Santamaria, the movement and the labor split of 1954-55: a re-examination.

An important new contribution to Australian Catholic history appeared in March 2001, entitled Crusade or Conspiracy? Catholics and the Anti-Communist Struggle in Australia. The author, Bruce Duncan, a Redemptorist priest, comprehensively details the various controversies within and between the Catholic Church and the Labor Party during the early Cold War period. Accordingly, he devotes an entire chapter to one of the most momentous and convulsive episodes of those crowded years: Dr Evatt's declaration of war on B. A. Santamaria, News-Weekly and the Catholic Social Studies Movement (CSSM). (1) Although he provides us with a fresh and highly informed account of the reactions and repercussions of the episode, Duncan sidesteps that crucial question: why did 'the Doc' do it?

This article, therefore, is concerned primarily with why Dr Evatt took what was arguably 'the most important [decision] in his political life'. (2) His sensational public exposure of the Movement directly triggered the Labor split in March 1955, which in turn changed the course of Australian political history. (3) Evatt's press statement of 5 October-his 'hydrogen bomb', as a journalist, Alan Reid, termed it--included the now legendary reference to

   a small minority group of members, located particularly in the State
   of Victoria, which has, since 1949, become increasingly disloyal to
   the Labor Movement and the Labor leadership ... It seems certain
   that the activities of this small group are largely directed from
   outside the Labor Movement. The Melbourne News-Weekly appears to act
   as their organ. A serious position exists. (4)

Issuing such a statement at that time, according to one historian, 'was like putting a match to tinder-dry scrub in a heatwave'. (5) Evatt's action becomes all the more remarkable when we realise that earlier in that same year, 1954, Evatt met privately with Santamaria to discuss in detail ALP policies and tactics no fewer than three times. (6) Indeed, according to Clyde Cameron, had Evatt won the May 1954 election 'he would have been a Grouper himself' and 'would have done whatever Santamaria told him to do'. (7)

Paranoia? Vendetta?

In explaining Evatt's 5 October statement, Cameron, who plyed a central role in the split, believes Evatt was suffering from 'an emotional breakdown' caused by the combined impact of the loss of the May 1954 election and the Petrov affair. (8) This is consistent with the judgement, held by many commentators, that Evatt's outburst was an early manifestation of his later dementia. Robert Murray, for example, referred explicitly to his 'paranoia' and to his 'heresy hunt' against the Groups and the Movement, (9) Gerard Henderson found his 'extraordinary' statement an example of his 'manifest paranoia' and his 'mental illness', (10) while Peter Crockett believed Evatt's views on the Movement were 'conspiratorial'. (11) A related explanation for Evatt's switching sides against the Movement centres on the Petrov Affair: according to Robert Manne, the 5 October statement was a 'direct consequence' of the Affair because it 'unbalanced his mind'; for Andrew Campbell, it was the 'crucial factor' since it 'added an intolerable strain on his vulnerable personality'. (12)

These explanations are not inconsistent with those of Santamaria and his supporters, although emphases differ. Archbishop Mannix claimed that Evatt's 'attack seems to be concentrated on those who have been active in the fight against Communism ... [who] have united, irrespective of creed, but as Australians, to defend their country against Communism'. This appeal to anti-communist and anti-sectarian instincts was secondary to Mannix's more important declaration: 'the Catholic Church has never aimed to control the Labor Party'. (13) The rumour that the Church, via the Movement, sought to control the ALP, will be discussed below. Suffice it to say here that it circulated amongst sections of the Party then (14) and became holy writ in Labor circles later. Fr D. Brown cssr contended that 'by using the sectarian weapon Evatt hoped to gain the allegiance of bigoted anti-Catholics, without losing the bulk of the general Catholic support for the ALP'. In this way, Brown argued, Evatt hoped 'to win sufficient votes to become Prime Minister at the next election'. (15) Tom Truman was more circumspect about the extent to which Evatt used sectarianism to arouse 'Protestants' fears and hostilities towards the Catholic Church'. But he was certain that Evatt's statement was 'untrue' as well as 'intemperate'. Accordingly, Evatt was trying to 'escape the political consequences' of the allegations made about his staff (Fergan O'Sullivan and Alan Dalziel) at the Petrov Royal Commission on Espionage. Thus, he 'singled out Victorian Labor as a scapegoat'. (16) The former NSW state president of the Movement, Kevin Davis, (17) discerns an explanation in Evatt's "eccentric behaviour' during 1954 and the consequent loss of political support 'within his Parliamentary Caucus'. (18)

