Security Council demands South Africa withdraw its forces from Angola.

That "gesture", South Africa said, would have to be reciprocated by Angola through assurances that "its own forces, SWAPO and the Cubans would not exploit the resulting situation, in particular with regard to actions which might threaten the security of the inhabitants of SWA/Namibia".

Angola on 31 December replied it "would not oppose the establishment of a truce of 30 days after 31 January", if SWAPO agreed to it, and if South Africa "withdraws its military units from Angolan territory and solemnly promises to initiate the implementation, within 15 days after that period, of resolution 435 (1978) on Namibia without extraneous considerations in that context".

Annexed to the letter was what the Angolan President termed "a partial chronological list of acts of aggression perpetrated against the sovereignty of the People's Republic of Angola by the South African armed forces, and which demonstrates the military escalation which has taken place" since South Africa's 15 December proposal.

Security Council resolution 435 (1978) outlines a United Nations plan for Namibia's independence. South Africa has specified that the major issue to be resolved before implementation would be the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, on the understanding that they would not be replaced by any other hostile forces; that firm agreement would have to be reached on the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal; and that a commitment would have to be obtained from the Angolan Government regarding the implementation of such an agreement.

(South Africa's position had been rejected by the Security Council in its resolution 539 (1983), adopted on 28 October 1983, in which the Council said that independence of Namibia "cannot be held hostage" to the resolution of irrelevant and extraneous issues.)

The South African proposal came in a letter of 15 December to the Secretary-General from its Foreign Minister R.F. Botha (document S/16219). Angola's reply was from its President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, in a letter to the Secretary-General (document S/16245).

South Africa also said in its letter that it would consider extending the disengagement period if provisions of its proposal were adhered to and was prepared to begin the process of implementing Security Council resolution 435 (1978) "upon resolution of the problem of Cuban forces in Angola".

On 5 January, Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, in a letter to the Secretary-General (document S/16256), said SWAPO had always been agreeable to the immediate signing of a cease-fire between itself and South Africa. It agreed with the Angolan proposal that the Secretary-General should initiate consultations with the two parties concerned to agree on the exact date for a cease-fire in Namibia.

SWAPO wanted resolution 435 (1978) "implemented forthwith without modification or extraneous and irrelevant issues such as linkage, parallelism or reciprocity". Provisions of that resolution did not, in any way, refer to temporary cease-fire arrangements in Namibia, SWAPO maintained.

Resolutions Adopted: Council resolution 545 (1983) was adopted by a vote of 14 in favour (China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, USSR, United Kingdom, Zaire, Zimbabwe) to non against, with 1 abstention (United States).

Under the 14-Power draft, the Council demanded that South Africa cease all violations against Angola and "strongly" condemned its continued military occupation of parts of southern Angola. It declared that the continued illegal military occupation of Angola's territory was "a flagrant violation" of Angola's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity and endangered international peace and security.

The Council demanded that South Africa henceforth "scrupulously respect" Angola's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It considered that Angola was entitled to appropriate redress for any material damage it had suffered, and called on all Member States to "desist from any action which would undermine the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Angola".

Resolution 546 (1984) was adopted by a vote of 13 in favour (China, Egypt, France, India, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper Volta, Zimbabwe) to none against, with 2 abstentions (United Kingdom, United States).

By the 13-nation text, the Council demanded that South Africa "cease immediately all bombing and other acts of aggression" and "strongly" condemned South Africa "for its renewed, intensified, premeditated and unprovoked bombing, as well as the continuing occupation of parts of the territory of Angola".

The Council also strongly condemned South Africa for using the international territory of Namibia "as a springboard for perpetrating the armed attacks as well as sustaining its occupation of parts of the territory of Angola". All States were called on to implement fully the arms embargo imposed against South Africa in Council resolution 418 (1977).

The Council asked the Secretary-General to report to it not later than 10 January on implementation of resolution 546 (1984) and decided to meet again if South Africa did not comply with that resolution, "to consider the adoption of more effective measures in accordance with appropriate provisions of the Charter".

(The two-year terms of five non-permanent Security Council members--Guyana, Jordan, Poland, Togo and Zaire--expired on 31 December, and the terms of Egypt, India, Peru, Ukrainian SSR and Upper Volta began on 1 January.)

Secretary-General's Report: On 10 January, the Secretary-General reported (document S/16266) that South Africa had informed him it would not respond formally to resolution 546, which it rejected. However, it had provided him with extracts from recent official statements to indicate its position on some matters raised in the resolution. The Secretary-General said that in a statement on 7 January, South African Foreign Minister Botha had said that South Africa would continue to act against "any terrorist organization" that sought to determine the future of South West Africa through violence. South Africa accepted that that position "can entail confrontation with the whole world". *nevertheless, South Africa was prepared to accept the confrontation and conflict which might ensue and all its consequences.

