Shedding light on Theophostic Ministry 1: practice issues.

Theophostic Ministry (TPM), a "Christian Counseling Ministry" developed by Ed Smith (1997, 2000), is reviewed and critiqued regarding practice issues that emerge from its use. According to Smith, thousands of pastoral, lay, and professional counselors have been trained in Theophostic Ministry, treating a wide range of mental health disorders. To date there is virtually no published literature on Theophostic Ministry in the professional journals, either of a theoretical or empirical nature. After providing a summary of TPM methods and claims made in its behalf, the present article aims to (a) evaluate the adequacy of Smith's exegetical support for TPM and (b) evaluate praxis and theory issues regarding TPM relative to (1) views on neurobiology, memory, emotion, and antidepressants; (2) views on dissociative phenomena and demonology; (3) reported rates of traumatic abuse; and (4) the possibility that TPM may induce iatrogenic memories.

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Theophostic Ministry (TPM) was defined by Ed Smith (2000), its founder, as "a method of delivering God's healing grace to hurting emotional [sic] wounded people" (p. i). Smith coined the term Theophostic from the Greek words for God ([theta][epsilon]o[sigma]) and light ([phi][omega][sigma]) (p. 13). According to Smith, "Theophostic Ministry is a process of divinely accomplished miracles," in which "the Spirit of Christ ... [exposes] darkness with light" (p. 13). In short, TPM is predicated on the beliefs that current distress is rooted in a painful memory in which a "lie" is embedded, and that Christ can bring release by exposing the lie and replacing it with truth as He reveals His literal presence in the person's memory.

While TPM is a relatively new technique, having been developed by Smith (2000) in 1995, the phenomenon of integrating religious beliefs and practices into therapeutic techniques is older than the history of psychology as a science. Despite periods in which animism and spiritism were predominant, Christianity, Islam, and other religions often were at the forefront of humanitarian reforms in treatment for the mentally ill. Likewise, despite periods of animosity and neglect toward religious faith by modern psychology, recent decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in religious faith and its psychological benefits (Bergin, 1980, 1991; Scott & Bergin, 2000) as well as the development of overtly Christian therapeutic approaches (Bufford, 1997; Hall & Hall, 1997). Furthermore, empirical research has supported the contention that religious faith can be beneficial as a coping mechanism (e.g., Pargament, Ensing, Falgout, Olsen, et al., 1990; Pargament, Olsen, Reilly, Falgout, et al., 1992). While much of the research on religious faith and formal attempts at integration have been published in secular and Christian professional journals, a second strand of integrative efforts stems from the lay community. One subset of these lay-initiated integrative efforts focuses on what has been termed "healing of the memories," generally seen as beginning with the work of Agnes Sanford (1966) and developed by others (e.g., MacNutt, 1974; Sandford & Sandford, 1985, 1992; Seamands, 1981,1985). TPM follows in this lineage of inner healing.

Inner healing is summarized well by MacNutt (1974) as involving "bringing to light the things that have hurt us" and "praying the Lord to heal the binding effects of the hurtful incidents of the past" (p. 183). While TPM may be rooted in the inner healing tradition, Smith (2000) developed a unique form that he asserted was independent of other inner healing methods. Use of TPM appears to be spreading rapidly, though it has received scant formal attention from the professional Christian counseling community except a brief mention in Anderson, Zuehlke, and Zuehlke's (2000) compilation of Christian approaches to psychotherapy, and a theological critique by Maier and Monroe (2002). In the following pages some of Smith's claims about TPM will be recounted and critiqued, focusing on praxis issues, beginning with a summary of its methods, and claims asserted by Smith regarding TPM.

TPM METHODS AND CLAIMS

The theory behind TPM is that current emotional difficulties are the "historical emotional echo" of traumatic or hurtful events that are encoded in memory (Smith, 1997, p. 13). Present emotional pain is viewed as a reliving of an encoded memory in which an "original lie" led the individual to believe something false and damaging (such as the abused child who believes that it was all her fault, that she is bad, unacceptable, unlovable, and so forth). Smith asserted that God can be found within the original memory, and that when He reveals His truth to the person, the memory is healed and the emotional difficulty associated with that memory completely removed. According to Smith (1997), "When using Theophostic counseling we arrive at complete recovery one lie at a time. We see complete restoration in each memory as God speaks His truth dispelling each lie" (p. 9).

