Security Council implements resolution 687, monitors Iraqi disarmament, creates compensation fund.

In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf crisis, the Security Council acted to implement its historic resolution 687 (1991), setting detailed conditions for the formal cease-fire ending the hostilities resulting from iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

Among other things, the

* Established on 9 April a UN observer mission (UNIKOM) to monitor the Iraq-Kuwait border;

* Dispatched expert teams in May and June to oversee the transfer and destruction of Iraqi weapons, including chemical, biological and nuclear arms, under the auspices of the Special Commission on Iraqi disarmament;

* Created on 20 May a compensation fund for claims against Iraq resulting from its 2 August 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

Council resolution 687, the complex, 34-paragraph text laying down specific conditions by which international peace and security was to be restored in the area, was adopted on 3 April, a little over a month after the conflict ended. Iraq officially accepted its terms on 6 April. It was the fourteenth Council resolution in a series of Council actions dealing with the consequences of Kuwait's takeover.

Among other things, the Council called on Iraq to accept a 1963 border agreement with Kuwait, to compensate Kuwait and other countries for damage arising from the seven-month occupation, and to relinquish or destroy weapons of mass destruction.

Arms embargo 

The Council on 17 June, in unanimously adopting resolution 699 (1991), decided that the full cost of the destruction of proscribed weapons within Iraq, as outlined in resolution 687, should be borne by Iraq. The Secretary-General was to recommend, the Council said, the most effective means by which Iraq might meet those obligations. Maximum assistance, in cash and in kind, was asked from all Member States, to ensure fast and effective destruction of those weapons.

The items proscribed include: chemical and biological weapons; ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres; and nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable material. The Council also decided that all States should continue to prevent the sale or supply to Iraq of all forms of conventional weapons and military equipment.

Also proscribed are: research, development, support and manufacturing facilities for those items; repair and production facilities for ballistic missiles concerned; technology under licensing used in the production, utilization or stockpiling of proscribed items; and personnel or materials for training or technical support services.

Also on 17 June, in resolution 700 (1991), the Council approved a set of guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of the arms embargo provisions of resolution 687. The Council's Sanctions Committee was to monitor the arms embargo and report to the Council every three months.

In a report to the Council (S/22660), the Secretary-Gencral recommended that international organizations take appropriate steps to assist in ensuring full compliance with the arms embargo.

Iraqi disarmament

The Secretary-General, in line with resolution 687, in April established a 21-member Special Commission on Iraqi disarmament.

Specifically, in paragraph 9(b), the Council had called for: "immediate on-site inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities"; the yielding to the Commission by Iraq of the weapons specified "for destruction, removal or rendering harmless", and destruction by Iraq, under Commission supervision, of all its missile capabilities, including launchers; and provision by the Commission of assistance to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the removal of Iraq's nuclear-weapons-usable materials.

On 22 April, Rolf Ekeus of Sweden was named Executive Chairman of the Special Commission. Robert L. Gallucci of the United States was appointed Deputy Executive Chairman.

Other members are from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, japan, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, United Kingdom, USSR and Venezuela.

The body deals with issues related to biological and chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, nuclear-weapons capabilities, and compliance and operations support. Technical experts serve as inspectors, disposal teams and field support officers. The IAEA is to monitor the removal of nuclear-weapons-usable material.

The Secretary-General reported (S/22614) on 17 May that the Special Commission would operate in three stages: gathering and assessment of information; disposal of weapons and facilities; and monitoring of verification and compliance. On-site inspections had begun, the report states, on the basis of information provided by Iraq and developed independently on the location, amounts and types of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles.

In the course of its work, the Commission was to check the information gathered against the actual situation in the field, assess the magnitude of the task of disposal of weapons and facilities, and determine the modalities for carrying it out.

To ensure safe access to specific sites, the Commission engaged teams of explosive ordnance disposal experts, construction engineers and security personnel. The teams were to give paramount concern to the safety of the inspections teams and the local population.

Missions to the area

In May and June, the Special Commission dispatched teams of experts to Iraq in connection with the ongoing disarmament process outlined in resolution 687. The missions regarding nuclear armaments were conducted jointly with the IAEA.

On 18 April, Iraq had submitted to the IAEA Director-General the declaration required by paragraph 12 of resolution 687, specifying the locations, amounts, and types of all nuclear weapons or nuclearweapons-usable material, or any sub-systems or components, or any research, development, support or manufacturing facilities related to the above.

Executive Chairman Ekeus said the Commission was to assist the IAEA in disposing Iraq's nuclear-weapons capabilities and submit a plan for verification of Iraq's undertaking not to acquire such weapons in future. The elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, he said, was an essential ingredient in achieving a lasting peace in the region.

An IAEA plan for destroying, removing or rendering harmless the items specified in resolution 687 was submitted on 17 May (S/22615) to the Security Council.