Finally, Santamaria's response to Evatt's attack. In April 1955 Santamaria told the National Executive of the Movement: 'It is possible to sum up in one sentence the objectives of Dr Evatt and of the forces behind him'. His one sentence was marked, if not by brevity, by the clear implication that Evatt was doing the work of the communists and fellow-travellers. 'This objective was to use the machinery of the Labor Party to destroy the A.L.P. Industrial Groups, and, much more important from the point of view of the Communist Party and some of Dr. Evatt's other backers, to destroy the machinery and organisation of the CSSM which strongly supported all anti-Communist forces including the Industrial Groups'. (19) Santamaria had analysed Evatt's action within hours of his attack; between then, October 1954, and April 1955 there was 'no reason for formulating a different analysis of the situation'. Santamaria's 6 October analysis, forwarded to Bishop O'Collins of Ballarat, 'Melbourne No. 1' (Archbishop Mannix) and Regional Officers of the Movement, maintained that Evatt sought:

   To isolate the Victorian A.L.P. within the whole of the Australian
   Labor Movement by using the weapon of intimidation and by appealing
   to the instinct of labor [sic] leaders in each state to save
   themselves by dissociating themselves from Victoria. This tactic was
   obviously one of 'divide and conquer'.

   To isolate the Catholic Church within the framework of the
   Australian community by using the weapon of sectarianism and by
   appealing to other religious denominations to react against
   Catholicism.

   To isolate the C.S.S.M. within the Church, by repeating constantly
   that the organisation had no official standing and was not hacked by
   the entire body of Ordinaries. (20)

In his memoirs, Santamaria's views echo those of Murray, Henderson, Manne and Campbell cited above. He refers to Evatt's 'mental disturbance', 'delusion' and 'growing mental disorientation' and states how 'dishonest were the terms of the attack he made on the Industrial groups, the Movement, and me personally'. (21) To all these writers the proposition that Evatt may have acted rationally in response to a genuinely perceived threat from Catholic Action would be anathema. Indeed, such a proposition lacked a sufficient empirical basis to assume an accepted place in the historiography of the Split or even to rise above the status of rumour. As Murray concluded, 'the records show little attempt ... to put forward distinctive Movement policy ... [The Movement] gave added strength to the Groups as an ALP faction. Beyond that, its importance was peripheral'. (22)

Or a rational response?

However, new evidence in the form of unpublished private papers has recently emerged that questions this status and challenges the accepted interpretation, Catholic and non-Catholic, of Evatt's actions. This evidence is significant because the source is from within the Movement itself--specifically Charles James ('Charlie') Murphy, a leading Movement member. And it should be remembered that, apart from 'unconnected pockets' of Catholic opposition to Santamaria, there has not been 'a tradition in the Catholic Church of ... competing viewpoints to that of Santamaria'; indeed, his point of view appeared 'within and without the Church to be the Catholic view'. (23) So Murphy's political intimacy with B.A. Santamaria and his impeccable CCSM credentials give his perspective a particular credibility, authenticity and authority. His case is therefore of particular interest to historians of Australian Catholicism. What follows is based on typed transcripts of two private conversations with fellow Movement activist, John Cotter, on 6 October 1991 and 15 July 1994 and an undated handwritten notebook by Murphy. He gave it to Cotter, along with his private papers, with the request 'to do something with it' after his death. Murphy died, aged 88, on 6 January 1997. (24)

In 1940 Charlie Murphy, secretary of the Hawthorn branch of the ALP, a leading member of the Catholic Young Men's Society, and a protege and friend of former Prime Minister and Hawthorn resident James Scullin, was contacted by Santamaria. 'Bob approached me and asked ill would be secretary of a movement he was forming to fight the Corns in the A.L.P. and the unions'. He declined the offer but became both a foundation member of the Movement and the foundation secretary of the National Catholic Workers' Movement. In 1943 he accepted Santamaria's invitation to manage the Movement's official mouthpiece, Freedom, and later News-Weekly; he held this position until 1955. In 1946 he helped form the Clerical Workers ALP Industrial Group in the communist-controlled Federated Clerks' Union. (25) He was very active with John Maynes--whom he disliked, describing him as a 'standover merchant'--in defeating communist candidates in a court-controlled ballot in 1950. By this time the Movement had effective control of ALP pre-selection of numerous state and federal seats.

