Secretary-General reports on mission of inquiry findings after visit to three countries.

Secretary-General reports on mission of inquiry findings after visit to three countries

"UNIFIL faces a major crisis", theSecretary-General declared in summing up his report (S/18348). Recent weeks had witnessed a "dangerously high level of violence" in the Force's area of deployment, which had brought to a head difficulties which from the beginning had been inherent in the situation, because of the failure of parties at various times to give UNIFIL full co-operation.

In particular, he said, Israel's refusalto withdraw completely from territory occupied during its 1982 invasion in Lebanon had led to "steadily growing military activity against the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) and the "South Lebanon Army" (SLA). It had not so far proved possible to persuade Israel to withdraw, and in those circumstances, it had been impossible for UNIFIL to prevent its area of deployment from being used for "hostile activities". Some parts of that area had become the "scene of almost continuous hostilities", with consequent dangers to UNIFIL personnel.

Despite its "uncomfortable anddangerous" position, UNIFIL continued to "make an important contribution" to "such peace and stability as exists in southern Lebanon". If it were withdrawn, the Secretary-General believed there would be "an immediate intensification of hostilities" between IDF/SLA and the various armed groups "which wish to drive Israeli forces out of Lebanon". Israel itself might be attacked, and the mission had reported that Israel had indicated its reaction would be "very severe" and expansion of the "security zone" would not be excluded. "There would thus be a grave risk of the conflict spreading", he said. "The main sufferers would be the civilian population of southern Lebanon who would again be forced to flee their homes and abandon their land to the combatants."

If the Council was to continue to askthe troop-contributing countries to put the lives of their nationals at risk in the dangerous situation in southern Lebanon, they must be given reason to hope that their sacrifices had not been in vain and that a solution to that longstanding problem was in sight, that their soldiers must be able to operate in conditions of reasonable security, and that they must be reimbursed at the rates laid down by the General Assembly.

The solution lay, he said, in thecomplete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanese territory and the deployment of UNIFIL to the international frontier "where it can play the role originally assigned to it of restoring international peace and security."

Because his efforts to that end hadnot succeeded, the Secretary-General believed the only hope of progress lay in a "determined effort" by the Security Council itself. He recommended that Council members, collectively and individually, should take urgent action to "unblock the present impasse" and make substantial progress towards implementation of resolution 425 (1978), which would be the best way of improving the security of UNIFIL's personnel.

If such progress was not achievedsoon, he stated, the Council might be compelled to give serious consideration to "withdrawal of the Force, despite the very damaging consequences that could result".

Mission dispatched: The missionof inquiry, led by Under-Secretary-General Marrack I. Goulding, visited southern Lebanon, Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic during its 12-day trip (4-15 September). It considered, in co-operation with UNIFIL Commander Hagglund and in consultation with the Lebanese Government, measures to be taken to improve the security of UNIFIL personnel, and consulted with the parties on how progress could be made towards implementation of resolution 425.

The mission reported the details ofthe armed incidents which occurred in UNIFIL's area of deployment between 11 August and 13 September.

Late on 11 August, two men, one ofthem a local leader of the Amal movement in southern Lebanon, were shot by a sentry of the French contingent at a UNIFIL checkpoint near the village of Abbasiyah, in the French battalion's sector. Both men died shortly afterwards. It was reported to the Force Commander that the sentry had been threatened and had acted in self-defence.

Later the same night, members ofAmal and other armed elements attacked nine different French battalion positions as well as the UNIFIL transit base at Tyre. Those attacks were particularly intense in and around Ma'rakah, where the French batallion had its headquarters. That initial and intense round of attacks ended in the early afternoon of 12 August, but UNIFIL positions continued to come under sporadic attacks until 22 August, not only in the French sector, but also in the sectors entrusted to Fiji, Finland, Ireland and Nepal. Seventeen French soldiers were wounded during those attacks.

On 21 August, in an apparently unconnectedincident, an Irish lieutenant was killed by a remote-controlled roadside bomb while leading a patrol in the southern part of the Irish sector. After 22 August, the mission reported, there had been a period of comparative calm during which UNIFIL made strenuous efforts, with the co-operation of the Lebanese authorities and Amal leaders, to reduce tension and re-establish calm in the area. Despite those efforst, on 4 September, three French UNIFIL soldiers were killed by a remote-controlled bomb while on a road-running exercise in their sector.

On 5 September, Israel carried outa helicopter raid in the village of Zibqin in the Nepalese battalion sector. The Force Commander made a strong protest to the Israeli authorities. An Israeli soldier was killed during the raid and four Lebanese villagers were abducted by the Israelis.

In the early hours of 11 September,an unidentified group of armed elements raided an SLA position near the village of Kafra in the Nepalese battalion sector. Two SLA personnel were killed and three others wounded, and an armoured personnel carrier belonging to SLA was captured. Three of the attackers were killed.