An in-depth description of Theophostic procedures is beyond the scope of the present article (for a good summary, see Garzon et al., 2001). In very abbreviated form, the method can be summarized as follows. The client, having been told that the current pain is the echo of a "historical memory," is instructed to focus on the current emotion and to "'drift' back through time" to a memory that contains the same feeling, perhaps "revealing things you had long forgotten" (Smith, 1997, p. 61). At this point, "the person can be led to 'stir up' the falsehood (which they [sic] are embracing as truth)" following which, Smith claimed, "God will speak divine truth which immediately neutralizes the former way of thinking and the 'stronghold' is destroyed" (p. 35). This description is deceptively simple; in reality TPM is a complex procedure that adopts techniques similar to those of cognitive restructuring, exposure and desensitization therapies, identifying psychodynamic defense mechanisms, the use of rating scales, and healing of memories (e.g. Sandford & Sandford, 1992; Seamonds, 1985).

It is important to highlight that Smith (1997) asserted that the appearance of God in a remembered event during a TPM session is to be taken literally, not as guided imagery or imagination. Smith (2000) further cautioned that a "false Jesus" can appear, a result of "demonic interference" (p. 144). It is thus necessary to understand and critique TPM not simply as visualization, but as a technique that is predicated on the assumptions that divine revelation within TPM sessions is to be expected, and that demonic interference is common, both of which will be shown to be suspect.

EXEGETICAL ISSUES

Smith's materials frequently contain scriptural references with conclusions that are hermeneutically questionable. Smith (1997), in his client manual, proclaimed, "It is God's will for you to find complete recovery from all the lies which bind you. And once you 'know the truth' you will indeed be free. For when the Lord 'sets you free, you are free indeed!'" (p. 58). It is interesting to note that the passage Smith adapted--John 8:31--is a statement by Jesus which occurred in the context of a discussion with the Pharisees about their supposed freedom under the Law as Jews. The idea of a freeing theophostic revelation simply does not fit the context of the passage. Furthermore, the assertion of "God's will" is completely unsubstantiated and unsupported.

In an interesting discussion of I Peter 4:1, Smith (2000) wrote, "as you apply the Theophostic grid over this passage, it makes perfect sense" (p. 262). In many cases, this seems to be exactly what Smith has done. Going to scripture with a mindset of "Theophostic beliefs" that are alien to the original literary and cultural context, Smith reads into texts things that simply are not there. Another example is Smith's claim that TPM's method of exposure to the traumatic memory and lie is biblically based.

There are several reasons for immersing the person into the trauma and
life. First, it is biblical. Paul wrote in his letter to the church at
Corinth to "take every thought we have captive." We are not to run from
them or repress them. (p. 364, italics in original)

The context of the italicized phrase, which occurs in II Corinthians 10:5, clearly has in mind confronting false teaching with correct doctrine, not a cleansing of one's personal memory and cognitive processes.

These are just a few representative instances of Smith's use of scripture, which could often be considered more eisogetical than exegetical. Similar errors will be demonstrated in Smith's use of psychological explanations, as will be seen in the next section.

PRAXIS AND THEORY ISSUES

When claims are made for a counseling theory regarding phenomena that have been subject to prior scientific scrutiny, these claims must be assessed against the current theories and data available about those phenomena. Smith's (1997, 2000) presentation of TPM sometimes includes explanations that are inconsistent with modern psychological research. Smith's claims regarding the neurobiology of memory and emotion, as well as his claims about dissociative phenomena, fall into this category.

