Security Council hears Chad complaint against Libya.

The Security Council on 30 January heard statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, Gouara--Lassou, and the Charge d'Affaires of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Rajab A. Azzarouk, in connection with a complaint by Chad about "the serious situation prevailing" in Chad.

Following his statement, Mr. Lassou showed a five-minute video tape, accompanied by a sound track, describing what he said was a foiled attempt last autumn by Libya to place an explosive device in a Chamber of Commerce hall in N'djamena, the capital of Chad. The bomb, he asserted, would have assassinated the President of Chad, Hissein Habre, and members of his Government who were going to be in that hall.

The Council met in response to Chad's urgent request, which was contained in a letter of 28 January from the Charge d'affaires of Chad, Ngare Kessely, addressed to the Council President (S/16911). In a letter of 25 January, also addressed to the Council President (S/16906), Mr. Kessely stated that Libya was continuing its meddling in Chad's internal affairs and was illegally occupying 550,000 square kilometres of Chadian territory. The Libyan Government refused to follow the terms of a statement by the President of the Council on 6 April 1983, in which the Council had called on Chad and Libya to discuss their differences and to settle them without undue delay and by peaceful means. The Libyan Government had planned an attack on President Habre and members of his Government. "Luckily this terrorist attack was foiled. Libyan responsibility was clearly established by the investigation."

In reply, Mr. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), in a letter of 28 January to the Council President (S/16912), said Mr. Kessely's letter contained "unfounded allegations and slander" and was aimed at "diminishing the importance of the legitimate Government of Chad, which exercises its authority over the larger part of the territory and has its forces and administration in the northern part of the country". He added: "There is no Libyan presence in Chadian territory and the statements to the effect that there are Libyan forces in that territory are completely unfounded. In fact, the only elements actually present in the northern zone are the forces of the legitimate Government and the population of northern Chad." The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya did not wish to deal with "the so-called Government of Hissein Habre". What was happening in Chad "is simply a civil war and an internal conflict resulting from the blow at legality struck by Hissein Habre", the letter said.

Statements

Gouara Lassou, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation of Chad, said that on 27 September 1984, a plot aimed at "physically eliminating" President Habre and all members of the Government was foiled in N'djamena. "Qaddafi's secret dream is the occupation and subjugation of all Chad and the Chadian people in order thereafter to destabilize the rest of Africa." Chadian authorities had tried, in vain, to negotaite with Libya. While Chad's civilian population was suffering the hardships of drought and dying of hunger, its Government has been obliged to use a large part of the meagre resources available to the country to cope with a war imposed on it by the Tripoli regime.

On 26 September 1984 security agents discovered an attache case in the house of a Chadian businessman named Ali Hassan Adam. The case contained an electronic detonating mechanism and enough explosives to wreck a house completely. The deposition taken from Ali Hassan Adam showed that he had received that booby-trapped device from a Libyan agent in Kousseri, Cameroon. The agent told Ali that the case contained eavesdropping equipment and asked him to place it in the meeting room of the Chamber of Commerce just before a meeting between President Habre with members of his Government. That "eavesdropping device" was in fact a bomb.

Inquiries by the security forces made it absolutely clear that the "murderous conspiracy" had been encouraged by the Libyan Government and its leader Muammar Qaddafi. It also proved that several Libyans and experienced foreign technicians were accomplices in that attempted assassination. The "duped" Chadian would certainly have been blown up along with his so-called "eavesdropping device", thereby wiping out the chief witness against the "terrorist Colonel".

Mr. Lassou then showed the Council an attache case similar to the one he said had been given the Chadian businessman. He said he had not brought the explosive itself because that would have been dangerous, but the case did contain the detonator for the bomb.

Rajab A. Azzarouk (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said his country did not interfere in Chad and had no presence whatsoever on Chadian territory. What was described by some "hostile circles" as a presence of Libyan forces was only the presence of forces of the "legitimate Government of National Unity" stationed in northern Chad. Hissein Habre and his representatives disfavoured security, peace and stability in Chad. Habre had always been a "source of disturbance" and instability in Chad. Habre had plunged Chad into a long civil war. He had violated the Lagos Agreement of 18 August 1979 by rebelling against the legitimate interim Government of National Unity headed by Goukouni Oueddei--the result of the Lagos' Agreement.

That government was the only one set up as a result of agreement among all factions in Chad, and was recognized by the Organization of African Unity. Famine and Habre's "crimes" had prompted Chadians to seek asylum in neighbouring countries, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, which hosted tens of thousands of Chadian refugees. The international community could not give legitimacy to a Govenment formed of only one faction, which came to power through "rebellion and force of arms, with the support of mercenary and foreign forces".

The allegation that Libya had concocted an attempt to assassinate Habre was without foundation. What was likely, he stated, was that the attempt had been made by a group in Habre's personal guard--as stated by the "legitimate Chadian government of National Unity". The "rebel Hissein Habre and his clique" had no legitimacy. What was going on in Chad was a civil war due to elements such as Habre, who put their "personal aspirations" before the interests of Chadians.

The only solution was to seek national reconciliation in accordance with the Lagos Agreement, under the supervision of the OAU, with the participation of all the parties that had consistently endeavoured to maintain the unity, security and stability of Chadians and was the first to strive to achieve national reconciliation in Chad. Libya was ready to contribute to any efforts made within the framework of the OAU to achieve peace and security in Chad.