Following that incident, four SLApositions in the Israeli "security zone" fired on the villages of Yatar, Kafra, Haris and Haddathah in the UNIFIL area. One UNIFIL position was hit and five Nepalese soldiers were injured, one seriously.

On 13 September, an armouredpatrol of the French battalion was attacked with a remote-controlled roadside bomb near the village of Bafliyah in the French battalion sector. One French soldier was killed and three wounded, one seriously.

Security assessment: The missionreported to him, said the Secretary-General, that many of the dangers to which UNIFIL personnel were exposed resulted from a discrepancy between its terms of reference and the situation on the ground. The Force's terms of reference included the requirement that it "use its best efforts to prevent the recurrence of fighting and to ensure that its area of operation is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind".

That requirement, the Secretary-Generalstated, was bassed on the assumption that Israel would withdraw its forces and that UNIFIL would operate with the full co-operation of all the parties concerned. However, Israel's refusal to withdraw had invalidated that assumption. The Force had sought to maintain a degree of peace and security in southern Lebanon by controlling movement of armed personnel and weapons and munitions into and through its area of deployment and by disposing of any mines or roadside bombs it discovered.

In recent months Israel's continuingoccupation and the behaviour of "its allies" in SLA had increasingly provoked armed resistance by various groups in southern Lebanon, the Secretary-General stated. UNIFIL's activities had in those circumstances brought a growing risk of confrontation between it and the armed groups which wished to attack IDF and SLA.

The Secretary-General said a sourceof danger to UNIFIL personnel also lay in the intensifying conflict between IDF/SLA and armed groups attacking the "security zone".

The Force Commander had takenvarious measures to improve the security of his troops, especially that of the French contingent, and the Secretary-General had authorized certain redeployments to improve that contingent's security. But such measures could provide only partial protection against determined attacks.

All concerned within the areashould "make every effort to identify and apprehend those responsible for the recent premeditated attacks against UNIFIL personnel and to intervene with those who might have influence with those responsible in order to get the attacks stopped", the mission urged.

No force: The Secretary-Generalstressed that as a peace-keeping operation UNIFIL could not use force except in self-defence and was not therefore in a position to enforce the Council's will. Its effectiveness depended on the voluntary co-operation and consent of the parties to the conflict--and of the troop-contributing Governments. If the necessary co-operation was not forthcoming from the parties to the conflict, the Council could in theory revise the Force's mandate or terms of reference in a manner that would win the cooperation of all. In practice, however, the possibilities were very limited. The provisions of resolution 425 remained of fundamental importance to Lebanon. Changes in UNIFIL's mandate or terms of reference would be unlikely to resolve its present difficulties.

As regarded the means available tothe Force, useful changes could be made, on the assumption that the Council decided to maintain the Force in existence and that the necessary resources could be made available. The Force Commander had recommended: that UNIFIL's deployment should be consolidated by having fewer, stronger and better located positions, in accordance with the Force's existing operational situation; that the defences of UNIFIL's positions be strengthened; and that the two battalions which did not at present have armoured personnel carriers should be supplied with such vehicles to give them better protection while on the move.

Given the Force's need for the cooperationand consent of the local population, the Force Commander was of the view that it should not be provided with weapons heavier than it had at present. UNIFIL's tactical concept should be to avoid violence by being able to deploy superior force quickly if threatened. Increased holdings of armoured vehicles would provide the desired mobility, flexibility and protection. The armament available to the Force should be revised to ensure greater accuracy of fire and to keep casualties to the minimum in any confrontations that might occur.

Parties' positions: In Lebanon, theSecretary-General said, all the leaders to whom the mission had spoken had expressed unequivocal support for UNIFIL's continued presence and for urgent implementation of resolution 425. Rallies in support of UNIFIL had been held in southern Lebanon. Lebanese leaders had insisted on the need for Israel to withdraw its forces and to dismantle the "security zone" if the present deterioration of the situation in southern Lebanon was to be arrested.

The Government of Syria also expressedunequivocal support for resolution 425 and for UNIFIL. Syrian leaders blamed the current state of affairs on Israel's refusal to withdraw its forces, reiterating their support for the position of those in Lebanon who had expressed their determination that, if Israel withdrew its forces and dismantled the "security zone", there should be no return to the situation that had existed in the area before 1982.

Israel said the only reason for its continuingmilitary presence in Lebanon was to ensure the security of northern Israel and it had no wish for its forces to remain in Lebanon indefinitely. However, in the prevailing circumstances in Lebanon, it had no alternative but to maintain the "security zone", including SLA. It did not want UNIFIL to be withdrawn but it was not prepared to take any risks with its security in order to keep it in place. Israel gave no indication that there would be any early change in its position or that it would withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory in accordance with resolution 425.