Murphy stood unsuccessfully for the blue-ribbon Liberal seat of Hawthorn in 1947 and 1949. In 1952 he achieved the seemingly impossible and won Hawthorn for the first and last time for the Labor Party. (26) He was now a member of the new government led by John Cain, and 'Bob was pleased for me to stay on News-Weekly now I was a person of some importance'. Such was the influence of the Movement within the Labor Party that the State Executive of the Victorian branch of the ALP saw no conflict of interest between his parliamentary role and his position as manager of News-Weekly: 'they never said boo to me'. According to Murphy--and this is a remarkable revelation--'Bob used to tell Cain he had so many votes at his command in Cain's Caucus and he used to make arrangements between himself and Cain. The pro-Bob parliamentarians never did anything by ourselves. We were just told'. (27)

It was during his tenure as MLA for Hawthorn, from 1952 to 1955, that Murphy and Santamaria began to part company. The issue was Santamaria's desire to extend the political influence of the Movement. As Duncan has noted, from the moment Evatt made his accusations, Santamaria and his supporters or acolytes have consistently and repeatedly denied any intention to capture the Labor Party. 'At no stage', wrote Kevin Duffy in The Bulletin in 1961, 'did any National Conference or National Executive [of the Movement] discuss any proposal to "take over the ALP"'. (28) Murphy remembers differently: 'When I heard Bob say at a Movement national executive meeting, with Bishop O'Collins in the chair, that the Movement was going into politics, my heart fell to the floor'. This is a significant admission, which no former Movement member has previously made. (29) And unlike nearly all Movement men who have spoken about the split, Murphy does not necessarily see Evatt as the bete noir, as the quintessential factor. (30) Murphy continued:

   When the Industrial Groups had virtually won the war in the unions,
   Bob [Santamaria] sought to enter the political field. He decided
   that it was his destiny or function to 'clean up' the political
   party, to get rid of 'dead wood' as he chose to regard it, Bob of
   course deciding who was 'dead' and who deserved to survive. Bob was
   the arbiter. Bob's plans inevitably came up against opposition from
   his erstwhile allies like Calwell & Kennelly, as was to be expected.
   But Bob was either too innocent or too smug to appreciate the
   dangers. He trod on a lot of political corns. He bred personal
   ill-feeling and hatred. When rebuffed [by Calwell] Bob sought to
   attach himself to Evatt and ordered nasty articles to be published
   in News-Weekly. I reacted strongly to these articles because I
   looked on Arthur as our anti-communist leader. This was the point
   where I personally came to the parting of ways and my relationship
   with Bob deteriorated ... (31)

This written record is corroborated by his private conversation with Cotter on 22 December 1982. According to Cotter's notes of this conversation,

   Charlie said 'the ALP was willing to cooperate with Bob against the
   Comms but was not keen to reform its policies. This is what Bob
   wanted. He was now substituting himself and the Movement for the
   Comms. Bob asked Calwell and Kennelly to move up for him and he was
   hurt when he got rebuffed ... At a meeting of the Movement's
   national executive chaired by [Bishop] O'Collins Bob proposed to
   move into politics'. Charlie said to me he had 'not realised the
   involvement of the whole Hierarchy until Gerard Henderson's book
   [Mr. Santamaria and the Bishops]'. (32)