Neurobiology, Memory, Emotion, and Antidepressants

Memory plays a crucial role in the theory of TPM. Smith has at points made assertions about memory that may superficially sound scientific, but which are inconsistent with current scientific theory and research. For instance, Smith (1997) asserted that "memory is encoded in the brain in at least three different ways" including "visual memories," "emotional memories," and "physical/sensory memory" (p. 14). Smith's theory of memory is significantly at variance with current theory and research on episodic, semantic, and procedural memory systems (e.g., Schacter & Tulving, 1994). Similarly, Smith's theory of emotion is out of sync with current psychological theory and research. In Smith's (2000) view, "emotions are previously learned responses made available in a given situation based upon their likeness to other stored memories" (p. 45). Smith (1997) asserted that present emotion is actually rooted in past experience: "I believe every emotion we feel in the present is a preconceived interpretation based upon an earlier memory event" (p. 57). In contrast, the concept of state dependent memory would tend to be the reverse, that is, that current emotion triggers memories formed during similar emotional states. There is little in the empirical literature to suggest that prior learning is the penultimate cause of current emotion, although some emotional reactions can be classically conditioned. Smith's departure from current psychological theory and research can be even more explicitly seen in his view of the biological basis of emotional disorders.

Further unsubstantiated assertions about brain neurobiology can be found in Smith's (1997) theory of memory storage. "The part of our brain which stores traumatic memory has great difficulty discerning the difference between the here and now and the past and then" (p. 25, italics in original). In discussing the phenomenon of individuals logically knowing that they are forgiven but still feeling condemned, Smith (2000) asserted that the discrepancy is neurologically based, because "The lie is embedded in the memory banks of the brain while the truth is located in a different part with other logical facts. The person is not able to access both areas at the same time" (p. 370). Smith failed to provide evidentiary data to substantiate these ideas about the neurophysiology of memory, and they are inconsistent with current theories of memory and neurological function (e.g., Squire & Kosslyn, 1998).

Smith's (2000) training manual offers an equally inaccurate description of emotion, which he construes as the product of the "soul/mind":

Feelings or emotions are, in their most basic form, electro/adrenaline
reactions to an external stimuli [sic] generated by the mind through the
glandular system ... the brain electronically tells the glandular system
to excrete the proper type and amount of chemical into the bloodstream,
resulting in emotion. (p. 216)

While elements of cognitive-behavioral theory can be seen in his view (i.e., any given emotion is linked to a cognitive interpretation of events), Smith's description of the neurological process is grossly inaccurate and inconsistent with current research and theories on the neurophysiology of emotion (e.g., Le Doux, 1995a; Le Doux, 1995b). Similar problems are notable in Smith's theory of antidepressant function.

In his client manual, Smith (1997) conveys his thinking about the effects of antidepressants:

Part of the mind controls the release of these chemicals causing us to
feel different emotions. Certain drugs block the messages being sent to
the glands which hinders the amount of hormones released in a given
situation. This part of the mind knows just how or what chemical to
release in order to feel a specific emotion. (p. 35)

Not only does Smith's assertion fail to accurately reflect the neurophysiology of emotion, it also personifies the mind and creates a homunculus as an explanatory process.

Taken together, it is evident that Smith (1997, 2000) has made assertions about neurobiology, memory, emotion, and antidepressant function for which he fails to provide evidentiary support and which are inconsistent with current theories and findings in these areas (e.g., Le Doux, 1995a, 1995b; Schacter & Tulving, 1994; Stahl, 1996). Similarly unsubstantiated claims can be found in Smith's assertions about Dissociative Identity Disorder and Satanic Ritual Abuse, as will be described below.

THEOPHOSTIC MINISTRY, DISSOCIATIVE PHENOMENA AND DEMONOLOGY

The contents of TPM client and training manuals are heavily focused on dissociative phenomena and extend to beliefs about demons. The claims made regarding dissociative phenomena and demonology suffer from similar evidentiary problems as those noted above.

