Security Council hears views on Cyprus efforts, extends mandate of Peace-keeping Force.

Security Council hears views on Cyprus efforts, extends mandate of Peace-keeping Force

The Security Council on 14 June unanimously extended the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months until 15 December. The Cyprus force has been in place since 1964.

The Council, in resolution 565 (1985), also called upon all the parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force "on the basis of the present mandate". It requested Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Council informed of the progress made and to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution by 30 November.

Report on talks: In his report on the United Nations operation in Cyprus over the previous six months (S/17227 and Add. 1 and 2), the Secretary-General stated that he had pursued the mission of good offices entrusted to him by Council. As he had informed the Council on 2 February, the Turkish Cypriot side had stated at the joint high-level meeting at United Nations Headquarters from 17 to 20 January that it accepted the draft agreement as contained in the documentation which he had presented, while the Greek Cypriot side had stated that it accepted the documentation as a basis for negotiations, and had come to the joint high-level meeting with a view to having constructive and meaningful negotiations. Despite that situation, he had remained convinced--given their respective positions on the substance of the documentation--that the gap which had persisted for so long had never been so narrow. He had therefore considered that it was essential to preserve and to build upon the important progress that had been made prior to the January meeting. He had appealed to both sides to avoid any action which would make "our task more difficult and might detract from our objective".

Following contacts with the two sides, the Secretary-General stated, he had decided to concentrate his initial efforts on overcoming the difficulties which had arisen during the January meeting, while preserving the substance of the documentation, and he had so informed the leaders of the two communities. Towards that end, he had incorporated the components of the documentation into a single consolidated draft agreement, had endeavoured to bring greater clarity to its various elements, and had devised possible procedural arrangements for the follow-up action.

To further that process, he had met on 11 March with President Kyprianou in Geneva, and had sought to ascertain his views on the consolidated draft agreement, including the clarifications of its various elements and the possible procedural arrangements. Likewise, Foreign Minister Iacovou had come to Oman to meet with the Secretary-General on 3 April. Upon receiving an affirmative reply from the Greek Cypriot side, the Secretary-General had written to Mr. Rauf Denktash on 12 April to inform him of the status of his efforts and had sought the views of the Turkish Cypriot side. In the contacts that had followed, Mr. Denktash had stated that due to the referendum and elections which his community intended to conduct during May and June, the Turkish Cypriot side would not be in a position to engage in substantive discussions until that process had been completed.

The Secretary-General said the Government of Cyprus had made strong representations on the subject of the referendum and elections, emphasizing that such actions violated United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, in particular Council resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984). The Turkish Cypriot side had maintained that it had the right to engage in such a process; and that this would not hinder prospects for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem to which it remained committed. On 6 May, the Secretary-General recalled, his spokesman had stated that the United Nations, as reaffirmed by the Council, recognized no Cypriot State other than the Republic of Cyprus, and that therefore the Secretary-General could not condone any development or action which was at variance with that position.

The Secretary-General remained convinced that an agreement was within reach. his approach since January had taken into account the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side had agreed to the documentation; and he had therefore assumed that it would wish to preserve what had been achieved and stand by its acceptance, provided the other side also agreed. As he had reported, the outcome of his subsequent efforts to overcome the obstacles which had stook in the way of the acceptance of the documentation by the Greek Cypriot side had been positive. The Turkish Cypriot side had not yet made known its position on the efforts he had undertaken since January, and he was awaiting its response.

In order to create an atmosphere conducive to progress, the Secretary-General said it was important that both sides refrained from making public statements that were at variance with the positions they had taken in the context of his mission of good offices. Such statements, he noted, only contributed to the cycle of distrust and increased "the danger of the two sides reverting to mutually irreconcilable attitudes". "The substance of the documentation which has been worked out during the past ten months of strenuous effort", the Secretary-General added, "represents the formula most likely to lead to a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Provided both sides manifest the necessary goodwill and co-operaton, an agreement can be reached without further delay." The Secretary-General therefore intended to intensify his diplomatic action.

UNFICYP operations: the Secretary-General said the continued presence of UNFICYP remained indispensable in helping to maintain calm on the island and in creating the conditions in which the search for a peaceful settlement could best be pursued.

Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus: The Secretary-General reported that effective 28 April, he had appointed Paul Wurth of Switzerland to succeed the late Claude Pilloud as the third member of the Committee. The Committee was not wagain complete and was expected to resume its work in June.

Financial status: The Secretary-General expressed his continuing concern about the increasingly difficult financial situation of UNFICYP. Stressing that voluntary contributions from Governments were required to finance the cost to the Organization of maintaining the Force, he said that such contributions had consistently fallen short of expenditure, causing a growing deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account. Including some $4.6 million in voluntary contributions that had been pledged but not yet received, that deficit would amount to approximately $128.7 million as of 15 June--an increase of $6.8 million during the six-month period ending on that date. As a result, the troop-contributing countries had been reimbursed only through June 1978 for claims which covered only a fraction of the costs incurred by them. The deepening deficit thus placed an ever heavier burden on those countries. The Secretary-General once again appealed to all States to make every effort to contribute to that important peace-keeping operation of the United Nations.

Statements

The Council heard statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, Australia, and by Ozer Koray, who was invited to address the Council in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure. (The rule states that the Council may invite persons whom it considers competent to supply information on matters with which it is dealing).

Constantine Moushoutas (Cyprus) said Cyprus had given its prior consent to the Council's decision to renew UNFICYP's mandate. UNFICYP's peace-keeping functions had been made imperative by the situation prevailing in Cyprus. He assured the Secretary-General of Cyprus' full cooperation and contined support for the successful conclusion of his initiative.

The significant developments which had taken place concerning the Secretary-General's initiative and which had led to the January meeting had not produced the widely anticipated progress because of Mr. Denktash's "premeditated plans to ruin that meeting in order to proceed with further illegal and partitionist acts". That regrettable turn of events had developed notwithstanding the Secretary-General's many efforts and the concrete compromise proposals offered by President Kyprianou as a way out of the deadlock to which Mr. Denktash had deliberately led the meeting.

He stated that the Turkish side, soon after it had rejected the Secretary-General's invitation for a new high-level meeting in February, had announced its "illegal decision to hold so-called parliamentary and presidential elections in the occupied areas, as well as a 'referendum' on the so-called constitution of the illegal secessionist entity". The "so-called referendum and elections" violated United Nations resolutions on Cyprus--particularly Council resolutions 541 and 550.

The "so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" was a "bogus entity, set up by Turkey as its puppet in the occupied area". Legally, that entity had no territory of its own, except the areas occupied by the Turkish troops, who had uprooted the whole indigenous Greek Cypriot community constituting 82 per cent of the population in the area, and had "implanted thousands of settlers from the mainland of Turkey in the homes and lands of those expelled". Turkish Cypriots, being under occupation, could not freely exercise democratic processes. It was Turkey that had conceived and had dictated those "separatist acts" against Cyprus' territorial integrity and unity. The Turkish argument that the Turkish Cypriot community in the area could exercise separately the right to self-determination was untenable.

The results on the "so-called referendum" had established beyond any doubt, he went on, that without the "votes" of the "settlers imported by the occupying Power from Turkey", a majority in favour of the new "constitution" would not have been secured. The tragedy of Cyprus consisted of the "unchecked and ongoing turkish aggression and occupation" and the non-implementation by Turkey of Council resolutions and its systematic undermining of the negotiating process through faits accomplis aimed at "consolidating its stranglehold over its victim"--the Republic of Cyprus and its people.

Cyprus was in a hurry to reach a just and lasting settlement of the question. The total withdrawal of the "foreign troops of occupation" formed the backbone of the United Nations resolutions and was a sine qua non for any viable and just solution. A demilitarized Cyprus as proposed by President Kyprianou would "bring forth again, stronger and warmer, the age-old, peaceful and amicable coexistence of the Cypriot people now divided by artificially imposed barriers". The Cyprus Government totally and unreservedly supported the Secretary-General's efforts within the framework of his personal initiative and in accordance with the relevant Council resolutions. Cyprus was ready to achieve a solution in accordance with the United Nations resolutions and the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979. But was the Turkish side ready as well? That was the crux of the matter.