According to the IAEA, nuclear-weapons-usable material, or "direct-use material" could not be destroyed or rendered harmless in Iraq, and the Agency would have to take exclusive control of any such material for custody and removal. This was considered to be the foremost task to be undertaken.

It said negotiations were under way with countries possessing the technology for the transportation and storage of direct-use material to ascertain their willingness to receive it. Consideration was also being given to various options for the long-term disposal or rendering harmless of this material.

The Agency reported that the declaration of Iraq listed only direct-use material and a yellow-cake production unit. Inspections of sites for other items subject to paragraph 12 of resolution 687 would aim to determine if such items existed and, if so, to remove, destroy or render them harmless. It also said that the identification of research, development, support or manufacturing facilities and materials relevant or connected to reprocessing of irradiated fuel and isotopic enrichment of uranium would be given priority, as they were capable of producing additional direct-use material.

Site inspections

The first on-site inspection of a nuclear facility in Iraq took place from 14 to 22 May, with the assistance and cooperation of the Special Commission. A team of 34 experts from 19 countries participated.

They examined the main Iraqi nuclear research facility at Al Tuwaitha and one additional site in the Baghdad area, to verify quantities and conditions of nuclear materials there as declared by Iraq.

The IAEA had taken custody, it reported, of nuclear-weapons-usable material, applying Agency verification, containment and surveillance procedures, as required by resolution 687.

Iraq fully cooperated and complied with all the Agency team's requests, it reported. Further operations to remove from Iraq all nuclear-weapons-usable materials were being planned.

A second expert group of 18 members arrived in Iraq on 22 June to continue inspection of Iraq's nuclear capabilities, planning to visit again the Tuwaitha site, as well as some newly designated sites.

Access denied

The team began its inspection activities on 23 June. The IAEA on 26 June announced that Iraqi military authorities had twice denied or restricted an IAEA inspection team access to a designated site. After protests, full access was granted on 26 June.

IAEA Director-General Hans Blix reported those developments to the Security Council, which met on 26 June to consider the situation.

It was reported that Iraqi authorities had denied for three days access to a site in the Abu Gharaib Army Barracks in Baghdad, while "considerable activity ... involving cranes, trucks, forklifts, other equipment and work crews" took place. When access was finally granted, "activities which had been observed from a distance during the first visit had ceased and objects that had been seen had been removed".

The Council, after debating the reports, adjourned without taking action.

In debate, the United States charged that Iraq had obstructed the work of the inspection team and was engaged in "nuclear deception".

France said Iraqi violation of several provisions of resolutions 687 and 699 was "extremely serious and must never be repeated".

The United Kingdom said Iraqi authorities at the highest appropriate level must be called upon to reaffirm their commitment to cooperate fully with the Commission and the IAEA, "not just in word but in deed".

Iraq replied that "given the lack of concrete evidence of the noncooperation of the Iraqi authorities with the IAEA mission, we are faced with a non-issue". Iraq asserted it was "honest and sincere in its cooperation with all UN missions.

Council action

On 28 June, the Security Council met again to consider the question of Iraqi non-cooperation. In a statement made by Council President Jean-Jacques Bechio of Cote d'Ivoire, the body asked Iraq to grant a nuclear inspection team "immediate and unimpeded access" to a site it had attempted to inspect on 28 June, as well as to any other site deemed necessary, stating that "any recurrence of non-compliance would have serious consequences

It was reported also on 28 June that Iraqi military authorities had denied an inspection team immediate access to a military transportation facility east of Fallujah, that equipment had been removed contrary to a UN official's request, and that the UN team had been obstructed from carrying out duties in accordance with resolution 687.

It was also reported that Iraqi troops had fired guns into the air while trying to seize UN cameras recording the incident.

The Council strongly deplored the incidents, condemning the conduct of Iraqi authorities.

On 28 June, Iraq said (S/22749) it wanted to avoid any incident that might cast a shadow on its endeavour to fulfil its obligations and cooperate with the UN. The Iraqi President had ordered all bodies and authorities which UN officials might wish to inspect to grant the necessary permission without hesitation.

Council members asked the Secretary-General to send a high-level mission to Baghdad to convey to the highest levels of the Iraqi Government "the Council's urgent demand for unequivocal assurances that the Government will take all necessary measures to ensure that no hindrances are placed in the way of the discharge of the Special Commission's mandate".

The mission, composed of the Director-General of the IAEA, the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the UnderSecretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, arrived in Baghdad on 30 June. It was to discuss with the Iraqis the complete freedom of movement and immediate access of UN inspectors in Iraq and the safety of all inspectors on the ground.

On 30 June and 1 July, it met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Ahmed Hussein, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi.

Chemical inspection

An on-site inspection of an Iraqi chemical weapons facility, conducted by a team of experts from eight countries, took place in mid-June.

Following a visit to the Samarra chemical weapons plant northwest of Baghdad, the group reported that chemical weapons remained in Iraq following the Persian Gulf war.

