SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, publ. by Oxford University Press, 2004, ISBN 0-19-927420-7, 859 pages, 80.00 [pounds sterling]. Order forms available at http://www.sipri.org.

The 35th edition of the SIPRI Yearbook analyses developments in 2003 in

* security and conflicts,

* military spending and armaments,

* non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, with extensive annexes on arms control and disarmament agreements and a chronology of security- and arms control-related events.

Included in this volume are studies on

* Euro-Atlantic organizations and relationships

* the Iraq war 

* major armed conflicts and multilateral peace missions

* developments in international courts

* China's new security multilateralism 

* national defence reform and the African Union 

* security sector reform in the Western Balkans

* science- and technology-based military innovation

* world military, expenditure and arms production

* international arms transfers, and the suppliers of ballistic missile technology

* potential indicators of offensive biological weapon activities

* major trends in arms control and non-proliferation

* nuclear arms control and non-proliferation

* world nuclear forces and ballistic missile defence

* chemical and biological warfare developments and arms control

* the SARS epidemic 

* conventional arms control

* transfer controls and destruction programs and

* withdrawal from arms control treaties.

Following is SIPRI's summary of Chapter 14: "Major trends in arms control and non-proliferation."

   In 2003 the issue of how to respond to the proliferation
   of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC)
   weapons and their delivery systems continued to
   occupy a central place on the foreign and security
   policy agenda both of states and international
   organizations. Recent information has underlined the
   serious shortcomings in the level of knowledge about
   the NBC weapon programmes of states. Previously
   unknown weapon-related activities have come to light
   in several states, and new information highlights the
   need to re-evaluate what had been thought of as
   relatively solid conclusions about the pattern of NBC
   weapon programme development.

   While the critical need to generate more accurate
   information and assessments of current trends and
   developments was underlined, multilateral arms control
   treaty regimes did not move any closer to agreement
   on how to identify violations of existing treaties
   and agreements, or how to respond where such violations
   are detected. The conflict in Iraq was preceded
   by a complete failure in the effort to develop a common
   approach to implementing the UN Security
   Council resolutions related to Iraqi disarmament.

   In May 2003 US President George W. Bush announced
   the creation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
   The purpose of the new initiative is to intercept ships,
   aircraft and vehicles suspected of carrying nuclear and
   other weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles,
   and related technologies to or from 'countries of proliferation
   concern'. It allows participating states to
   detain and search suspect shipments as soon as they
   enter their territory, territorial waters or airspace.
   Bush's announcement was quickly followed by the
   formation of a core group of 11 nations (Australia,
   France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
   Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
   United States) that has begun pooling intelligence and
   organizing military exercises. Three additional countries
   (Canada, Norway and Singapore) subsequently
   began to participate in the activities of this core group
   while a large number of other states have associated
   themselves with it. Russia joined the PSI on 31 May
   2004.

   The legal basis for the PSI is the subject of controversy.
   Although activities carried out to date suggest
   that current national and international laws will provide
   a sufficient basis for most of what the PSI envisages,
   additional clarification will be needed in the
   case of shipments of dual-use items that have civilian
   applications as well as roles in constituting WMD--which
   international law does not address. The PSI
   could have a positive effect by bringing about closer
   international coordination among national agencies
   and authorities charged with the enforcement of existing
   export control laws and other relevant national
   legislation. A practical mechanism for cooperation
   and information exchange between these national
   authorities is currently lacking.

   On 13 December 2003 the Council of the European
   Union adopted the EU Strategy Against Proliferation
   of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The document drew
   on a set of basic principles agreed in June 2003 and
   set out in more detail the approach of the EU to
   addressing the threat of proliferation. The EU agreed
   an Action Plan in June 2003 that contained a specific
   and measurable set of projects, programmes and
   objectives its well as identifying the finances required
   to implement the agreed measures and specifying the
   source of that financing. At the time the WMD Strategy
   was adopted, the Council agreed on a procedure for
   monitoring and reviewing its implementation at the
   General Affairs and External Relations Council (in
   which the foreign ministers of the EU member states
   participate) on a six-monthly basis, thereby guaranteeing
   continued high-level political attention for the
   issue.

   Arms control has focused on measures to help manage
   the potential security risks posed by militarily relevant
   quantities of weapons held by states. The attacks
   carried out in the United States on 11 September
   2001 focused attention on two threats that were not
   previously addressed: weapons in the hands of non-state
   actors; and the threat posed by the use of items
   not normally thought of as weapons. In 2003 consideration
   was given to the role that a number of legal
   instruments which are not thought of as part of arms
   control might play in managing these threats. In particular,
   attention was paid to instruments that can
   help to secure sensitive materials and prevent their
   diversion to unauthorized end-users and dangerous
   end-uses.