So, according to Charlie Murphy, Santamaria wielded significant political influence with the Cain Labor Government, sought to extend even further the role of the Movement in Labor politics, was spumed by Victorian Labor power-brokers Calwell and Kennelly, and was involved in the political machinations of the leadership battle between Evatt and Calwell. Thus there appears to be strong circumstantial evidence that Santamaria envisaged for himself and the Movement a role of considerable political influence, if not control. In the fevered atmosphere of 1954, it was easy to confuse influence with power, intention with near-fulfillment. That Santamaria's aim was not realised does not invalidate the perception that it could be realised. It is therefore arguable that Evatt's bombshell of October 1954 was neither duplicitous nor disingenuous. His allegations had some substance and he made them genuinely. This does not ignore Evatt's flawed personality or his capacity for irrational behaviour, but it does challenge Murray's argument that Evatt's statement was 'mainly a rehash of much of the gossip of the Sydney anti-Movement front ... the standard, largely meaningless stuff of propagandist appeals to the Labor rank and file'. (33)

Private correspondence between Santamaria and Mannix now confirms Evatt's suspicions about a Movement 'takeover' of the ALP. Such suspicions had been aroused by Santamaria's 'The Movement of Ideas' address, given at the national conference of the Movement in March 1953. J. P. ('Jim') Ormonde secured a verbatim copy of the address and gave it to Evatt. (34) As Santamaria acknowledges, 'great play' was made of its call to destroy 'the Chifley legend'. (35) Santamaria approvingly cites Murray's assertion that 'only by assiduous "reading between the lines" ... could [it] have been construed as hinting that Santamaria wanted the Movement to "take over" the ALP'. (36) Yet to Santamaria's critics in the Labor Party, the speech certainly appeared 'highly provocative, arrogant and extreme'. (37) In Santamaria's letter to Mannix of 11 December 1952, there was no need to 'read between the lines': the political dimensions of Santamaria's religious apostolate were unambiguous. It did not require conspiratorial imaginings or paranoid delusions or mental disturbances so regularly attributed to Evatt in this context--to realise the vastness of Santamaria's ambition for the Movement.

The long 'Personal and Confidential' letter to 'Melbourne No. 1' outlined 'the whole future of our work in the industrial and political parties'. Santamaria wrote that 'Your Grace is well aware of the personalities whom we have been able to influence and organise within both State and Federal political circles'. He argued that the potentialities of the Movement were 'far wider than those of the defensive battle against Communism'. Indeed, he stated,

   The Social Studies Movement should within a period of five to six
   years be able to completely transform the leadership of the Labor
   Movement, and to introduce into Federal and State spheres large
   numbers of members who possess a clear realisation of what Australia
   demands of them, and the will to carry it out. Without going into
   details, they should be able to implement a Christian social
   programme in both the Federal and State spheres, and, above all, to
   achieve co-ordination between the different States in so doing. This
   is the first time that such a work has been possible in Australia,
   and, as far as I can see, in the Anglo-Saxon world since the advent
   of Protestantism. (38)

Santamaria stressed that the implementation of 'correct Catholic ideas' in the political arena was dependent upon 'a strong and co-ordinated influence on the political plane' and that 'this influence is within our reach now for the first time'. (39)

This is a highly significant statement that has received scant historical attention. (40) It demonstrates clearly that the fears of Evatt and others were not entirely ill-founded. In 1970 Robert Murray peremptorily dismissed the notion that Evatt acted to 'check a trend that would turn the ALP into a ... Catholic Centre Party'. In contrast, in 2001, Bruce Duncan accepted such a possibility:

   The conclusion seems unavoidable that Santamaria did aim at what
   most observers would regard as control of the ALP. But it would have
   been too damaging ever publicly to admit this and ... he always
   denied he intended to take over the ALP. However, many documents
   attest that Santamaria aimed to establish dominance over ALP
   personnel and policy. (41)

Two sets of those documents, Charlie Murphy's private papers and B.A. Santamaria's private correspondence, confirm Duncan's conclusion. They also cast considerable doubt on the arguments used by most historians and commentators, of excessive paranoia or incipient madness, to explain Evatt's actions.