Dissociative Phenomena, DID, & SRA

Smith (2000) asserted that dissociation is a relatively common phenomenon and that dissociative disorders are widespread. Dismissing claims to the contrary (e.g., Spanos, 1994), Smith said, "Modern psychology suggests that Dissociative Identity Disorder is a rare condition. This simply is not true" (p. 99). Smith failed to cite any epidemiological research or his basis for disagreement with "modern psychology" on this point. Smith's views on dissociation are tied strongly to his assumption that present difficulties are almost universally rooted in traumatic memory. Smith argued that TPM allows the Lord to remove the barriers that keep individuals with DID from accessing the memories of their original wounds, which will contain the "Authentic child (the person at the age of the event who actually went through the memory)" (p. 376). Smith asserted that Theophostic Ministry is very effective with DID: "Jesus loves the alters and wants us to learn to work within this reality as we set the captives free using His truth and guidance" (pp. 101-103).

Smith (2000) asserted that Satanic Ritual Abuse is also far more common than most people believe. Again, he based this claim not on research but on his own personal experience. "I do much work with SRA victims (people who have suffered unimaginable trauma and torture at the hands of depraved evil people)" (p. 66). Smith alleged that SRA "programmers" program some of the alters of DID individuals "to believe they are demons" (p. 300). Smith described SRA as a system that is intentionally created by evil "programmers" who intentionally traumatize their victim with the aim of developing a subject who is "fully mind-controlled and demonically driven at the subconscious level" (p. 396). "The evil people doing this work have a much larger plan than just defiling Christian beliefs and hurting and defiling the Christian mind," wrote Smith. "In some cases the mind control victim may ultimately play a role in a more global plan" (p. 396). All of these claims are presented without biblical, rational, empirical, or epidemiological evidence. Absent such evidence, Smith's assertions based on subjective case studies are simply not compelling given alternative explanations, and in many ways the controversy mirrors the larger clinical debate about the dubious reality and extent of DID (e.g., Spanos, 1994) and SRA phenomena (e.g., Bottoms & Davis, 1997; Lotto, 1994).

TPM and Demonology

Smith's belief in the reality of Satanic Ritual Abuse is matched by a belief in the commonality of demonic influence. (1) Smith (2000) noted that in TPM, "sometimes demonic spirits will manifest in a person's memory and create a sense of confusion" (p. 88). Smith advocated taking authority over the spirit and saying "I forbid you to interfere again. If you choose not to comply, you willfully defy the name of Jesus" (p. 88). Smith claimed to have had "literally thousands of demonic encounters" (p. 98). Smith argued based on his experience that such demonic activity is commonplace and genuine. "How can unrelated clients have these common experiences unless the common denominator is demonic?" (p. 310). Smith's reasoning circumvents two more plausible common denominators: Smith himself, and the shared cultural heritage of his clients. Further, given the possibility of therapeutically induced false memory (e.g., Loftus, 1996), Smith's conclusion that the "common denominator" is demonic remains dubious.

Smith (2000) asserted that the "lies" of one's memory "are the source of the demonic's deceptive power" (p. 291). Far from seeing demonic inhabitation as the exception, Smith maintained that such phenomena are quite common. "About 40 percent of the time, I encounter resistance in the person hearing God speak due to some level of demonic interference" (p. 148). Smith recognized that clients might be resistant to being told that they have a demon. In response to a question about how to handle a situation in which a person who does not believe in demons has a demon, Smith counseled, "take things slowly and gradually and lead your client along at a pace at which he is comfortable ... You will have to educate them from a Biblical perspective and ask them to consider this as a possibility" (p. 314). Such education may well function as indoctrination and suggestion as to how to behave as a "demon possessed" client.

Smith's belief in the prevalence of demonic involvement and SRA lack support outside of his own reported experience. Given that his claims are otherwise unsubstantiated and atypical, it is worth considering the possibility that these phenomena are iatrogenically created.

TPM AND PREVALENCE OF ABUSE

In addition to advancing atypical views of neurobiology, dissociative phenomena, and demonology, Smith (1997, 2000) recounted a higher rate of traumatic abuse among clients he has treated with TPM than that found among individuals treated by more standard methods (see below for typically reported rates). This observation leads one to wonder why Smith's observed rates of abuse are above what is typically reported in research, and to consider the possibility that TPM may promote iatrogenic memories.