On 8 January, the report stated, South Africa's Defence Minister, General M. Malan, had said that South African security forces had "reached their goal with the premptive operations against SWAPO terrorists in southern Angola and the withdrawal had already commenced". South Africa believed, he said, that the solution to the problem should be sought at the conference table and not through military force. Angola should realize the seriousness of the situation and "cease protecting and supporting terrorists in their murder plans and actions against the local population of South West Africa/Namibia". South Africa had always been and still remained "prepared to negotiate with that Government with a view to obtaining lasting peace in our sub-continent".

On 10 January, the Secretary-General said, Angola informed him there had been no fundamental change in the military situation in Angola and no signs of withdrawal of South African armed forces. South African forces continued to conduct operations and to occupy parts of southern Angola, it reported.

Further information was provided on 24 January, when Angola reported to the President of the Security Council (dodument 16287) that contrary to Western media reports of a South African withdrawal, South African troops still had eight infantry battalions, an artillery battery and a group of 155 mm. artillery in six localities: Otchinjau, Vangongo, quiteve, Nigive, Mupa and south of Caiundo. Also from 15 to 17 January, the South African forces had violated five times the aerial space of Angola, carrying out reconnaissance flights over some of those localities and Mulondo, Cuvelai, Jamba, Kassinga and Cuchie.

On 14 December, Angola, in a letter to the Council President (document S/16216), asked the Council to meet urgently "in view of the threat to regional and international peace and security represented by the occupation since 1981 of parts of southern Angola" by South Africa, "resulting in the violation of the territorial integrity and national sovereignty" of Angola, and increased acts of aggression and violence.

In the debate, Angola said the fullscale war by South Africa against Angola since 1981 was being supported by certain Member States. Without their backing, Pretoria would not be able to carry out destabilizing attempts against Angola. South Africa's acts of aggression against Angola had intensified since mid-1982. As a result of the veto by a super-Power, a permanent Council member, in August 1981 of a Council draft resolution that had, among other things, demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, South African troops were still occupying southern Angola. In a gesture of Calculated cynicism", Pretoria, upon hearing of Angola's request for a Council meeting, had made a tactical move aimed at diffusing suport for Angola, and at giving its allies the dubious distinction of being able to point with pride to the fact that, at last, their policy of constructive engagement was paying off. Despite the South African letter and the publicity given to its "offer", four columns of racist troops made up of armoured corps had mounted an offensive into Huila province. A clash had already taken place on 14 December near Mulongo between them and the People's Forces for the Liberation of Angola.

Angola stated that South Africa had really made no offer at all. The letter contained a vague statement that South Africa was prepared to begin a disengagement, but it did not talk of withdrawal. Furthermore, it again brought up linkage, which Angola and most nations had rejected. The withdrawal of the racist soldiers and mercenaries was non-negotiable--it was Angola's inherent right under international law. After the unconditional withdrawal, as a sine qua non for a solution to the problems in southern Africa, other issues could be discussed. But South Africa must first withdraw its five battalions. Angola had never refused, or been afraid, to meet, talk or negotiate. But there were some principles on which it could not compromise, including its sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a Member State, it had the right to expect supportive action, especially from the Council, whose permanent members had the duty not to make a mockery of international law and of the Charter by using the veto to block the course of justice. If the Council did not condemn Pretoria for its occupation of Angola and force its withdrawal, then Angola would conclude that "this peace-keeping organ by its impotence and inaction legitimezes war".

Speaking after the vote, Angola said the Council had adopted its sixth resolution on the subject since 1976. The Charter obliged it to ensure implementation of its resolutions. Angola represented a threat to Pretoria's military expansionism and economic stranglehold over southern Africa; hence, the occupation of parts of Angola was a concerted effort to cripple the nation and destabilize the Government. Pretoria's pathetic excuses to justify its despicable actions in all of southern Africa did not deserve to be taken seriously. Angolans deserved redress for their grievances and an end to the misery imposed on them by imperialism and racism.

South Africa said its security operations in southern Angola had only one objective: "the protection of South Africa said its security operations in southern Angola had only one objective: "the protection of South West Africa/Namibia against SWAPO terrorist attacks". SWAPO had murdered more than 1,300 "South West Africa/Namibians" since it had begun its terrorist campaign. It had assassinated more than 25 important political leaders and had maimed or seriously injured more than 1,000 "South West Africa/Namibians". Eleven hundred people, mostly schoolchildren, had been abducted from South West Africa/Namibia. Those actions were SWAPO's response to the prospect of free and fair elections is South West Africa/Namibia. As long as SWAPO continued its campaign of violence, South Africa would take the necessary action to defend the people of South West Africa/Namibia. South Africa would not allow SWAPO bands to establish sanctuaries in Angola. South Africa had explored all possibilities for a negotiated solution. In 54 letters to the former Secretary-General, it had brought to the United Nations' attention details of SWAPO murders. It had repeatedly urged the former Secretary-General to use his good offices to bring about a cessation of attacks against South West Africa/-Namibia from Angola, but its letters had been ignored.