Collateral damage 

That the Movement, the Industrial Groups and the ALP itself all became casualties of the Labor Split has been extensively documented. What is less well known are the individual, personal casualties. Two of these were Movement men--'Bob's parliamentarians'--Charles Murphy and Michael Francis ('Mick') Lucy. Both had entered State Parliament in 1952, both defeated sitting Liberal Party members, both received 53 per cent of the vote, and both lost their seats, Hawthorn and Ivanhoe respectively, in the election of 1955. Five months after Evatt's fateful statement and on the very eve of the equally fateful Federal Conference of the ALP in Hobart, Charlie Murphy went to Washington. His brief was to study the American style of industrial relations, particularly in the clerical unions. (42) His visit was financed by the US Department of State, but seems to have been poorly organised: 'in the United States no-one ever met me anywhere or saw me off. I never really knew what it was all about'. (43) However, Murphy did know what was happening back in Australia. His parliamentary colleague, Mick Lucy, regularly corresponded and this correspondence has survived. It affords a rare, even unique, insight into the machinations and shifting fortunes within the ALP at one of the most pivotal moments in its history.

The first letter from Lucy to Murphy coincided with the second day of the Hobart conference, Tuesday 15 March. The anti-Evatt/Grouper delegates, it seemed, had achieved a victory of sorts by mobilising sufficient numbers against certain decisions of the ALP Federal Executive to ensure the admittance of the 'old' Victorian Executive (dubbed the 'Santamaria-McManus-Keon Executive'). (44) Lucy was relieved:

   It is a great pity that you had to take off from our sunny shores
   this morning, as believe me, today has been the first day since that
   dark day in October of last year when this 'blue' started, that a
   ray of sunshine has smiled on us. (45)

Soon, he was less sanguine. It was clear that the victory was pyrrhic. On 17 March Lucy remarked that '[T]hings have gone really bad' and he sought God's blessing of St. Patrick. The previous day had seen the Federal Executive directing State branches to withdraw official recognition of the once seemingly unassailable Industrial Groups:

   The views of the Federal Executive are changing much more rapidly
   than the weather during a nice Spring day in Victoria. If it wasn't
   so tragic and real it would be the greatest comedy that has ever
   been staged in political history of Australia. The Lib. brawl during
   the Hollway bustup is only kid stakes to this. (46)

That the manoeuverings over the next weeks were utterly bewildering is evident from one of Lucy's later letters. Although he apologised that his previous three letters had discussed 'nothing else but this stinking dispute', the pattern continued with his attempt to analyse these crowded and confusing events. In the end, he was frustrated: 'I don't know, it is all getting a bit beyond me, and we can only go from day to day to see what happens ... Your [sic] the intellectual genius, so maybe you in Washington can get a clearer picture of this complex situation'. (47)

Between this letter, dated 21 March, and his next, sent on 4 April, Lucy and twenty three state and federal parliamentarians were suspended--prior to being expelled in the 'night of the knife' on 7 April--from membership of the ALP. They had attended a meeting called by the 'old' Victorian Executive on 25 March. (48) According to Lucy, the 'further this split goes, the deeper the bloodbath'. His bitterly ironic words--'Charlie, this is a nice show, you wouldn't miss it for quids'--captured the mood. He ended his long letter on a prophetic note:

   This is about all for now matey. One day, when you and I are both
   ex-members of Parliament, I am going to make a point of writing you
   a pleasant letter, just to prove to you that I can put pleasing and
   nice things to paper but there is nothing nice about this. These
   people are out to wreck us and the Party, and this is all there is
   to it. There is no remorse, there is nought. Vic [Stout] an his
   friends are going to fight this out to the last member of
   Parliament. (49)

Lucy and Murphy, of course, rapidly became 'ex-members'. An election was called, the Australian Labor Party (Anti-Communist) was formed and Murphy hurried home. (50) Although Mick Lucy envied Charlie Murphy's overseas 'posting' which meant he was not 'rubbed out', as Lucy was, and described him as 'a clean skin and a real true blood Evatt-Stout-Kennelly Labor Party man', (51) for Murphy there was no choice but to throw in his lot with the breakaway group. His close ties with Freedom, News-Weekly and the Movement, his deeply religious outlook ('I was always of a religious frame, even as a boy'), and his strong distaste for Evatt doused any possible dilemmas. The election campaign, which commenced on 5 May, was especially nasty. In Richmond, apparently, it was 'terrifying'. (52) Murray evocatively describes that month of May:

   Those who took part in the campaign were never likely to forget it.
   Everybody has his story of being insulted and even spat upon, of
   doors shut in the face, of scuffles, whispering campaigns and ...
   dead rats in the mail. Many on both sides received angry and
   threatening calls. Men who had been close friends since childhood
   stopped speaking to each other. Catholics supporting the Cain party
   were snubbed at church and their children often made miserable at
   Church schools. (53)

