Scholastic Tradition and Humanist Innovation: The Concept of the Neutrum in Renaissance Medicine & Bruno, l'infini et les mondes.

Timo Joutsivuo, Scholastic Tradition and Humanist Innovation: The Concept of the Neutrum in Renaissance Medicine

(Humaniora series, 303.) Helsinki: The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 1999. 288 pp. n.p. ISBN: 951-41-0863-9.

Antonella Del Prete, Bruno, l'infini et les mondes

(Philosophies Series.) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1999. n.p. ISBN: 2-13-049869-8.

At first glance these volumes look quite different; one concerns the history of medicine and the other astronomy. However, they share a common interest: examining the history of ideas from the ancient world through its Scholastic development and into the Renaissance through a single important problem.

Joutsivuo's well-defined and -executed study consists, beyond the acknowledgments (7-8), of an introduction to the problem of the neutrum and his method of analysis (9-43), the analysis itself (45-213) followed by "General Conclusions" (215-219) and three very useful appendices. The first gives biographies of the Renaissance commentators on Galen's Ars Medica (221-230), the second discusses Latin translations of the Ars Medica (231-233), and the third lists printed commentaries on the Aristotle's Medica, including the date of writing the commentary, if known, and additional "special comments" (234-246). A list of sources (247-254), bibliography (255-272) and an "Index Nominum et Rerum" (273-288) complete the volume.

Joutsivuo addresses several related tasks. The first is "to outline the conceptual history of the idea of a neutral body during the Renaissance" (12). The concept of a "neutral body," i.e., a body that is between health and disease, can be traced back to Galen and a quarrel on this topic with Aristotle (45) and then produces a long history first in scholastic discussions (54-74) and finally among humanist physicians (75-110). This history itself brings Joutsivuo to his second task: an analysis of the conceptual changes that occurred between scholastic and humanist interpretations (12). It also brings him to his third and in some ways most important task: an analysis of the historiography concerning humanist influence on science during the Renaissance. Historians have generally viewed humanist science negatively (13-15) and a major part of the success of this study lies in the implicit corrective that it offers.

Joutsivuo rests his case as an historian on tracing a single concept through complex treatments both by scholastic and humanist physicians, thereby underwriting his conclusions concerning "what medical humanism actually changed, how its methods differed from those used in the scholastic period, how its questions and answers differed from scholastic ones, and what the relation of medical humanism to the scholastic tradition was..." (15). He considers the neutrum both as part of a theoretical system (111-115) and as a practical idea, particularly within what we would now call geriatrics (159-213). As Joutsivuo is careful to emphasize, his analysis rests on a range of treatises on the problem of the neutrum, most of which are Italian, and he does not consider Renaissance medicine as a whole, but only through those who were formally trained, i.e., who would have known and used the treatises on the neutrum (19).

Joutsivuo concludes that while humanist investigations of the neutrum did lead to scientific change, humanist science was to a large extent limited by the humanist interest in ancient texts (215-219, esp. 217). If there is anything disappointing in this study, it is here. Joutsivuo has laid the groundwork for serious reflection on the definition and practice of science, but then fails to deliver; he could, for example, have argued either that a late notion of science, such as Sarton's, is anachronistic and wrongly applied to humanist science or even that humanist science cleared the way for later developments by showing the inadequacy of ancient texts (cf. 217). This disappointment, however, should not detract from the great interest of Joutsivuo's analysis itself.

The problem of the relation between ancient, scholastic, and Renaissance views also underlies Antonella Del Prete's Bruno, I'infini et les mondes. This study appears in the series, "Philosophies," the purpose of which is to facilitate the reading of a work or the exploration of a theme by providing the appropriate commentaries, documents, and/or texts. The volume consists of a very brief and general introduction to Bruno and the problem of infinite worlds (three paragraphs, 5-6), a compressed statement of the background to the problem (7-35), a brief account of Bruno's "New Image of the World" (36-89) and some of the claims often made concerning "the lost order" implied by the notion of an infinite number of "universes" (90-112), for example that humans are at the center of the universe. Three very brief 17th century text complete the volume (113-127): these are M. Mersenne, L'Impiete des deistes. Volume second, Paris, 1624; Charles Sorel, La Science universelle de Sorel. Volume second, Paris, 1647; Charles S orel, De la perfection de l'homme, Paris, 1655. A brief bibliography, subject index, and index of names follow, although the pages are not numbered.

While there is always pleasure in a small book that provides a clear window onto an important problem, this volume suffers the serious defects that often result from broad generalizations. Texts and the ideas they present appear outside their larger context, terms are incompletely defined, and there are omissions of startling enormity. For example, Aristotle's account of the infinite in Physics III is treated separately from his accounts of motion and nature and his claim that the cosmos is "bounded" is not explained in a way that makes sense either of the texts or of the ancient view of the world (8-10). There is no mention of Averroeism or the so-called "doctrine of double truth," although a page is devoted to the Condemnation of 1277 and modern interpretations of it (18-19). The treatment of the problem of infinity and infinite worlds both before and after the Condemnation, as represented by Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Jean Buridan, are condensed into ten pages (19-29).

Bruno himself is a difficult figure, and the treatment of his thought here is at best inadequate. Rather than harp on these difficulties, it may be more valuable to ask: who is the intended reader of this volume? It cannot be aimed at working professionals having any acquaintance with the original texts, because the treatment is simply too compressed to be in any way satisfactory. But should it be used by students? Probably not, as it is hard to see what any student would gain from reading a secondary source that does so little justice to the primary sources and their ideas. It is difficult to see who is served by this volume.