Smith (2000) noted that TPM will cause its practitioners to see an increase in client reports of traumatic events: "After doing Theophostic Ministry for awhile [sic], you will discover that many people, you would have never suspected, have deep rooted traumatic memory" (p. 8). Smith's estimates of the prevalence of DID and SRA are tied to a belief in an astounding prevalence of child sexual abuse that surpasses any epidemiological evidence. "My estimate is around 75 percent of any local congregation is hurting deeply from early suppressed wounds" (p. 24). He further asserted that "no less than 40-60 percent of all the females who come to me for ministry have at the root of their pain some degree of childhood sexual molestation" and that, while "typical statistical reports of cases of sexual abuse for women are around 33-35 percent ... My guess is somewhere around 50 percent of the female population in America has been sexually wounded...." (p. 25). In contrast, Peters, Wyatt, & Finkelhor (in Finkelhor, 1986) noted that prevalence studies of sexual abuse suffer from numerous methodological and definitional problems and have yielded widely discrepant rates, ranging "from 6% to 62% for females and from 3% to 31% for males" (p. 19). One of the most methodologically sound studies done in recent years found self-reported rates of sexual victimization in a sample of 1,145 males at 16% and 1481 females at 27% (Finkelhor, Hotaling, Lewis, & Smith, 1990). While epidemiological research on the prevalence of abuse suffers from numerous difficulties, the most reliable estimates are far below Smith's claim that fifty percent of U.S. women have suffered such trauma.

One might wonder why Smith's observations differ so markedly from those of empirical data. At least two reasons may contribute to this difference. First, therapists do not see a representative cross-section of the population; one would expect therapists to be exposed to traumatized individuals at rates higher than would be found in the general population. Therefore, extrapolating from a client sample to the larger population is likely to be misleading. Secondly, Smith's technique may prompt iatrogenic creation of traumatic memory. In a case that he reported, Smith (2000) instructed a client as follows.

It is very probable you have an early childhood event which felt the way
you are feeling now. The unpleasant emotions you are experiencing right
now are coming from this earlier picture.... It is most likely coming
from some earlier memory when something terrible must have happened to
you. What I want to help you do is find a historical event or memory
picture which matches what you feel right now. (p. 26)

Following this instruction, Smith encouraged the client to focus on her emotions and "drift backward through time," offering a prayer for God to take her to the primordial memory event (p. 26). Such techniques may well serve to prompt iatrogenically created traumatic memories.

TPM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF IATROGENIC MEMORIES

The thesis that Smith's (1997, 2000) method and theory may promote the creation of iatrogenic memories can be advanced by examining information provided to clients in the TPM manual, TPM techniques that may foster iatrogenic memories, and Smith's dismissiveness of false memory phenomena.

The TPM Client Manual and Memory

Clients reading the client manual are instructed, "Not all trauma sufferers have complete memory of what has happened to them. Often the memory which is producing the pain is buried deep in the inner recesses of the mind" (Smith, 1997, p. 14). Such statements may well promote an expectancy that clients will themselves uncover just such traumatic events. Also in his client manual, Smith asserted, "Remembering is the first phase of healing" (p. 48). Thus, according to Smith's view, those who would be healed must first "remember". Further, the vast majority of the case examples used in the client manual includes recollections of abuse. Smith's (1997) client manual seems to provide clients with the idea that they should expect to find repressed memories: "Sometimes the memory will begin to open up and unfold, revealing things you had long forgotten" (p. 61). Smith's client manual may serve to prompt clients to seek "repressed" memories as explanatory hypotheses for their present difficulties.

Smith's method, as well as his client manual, contains elements that may promote the creation of false memories. In a discussion of multiplicity, Smith (2000) noted, "the primary lie of a dissociative system is that the event never happened" (p. 376). While this assertion may be true when applied to repression of memories of actual traumatic events, it has the potential to create an atmosphere in which traumatic memories are presumed to underlie present difficulties without sufficient safeguards for the possibility that false memories may be iatrogenically created, especially when such information is given to clients in a manual designed to introduce them to TPM theory and treatment procedures.