The political result for the breakaway party was catastrophic. Every member except Scully lost his seat. (54) In Hawthorn, the split in Labor enabled the Liberal candidate, J.W. Manson, to win forty per cent of the vote and usher in an unbroken era of conservative rule. Murphy ran for office under the banner of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) until 1967. But the likelihood of regaining his seat became more remote with the passage of time. Gradually Murphy detached himself from Catholic Action and directed his energies to the Society of St Vincent de Paul where, he stated, 'the gospel was still being preached'.

Meanwhile, the bitterness persisted. It was an intense, acerbic bitterness fuelled by a generation of sectarian suspicions, personal ambitions and antagonistic ideologies. It was kept alive by the decisive role of DLP preferences, the emergence of the National Civic Council and several layers of disunity within the Catholic Church. It was fought out within unions, at local parishes and in homes. It resembled a fratricidal civil war--and civil wars are ugly events whose deep wounds are not easily healed. Evatt's declaration of war on Santamaria and the Movement on 5 October 1954 thereby cast a long shadow over the political activism of a great many Australian Catholics; this shadow only began to lift with the election of the Whitlam government in 1972. Thus, the events of 1954-55 were indeed a 'searing experience' for the Catholic Church. (55)

(1) See Bruce Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy? Catholics and the Anti-Communist Struggle in Australia, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2001, ch. 15.

(2) Robert Manne, The Petrov Affair: Politics and Espionage, Pergamon, Sydney, 1987, p.167.

(3) See B. A. Santamaria, The Price of Freedom: The Movement--After Ten Years, Melbourne: Hawthorn Press, 1966, preface. The genesis and consequences of the Split are part of a long and complex story that will not be told here. For a useful potted version see Geoffrey Bolton, The Oxford History of Australia, Volume 5, 1942-1988: The Middle Way, OUP, Melbourne, 1990, pp.141-6. Similarly, discussion of the tensions and divisions within both Catholic Action and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church are beyond the scope of this article, but see Gerard Henderson, Mr. Santamaria and the Bishops, St Patrick's College, Sydney, 1982, chs 6-8.

(4) The Age, 6 October 1954, p.1 cited in Robert Murray. The Split: Australian Labor in the Fifties, Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970, p.180.

(5) Ross McMullin, The Light on the Hill: The Australian Labor Party 1891-1991, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1991, p.276.

(6) Murray, The Split, pp. 147-8; Manne, The Petrov Affair, note, p. 167; B. A. Santamaria, Santamaria, A Memoir, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp.123-4. (This memoir is an expanded and updated version of B. A. Santamaria, Against the Tide, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1981.)

(7) Cited in Robert Murray, 'Split of 54 a struggle for Labor's soul', The Weekend Australian, 1 October 1994, p. 10. For a fascinating article on the reconcilation between Cameron and Santamaria, see Cameron Forbes, 'The End of the War', The Australian Magazine, 23-4 September 1995, pp. 12-18.

(8) Murray, 'Split of 54'.

(9) Murray, The Split, p.183; Robert Murray and Kate White, The Ironworkers: A History of the Federated Ironworkers' Association of Australia, Hale & Iremonger, Sydney, 1982, p.242. In 1998 Murray reiterated that Evatt's 'advancing paranoia' was a major contributing factor behind his attack on the Movement. See 'Split Visions', Weekend Australian, 28 February-1 March 1998, p.20 (Focus)

(10) Gerard Henderson, 'Evatt: canonisation or cannonade', Age, 29 December 1992.

(11) Peter Crockett, Evatt: A Life, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1993, p.284.

(12) Manne, The Petrov Affair, p.168; Manne, 'Christian Soldier', The Age, 28 February 1998, p.7 (News Extra); Andrew A. Campbell, Politics as a Vocation: A Critical Examination of B. A. Santamaria and the Politics of Commitment 1936-1957, unpublished PhD thesis, Deakin University, 1989, p.308. Both Manne and Campbell do, however, acknowledge the role, albeit less decisive, of a range of other factors including the attacks on Evatt from Catholic Actionists in Caucus; and the influence of Alan Reid, J.P. Ormonde and Alan Dalziel on Evatt's thinking. There is also strong circumstantial evidence provided by a retired barrister that E.F. (Ted) Hill influenced Evatt strongly against the Groupers. This is indirectly alluded to in Santamaria, Price of Freedom, p.50.

