercial dimensions." In May 1996, after extended negotiations with the UN Secretariat, Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding setting out arrangements for the implementation of SCR 986. Subsequent to this, so-called humanitarian activity in Iraq has become a veritable industry for the various ECOSOC agencies of the United Nations--so-called because the whole of it (including its administration as well as the purchase of goods and services) are all paid for by Iraq from the oil revenues generated. Indicative of this complexity, in 1997, an Office of the Iraq Program (OIP) opened to process applications for export to Iraq of contracts for the supply of foodstuffs, medicine and other goods. Its terms of reference reflect a degree of bureaucratic complexity that would be comic if not for the complex humanitarian disaster unfolding for the Iraqi population:

   The OIP is the focal point for tracking and coordination of all
   activities regarding the preparation and approval of the
   distribution plan; revenue generation and allocation of funds;
   evaluation, processing, circulation and approval of
   applications; processing of letters of credit in coordination
   with the United Nations Treasury; authentication of the
   delivery of goods and quality checks by the independent
   inspection agents at points of entry; as well as the distribution
   of supplies in Iraq (United Nations, Office of the Iraq
   Program, 2002).

By March 2002, the "temporary measure" passed in 1996 was in its eleventh phase of operation and $53,561 billion worth of oil had been pumped from Iraq to pay for the program (Office of the Iraq Program, Basic Figures, 2002). In a theater of the absurd kind of parody on humanitarianism, goods and services can be purchased by Iraq under the oil-for-food program, but an order can be put on hold by a member of the 15 member Security Council under the sanctions regime. On 16 May 2002, the Turkish Daily News reported that $5 billion (U.S.) worth of contracts "are currently on hold--about 90 percent by the United States and about 10 percent by Britain--on grounds that the goods have a potential military use."

In addition to the oil-for-food program, OIP contracts out a number of programs operating in Iraq under the UN Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq. Reflecting this component of OIP's operations, a $148 million water and sanitation project in Northern Iraq was contracted and a $45 million mine clearance program was initiated. In addition, the UNDP (United Nations Development Program) operates a number of programs in Iraq. Its office in Baghdad, in fact, hosts over 100 staff members. Its main activities in Iraq involve overseeing the preparation and institutionalization of a database of statistics on Iraq. The first report, the National Human Development Report (NHDR), 1995, was published in 1995, and the second, due in 2001, scheduled for release in the summer of 2002. The UNDP in Iraq also runs a cultural program which features a Learning Resources Center and is affiliated with the Baghdad International School for children of UN staff (UNDP, 2002).

CONCLUSION

What can we construe about social policy in the Arab world from the case study of social policy in Iraq? Like the experimental design in quantitative analysis, a case study is not intended to be representative. External validity is not the function of the design. Rather, it provides a focused examination of inter-connections. In the case study of social policy in Iraq, inter-connections between national and international social policy were examined. In many respects, the Iraqi case is unique as it represents the first case of a form of what might be called globalized colonialism; that is, a state's subordination to the Security Council. The imposition of the sanctions regime on Iraq, indeed, represents the colonial occupation of Iraq by the Security Council. There are a number of observations to be drawn from this.

The first observation relates to the role played by military expenditure in creating a bridge into the state for the international arms market access to the public purse. In Iraq, social policy played a handmaiden role to the militarization of the state. The militarized state in Iraq proved to be an institution inimical to the welfare of the population as it became the vehicle for the subordination of Iraq to the Security Council.

The second observation relates to this. With the subordination of Iraq to the Security Council, social policy is administered as an arm of the United Nations' Humanitarian Affairs. This also has proven inimical to the welfare of Iraq's population. In neither case--national social policy nor international social policy--are the human rights of Iraqis effectively respected.

As a colonized people, the plight of Iraqis can be compared with the plight of the Palestinians. In essence, the role of the Security Council in Iraq is not so different from the role of the Israeli government in Palestine. Similarly, the role of Saddam Hussein as a legitimating agent for Security Council policy in Iraq is a prototype for the role of Yasir Arafat as a legitimating agent for Israeli policy in Palestine. That is, their roles are used to legitimate the abuse of human rights by the Security Council on the one hand and the Israeli government on the other. International social policy in both cases is subordinated to the strategic policy interests of the imperial power.