The Reliability and Malleability of Memory: TPM Techniques

In Genuine Recovery, a manual designed for TPM clients, Smith (1997) wrote:

The visual record is not a perfect recollection of the event due to
additional visual alterations and enhancements which are made through
the years. Because of this fact one could build a case for the support
of the false memory syndrome except for the fact that there is usually
enough reality in the picture to give evidence the event actually
occurred. (p. 15)

Contrary to Smith's claims, current research has shown how very malleable and errant memory can be (e.g., Loftus, 2001; see also Loftus, 1979). Research has also demonstrated that therapists cannot reliably differentiate true from false memories (Bruck & Ceci, 1997).

Even when evaluating allegations of current abuse, clinicians are far from infallible. A series of studies by Horner, Guyer, and Kalter (1993) highlight the unreliability of clinician competence in discerning abuse. The researchers provided 129 mental health professionals with identical clinical evaluations of a 3-year-old child whom her mother alleged had been sexually abused by the child's father. The clinician-subjects' estimates of the likelihood of abuse ranged from 0% (certainty that no sexual abuse had occurred) to 100% (certainty that the child had been sexually abused by her father). However, the claim to clinical certainty exerts a powerful, if uncorroborated, force.

Many mental health experts implicitly claim the abilities to describe,
uncover, or forecast events of the past or future that are superior to
those of the ordinary person.... The claim of expertise, no matter how
inchoate, is a powerful claim, impelling both its purveyors and
solicitors toward a belief in its special merits. (Horner et al., p.
925)

Unfortunately, Smith's (1997) assertions both overestimate the reliability of memory and of clinical skill in assessing such reliability.

Recognizing that abuse does occur, that memories of abuse can be repressed and later recovered, and that false memories can be created, the American Psychological Association (1995) issued a statement cautioning that "it is not possible to distinguish true from false memories without corroborating evidence" (What's the Bottom Line, [paragraph] 1 & 2). The American Psychiatric Association (1996) further noted that therapists sometimes need to help clients live with the uncertainty of whether or not a memory of abuse is true. As previously noted, Smith presumed that there is usually sufficient evidence to discount claims of false memory. However, if the lie that is believed is that one has been abused, then false accusations might well be made that could legally and financially jeopardize an innocent person and whole family systems.

Not only did Smith (2000) fail to adequately distinguish between true and false memories, but he further proposed a technique in which a client imagines events that did not happen to simulate things which did presumably happen. Smith (1997) wrote "I sometimes create a memory facsimile from the sense of what happened that matches the lie, rather than spend more time digging around for more visual information which you [sic] may or may not ever locate" (p. 17). He illustrated this technique by presenting a case in which he instructed a client to "imagine herself being surrounded by her family and hearing them condemn, shame, and belittle her. This 'false' memory picture was an accurate depiction of what she felt as a little child" (p. 17). Ironically, Smith placed himself in the position of utilizing an acknowledged "false" memory to expose a "lie" in order to bring healing by God exposing "truth."

Smith's method of recovering "memories" may have been influenced by a technique similar to age regression hypnosis. Smith (2000) recommended that a client's final session include making a "broad sweep of [the client's] memories" (p. 282). Smith claimed to have adapted this procedure from Charles Kraft, whose method included having clients recall their birth and then review their life year by year up to the present time. However, the inappropriateness of age regression and the unreliability of its attendant "memories" have been demonstrated by a significant body of research (e.g, Spanos, Burgess, Burgess, Samuales, & Blois, 1999).

Other TPM techniques may also promote the creation of false memories. Smith (2000) indicated that once his client has traced a current emotion to a connected "memory" and the TPM process has been applied successfully, he then asks "the Lord (out loud) to lead this person to other memories which need to be healed" (p. 371). This "prayer" may well function as an instruction to the client to produce another "memory."

The hypothesis that TPM promotes iatrogenically created memories may perhaps be furthered by Smith's observation that "children can be processed [with TPM] in the same manner as adults but with less effort" (p. 379). Smith expressed the opinion that children are so amenable to TPM because they are less defended than adults and their memories less suppressed. However, a more likely explanation is that children, particularly young children, are often more easily influenced by suggestion than adults, and are thus more amenable to creating false memories (Bruck & Ceci, 1997; Ceci, Huffman, Smith, & Loftus, 1994).

