Security Council extends mandate of Cyprus force until 15 December 1986.

Security Council extends mandate of Cyprus Force until 15 December 1986

The Security Council on 13 June unanimously extended the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months until 15 December 1986. The Cyprus Force has been in place since 1964.

The Council, in its resolution 585 (1986), also called upon all parties concerned to continue to co-operate with the Force "on the basis of the present mandate'. The Secretary-General was asked to continue his mission of good offices, to keep the Council informed of progress made and to report on implementation of the resolution by 30 November 1986.

Established by Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, the Force has the task of preventing a recurrence of fighting and helping to restore normal conditions to the island. It also supervises the cease-fire lines in Cyprus and performs certain humanitarian tasks.

With a total strength of 2,328-2,290 troops and 38 civilian police--UNFICYP is under the command of Major-General Gunther G. Greindl. Contributing countries are: Australia (20 civilian police); Austria (301); Canada (515); Denmark (341); Finland (10); Ireland (8); Sweden (374 troops and 18 civilian police); and the United Kingdom (741). UNFICYP also has 34 international civilian staff members. The Force has suffered 139 fatal casualties since its inception.

In his report (S/18102 and Add. 1 and 2) on the United Nations operation in Cyprus covering the period 1 December 1985 to 11 June 1986, the Secretary-General stated that in carrying out the mossion of good offices entrusted to him by the Council, his objective had been to achieve an overall solution which would preserve the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of Cyprus in accordance with the frequently expressed view of the Council. That would respond not only to the wishes of the people of Cyprus but also to the requirements of international peace and security in the region as a whole, he said.

In the course of the initiative he had pursued since August 1984, he had sought to obtain agreement of the two sides to a framework within which an overall solution could be promptly and conclusively negotiated. To that end, he had tried to build the largest possible measure of agreement between the two sides and to devise procedures for resolving the outstanding issues. He had also had to bear in mind, he said, the "distrust which sadly exists between the two sides' and the fact that certain issues were felt to be of special importance by one side or the other.

In the light of those various factors, the Secretary-General said, he had proposed negotiating procedures which would give each side an ample opportunity in the negotiations that lay ahead to assure itself of the good intentions of the other. Those procedures included the convening of high-level meetings whose agenda would include from the outset the questions of the withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces; international guarantees; and freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property. He had also proposed the concept of an integrated whole, that is that neither side would be ultimately committed to an overall solution until all issues had been resolved to its satisfaction. The Secretary-General stated that that approach was reflected in successive versions of the documentation which had been presented to the two sides since December 1984.

By March 1986, Mr. Perez de Cuellar said, he believed that the differences between the two sides could be bridged by a "decisive effort'. He had therefore presented to them on 29 March a draft framework agreement that preserved all the points on which agreement had been achieved since August 1984, suggested solutions to remaining divergences in a manner that, in his judgment, protected the interests of both communities, and proposed procedures for negotiating outstanding issues, including withdrawal of non-Cypriot forces, guarantees and the three freedoms--freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property.

On 20 April 1986, the Secretary-General received a letter from President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus, stating that before the Greek Cypriot side could express its views on the proposed document, agreement must be reached on "the basic issues of the Cyprus problem as a matter of priority', namely on withdrawal of the Turkish forces of occupation and settlers, effective international guarantees and the application of the "three freedoms'--freedom of movement, freedom of settlement and the right to property. Towards that end he had requested the Secretary-General to convene an international conference to deal with the first two issues or, if that proved impossible, to convene a high-level meeting to deal with all three issues.

On 21 April 1986, Mr. Perez de Cuellar received a letter from the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, setting out views and considerations in the light of which the Turkish Cypriots accepted the draft framework agreement. In a further letter on 27 April, Mr. Denktash stated that he would sign the agreement "as it was, when the blank dates had been filled in'. He also stated that the Turkish Cypriot side "could not accept any procedure other than that contained in the draft framework agreement'.