South Africa stated that an overall solution to the region's problems would require Cuban withdrawal from Angola. South Africa had no desire to control a single centimetre of Angola. It was prepared to examine the possibility of peaceful coexistence with all the States of the region. The moment SWAPO carried out a commitment to cease its campaign of violence, action against it by South Africa would cease.

Angola should ensure that it was not used for the launching of terrorist attacks against its neighbours, South Africa went on. The Angolan regime had requested the present Council meeting to hide its own aggressive designs against the people of South West Africa/Namibia and to distract attention from its own serious internal problems, which had arisen from the imposition on Angola of an ideology which was utterly alien to the peoples of Africa. The Angolan regime's authority did not derive from the freely expressed wishes of Angolans but from the military force of foreign troops. By requesting the meeting, that regime also hoped to justify the presence in Angola of the Cuban and other surrogates which it had invited to suppress Angolans. The Cubans were not there to fight South Africa; they were there to fight Angolans. They were not there to defend the independence of a sovereign Government. They were there to prop up an unrepresentative, unelected and unpopular clique. They were not the allies of africa in the struggle for liberation; they were the vanguard of the new imperialists and colonialists.

One day, South Africa said, Africa would realize that the South African forces in the Angolan-South West Africa border area were fighting in defence of Africa against a powerful and sinister threat to all African States. South Africa's attitude towards further efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the South West Africa/Namibia issue would be influenced by the response to its latest initiative for peace.

Somalia, speaking as Chairman of the African Group for the month, said the situation was intolerable. It was made more untenable by South Africa's arrogant attempts to justify its actions with patently false arguments. A regime like that in Pretoria, which had so grossly violated its international responsibilities, could not claim the right to use force against those who opposed its illegal, racist and oppressive rule. The real terrorists were those who were engaged in the genocidal oppression of the majority in South Africa, spreading instability, death and destruction throughout southern Africa. South Africa would continue on its lawless and belligerent path as long as it believed that it could do so with no greater penalty than verbal condemnation, and so long as it enjoyed the support of its powerful friends.

India, speaking as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Group, said South Africa's so-called disengagement proposal was another diversionary tactic which was part of its overall strategy. It mentioned nothing about a South African withdrawal and was an attempt by an aggressor to set conditions for observance by the victim of its aggression. It implied that South Africa claimed the right to continue its military operations against Angola; that was unacceptable. South Africa's illegal occupation of Angolan territory was "of a piece" with its larger strategy of destabilization in the region. The non-aligned countries had always stood by

Angola. If South Africa's intransigence persisted, the Council must adopt measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Council Members: France said the accusations against South Africa were serious. France expressed profound sympathy for Angolans and was resolutely on Angola's side "in this test". France condemned the occupation of Angolan territory and demanded that South Africa withdraw its troops from Angola and respect that country's territorial integrity. It deplored the South African position whereby implementation of resolution 435 (1978) was linked to a matter that was exclusively germaine to Angola's sovereignty. France reiterated its warning to South Africa against the risks of violence breaking out throughout the region. The mechanism of peace must now be set in motion. It depended above all on South Africa whether that came to pass or not.

Zimbabwe said Angola continued to be the target of Pretoria's unprovoked aggression. The Council must reject any attempt to justify apartheid aggression against Angola, which posed no threat to Pretoria. If South Africa was really looking for SWAPO freedom fighters, then it should direct its forces where they were--in Namibia. The fact that the so-called South African intention to disengage had been qualified with conditions had reduced the announcement to a restating of the rejected linkage issue. Nothing but the immediate and unconditional calling off of hostilities against Angola, followed by tht immediate and unconditional withdrawal of its forces, would convince Zimbabwe of South Africa's seriousness about disengagement.

Nicaragua said the "champions of freedom and democracy" in the Western hemisphere either supported the unequal war to which Angola had constantly been subjected or were indifferent to it. Only the United States and South Africa were linking Namibian independence to the withdrawal fo Cuban troops fron Angola, which had never attacked anyone. Only the United States Administration could find South Africa's unlawful occupation of Angola legal and permissible. The South African Foreign Minister's letter tried to present as a concession what was in fact an unfulfilled South African obligation. It must be rejected. Angola must not be asked to make concessions. South Africa must withdraw unconditionally and compensate Angola. South Africa would continue to violate international law and Council resolutions as long as it had the support of its powerful allies.

