Security Council discusses Supplement to 'Agenda for Peace.' (United Nations Security Council, United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's position paper)(Peace-Keeping)

Endorsing the crucial importance of economic and social development as a secure basis for lasting peace, the Security Council on 22 February urged States to support UN efforts in preventive and post-conflict peace-building activities by providing the necessary assistance for the economic and social development of countries.

The action followed an intense review of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's position paper, "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60S/1995/1) which was issued on 225 January.

"The times call for thinking afresh, for striving together and for creating new ways to overcome crises", the Secretary-General stated.

"This is because the different world that emerged when the cold war ceased is still a world not fully understood. The changed face of conflict today requires us to be perceptive, adaptive, creative and courageous, and to address simultaneously the immediate as well as the root causes of conflict, which all too often lie in the absence of economic opportunities and social inequities. Perhaps above all it requires a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before".

In a statement by its President, Legwaila J. Legwaila of Botswana, the Council recognized the crucial importance of the availability of resources for activities to sustain international peace and security, and urged Member States to honour their financial obligations to the UN.

Discussions took place over three Council meetings held on 18 and 19 January, constituting the first stage of consideration of the position paper.

The Supplement details a wide range of issues, among them: the dramatic changes in the quantity and nature of activities in the field of peace and security since the Security Council Summit held on 31 January 1992, which had resulted in the Secretary-General's "An Agenda for Peace".

Other areas discussed were: UN instruments for conflict control and resolution, including preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peace-keeping; post-conflict peace-building; sanctions; enforcement; disarmament; and the need for financial resources.

The failure of Member States to pay their assessed contributions for activities that they themselves had voted into being, the Secretary-General stressed, made it impossible to carry out those activities to the standard expected.

In its 22 February statement, the Council welcomed the Secretary-General's analysis of peace-keeping operations. It also urged him to strengthen Secretariat units dealing directly with sanctions, so that matters were addressed in an "effective, consistent and timely" manner.

The Council wanted appropriate measures taken to ensure that humanitarian supplies reached affected populations, and appropriate consideration given to submissions by third party States affected by special economic problems as a result of imposition of sanctions.

The Council encouraged continued study of options to improve UN capacity for rapid deployment and reinforcement of peace-keeping operations, including establishment of a comprehensive database to cover civilian and military resources. It strongly supported the Secretary-General's conclusion that such operations needed an effective information rapacity.

Addressing the issue of "microdisarmament", the Council shared concern over the negative consequences for international peace and security arising from the illicit traffic in conventional weapons, including small arms. The search for effective solutions to that problem should begin now, it was stated.

The vital importance of strict implementation of existing arms embargo regimes was stressed. Deep concern was expressed over the tremendous humanitarian problems caused by mines and other unexploded devices to populations of mine-infested countries.

A new breed of conflict

In his paper, the Secretary-General said that the fiftieth anniversary of the UN presented an opportunity to assess the successes and failures of its peace-keeping operations and new ways to overcome crises.

Most current conflicts were within States, fought by armies and irregular forces, with civilians as the main victims and many state institutions destroyed, he said. There were 5 operations in early 1988, only 1 of which concerned intra-State conflict. Since then, 21 had been established, 13 of them involving intra-State conflicts.

Those efforts had called for increasingly complex and expensive interventions, which went far beyond the more traditional cease-fire and buffer zone monitoring and control, he said.

The "new breed" of intra-State conflicts often involved humanitarian emergencies, which combatant authorities often lacked the capacity to address, the Secretary-General stated. For example, the number of refugees had increased from 13 million in 1987 to 26 million in 1994, with an even greater increase in the number of internally displaced persons.

With the complete collapse of state institutions, the UN was being called upon to promote national reconciliation and re-establish effective government, in addition to carrying out its humanitarian and military tasks.

UN forces were being used to protect humanitarian operations. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia, that function had led to a new kind of UN operation where the mandate authorized the use of force for limited and local purposes, and not to bring the war to an end.

Another kind of operation had been deployed with success in such places as Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozembique, where negotiated settlements had already been reached. The UN was then called upon to help the parties implement a comprehensive settlement and undertake an unprecedented variety of functions such as: supervision of cease-fires: regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; design and implementation of demining programmes; return of refugees and displaced persons; provision of humanitarian assistance; supervision of existing administrative structures; establishment of new police forces; verification of respect for human rights; design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections; and coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Such multifunctional operations had highlighted the role the UN could play, following a negotiated settlement, to ensure that the original causes of the war were eradicated.

