Sitting Ducks?

Piracy is still a big problem at Brazil's ports. Santos is fighting it with efficiency-and bullets.

IT WAS A BLACK AND STEAMY SOUTH American summer night in January 1998 at the Port of Santos, and Percival de Araujo Costa moved by instinct. He drew on his training at Quantico, Camp Le Jeune and the jungle warfare school to block out the crack of gunfire, whine of bullets and screams of fear.

The port's top cop and his six port patrol officers faced a gang of four. The firepower favored the enemy-pistols against Uzis. One of the officers ran out of ammo. Another didn't hesitate-he raced through the darkness and dodged bullets, crates and other port flotsam to get close enough to let go a fresh round. "If you think, you don't go," Araujo says.

By the time the shooting was over, a pirate was dead and two crew members of the British-flagged Isomeria oil tanker were wounded. That's been the last of the pirate attacks at the port of Santos-the busiest in Latin America, "These kinds of organized attacks are finished here," says Araujo, the port captain and the man responsible for securing Santos' piers.

Although his optimism might be premature, the international shipping community is taking notice. Ove C. Tvedt, the deputy secretary general of the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the world's largest private shipping organization, says the major Brazilian port has started to make strides.

It would certainly seem so. The UK-based International Maritime Bureau, a unit of the International Chamber of Commerce that deals with maritime crime, reported a half-dozen attacks for Santos and Rio de Janeiro in 1997. While Rio's average has climbed since then, Santos reported only one attack-the one on the Isomeria.

Brazil ranked fifth worldwide last year with nine attacks (see table, above). However, the actual number of pirate attacks for any port is probably twice or three times what the reports say because many shipping lines order their captains not to report any attacks.

"We get some pirates that come aboard a ship in Rio. If no one's been hurt. we don't report anything," says the top regional executive of one of the leading shipping lines serving Brazil, who doesn't want to be identified--it's not considered good business to be a pirate patsy "We can't afford to get tied up while they [officials] do their investigation."

Pirates' unknown treasures. Araujo scoffs at such comments. "What's 24 hours to do an investigation?" he asks. "We need to talk to the crew members, we need to get descriptions. It would be the same thing in a place like Miami.

The Miami area reported just as many pirate attacks as Santos last year. But whether it is Santos or Miami, on top of the loss to the thieves, 24 hours can mean a loss of $25,000 to $50,000, the daily cost to operate a large cargo ship.

How much the pirates get from the ships is hard to pinpoint Sometimes, it's just the wad of cash in the captain's safe--money for payroll and such--and the watches, money and jewelry of the crew. But more recently, maritime marauders have been setting their sights on containers of electronic goods and other expensive cargo, which can be worth millions per box.

"Piracy is a real problem," says Celina Carpi, executive vice president of Grupo Libra, a Brazilian shipping and transportation company.

Carpi should know. Pirates hit the Brazilian ship Libra Buenos Aires in September 1997. They knew which ship to hit because they had copies of the ship manifests--kind of like an art thief having the security layout for the Louvre. "I see my manifests in someone else's hands and there's nothing I can do about it," she says.

Araujo says it's more likely that the containers are being hijacked near the port--or maybe they're never put on the ships in the first place. "It's just so much easier to say it was stolen from the ship by pirates," he says. "These are not even pirate attacks. These ships are not moving. It's like an assault on a house."

There are, though, fewer assaults in Santos than in the past. Araujo says part of the reason is due to a more efficient port. "The port is moving ships in and out more quickly," he says, leaving would-be thieves less time to target and attack a ship.

Until about three years ago, the terminals were operated poorly by the government. The ships lay at anchor near the piers, waiting weeks for a berth--floating bull's-eyes for pirates.

Then the Grupo Libra subsidiary Terminal 37 took over a pier by the same name and tripled the speed at which cargo goes through the port. Later, another company, Santos, Brash, took over another terminal and that put an end to the delays. "We've been making things happen," says Henry Robinson, manager of Terminal 37.

Private companies are trying to make it happen in Rio as well. Yet, despite better port performance, the attacks have continued. Local police have suggested that the attacks might be cover operations for smugglers of illegal arms, drugs or money--bigger problems in Rio than in Santos.

While organized crime could be playing an increasing role in the attacks, Araujo isn't concerned. He's getting rid of all kinds of maritime marauders using the same method: his instincts.

                            MARITIME MARAUDERS
                   Brazil ranked fifth in the world last
                   year in the number of pirate attacks,
                     with nine incidents reported. But
                         many more go unreported.

COUNTRY          NUMBER OF
            ATTACKS (1998)
INDONESIA               59
PHILIPPINES             15
INDIA                   12
MALAYSIA                10
BRAZIL                   9
ECUADOR                  9
SOMALIA                  9
BANGLADESH               9


SOURCE: ICC International Maritime Bureau