Poland said the brutality of South African military actions against Angola had been confirmed by United Nations fact-finding missions. Angola was a victim of continued aggression. South Africa's claims that steps had been taken for a peaceful settlement were a smoke-screen to hide its real intentions. It was levelling unfounded charges and allegations. The South African statement implied an alleged South African right to continue military actions against Angola and to keep its military presence there. The Council must be prepared to adopt measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Pakistan said the lack of effective response by the Council to South Africa's aggressive action against Angola in 1981 has encouraged it to continue its aggressive activities with impunity and had emboldened it to remain in Angola. The aim of Pretoria's disengagement offer appeared to be to avoid condemnation by the Council of its continued occupation of Angola. It skirted the central issue of the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola, and, instead, held out a promise of disengagement under conditions which, if accepted, would amount to the United Nations endorsing Pretoria's purported justification of its lawless actions against Angola. Any credibility of the offer had been destroyed by Pretoria's dispatch of four columns of its armoured coprs on an offensive in Huila province, immediately after announcing its disengagement proposal.

China said South Africa was still occupying large tracts of land in southern Angola. While stepping up its aggression, Pretoria had of late resorted to the manoeuvre of feigning the easing of tension by proposing the so-called disengagement between the military forces of the two sides in Angola. In making that proposal, South Africa was trying to confuse the aggressors and the victims of aggression, dodge its responsibilities for aggression and legitimize its occupation of Namibia and parts of Angola. That scheme would never succeed. China would uphold the just struggle of Angola and other countries in southern Africa against South African aggression.

The USSR said South Africa was using Namibia as a springboard for waging war against Angola. Pretoria was benefiting from the patronage of the United States and certain other NATO members, who were impeding the adoption by the Council of effective measures against the aggressor. Pretoria was now proposing a sort of "disengagement" and the imposition upon Angola of limitations on its sovereign rights in its own territory, including the notorious Linkage", which had been rejected by practically everyone. Angola's sovereignty could not be negotiated. South African troops must be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally, and Angola's sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected by all. Effective measures should be adopted against Pretoria under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Guyana said South Africa sought to deprive its oppressed majority of any external support in their effort to end their oppression, and it sought to destabilize neighbouring States so as to weaken them or to create or reinforce dependence on it. It was in that context that its aggression against Angola must be seen. South Africa's major Western friends had shown permissiveness towards it. South Africa's letter of 15 December was a diversionary manoeuvre. Guyana hoped that the spirit of accomodation displayed by the resolution's sponsors would be matched by a willingness on the part of Pretoria's friends, particularly among permanent Council members, to intensify pressure on Pretoria to respect Angola's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Malta said the "big stick policy" and attitude of South Africa, both in its internal administration and in its illegal occupation of Namibia, and in its relations with neighbouring countries, were fanning the fires of discontent and were sowing the seeds for intensification of conflict. A prerequisite for a peaceful change in southern Africa was Namibian independence and a changed attitude by South Africa towards South Africans and its neighbours. Malta hoped that the South African letter portended the beginnings of a change of attitude. However, it regretted that its date had coincided with the latest offensive against Angola, whose openness and disposition for negotiations had been reaffirmed a number of times.

The Netherlands said the Council should take urgent action to redress the intolerable situation. The Netherlands condemned South Africa's unjustifiable invasion of Angola. All South African troops should be withdrawn immediately and unconditionally. Pretoria's attempt to present its attacks as an act of self-defence lacked any validity. The wording of South Africa's latest proposal left it a matter of conjecture whether Pretoria intended to withdraw its forces completely from Angola. A withdrawal of South African forces would be a significatnt step in defusing a situation which might plunge the region into ever deeper turmoil, without sparing South Africa itself.

The United Kingdom said it had certain reservations on the resolution. It had consistently pressed for the withdrawal of all South African forces from Angola, whose sovereignty and territorial integrity must be fully respected. The withdrawal of those forces--indeed of all foreign forces--would make a major contribution to the reduction of tensions and contentious issues in the region. The United Kingdom had welcomed the indication in the South African letter that South Africa would begin to disengage its forces in Angola. That was a major opportunity for progress towards peace and the reduction of tension in the area. That matter now needed to be dealt with in a cooperative way and through confidential exchanges between the parties.