Smith's Views on False Memory

In a very brief section under the heading "Can people's memory [sic] be false?" (Smith, 2000, p. 56), Smith derided those who are "overly concerned" with whether or not an alleged memory of sexual abuse is reliable. While it is true that even false beliefs have real emotional consequences, the reliability of memory is a crucial issue, especially when one considers the potential consequences of false allegations.

Smith (2000) dismissed critics who concern themselves with false memory as simply denying the reality of abuse. He further attacked the motives of people who disagree with his beliefs about recovered memories, insinuating that they may be hiding their own abusive tendencies (p. 57). While it would be tragic to deny genuine abuse, it is equally tragic to turn a blind eye to evidence that memory is fallible and malleable. It would be far better to presume that one's critics are concerned scholars arguing from evidentiary and theoretical bases than to cast unsubstantiated and possibly libelous accusations at one's critics.

In a discussion about how demons can allegedly create the illusion of physical disability or pain, Smith (2000) noted, "Anyone who does hypnosis can testify to the power of the suggestion" (p. 319). Ironically, Smith does not seem to be aware of the immense amount of suggestion inherent in his own system. Smith's instructions on handling demons seem to carry the weight of suggestion: "Demons will do what they are told if they are confident you are convinced of your authority" (p. 296). While Smith claimed such demonic compliance as evidence of the veracity of his method, one might note that hypnotic subjects are equally compliant in "recalling" past lives (e.g., Spanos, 1987-1988).

Smith denied that TPM utilizes suggestion, or that it can implant false memories (Theophostic Ministries, n.d., Misconceptions, Answer to Objections #8 & #9 sections). An inadequate understanding of the subtleties of suggestion seems to have resulted in Smith's overly simplistic denials in this regard. TPM shares many features with hypnotic induction (especially its focus on connecting emotional experience to a presumed historical memory) that could well account for the creation of DID and SRA accounts as well as "memories" of the abuse allegedly underlying these phenomena.

It is reasonable to conclude that Smith's (1997) client manual may promote client expectancy of discovering repressed memories, that several TPM techniques fail to provide adequate safeguards against the creation of iatrogenic memories, and that Smith's (1997, 2000) materials fail to provide an adequate appreciation of the difficulty of discerning true from false memories.

SUMMARY

TPM follows in the lineage of "healing of memory" techniques, though it departs from that lineage in a number of important respects. Numerous concerns exist surrounding insufficient attempts to ground TPM in biblical concepts; inadequate and often flawed explanations of basic psychological processes; dubious claims about the prevalence of DID, SRA, and demonic activity; estimates of traumatic abuse that exceed empirical findings; and the failure to sufficiently appreciate the possibility of iatrogenic memory contamination. Psychologists, pastors, and other helping professionals who may be consulted regarding TPM need to be aware of the weightiness of these concerns. While further empirical research on, and theoretical analysis of, TPM is needed, the present state of affairs warrants considerable caution.

(1) At issue here is not the reality of demonic influence, but the commonality of it, and the possibility of mislabeling a hypnogogic or sociocognitive phenomenon as demonic. Although Smith (2000) asserted that his teachings on the demonic should be taken separately from TPM in general, given his claims of the commonality of demonic influence and his offering of specialized SRA workshops, it seems a valid issue to confront in discussing TPM.

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DAVID N. ENTWISTLE

Malone College

Correspondence concerning this article may be addressed to David N. Entwistle, PsyD, Dept. of Psychology, Malone College, 515 25th St., NW, Canton, OH 44709. Email: [e-mail]

AUTHOR

ENTWISTLE, DAVID N. Address: Dept. of Psychology, Malone College, 515 25th St., NW, Canton, OH 44709. Title: Associate Professor of Psychology. Degrees: MA, PsyD, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University. Specializations: Teaching of Psychology; Clinical Psychology; Integration of Psychology and Theology.