On 10 June 1986, the Secretary-General received another letter from President Kyprianou, setting out his assessment of the underlying issues of the Cyprus problem, describing the fundamental importance for the Greek Cypriot side of the three issues set out in his 20 April letter, commenting on various aspects of the agreement, and reiterating his proposal for an international conference or a high-level meeting to consider the three issues concerned. When substantive decisions had been taken for the resolution of those problems, it should be possible to assess the results of the high-level meeting or the international conference and the content of the draft framework agreement.

The Secretary-General remained convinced that, if accepted by each of the two sides, the document he had presented to them on 29 March "would provide the right framework for negotiating a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem'. He had been heartened both by the support his efforts had received from the Council, and by the frequent declarations by both sides of their desire to achieve a final settlement of the problem. He regretted that, since one side was not yet in a position to accept the draft framework agreement, the way was not yet open to proceed with negotiations. In those circumstances he was concerned by the "dangers inherent in the present situation'. The way forward would require careful reflection by all concerned, he added.

UNFICYP: The Secretary-General reported that the continued presence of UNFICYP was "indispensable' in helping to maintain calm on the island, "an essential condition for the search for a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem'. He recommended therefore that the Council extend UNFICYP's mandate for a further period of six months.

Missing persons: The Secretary-General also reported that the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus had held 12 formal meetings since December 1985. Work had reached an "advanced state' on the 168 individual cases being investigated. The Committee was endeavouring to complete its work as soon as possible and ways were being explored to facilitate the Committee's decision-making process in that regard.

Financing: The Secretary-General expressed his "profound concern' that the Force's financial situation had "further deteriorated' during the past six months. That situation continued to place an "unfair and disproportionate burden' on the troop-contributing countries, he said. The financing of the Force depended entirely on voluntary contributions from Governments, which had "consistently fallen short of expenditure'. The deficit was expected to reach $145.7 million by 15 June 1986 unless additional contributions were received; that deficit reflected an increase of some $11.8 million in the last six months. Troop-contributing countries had been reimbursed only up to December 1978 for claims that covered only a fraction of the costs incurred by them, he added.

To date, only six States had made pledges or contributions in respect of the six-month period ending on 15 June 1986, amounting to only some $2 million, to cover expected expenditures for that period of approximately $14 million. He had again appealed to all States to contribute to the financing of UNFICYP.

Troop contributors: In a 12 June statement after meeting with the Secretary-General, UNFICYP troop contributors expressed willingness to maintain contributions to the Force for a further period of six months. At the same time, they expressed concern that UNFICYP had been in the field for 22 years and that "there should be no tendency to take its existence for granted'. That would not be easy for them to accept, especially since the financial situation had further deteriorated, which placed "an increasingly unfair and disproportionate burden' on them, they said.

They also expressed support for the Secretary-General's efforts and appealed to parties to show the flexibility necessary to bring abut a negotiated settlement.

Statements

The Council heard statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, and by Ozer Koray, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community.

Constantine Moushoutas (Cyprus) said his Government had approved the resolution because it contained the basic provisions for stationing of United Nations troops in Cyprus, "made necessary in light of the continuing Turkish occupation of part of our territory and the ongoing initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General'. The problem of Cyprus was one of "foreign invasion and continuing occupation by Turkey' of 40 per cent of the territory of a small non-aligned country, "usurpation of lands, the inhuman expulsion of thousands of people from their ancestral homes and the massive violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all Cypriots'. Council resolutions still were unimplemented.

The "puppet regime' of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'-- an "illegal concoction of attempted secession'--continued with illegalities. No lawful or adequate expression of free will could take place in the occupied areas because of the massive Turkish military presence and the uprooting and expulsion of the lawful inhabitants constituting 82 per cent of the population in those areas and the implantation in their homes of Turkish settlers.