The United States said South Africa's commitment to begin a disengagement of its forces had the potential to contribute substantially to a climate that could facilitate further movement in southern African negotiations. The United States hoped that conditions on the ground would permit a cease-fire as soon as possible, and that once a cease-fire came into effect, it would extend beyong the initial 3/-day period. A durable southern Africa settlement depended on mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all regional States. It must take acount of the security of all in the region. The South African announcement underscored the validity of the Contact Group's effort, which provided the best hope of bringing lasting peace to the area. There were no military solutions to the region's conflicts. Negotiated solutions were possible and essential. Cross-border violence could not be condoned. "Our own effort" to pursue peace in southern Africa was moving forward through contacts with the States most directly involved. The United States, which was committed to achieving results in the "ongoing" negotiations, had abastained because "we do not intend to let this opportunity pass us by".

Other Speakers: Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Chairman of the Special Committee on decolonization, said South African forces were illegally occupying Angolan territory and using Namibia as a springboard for armed invasions and acts of aggression. South Africa deployed its army in the region to intimidate neighbouring States into silent accomplices, while it continued with its colonial occupation of Namibia and attempted to paralyse and destory Angola in the process. It was through measures under Chapter VII of the Charter that peace, justice and freedom could be speedily restored to the people of southern Africa.

Other speakers in the December debate were the representatives of Botswana, Portugal, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Nigeria, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Argentina, United Republic of Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, German Democratic Rebpublic, Ethiopia, Egypt, Cuba, and Turkey.

A number of speakers criticized the Council for having failed to take any measures to stop a repetition of South African attacks on Angola and other African States and asked that it condemn Pretoria for its attacks on Angola and its occupation of part of Angolan territory, as well as its violation of Angola's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity.

Calls were made for the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter against South Africa if it persisted in its aggression and for the Council to demand that South Africa: totally withdraw its forces from Angola immediately and unconditionally; cease its attacks on neighbouring countries; declare its willingness to implement the United Nations plan for Namibian independence, incorporated in resolution 435 (1978); pay full and prompt compensation to Angola for the destruction of property and loss of life caused by its aggression; scrupulously respect Angola's independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty; and cease supporting UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces.

A number of countries stated that the South African aggression against peaceful Angola had not been provoked by Angola, which was a small, weak and defenceless country that did not share any border with South Africa. On the contrary, it had been provoked by South Africa--which permanently occupied a part of Angola--in an attempt to intimidate Angola and to deny Angolans the freedom to choose the political system under which they wanted to live. It was stated that through destabilization,

South Africa sought to surround itself with thoroughly submissive neighbours.

Some States said that South Africa, which had arrogated to itself the right to intervene militarily in any country south of the Sahara if its interests were threatened, used "lame excuses" for its actions. Actually, however, it was the system of apartheid--institutionalized racism--that was at the root of aggressions by Pretoria against other countries.

Most speakers stressed that the military attacks and the occupation of Angolan territory represented a violation of international law as well as of the Charter. They were also a clear threat to the peace and stability of southern Africa.

The point was also made that South Africa's use of Namibia--over which its Mandate was revoked by the United nations--as a springboard for military attacks against Angola was a gross violation of the international status of that Territory; it was calculated to delay the process of decolonization and secure South Africa's permanent presence there for continuing exploitation of the Territory's people and natural resources. It was stated that Angola was not responsible for Namibians' resistance; it was the brutality, savagery and unacceptability of the apartheid system. South Africa had occupied Angola to perpetuate its illegal occupation of Namibia and the inhuman system of apartheid.

Referring to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola, several speakers said they were there at the invitation of the Angolan Government, in its legitimate right of the exercise of self-defence. There was general support for Angola in the measures it had taken to seek protection and security for itself. Cuba said its forces would remain in Angola until "an end has been put to the danger to Angolan security, sovereignty and independence represented by the continued and illegal occupation of Namibia and parts of Nagolan territory by the South African racists".

Some countries criticized the United States veto in August 1981 of the Council resolution "which could have upheld not only the right of Angola but also the principles and purposes of the Charter". It was stated that that veto had politically reinforced South Africa, which had escalated its military operations.

A number of speakers criticized South Africa's allies and Western friends for encouraging Pretoria's "belligerent and intransigent" behaviour. Those countries, it was said, had prevented the Council from adopting any measures which might comple South Africa to comply with the will of the international community. It was stressed that Western Powers bore the responsibility to restrain South Africa's "unbridled ambitions" and to help in Angola's reconstruction.

A number of countries dismissed South Africa's latest disengagement offer as a bid to prevent the Council from taking any meaningful action, to link South Africa's illegal occupation of Angola with implementation of the United Nations plan for Namibian independence and to set up a smoke-screen around South Africa's acts of aggression against Angola. It was pointed out that the offer had made no mention of the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola.

In his call for a second series of Council deliberations in January, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos said he wished to avoid a situation "that would lkead to disastrous consequences, which would in turn threaten peace and security in the region" and asked the Council "to take necessary action" (document S/16244).

