Second treaty review conference calls for measures to strengthen biological weapons ban.

Second Treaty Review Conference calls for measures to strengthen biological weapons ban

States Parties to the Convention onthe Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, concluding their Second Review Conference, declared their strong determination to exclude completely the possibility of biological agents being used as weapons, and reiterated their commitment to the goal of achieving early agreement on a chemical weapons ban.

Sixty-three of the 103 ConventionParties, and four signatory States, attended the three-week Conference (Geneva, 8-26 September).

In a 10-article Final Declarationadopted by consensus on 26 September, the Conference agreed that States Parties should implement measures to prevent or reduce "the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts or suspicion" regarding bacteriological activities and to improve international co-operation in peaceful microbiology use.

Those measures include exchangingdata on research centres and laboratories established for handling high-risk biological materials; exchanging information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins that seem to deviate from normal patterns; actively promoting contacts between scientists engaged in biological research; and encouraging publication of research results.

The Conference decided to convenein Geneva from 31 March to 15 April 1987 an ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States Parties to complete the modalities for exchange of information.

Conference President, WinfriedLang (Austria) told participants the main purpose of the meeting would be to strengthen confidence in the Convention as a "genuine disarmament measure" that had actively eliminated the possibility of an arms race in at least one important area. In his opening statement, he also urged them not to overlook the peaceful uses of the biosciences, or the need for international co-operation in microbiology to benefit the developing countries in particular.

Secretary-General Javier Perez deCuellar, in a message delivered to the Conference by Jan Martenson, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, said the biological weapons Convention had "aptly been called the world's first disarmament treaty," as it was the first and, so far, only international instrument binding States Parties to prohibit and prevent the development, production and stockpiling of "an entire category of weapons of mass destruction," as well as, "most importantly", obliging them to destroy such weapons or divert them to peaceful purposes.

"[The Convention] continues toserve as a guide to the international community in its efforts to achieve genuine disarmament measures regarding other types of weapons and their systems", the Secretary-General affirmed. "Limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of weapons of mass destruction . . . [are] to be regarded as imperative, but there can be no progress in that direction unless the arms race, particularly in the nuclear field, is arrested. Meanwhile, the international community should take every opportunity to affirm and strengthen existing agreements."

The 15-article Convention wassigned in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. It was drawn up on the basis of work carried out by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, a predecessor of the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, which is currently negotiating a chemical weapons ban.

The Convention called for a ReviewConference to be held within five years of entry into force to assure that its provisions were being carried out, taking into account any relevant new scientific and technological developments. The First Review Conference was held in 1980. A Third Review Conference should be held at the request of a majority of States Parties no later than 1991, it was decided at the Second Conference. Noting States Parties' differing views regarding verification, the Conference decided that the review should consider the impact of recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention and the relevance for its effective implementation of the results of negotiations on prohibition of chemical weapons.

Final Declaration

In the Final Declaration, ConventionParties appealed to all States to refrain from any action that might jeopardize the Convention or any of its provisions, reaffirming their continued dedication to the principles embodied in the instrument.

The Declaration's main points aresummarized below:

Compliance: The Conferencenoted statements by some State Parties that compliance with Articles I, II and III of the Convention was in some cases subject to grave doubt. Other Parties said, however, that such doubt was unfounded and not in accordance with the Convention. The Conference agreed that a "positive approach" to compliance would serve to promote confidence among Parties.

[Under Article I, States Partiesagree under to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or retain microbial and other biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for porphylactic, protection or other peaceful purposes." They also agree never to develop or acquire weapons, equipment or means of delivery for use of such agents for hostile purposesor in armed conflict committing themselves under Article II to "destroy or divert for peaceful purposes" those agents. Under Article III, Parties agree not to assist or encourage others to manufacture of acquire any of the banned materials.]

Conscious of apprehensions arisingfrom relevant scientific and technological development, the Conference reaffirmed that Article I applied unequivocally to all natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production.

The Conference found Aarticle IIIsufficiently comprehensive to cover any recipient whatsoever at international, national or subnational levels, and confirmed that provisions of the article should not be used to impose restrictions on transfer of such agents for purposes consistent with the Convention.

In reviewing Article IV, underwhich States Parties are to take measures to prevent acts which could contravene the Convention, the Conference noted the importance of such steps as legislation on the protection of laboratories and facilities to prevent unauthorized access to and removal of pathogenic or toxin material, and inclusion in textbooks and educational programmes of information on prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons.

Co-operation in problem-solving:The Confernce reaffirmed the obligation of Parties to consult and cooperate with one another in solving any problems that might arise in relation to application of the Convention, affirming that such co-operation might be undertaken through "appropriate international procedures" within the framework of the United Nations. Those procedures include the right of any Party to request the convening of an expert consultative meeting open to all State Parties.

The Conference also noted the importanceof Article VI, which provides for any State Party which finds another Party breaching its obligations under the Convention to lodge a complaint with the Security Council.

Chemical weapons ban: The Conferencereaffirmed that nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as limiting or detracting from obligations assumed under the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, or bacteriological agents.

In reaffirming the obligation ofState Parties to continue negotiations towards a chemical weapons agreement, the Conference noted the substantial progress made in that regard by the Conference on Disarmament, urging that body to continue to exert all efforts to conclude a chemical weapons ban with effective verification procedures by the earliest possible date.

The Review Conference also notedthe bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on prohibiting chemical weapons.

Microbiology co-operation: TheConference emphasized the increasing importance of Convention provisions calling for exchange of equipment and information for the peaceful use of bacteriological agents and toxins, noting that recent developments in the field of biotechnology had vastly increased the potential for co-operation between States to promote economic and social development, and scientific and technological progress, especially in the developing countries.

Expressing concern at the increasinggap between developed and developing countries in biotechnology, genetic engineering, microbiology and related areas, the Conference urged Convention Parties to provide wider access to knowledge in those fields and promote the fullest possible international co-operation in this area.

Taking the view that co-operationwould be best initiated by improved "institutionalized direction and coordination," the Conference requested the Secretary-General to propose discussion by a relevant body of the means for improving institutional mechanisms to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and information for the peaceful use of biological agents and toxins.