Mihalis Dountas (Greece) said Greece fully supported the resolution. In doing so, it had noted the fact that the Government of the Republic of Cyprus--"the only legitimate spokesman of the sovereignty of the Republic"--had already given its consent. It was imperative that UNFICYP remain in Cyprus in its present strength. UNFICYP had become "a very important component of a highly delicate balance consisting of a wide spectrum of factors". Without UNFICYP, that balance might be "gravely disturbed, to the detriment of peace in the region". UNFICYP was carrying out its difficult task in a very effective manner.

He stressed the positive attitude of the Cyprus Government with regard to the Secretary-General's initiative. In its desire to contribute to a climate conducive to the success of the Secretary-General's efforts, the Cyprus Government had displayed "great political restraint and statesmanship". Not only had it accepted, "with onerous sacrifices", all of the Secretary-General's proposals; it had also not brought to the Council the recent violations of the sovereignty of the Republic by the Turkish side--"the promulgation and carrying out of so-called referendums, elections, and so forth". These were vilations that ran counter to and defied the relevant United Nations resolutions and the unequivocally and repeatedly stated positions of the totality of the nations of the Oranization--with Turkey's exception.

While Greece had supported the Secretary-General's recent initiative, others had only paid lip-service to it while at the same time undermining its substance with their actions. Greece hoped that the Secretary-General's efforts would succeed. It wished that a solution to the Cyprus question would be found soon--a viable solution that would secure Cyprus' territorial integrity and unity, based on justice, internationally accepted democratic principles and respect for human rights, and one which would entail, upon agreement, the withdrawal of all "occupation troops". Greece wished that the Turkish side would respond positively to the SEcretary-General's proposals.

Ozer Koray, speaking on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, said the Greek Cypriot side, led by Mr. Kyprianou, did not want a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zontal federal republic of Cyprus, as envisaged by the draft agreement presented to the two sides for conclusion on 17 January. By his total rejection of that agreement, Mr. Kyprianou was sending a clear message to all concerned that he was "intent to hanging on to the seat of government which his predecessor had usurped in 1963 and passed on to him".

Mr. Kyprianou did not want a settlement in Cyprus which envisaged guaranteeing the equal political status of the two communities, which embodied the basic principles of bi-communality and bi-zonality, and which ensured the continuation of the Turkish guarantee that was indispensable for the Turkish Cypriot side. The "internal democratic processes" that were taking place on the Turkish Cypriot side were purely internal matters for the Turkish Cypriot people, who were in the process of electing the organs and the people who would be authorized and mandated to represent them in all matters of State, including the negotiations aimed at finding a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. Elections in Cyprus had always been held separately by the two communities.

Commenting on the Secretary-General's report, he stated that the draft agreement of 27 November 1984 constituted, in all its aspects, an integrated whole which his side had accepted in toto, and which could not be changed without its consent and agreement. However, the new text contained substantial differences as regarded both the substance and the procedure to be followed. The Turkish Cypriot side would communicate to the Secretary-General its views and proposals as regarded the substantial differences after the elections on 23 June.

It was misleading to speak of a "single consolidated text" since it did not cover all of the substantial elements of the original documentation, which constituted an integrated whole. The Secretary-General's reference to contacts with the two sides might lead to the impression that, following the collapse of the January summit, the exercise of consolidating the texts had been initiated and carried out with the consent of the two sides. That would be misleading, since the Turkish Cypriot side had not given its consent to such an exercise, which had been carried out through contacts and consultations with the Greek Cypriot side only.

It was imperative, he continued, for the Turkish Cypriot side to be informed whether Mr. Kyprianou now accepted the "basic concepts and principles embodied in the original documentation, such as equal political status of the two sides, bi-zonality, international guarantees, security, the regulation of the three freedoms in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Denktash-Makarios agreement". Statements by Mr. Kyprianou since the January summit demonstrated that he had not changed his previous position on those basic concepts and principles.

He said the statement of the Secretary-General's spokesman contained in the Secretary-General's report was "entirely irrelevant" and "cast a shadow on the basis of the mission of good offices". The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus had come into being in November 1983 as a manifestation of the right to self-determination of the Turkish Cypriot people. It was "as legitimate an entity as the Greek Cypriot administration in the south, only more so". Nobody had any right to pass judgements on its "democratic and peaceful internal developments".