Turkey had recently proceeded with construction of a vast military airport in Lefkonico and a naval base in Kyrenia, while his Government had accepted, in writing, talks for Nicosia's demilitarization, he said. The "tragic question of the missing' remained unresolved. "Segregation, so reminiscent of the deplorable system of apartheid in South Africa, has been imposed as the policy of Ankara in its effort to partition and annex to mainland Turkey the occupied part of Cyprus.' Turkey was attempting to change the island's demographic character. Historical names of towns and villages were being changed to Turkish place-names, and historic monuments were being looted by "the invader'. Those Turkish actions constituted a crime against humanity.

Settlers were also desecrating holy places, he stated. Ankara wished to perpetuate its stranglehold over Cyprus, paying "only lip-service' to a negotiated settlement of the problem. It was consolidating the results of its aggression by speedily incorporating the occupied areas into the State of Turkey.

The Greek Cypriot side was committed to a just and viable solution of the Cyprus problem as a matter of urgency, in accordance with the Charter and United Nations resolutions. It had made many "painful concessions' to reach a solution. It was willing to accept many--"even unorthodox'-- provisions relating to territorial and constitutional issues. But the Turkish side had refused to enter into any meaningful discussion on "crucial issues'.

The draft framework agreement did not reflect Greek Cypriot concerns. All political parties in Cyprus agreed that it could not be accepted as it stood. The formulation of the territorial question had been changed radically, with little resemblance to previous formulations. The Greek Cypriot side would have found itself bound by an "unworkable constitutional arrangement', without benefiting from corresponding commitments of the other side on issues of vital concern to the Greek Cypriots.

The time had come to establish a balance among elements of the framework. When balance was established, which would be possible only when outstanding basic issues were discussed, further negotiations on the other elements of the package could be justified and in fact facilitated. The Greek Cypriots could not accept that their 20 April proposal was not viable simply because Mr. Denktash might reject it.

The Council must ensure that Turkey abandoned what had been obtained by force of arms, withdrew its troops and respected the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of Cyprus. Turkey must implement Council decisions and resolutions. "It is not, and must not be, Cyprus, the victim, that must be made to sign its surrender.' The Government of Cyprus was striving to secure implementation of United Nations resolutions, "to make Cyprus an island without foreign armies or dividing lines and to rebuild the bridges of co-operation blown up by foreign interference and intervention'.

Mihalis Dountas (Greece) said the solution of the Cyprus problem had always been seen as being based on a package of several elements. The interdependence of those elements was such that it was impossible for either side to commit itself to part of the package without knowing the whole.

Throughout the process of negotiations, only one group of subjects had been discussed extensively, namely that related to a new constitutional structure for the Republic of Cyprus. The territorial issue had also been discussed, although at a much later stage. The question of the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, of guarantees and of "the three freedoms' had never been explored. The Turkish side had adamantly refused to enter into serious negotiations on the subject.

The text of the draft framework agreement was therefore "incomplete and consequently imbalanced'. Despite that, a commitment to initial acceptance was being sought from the parties. The suggestion of President Kyprianou to convene an international conference or a high-level meeting to deal with the three remaining issues and then with the draft framework was "conceptually and politically sound, given the imbalances and the farranging provisions' of the draft framework agreement.

Precedence should be given to the three outstanding main issues. No farreaching agreement could be achieved without full knowledge of the position of the other side on the remaining main aspects of the question.

When the draft framework agreement had been presented to the parties, their position on crucial matters was so far apart as not to justify its submission for acceptance. The hasty submission of that incomplete document was "a mistake, an error of judgement'. The "integrated-whole' approach--as designed and described in the draft agreement--would, if ever accepted, "end up as a euphemism for Greek Cypriot concessions through salami tactics'.

In his 21 April letter, Mr. Denktash had made it clear that part of the Turkish troops would remain in Cyprus indefinitely. He had also made clear that the Government of Cyprus would have to be dissolved and replaced by a transitional government "paralysed by Turkish vetoes', and that the National Guard would have to be disbanded before Turkish occupation forces begin partial withdrawal.

The draft framework agreement significantly departed from documents put forward in April 1985. Even "the faint trust which had led the Greek side to risk the acceptance, with certain understandings', of those documents, had been "dissipating ever since'. The Council should deal with the matter of the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus as a matter of absolute priority.