Angola complained of "the worsening military situartion" in the south of the country "created by the progressive moves by the South African military units further north into Angolan territory" and the violent combat that was occurring between those military units and Angolan units "more than 200 kilometres distant from the Namibian border".

In the debate, Angola said that before it could even begin to study South Africa's "disengagement offer" to determine its genuineness, perhaps to seek clarification on certain points, it received an answer to its unspoken questions, which were a confirmation of its unvoiced suspicions. Even as the Council had placed before it the South African letter, even as Pretoria's friends and allies were pointing to the letter with pious satisfaction, South Africa was fortifying its military positions inside Angola. Then began a series of military moves by South Africa farther north of its positions inside Angola. Its acts of armed aggression were aimed at localities more thatn 200 kilometres from the Namibian border. That gave the lie to Pretoria's assertion that its troops would engage in operations only against Namibian freedom fighters.

Angola stated that South Africa's latest operation, carried out against old and new Angolan targets and from inside Angolan targets and from inside Angolan territory, was one of the largest such operations carried out by it. The sophisticated military arms and arsenals at South Africa's disposal were available through direct and indirect military assistance--in contravention of the Council's arms embargo--by Pretoria's western friends and allies, many of whom were permanent or rotating Council members. For the apartheid regime to feel safe inside South African borders, it felt impelled to exert its hegemony over Africa up to the equator. Unfortunately, Angola stood in the Way. To deny Pretoria's friends any excuse to point a finger, Angola was willing to test the so-called South African offer.

Speaking after the vote, Angola said it was hypocrisy for Pretoria to state that its only objective was to protect Namibians. In reality, Namibians needed protection from South Africa. Angola had documented proof that South African troops had committed atrocities against Angolan civilians. The only ideology completely foreign to Africa was that of apartheid. All the Governments and peoples of southern Africa would have to comply with the conditions for peace: the racist regime was not exempt from that undertaking. Angola's offer contained in document *s/16245 (its letter to the Secretary-General of 31 December), stood.

South Africa said Angola's actions in aiding and abetting SWAPO's terrorist aims and in supporting SWAPO to launch attacks from Angola and maintain bases there would lead to "disastrous consequences"--unless Angola came to its senses. South Africa would not sit idly by while SWAPO operated with impunity from the safety of Angolan territory. It was hypocrisy for Angola to have the effrontery to complain to the Council about the security operations of the South African military forces in the execution of their task to seek out and destroy SWAPO gases in southern Angola in pre-emptive actions such as the one which was currently under way. South Africa had declared its intentions openly.

Angola made no secret of its support for SWAPO's aims and objectives. Angolan forces were becoming increasingly integrated with the SWAPO murder gangs for whom they provided facilities and arms and equipment.

South Africa stated that it had no quarrel with Angolan military units. Its cross-border activities were aimed at eradicating SWAPO nests in Angola. If the Angolan armed forces were bent on giving active military support to SWAPO or interfered with South Africa's operations against SWAPO, then they must bear full responsibility for the consequences. South African forces had not committed atrocities against Angolan civilians. The presence in Angola of the Cuban and other surrogates, who represented ideologies completely foreign to Africa, was a threat to the region's peace and security, and was leading Angola to disastrous consequences because Angolans refused to succumb to the tyranny which had been imposed on them with the direct assistance of the Cuban forces. As long as Angola tolerated, encouraged and nourished SWAPO's gangs of terrorists on its soil, South Africa would destroy their bases.

South Africa said its offer still stood. Angola could have peace by not allowing SWAPO to operate from its territory and by not exploiting any arrangement for the cessation of hostilities. South Africa remained prepared to begin the process of implementation of resolution 435 (1978) upon resolution of the problem of Cuban forces in Angola as reflected in paragraph 12 of the Secretary-General's report to the Council (document S/15943) of 28 August 1983. Togo, speaking as Chairman of the African Group for the month and on its own behalf, said South Africa had set up a system of subversion, terrorism and aggression against neighbouring countries. The South African ogre had once again bared its fangs and claws and taken a heavy toll on the martyred Angolans. Pretoria had violated the commitments it had unilaterally and freely entered into in its letter of 15 December. The Council should exercise unaminous and increased pressure against Pretoria to force it to abandon its policy of aggression against and violation of the territorial integrity of its neighbours.

India, speaking as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, said Pretoria used Namibia as a springboard for launching acts of aggression, destabilization and terrorism against African States in an effort to consolidate its illegitimate presence in Namibia and to further its exploitation of that Territory's resources. South Africa had aggressed against Angola. The Council should not be taken in by Pretoria's arguments and diversionary manoeuvres. Angola's proposal of 31 december was positive and constructive. The Council must ensure, by every means available under the Charter, that South Africa withdrew immediately and unconditionally from Angola.