(13) The Age, 11 October 1954.

(14) Murray, The Split, p.197.

(15) Fr D. Brown, The Labor Party and Communism, 1940-1960, unpublished ms, 1960, p.19.

(16) Tom Truman, Catholic Action and Politics, Georgian House, Melbourne, 1960, pp.3-4.

(17) Davis was an important source of information for James Franklin's 'Catholic Thought and Catholic Action: Dr Paddy Ryan MSC and the Red Peril', Journal of the Australian Catholic' Historical Society, Vol. 17, 1996, pp.44-55.

(18) Cited in Bradon Ellem (ed.), The Great Labour Movement Split in New South Wales: Inside Stories, ASSLH, Sydney Branch Sydney, 1998, p.67. Murray, The Split p.183 also alludes to Evatt's 'caucus troubles' and the internal rivalry for the leadership position. In this context, McMullin, The Light on the Hill, p.276 maintains that Evatt was dabbling 'in intrigue and power plays'. See a so B. A. Santamaria "The Movement": 1941-60--An Outline, Hawthorn Press Melbourne [n.d., 1961?], p.34.

(19) [B. A. Santamaria], 'Report on the Political Situation and on National Policy of the C.S.S.M. in its work of combatting Communism in Australia (October 6, 1954 to April, 1955)', dated April 1955, p.1. Copy in the possession of the writer.

(20) ibid, pp.9-10.

(21) Santamaria, Santamaria: A Memoir, pp. 125, 129.

(22) Cited in Henderson Mr Santamaria and the Bishops p. 102.

(23) Murray, The Split, p.64 (emphasis in original). A notable recent exception to this tradition is the collection of critical reflections on Santamaria in Paul Ormonde (ed.), Santamaria: The Politics of Fear, Melbourne, Spectrum, 2000.

(24) John Cotter kindly provided me with the transcripts and Murphy's notebook. For details of Cotter's involvement with Catholic Action, see John Cotter, 'A rank-and-file view', in 50 Years of the Santamaria Movement, Eureka Street papers No.1, Jesuit Publications, Richmond [n.d., 1992?], pp.22-30; Phillip Deery, 'Memories of the Movement: John Cotter, Catholic Action and the Early Cold War', The Hummer, Vol. 3, No. 3, 2000, pp.9-18.

(25) See G.F. Walsh, The Origins of the Clerical Workers' ALP Industrial Group, MA thesis, La Trobe University, 1978, pp.86-96.

(26) See obituaries in the Herald-Sun, 14 January 1997 ('MP fought communism') and The Age, 13 February 1997 ('A champion of social justice'). Thereafter he distanced himself from Catholic Action and dedicated himself to the Society of St Vincent de Paul.

(27) John Cotter, Typewritten notes of a conversation with Charlie Murphy, 6 October 1991, pp.3, 5 (in possession of the present writer).

(28) Cited in Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy? p.406.

(29) Although a former Jesuit who requested anonymity, stated--entre nous--that he cleary recalled Rev. Harold Lalor SJ in the early 1950s, after Movement victories in several unions, openly boasting at a breakfast meeting about the inevitability of the Movement 'capturing' the Labor Party in Victoria.

(30) Cf. Tony Abate, A Fight for Labor? The Foundation of the Democratic Labor Party, BA Honours thesis, Victoria University of Technology, 1992. Abate's interviewees (who included A.J. Bailey, B. De Lea, F.X. Duffy, Fr P. Duffy, J.P. Maynes) all directly blamed Evatt for the split.

(31) 'Notebook of Charlie Murphy', pp.6-8.

(32) John Cotter, Typewritten notes of a conversation on 22 December 1982, p.5.

(33) Murray, The Split, p. 183.

(34) Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, p.186 notes that Ormonde, a Catholic ALP senator, played a 'critical role' in encouraging Evatt to denounce the Movement.

