Scenario 6 (a-c): how can law enforcement build effective ties to local Muslim communities, and what can these communities do to mobilize their members to speak out against terrorism?

(a) FBI behavioral specialists have been requested to provide a local police department and field office with specific recommendations to improve trust and cooperation within their large Muslim community. There already have been two incidents of violent retaliation against members of the Muslim community. These incidents, a homicide and violent physical assault, remain unsolved. Both incidents are being actively investigated by the FBI and local police, yet there is very limited cooperation from the victims' families and the community.

(b) The wealthier families and the Imam of a moderate Muslim mosque are discussing ways to attract and keep youth involved in religious and community activities. Many of the community's young people have latched onto other charismatic speakers in mosques who preach a strident, yet more hopeful sense of rules and order to the basic interpretation of the Koran.

The families and the moderate Imam are wondering what is the best way to mobilize the international Muslim community to speak out against abuses of the Koran and negative perceptions of mainstream Islam. They are also wondering how the mainstream Muslim community might help in deterring the development of extremist ideas in mosques.

During this period of time, threats have been made to moderate and mainstream Muslims. They are being accused of "watering down" the Koran. Several of the moderates within the Muslin community received various damage to their cars and homes.

(c) Members of the Muslim community are being harassed and victimized but are reluctant to report these crimes to the police. In regards to community policing issues, what strategies can the police use to build effective communications between the Muslim community and the local, state, and federal agencies? Do the strategies depend on the gender, age, and education of the community members?

Discussion notes regarding Scenarios 6a, b and c are presented together because of the similarity of the remarks.

Problem: What can the FBI do to enhance its image with the public in general and with the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities in particular?

Strategies: Ideally, good relationships with local communities are established before the community becomes a focal point for investigation or for protection against hate crimes. It is important to note that a long history of a good relationship between law enforcement and specific communities can be negated almost instantaneously with some real or perceived breach of faith on the part of law enforcement. In a real sense, law enforcement seldom gets a second chance, once such a misunderstanding occurs.

Description of a training program for law enforcement agencies is provided in Appendix 7, "Training Guide for Hate Crime Program."

Outreach initiatives should include:

Providing information:

* Information should be as accurate as possible, and the manner of presentation should be as consistent as possible.

* If erroneous information is provided, this should be admitted and corrected as soon as possible.

* Law enforcement's tendency to offer "no comment" in response to inquiry is almost always taken as evidence that it is trying to hide something from the community. An alternative response should be crafted, that is individually suited to the particular issue at hand.

* It also can be effective to admit mistakes, in order to provide a basis for asking for help. The effectiveness of such a strategy may be related to the fact that it gives the public a perception that it is an active partner in the process, and not just an entity that is acted on.

* It should be recognized that humans have what is called a negativity bias. That is, they are more affected by bad things happening than by good things happening. The psychological distance is even greater between bad things happening and nothing happening (examples of "Psychological Evaluations of Negativity Bias" are given in Appendix 8). This means that information about the protections or other service that the FBI and other law enforcement has provided will not be counted as much or remembered as well as what is done poorly. It would be useful to reiterate successes as often as possible, both when they occur and when failures occur.

Knowing and understanding the perspective of the community towards law enforcement and other U.S. government agencies. From the political perspective, there appears to be a significant tendency for the actions of U.S. government agencies to be to affected by political contributions. Here, this means (to the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities) that some groups which should have been shut down after 9/11 were not, whereas those with less political clout were. In discussions with these communities, law enforcement should be aware of these controversial points and show sensitivity towards their negative impact.

The community can be contacted via local organizations and groups, including schools.

Ideally, law enforcement develops a regular and ongoing outreach initiative, rather than an erratic one that appears to be responding only to the crisis of the moment. The model of the beat cop is a good one, although this may be precluded for personnel who are rotational.

The lack of FBI presence in most communities--unlike the police--means that people interpret its presence as "bad news," rather than as potentially helpful or protective. This means that the FBI might best work with local law enforcement in communities where it otherwise is not often present.

Law enforcement should know that whatever side they embrace, that side might have its credibility with the larger community compromised. This is a cost of law enforcement engaging in a public partnership with a community group, which should be considered before such a strategy is used. Ideally, the potential for such compromise would be determined before the partnership is considered or made public.

There was some consensus that the relations with FBI are the good, and that mistrust is limited to a fairly narrow segment of the Arab-American population. The FBI should consider taking advantage of, and nurturing relationships with, the majority of Arab-Americans who are willing to trust the FBI and other law enforcement agencies. These people also are those from whom agents can be recruited.

See also discussion of Scenarios 1 and 3a.

Problem: What might be the expected impact of the long-term detention policies of various suspects on the relationship of the Arab-American and Muslim-American communities with law enforcement?

Strategies: Victimization within the Arab-American community is likely to breed solidarity. In the current context, use of the indefinite detention policy can be predicted to seed long-term discontent.

Problem: What can law enforcement and intelligence do to discourage Americans from joining fundamentalist groups with anti-government agenda?

Strategies: It was recommended that law enforcement conduct information campaigns that emphasize the:

* Disapproval and even condemnation of such movements by respected Muslim leaders and theologians (thus reducing the cognitive dissonance caused by opposing or reporting terrorists).

* Number of Arabs and Muslims who died in the WTC, Pentagon, and other Islamic terrorist attacks (other than the terrorists themselves, of course, thus emphasizing in-group solidarity).

* Backlash against the larger communities from which the terrorists come, making their lives more difficult.

* The greater probability of success of nonviolent strategies for influencing government policy and public opinion (reciprocity norms).

Problem: How likely is it that Muslim-American and Arab-American communities will be assimilated into mainstream American culture, especially as the number of individuals in these communities grows?

Strategies: Muslims do not need to do much assimilating to get along in U.S. society because Americans expect very little in the way of conforming behavior. However, Arabs living in America may feel like they are living in enemy territory because of the way the United States has positioned itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This may serve to produce conflicts within Arab-Americans who see the United States at war with their country, and will make it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to enlist the aid of these communities in counter-terrorism efforts.

Implications for practice, training and research:

Additional research is needed on the extent to which religion was important to the actions of the 19 men who attacked on 9/11, as opposed to the social, economic, political and historical conditions that are characteristic of the countries from which they came.

Additional research is needed on the variations of the practice of fundamental Islam as a function of world region: for example, do the same conditions exist in India and Indonesia, which also contain large Muslim populations?

As much as possible, this research must be longitudinal, so as to avoid making conclusions based on only a recent or current analyses of the situation, given that the social, economic and political conditions of many regions of the world are changing at a fast rate. To this end, historians and political scientists must be engaged in the research endeavor.