Council Member: Upper Volta said the Council was unable to act because of the support enjoyed by Pretoria from Council members who lacked a political decision to discharge their responsibility regarding the maintenance of international peace and security. The situation in Angola was deteriorating from day to day. The Council, including those members whose attitudes encouraged Pretoria to persist in tis violation of Charter principles, should demand the strict implementation of its resolutions and decision. Upper Volta hoped that a clear decision and an unambiguous resolve, particularly on the part of permanent Council members, would induce Pretoria to grasp the fact that the Council expected of it the immediate, unconditional and total cessation of its attacks against Angola.

Egypt said South Africa had escalated its military operations inside Angola. Angola did not represent a security threat to South Africa, as the latter claimed in seeking to justify its continuing aggression. The contrary was true. The current situation was the result of South Africa's escalating aggression against Angola and added new dimensions to the deteriorating situation in the region. The Council, in addition to demanding that Pretoria immediately cease its armed aggression, withdraw its troops from Angola and desist from further air raids, must, in the light of Pretoria's disregard for Council resolutions, consider implementation of the relevant Charter provision. The Council must act to enforce implementation of its resolutions. Peru said South Africa's occupation of Angola continued, in violation of the latter's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Peru rejected Pretoria's use of force against Angola and the intensification of hostilities in recent days. The situation was particularly delicate because the continuing operations against Angola were being carried out from Namibia, unlawfully occupied and administered by South Africa. In view of the deterioration in southern Angola, which further aggravated the region's chronic instability and endangered international peace and security, the Council must reject South Africa's aggression, call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and demand the withdrawal of South African forces at the earliest.

Pakistan said South africa had intensified its aggressive strikes against Angola in disregard of the Council's decisions. The Council should warn South Africa that unless it heeded its call, the Council would proceed to mandatory action against it. The Angolan President's letter revived hope for the reactivation of the diplomatic process to effect the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola and to achieve a peaceful setlement of the central issue of Namibian independence on the basis of resolution 435 (1978). Angola had given a positive and constructive response to South Africa's ambiguous disengagement offer, which had been virtually nullified by the subsequent South African attacks against Angola. South Africa, by a convoluted logic, sought to use its illegal occupation of Namibia to justify its aggression against Angola.

China said that hardly had the ink on resolution 545 (1983) dried when South Africa began to dispatch more troops into Angola for an even larger-scale invasion of that country. One of the pretexts put forward by Pretoria was that its acts of aggression against Angola were aimed at protecting Namibians from attacks by SWAPO. That was a complete reversal of right and wrong. Another pretext used by Pretoria was that Angola sympathized with and supported the Namibians' independence struggle. But that struggle had international support. China demanded that South Africa immediately and unconditionally withdraw its troops. If Pretoria refused to implement Council resolutions, the Council should consider measures against it under Chapter VII of the Charter.

The USSR said South Africa's escalation of aggressive actions had created a serious threat to peace and security not only in southern Africa but far beyond its borders. South Africa's goal was to eliminate Angola's progressive regime. It wanted to perpetuate racist colonial systems in southern Africa through military might, destabilization of neighbouring African States and destruction of the chances for a political settlement in Namibia. Pretoria should understand that its policy of piracy against African States was doomed to failure and that it placed a heavy lien on the future of South Africa itself and on its relations with the world around it. History and Africans would not forgive the crimes being committed by the apartheid regime. The USSR sided with Angola and with other African peoples fighting for freedom and independence. Decisions adopted by the Council should be enforced.

Malta said it condemned the current South African armed intervention. The Angolan President's initiative was more generous thatn the one by the South African Foreign Minister. Angola was more positive in its attitude than South Africa, which illegally occupied Namibia and illegally maintained troops in Angola. Malta hoped the Council might devise more appropriate means than had been utilized in the past to discern the positive elements, to build on them, to negotiate stumbling-blocks and to encourage further dialogue and progress. Namibians, the nations of southern Africa and the world awaited a change in South Africa's negative attitude.

The Ukrainian SSR said Pretoria's plan, like the plans of those who pandered to and protected the racists, was to hang onto their domination in Namibia and in southern Africa by any means at any price. The recent escalation of aggression by South Africa against Angola, with the connivance and support of its protectors, primarily the United States, threatened peace and security in southern Africa and the world. The policy of "constructive engagement", pursued by the racists' senior partner, was the main obstacle to the elimination of colonialism and racism in southern Africa and the achievement of a just and effective settlement of the security problems of the African States that cherished peace and justice. The Council should impose sanctions against Pretoria under Chapter VII of the Charter. Pretoria should immediately stop its aggression against Angola and withdraw unconditionally.