The resolution contained elements that were unacceptable to the Turkish Cypriot side. Notwithstanding its "unavoidable rejection in toto" of the resolution, the Turkish cypriot side was nevertheless prepared "to accept UN-FICYP's presence on the territory of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the same basis as that stated in December 1984".

He reiterated his side's support for the mission of good offices of the Secretary-General emanating from Council resolution 367 (1975). The Turkish Cypriot side would be ready to contact the Secretary-General within the context of his good offices mission after the elections on 23 June.

Ilter Turkmen (Turkey) said the Greek Cypriot leader was responsible for having deliberately wasted in January a historic opportunity of conciliation between Cyprus' two peoples. Whatever rights existed in south Cyprus for the Greek Cypriots, the same rights existed in full in the north for the Turkish Cypriots. Any other approach closed the door to a federation which must rest on the political equality of the two peoples. The Greek Cypriots did not have any constitutional, legal or legitimate right to claim to represent Turkish Cypriots "and hence the whole of Cyprus". In the absence of a joint federal government, it was the Turkish Cypriots' right to be represented only by the authorities and organs elected freely by themselves.

Turkey commended the official policy of the Turkish Cypriot side of leaving the door open to a bi-zonal federal solution to be negotiated freely between the two sides in the island. The Greek Cypriots disagreed among themselves on what sort of a solution they should seek.

He said Turkey strongly supported the Secretary-General's efforts within the framework of his mission of good offices. It would continue to strive to facilitate the search for a bi-zonal federal solution. Mr. Kyprianou was very far from being reconciled to the concept of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. In agreeing to substantial concessions during the proximity talks, President Denktash had acted on the assumption that the documentation submitted to the January meeting had formed an integrated whole. However, after its rejection by Mr. Kyprianou, a new situation had emerged in which both parties were free to reformulate their negotiating positions.

The text now presented did not encompass some of the substantial points contained in the documentation submitted in January. Some additional elements to the draft agreement had been orally communicated to the parties, but their connection with the draft agreement remained undefined. To the extent that they covered the same points, the draft agreement now put forward presented numerous substantial and fundamental differences from the documentation submitted in January. Since a new negotiating process had to be initiated because of the failure of the January meeting, consultations with both sides before finalizing the new document were imperative.

The statement of the Secretary-General's spokesman contained in the Secretary-General's report was "totally irrelevant to the internal developments in Northern Cyprus", he continued. The spokesman's statement also put in doubt the basis on which the Secretary-General's mission of good offices was conducted. The absolute prerequisite of that mission was that the two sides in Cyprus should be treated on a strict basis of equality as the political authorities representing the two peoples of the island. The Secretary-General would have Turkey's full support in his future endeavours to revive the negotiations between the two sides on a basis and within a procedure which was acceptable to both sides.

He observed that the resolution had been rejected in its entirety by the Turkish Republic of Northern cyprus, which however had indicated its willingness to go along with UNFICYP's presence in Northern Cyprus and to continue to co-operate with it. Turkey completely agreed with that position. The principles, scope, modalities and procedures for co-operation between the authorities of that Republic and UNFICYP could only be based on decisions taken by the Government of that Republic. The contacts between the Turkish authorities in Cyprus and UNFICYP would continue to take place on the same basis. Turkey confirmed its continuing support for the Secretary-General's mission of good offices emanating from resolution 367.

Warren Hogue (Australia) said the Secretary-General's most recent endeavours had engendered an atmosphere of positive expectation, and the opportunity to bring lasting peace to Cyprus must not be allowed to slip out of reach. An early resolution of the island's problems could be effected only through negotiation and dialogue. Australia supported Council resolutions 541 and 550 and the path towards a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus mapped out in those and previous Council resolutions. Treading that path involved difficult choices for all concerned, but "we must take heart from the Secretary-General's view that there is a basis on which a just and lasting solution can be achieved". The efforts of the Secretary-General towards a negotiated settlement continued to present the best means of progress. Australia appealed to all the parties to continue to co-operate with the Secretary-General in his endeavours. No side should take any action that would jeopardize them.

Although Australia would continue to maintain its contingent of civilian policemen in UNFICYO, it was concerned at the growing deficit in the UNFICYP Special Account. There was clearly a need for a very substantial increase in voluntary contributions to the Account, as well as in the number of countries making contributions.