(35) Santamaria, Santamaria, p.127; Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, pp. 187-8, 231. The 'Movement of Ideas' address was extensively cited in the lurid Santamaria Unmasked! Master-Mind Behind Industrial Groups. Cloak and Stiletto Methods Exposed (Melbourne, 1954).

(36) Santamaria, Santamaria, p.127, Murray, The Split, p.178 (Murray incorrectly dates the conference as early 1954.)

(37) Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, p. 188.

(38) B.A. Santamaria to Archbishop Mannix, 11 December 1952, pp.1-3, Correspondence, Santamaria Papers, cited in Campbell, Politics as a Vocation, pp. 197, 241-2. As well as conducting twenty-eight formal and seventy-five informal interviews over four years with Santamaria, Campbell also secured unique and unfettered access to Santamaria personal papers and correspondence (see pp.viii, 490-1).

(39) ibid.

(40) Had, for example, the avowedly partisan Pattern of Deceit: The N.C.C. and the Labor Movement (AFULE Victorian Branch, Melbourne, nd.) access to this document, it most certainly would have published it.

(41) Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, p.407.

(42) Although 'the Coms, in the Clerks' Union, particularly J. R. Hughes, had been defeated by the Groups in 1950, Murphy felt that 'the FCU was in the hands of no-hopers and Keonites'. John Cotter, typewritten notes of a conversation with Charlie Murphy, 6 October 1991, p.5.

(43) ibid.

(44) See Jack Kane, Exploding the Myths: The political memoirs of Jack Kane, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1989, pp.64-6; Murray, The Split, pp.224-7.

(45) Michael Lucy to Charles Murphy, 15 March 1955, Murphy papers. Francis Raymond ('Frank') Scully, the powerful and popular (but not with Kennelly) MLA for Richmond and minister in the Cain government, was similarly pleased: 'Things have taken a turn for the good in Hobart, and are developing nicely'. Scully to Murphy, 16 March 1955, Murphy papers. Murphy did not keep any copies of his own correspondence from 1955.

(46) Lucy to Murphy, 17 March 1955. In June 1950 the Country Party, which had formed a coalition government with the Liberal Party under Premier T. Hollway, split. Friction between these two parties was a not uncommon feature of Victorian political history.

(47) Lucy to Murphy, 21 March 1955. However, Lucy, was not exactly an intellectual lightweight: during World War II he had been a RAAF pilot. According to John Cotter (conversation 10 March 2001) he was also a snappy, dapper dresser--quite different from the grey-suited conservative appearance of most Laborites.

(48) As he wrote on 1 April after Premier Cain sacked four Cabinet ministers (Barry, Coleman' Scully and Hayes), 'there is no appeal, fella, your [sic] just out!!! Thats [sic] it'. See also Murray, pp. 234-9.

(49) Lucy to Murphy, 4 April 1955.

(50) 'In was in New Orleans when I got a telegram from Scully that there was an election in the air ... so I got the first plane I could back here'. John Cotter, typewritten notes of a conversation with Charlie Murphy, 6 October 1991, p.5.

(51) Lucy to Murphy, 31 March 1955.

(52) Janet McCalman, Struggletown: Public and Private Life in Richmond 1900-1965, MUP, Melbourne, 1984, p. 238.

(53) Murray, The Split, pp.252-3.

(54) The first preference vote in Richmond was 40.43 per cent for the 'charismatic' Scully and 39.17 per cent for his Catholic ALP rival, P.V. ('Paddy') O'Connell. See McCalman, Struggletown, p.239, in the 1958 election, Scully was trounced by the ALP candidate W.J. Towers. Colin A. Hughes and B.D. Graham, Voting for the Victoria Legislative Assembly 1890-1964. ANU Press, Canberra, 1975, pp. 357, 374. According to John Cotter (conversation, 10 March 2001), Lucy was a close associate of Scully and may have been writing to Murphy, which mystified Murphy, in order to ensure his support for Scully.

(55) Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, p. 409.

Phillip Deery is an Associate Professor of History at Victoria University, Melbourne. His current research is focused on comparative studies of British and Australian attitudes during the Cold War, and, in particular, on government responses to domestic and international communism. He has also written about the position of scientists, unionists and peace activists during the Cold War.