The UN had developed a number of instruments to control and resolve conflicts. The most important were preventive diplomacy and peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building, which could be employed only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Other instruments were sanctions and enforcement, which were coercive measures, and disarmament, that could take place with agreement or in a coercive context.

While these instruments were often employed by regional organizations, ad hoc groups of States or individual States, the Secretary-General stressed that the UN system was better equipped to develop and apply the comprehensive. long-term approach needed to ensure the lasting resolution of conflicts.

Preventive diplomacy preferable

In resolving potential and actual conflicts, preventive diplomacy and peacemaking were obviously preferable to major politico-military efforts after fighting had broken out.

While the greatest obstacle to success in such endeavours came from the reluctance of one or more parties to accept UN help, the Organization had encountered two practical problems in the field, the Secretary-General stated.

The first was the difficulty of finding senior persons with the diplomatic skills and willingness to serve as special representatives or envoys.

The second was the establishment and financing of small field missions for preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. The source of legislative authority for such matters was unclear among Member States, and current budgetary procedures were not well-suited to meet their needs.

The Secretary-General offered two possible solutions: to include a $25-million contingency provision per biennium in the regular budget; and to enlarge the existing provision for unforeseen and extraordinary activities and make it available for all preventive and peace-making activities.

The Secretary-General stated that consent of the parties. impartiality and non-use of force, except in self-defence, were crucial elements to the success of any peace-keeping operation. In recent mandates, the tasks of protecting humanitarian operations and civilian populations during continued warfare, as well as pressing the parties to achieve a faster pace of national reconciliation, had led to forfeiture of the parties' consent.

In the case of Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. existing peace-keeping operations--with mandates requiring consent of parties, impartiality and non-use of force--were given additional mandates that required the use of force.

The Secretary-General emphasized: "Nothing is more dangerous for a peace-keeping operation than to ask it to use force when its existing composition, armament, logistic support and deployment deny it the capacity to do so." Enforcement tasks should not be mandated to a peace-keeping mission and the temptation to use military power to speed up the frustrating and lengthy process of negotiated solutions should be resisted, he added.

Other difficulties related to command and control, troop and equipment availability, and information capacity. Under the three levels of authority, the Security Council provides the overall political direction, the Secretary-General is responsible for executive direction, and the Chief of Mission is entrusted with command in the field.

The distinctions between the three levels must be kept constantly in mind. There must be no opening for the parties to a conflict to undermine a mission's unity of command. Troop contributing governments should not provide guidance or orders to their contingents on operational matters, the Secretary-General said.

Troop availability declines

The availability of troops and equipment had declined as the UN requirements increased, the Secretary-General pointed out. Considerable effort had been made to expand stand-by arrangements, but there was no guarantee that troops would be provided, as was the case in the decision to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).

The UN should give serious thought to the idea of a rapid reaction force, to serve as the Council's strategic reserve for emergency peace-keeping deployment. It might comprise battalion-sized units from a number of countries which would be trained to the same standards and use the same operating methods.

Regarding the growing problem of equipping and training troops, it might be necessary to establish a reserve stock of standard peace-keeping equipment, as well as partnerships between Governments needing equipment and those ready to provide it. The increased use of sanctions required a mechanism that would assess potential impact on third countries.

Capacity for enforcement

Enforcement action was at present beyond the capacity of the UN, except on a very limited scale, the Secretary-General noted. While in the long-term, the UN should develop such a capacity, currently the Council was essentially limited to authorizing Member States. acting nationally or regionally, to carry out enforcement tasks.

Such group arrangements, while preferable to unilateral use of force, sometimes had a negative impact on the credibility of the UN. There was also a danger that the States involved might claim approval for actions not envisaged by the Council.

In the area of coordination, the recent trend of establishing informal groups of Member States, referred to as "Friends of the Secretary-General", had proven valuable in a number of instances, he said.

Cooperation between the UN and regional organizations had occurred in the forms of diplomatic support, consultations, operational support, codeployment and joint operations.

He said that the necessary financial resources must be provided if the UN "instruments for peace and security" were to be employed effectively.

The credibility of the Organization was also damaged when the Council adopted decisions which could not be carried out because the necessary troops were not forthcoming, the Secretary-General concluded.