Ozer Koray, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot Community, said his side was trying to reach a just and lasting solution in Cyprus with the Greek Cypriots through the Secretary-General's mission of good offices. The two sides could pursue the peace process with a chance of success within the draft agreement on a federal solution presented by the Secretary-General. "This necessitated some degree of moderation and sensibility, and that is what we would have wished to see on the Greek Cypriot side rather than an increased propaganda effort.' The draft framework agreement, if concluded and adhered to in good faith by the two sides, could lead to a bicommunal and bizonal federal settlement based on the equal political status of the two peoples of Cyprus.

Greek Prime Minister Papandreou should "withdraw his unhelpful shadow from over Cyprus'. Another "golden opportunity' had been lost because the Greek Cypriot side had not accepted the draft framework agreement. In pondering the situation, he hoped the Greek Cypriot side would assume a positive attitude towards a negotiated solution. Until then, he said, the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will continue its independent existence'.

The "Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' rejected the resolution firmly and unequivocally. The Force's present mandate was not compatible with the "radically changed conditions and circumstances of today'. A reappraisal of the mandate of UNFICYP was long overdue and necessary. Despite that, his government was nevertheless disposed to accept UNFICYP's presence on its territory, on the same basis as that stated in December 1985. "The principle, the scope, the modalities and the procedures of co-operation between the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and UNFICYP shall be based only on decisions which shall be taken solely by the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'.

Troop contributors, he said, must display a neutral stance in the dispute between the two peoples of the island and respect the principle which lay at the core of the Secretary-General's mission of good offices and his initiatives, he said. Representatives of such countries visiting the island should take care to establish contact with both sides on the island and "thus not only acquaint themselves with both sides of the story but also demonstrate their resolve to respect the all-important principle of the equality of the two peoples'. The Secretary-General's mission of good offices should emanate from Council resolution 367 (1975), and, if so, he pledged full support to it.

Ilter Turkmen (Turkey) said that, under the present conditions, Turkey shared the Turkish Cypriot views on UNFICYP, which were based on the expectation that there would be a concrete peace-making process within an agreed framework, which UNFICYP would be called upon to support by performing certain specific functions. But if the peace process continued to be hampered by Greek Cypriot "intransigence', the need for the continued presence of the Force, especially in the light of its financial difficulties, would become more and more questionable. The resolution lacked the support of two of the directly interested parties. Turkey fully agreed with "the position of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on the modalities of UNFICYP's presence in Northern Cyprus'.

As for the draft framework agreement, the Secretary-General had not proposed a final settlement in all its details, but a framework within which the two sides could negotiate a solution. "Obviously the draft agreement does not satisfy completely any of the parties, and we are all aware that if this framework is accepted the negotiations which will ensue will still be difficult and time-consuming'. The draft framework agreement was the "only basis on which meaningful negotiations could at last begin', he stated.

An important characteristic of the agreement was "the delicate balance' it foresaw between the components of a solution. That was why the Secretary-General had underlined the concept of the "integrated whole'. No special priority could be attributed to any element since a solution could be feasible only if there was an agreement on all issues important for each party. An unequivocal reply by the two sides was needed to the Secretary-General's proposals, which would indicate readiness to sign the draft agreement. The Greek Cypriot side had rejected the Secretary-General's proposals in an "unqualified' manner.

Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, Mr. Turkmen said, was "dead set' against the Secretary-General's proposals and had the power to impose his will on Mr. Kyprianou. The Greek Cypriots had "reneged on their word' on every point to which they had obviously agreed during discussions with the Secretary-General and Secretariat officials. The Greek Cypriots "have lost their right to speak on their own destiny'. There could be no negotiated solution to the Cyprus problem as long as the Greek Prime Minister could dictate to the Greek Cypriots the policies they should follow.

Photo: Swedish battalion of UNFICYP.

Photo: Changing guard at Larnaca.