France said the unprovoked and unjustified South African invasion was of exceptional gravity. France condemned it and called on South Africa to immediately withdraw its troops. Pretoria's position that those attacks were an act of self-defence against SWAPO fighters was unacceptable. The immediate cause of escalation was the unjustified continuance of South Africa's presence in Namibia and Pretoria's refusal to unconditionally implement resolution 435 (1978). France deplored the fact that South Africa's operation was at variance with the intentions stated in its Foreign Minister's letter. France supported the Angolan President's offer, which could reverse the escalation of operations and lead to peace. South Africa should not miss a possible decisive opportunity to reach a peaceful settlement in southern Africa.

The Netherlands said the most recent aggression against Angola--which the Netherlands strongly condemned--was another indication of South Africa's obstinate refusal to implement Council decisions. South Africa could derive no valid legal claim for the violation of Angola's sovereignty and territorial integrity from its continued illegal presence in Namibia. South Africa's actions could lead only to further deterioration of the security situation in southern Africa and complicate the search for a solution of the region's problems. South Africa's military actions made a mockery of its desengagement proposal. The Netherlands hoped that the truce proposed by the Angolan President would meet with more success. South Africa's aggression against Angola was grave.

Zimbabwe said Pretoria's aggression against and intimidation and blackmail of Angola had escalated. A disaster would certainly follow it Pretoria was not restrained from flouting Council resolutions, the Charter and international law. Because Pretoria had contemptuously ignored the Council's just demands and had massively increased and stepped up its campaign of aggression against Angola, it was imperative that the Council make an appropriate response. The message to Pretoria from the Council should be unaminous, loud and very clear. If South Africa ignored the demands contained in the resolution, the Council should reserve the right to meet to consider the adoption of more effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Nicaragua said Pretoria's latest offensive was aimed at giving renewed backing and support to the counter-revolutionary groups facing the danger of complete elimination as a result of Angola's successful counter-offensive. The operations of the Angolan counter-revolution depended, both militarily and materially, on Pretoria and the Central Intelligence Agency of a great Power. The latest act of aggression by South Africa--part of its overall policy of destabilization of neighbouring States--was an answer to those who had knowingly let themselves be fooled by its diversionary manoeuvres. Angola deserved the Council's support. South Africa's neo-colonialist and expansionist policies must be stopped soon.

The United Kingdom said it condemned South African military action in Angola. It could not accept the extreme language of the resolution. Parts of it were unacceptable in substance, or were inappropriate. The United Kingdom would have preferred a dignified reiteration of the Council's position in December 1983 and would have joined its Council partners in voting for such a resolution. The resolution adopted did not reflect developments in the diplomatic field. The Angolan President's statement that, subject to certain important conditions, he would not oppose the establishment of a truce of 30 days from 31 January seemed to hold out at least some hope of positive progress. The Council's energies would be best occupied in discerning where the path of progress might lie and in lending its weight and wisdom in encouraging all parties to follow it as rapidly as possible.

The United States said it sought to promote conditions of peace, security and prosperity in the region and the end of all foreign intervention. It sought Namibian independence in accordance with resolution 435 (1978). "We have no hidden agenda, no desire for national gain." The South African disengagement offer and the Angolan acceptance provided a hopeful basis for moving towards a disengagement of forces and a cease-fire. Some parties distant from the conflict, those that seemed to seek solutions through the barrels of guns, were anxious to heighten the violence and to promote instability, even though it would be at the cost of African blood. The United States deplored South Africa's military activity in Angola. It expected Pretoria to respond to urgings for restraint. The United States once again urged all parties to exercise maximum restraint and to seize the present opportunity for peace.

Other Speakers: Also speaking in the January debate were: Mozambique, United Republic of Tanzania, Ethiopia, Syrian Arab Republic, Viet Nam, Zambia, Algeria and Yugoslavia.

A number of countries said South Africa's escalation of its unprovoked aggression against Angola, resulting in a worsening of the military situation in the southern part of that country, was Pretoria's arrogant response to resolution 545 (1983).

Some speakers said that South Africa, described by one of them as "a giant with clay feet", had a number of objectives in its acts of aggression against Angola and other African countries. They were: peace "South African style", with the creation of "a universe of its own, a constellation where it will be the star, while others gravitate around that apartheid, sun"; the consolidation of its illegal colonialist domination over Namibia; and depriving Angolans of the achievements they had made since independence.

Calls again were made for the Council to: impose sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter; delcare South Africa as the only obstacle to peace in southern Africa; condemn Pretoria's aggression more strongly; demand with greater firmness the cessation of South Africa's acts of aggression and the unconditional withdrawal of its troops from Angola; support Angola's right to invoke Article 51 of the Charter to defend itself; and ask Pretoria to compensate Angola for the damage its aggression had caused to that country.

Western countries again were criticized for their support of the apartheid regime.