The team verified the presence on the site of mustard gas and phosphorous nerve agent, both as bulk agent and in the form of munitions, and a number of precursor chemicals acquired from abroad. The group, which included officials of the World Health Organization, reported that Iraqi authorities were cooperative throughout the initial inspection.

On 9 June, Iraq had rejected (S/22682) liability for the cost of destroying its chemical weapons. However, it was willing to voluntarily destroy or render harmless those weapons. It had, it said, the necessary expertise and technical facilities to do so, under the supervision and to the satisfaction of UN experts.

Compensation Fund

created

The Security Council on 20 May formally created a Fund from which compensation for claims against Iraq arising from its invasion and occupation of Kuwait would be paid.

By resolution 692 (1991), adopted by a vote of 14 to none, with 1 abstention (Cuba), the Council also decided to establish a Commission to administer the Fund, to be known as the UN Compensation Fund.

Section E of resolution 687 reaffirmed Iraq's liability under international law for any direct loss, damage or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The liability was without prejudice to the debts and obligations of Iraq arising prior to 2 August 1990, which would be addressed "through the normal mechanisms". Iraq was called upon to "adhere scrupulously" to all of its foreign debt obligations. The Council, under resolution 687, made the creation of the Fund one of the conditions upon which the cease-fire in the Persian Gulf war was contingent.

The Council decided that the requirement for the Iraqi contribution should apply in the manner to be prescribed by the Fund's Governing Council with respect to all Iraqi petroleum and petroleum products exported after 3 April 1991, as well as such petroleum and petroleum products exported earlier but not delivered or not paid for as a specific result of the prohibitions contained in resolution 661 (1990).

According to the resolution, the Security Council intended to retain or to take action to reimpose the prohibition against the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq and financial transactions related to them, should it be notified by the Governing Council that Iraq had failed to carry out its (Governing Council's) decisions.

On 30 May, the SecretaryGeneral suggested that the compensation to be paid by Iraq for damage caused by its invasion and occupation of Kuwait-as stipulated by resolution 687-should not exceed 30 per cent of the annual value of the exports of petroleum and petroleum products from Iraq.

On 20 May, Iraq protested (S/22629) the Security Council decision to establish a Compensation Fund. The Council had violated international law by not asking the United States and its partners to compensate Iraq for the damage and destruction inflicted on Iraq during the war, it stated,

Iraq stated that it had been suffering from a full economic embargo since August 1990 and needed many times its oil revenue to meet urgent requirements for reconstructing the country. For that reason, Iraq wanted a moratorium of five years, during which no part of its limited oil revenues would be appropriated. By ignoring that request, he said, the Council was failing to respect the right to life of the Iraqi people.

UNIKOM

The Security Council created UNIKOM in adopting unanimously resolution 689 (1991).

The Secretary-General stated that UNIKOM's military contingent would comprise armed and unarmed military personnel. It would not be authorized to take physical action to prevent the entry of military personnel or equipment into the demilitarized zone (DMZ), nor would it assume responsibilities within the competence of the host Governments, such as civilian administration of the DMZ and the maintenance of law and order.

UNIKOM would seek to ensure that no military personnel and equipment were within the DMZ. To that end, it would: monitor the withdrawal of any armed forces in the zone; operate observation posts on the main roads to monitor traffic; operate such posts at selected locations within the zone; conduct land and air patrols throughout the DMZ; and carry out investigations.

It would also aim to deter boundary violations and observe any hostile or potentially hostile actions, using force only in self-defence.

The Mission, to consist eventually of up to 1,440 military personnel provided by Member States, would monitor the 40-kilometre-long Khor Abdullah waterway between the two countries, as well as the DMZ, extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait, based on borders established under a 1963 agreement.

On 10 April, the SecretaryGeneral appointed Major-General Gunther Greindl of Austria as UNIKOM's Chief Military Observer. UNIKOM has contingents from Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Kenya, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Venezuela.

On 3 May, appropriations totalling $60,977,000 to cover operation costs for UNIKOM's first six months, from 9 April to 8 October 1991, were approved by the General Assembly.

Boundary Commission

The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission was established on 17 May pursuant to resolution 687. It completed an onsite visit from 16 to 18 June, meeting in Kuwait City with Kuwaiti officials and experts, and in Baghdad with Iraqi officials and experts.

Commission members include three independent experts: Professor Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja, former Indonesian Foreign Minister, ChairmanIan Brook of Swedsurvey, Sweden, and William Robertson, Chief Executive, Department of Survey and Land Information, New Zealand. In addition, Iraq is represented by Ambassador Riyadh AlQaysi and Kuwait by Dr. Tariq A. Razouki.

Iraq on 23 May registered its discontent with the border arrangement in a letter to the SecretaryGeneral. It said the question of the legal boundary was unresolved because Iraq had never ratified the 1963 agreement. The imposition of the border by the Council was a dangerous precedent and "an assault on the sovereignty of States".