The case study of social policy in Iraq demonstrates a lesson for the Arab world. If the human rights and basic social needs of a people are not protected and promoted by the state in the national sphere, they are unlikely to be protected and promoted by any actor in the international sphere. The nature of neo-imperialism was rendered naked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq in April 2003 and subsequent occupation. The case of Iraq demonstrates, as Palestine before it, that the Security Council is a committee for the management of globalized imperialism, and Humanitarian Affairs is its handmaiden.

Table 1:

Infant Mortality Rate and Rank for Selected Years, OPEC Countries

             1977             1984             1987

COUNTRY      RATE    RANK     RATE    RANK     RATE    RANK

Iraq          104    (77)       75    (80)       69    (81)
Algeria       142    (107)      85    (87)       74    (89)
Ecuador        70    (60)       67    (76)       63    (76)
Gabon         178    (135)     112    (107)     103    (106)
Indonesia     114    (83)       87    (89)       82    (93)
Iran          104    (77)      112    (107)      65    (78)
Kuwait         39    (42)       22    (39)       19    (38)
Libya         130    (93)       84    (85)       80    (91)
Nigeria       160    (121)     129    (119)     105    (108)
Qatar         138    (100)      43    (59)       31    (54)
Saudi         150    (113)     100    (96)       71    (84)
Arabia
U.A.E.        138    (100)      38    (56)       26    (49)
Venezuela      49    (48)       38    (56)       36    (58)

             1990

COUNTRY      RATE    RANK

Iraq           47    (77)
Algeria        68    (89)
Ecuador        60    (77)
Gabon         138    (133)
Indonesia      70    (92)
Iran           46    (69)
Kuwait         17    (39)
Libya          75    (94)
Nigeria       101    (110)
Qatar          29    (54)
Saudi          65    (61)
Arabia
U.A.E.         24    (49)
Venezuela      35    (58)

Source: Sivard, R.L. (1980). World Military and Social Expenditures
(plus the 12th, 14th, and 15th editions).

Table 2:

Public Expenditures Per Capita on Selected Areas, 1977, OPEC Members

                   MILITARY         EDUCATION

                     $      RANK      $      RATIO *

Iraq                 138    (24)       56        40%
Algeria               28    (63)       93       332%
Ecuador               26    (66)       37       142%
Gabon                 29    (61)      138       475%
Indonesia              8    (96)      259       324%
Iran                 222    (15)      118       531%
Kuwait               659    (6)       520        79%
Libya                125    (22)      350       280%
Nigeria               28    (63)       23        82%
Qatar              1,257    (1)     2,131       169%
Saudi Arabia         939    (3)       561       597%
U.A.E.               822    (5)       288        35%
Venenzuela            43    (56)      142       330%

                   HEALTH

                     $      RATIO **

Iraq                   9      6%
Algeria               12     42%
Ecuador                8     30%
Gabon                 42    144%
Indonesia              2     25%
Iran                  33     14%
Kuwait               231     35%
Libya                 84     67%
Nigeria                7     25%
Qatar                235     19%
Saudi Arabia         125     13%
U.A.E.               264     32%
Venenzuela            74    172%

* Ratio: The ratio of education to military expenditures.

** Ratio: The ratio of health to military expenditures.

Source: Sivard, R.L. (1980). World Military and Social Expenditures.

Table 3

Iraq's Public Expenditures as a Percentage of GNP, 1960, 1987 and 1990

                 1960        1987        1990

Health           1.0%        0.8%        0.8%
Education        5.8%        4.6%        5.1%
Military         7.3%       30.2%       27.4%

Source: Sivard, R.L. (1991, 1993). World Military and Social
Expenditures.

ENDNOTE

(1.) In the three northern governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaimaniyah, the UNDP manages a similar rehabilitation program. Costing $570 million US, it is the largest program the UNDP has ever been involved with.

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Shereen T. Ismael is with the School of Social Work, McMaster University, Canada.