SECTARIAN ATTITUDES AS A FUNCTION OF THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON.

BACKGROUND

THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CRISIS accelerated on 18 April 1948 when several thousand Palestinians fled their homes and poured into neighboring Arab countries. As Israeli historian Benny Morris noted, along with the establishment of the state of Israel, the refugee problem was the major political consequence of the 1948 war, and became one of the intractable components of the Arab-Israeli conflict. [1]

In the early years after the creation of the state of Israel, many Palestinians hoped that the international community would come to their rescue and restore their national and natural rights. However, the most they were offered were a variety of resettlement schemes, which were fiercely rejected, preferring to remain refugees than to give up all claims to their land. [2] The most important piece of international legislation on Palestinian refugees is undoubtedly UN resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the essence of which is to guarantee Palestinian right to return home and to demand compensation. [3] However, since this resolution could not be implemented, UN focus shifted to the humanitarian dimension in an attempt to improve the conditions of Palestinian refugees in the host countries. For this purpose, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was created to assist Palestinian Refugees in the fields of education, work, healthcare and relief.

By the mid-1960s, it was evident that the UN plan had little chance of success as it attempted to solve a political problem using an economic approach. The Arab states were not prepared to cooperate on the large-scale development projects originally foreseen by the Agency as a means of alleviating the Palestinians' situation. In 1949, at the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission at Lausanne, Israel offered to repatriate 100,000 Arab refugees within the framework of a general settlement. The Arab delegations rejected the offer. In 1952, the UN Refugee Rehabilitation Fund offered the Arab states 200 million USD to find homes and jobs for the refugees. The Arab states used some of the money for relief work, but did not even apply for the greatest part of the fund. The Arab governments were unwilling to contribute to any plan that could be interpreted as encouraging resettlement. [4] They preferred to hang on to their own interpretation of Resolution 194, which they believed would eventually lead to repatriation. The Palestinians' only other hope was that the Arab states would resolve the problem, whether by force or diplomacy.

In the prevailing climate of Arab nationalism of the 1950s and 1960s, many Palestinians still believed in the Arab nationalist ideal and saw the restoration of their homeland taking place within the broader framework of the unification of the Arab world, chiefly under the leadership of Egypt's President Nasser. The latter had pledged to sweep all traces of Zionism, imperialism and the forces of reaction in the Arab world: [5]

The refugees will not return while the flag of Israel flies over the soil of Palestine. They will return when the flag of Palestine is hoisted over Arab Palestine. (Radio Cairo, 19 July 1957). [5]

The official Israeli position on the other hand, has always been that there can be no returning of the refugees to Israeli territories, and that the only solution to the problem was their resettlement in the Arab states or elsewhere. [6]

The 1967 military defeat of the front line Arab regimes had, among others, two major implications for the Palestinians: first, approximately 360,000 Palestinians were forced to leave the West Bank and Gaza Strip for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Second, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) took advantage of the outcome of the war to assert an increasing political and military role.

In September 1970, the Jordanian government launched an attack known as Black September against refugee camps in response to Palestinian military activities in Jordan. The result was the relocation of the PLO power base to Lebanon.

The Palestinians' strong political and military presence in Lebanon during the 1970s, often referred to as a "state-within-a-state", came at the expense of large segments of the Lebanese population. While the Israeli military campaign succeeded in crushing the PLO in Lebanon, it failed to eliminate the Palestinian presence.

The eruption of the Palestinian Intifada in 1987 shifted international attention to the occupied territories and confirmed PLO commitment to a negotiated two-state solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The breakout of the Gulf War increased pressure on the PLO whose support for Iraq alienated Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States. This justified Kuwaiti reprisal against Palestinians with the Palestinian community in Kuwait shrinking from 400,000 in 1990 to some 100,000 in August l991. [7]

The decline and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, eliminating one of the major supporters of the PLO, further aggravated the situation. Thus, the Palestinians were forced to enter negotiations with Israel culminating with the Oslo Declaration of principles. While Palestinians welcomed the attainment of self-rule and the prospect of a state, the refugees in Lebanon had little reason for rejoicing. In fact, the accords did not mention the 1948 refugees, who constituted the majority of Palestinians in Lebanon directly. The question of the refugees was addressed in two ways; the first through a multilateral working group under Canadian supervision. The second approach to the issue was to include it as an item on the agenda of the "final status" negotiations.

By excluding the refugees, the Oslo Accords revived the issue of resettlement and increased prospects that resettlement would be imposed by force. The Oslo Accords, therefore, stirred fear and concern among Lebanese, because no final Israeli-Palestinian settlement is possible without a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees. [8] The future of the sizable Palestinian community that has resided in Lebanon since its displacement in 1948 is one of the most divisive and explosive issues in Lebanon today.

The objective of this essay is to examine the views of Lebanese respondents with regard to the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon. In connection with this, the study will explore respondents' views on the following variables related to resettlement: first, blame for the Lebanese war on Palestinians; second, empathy with Palestinians; third, intensity of inter-group perceptions; fourth, personal contact with Palestinians; fifth, views on naturalization of the Palestinians.

THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY IN LEBANON

Initially impoverished, fragmented, dispirited, and without adequate leadership to address their concerns, the Palestinian refugee community was quiescent until the mid-1960s. The refusal of Lebanese political leadership to commit its troops to the June 1967 war enraged many Lebanese Muslims and Syria. In the aftermath of the war, Palestinian guerrillas' infiltration from Syria to wage commando raids against Israeli borders prompted severe retaliation. On the other hand, Lebanese army attempts to regulate the Palestinian armed movement in the country was widely opposed by the Muslim and leftist leadership. In November 1969, following a series of clashes between Palestinians and the Lebanese army, the Lebanese government was compelled under internal and external pressures to conclude the Cairo Agreement. The immediate effects of this Accord were to set free the hands of the PLO militarily and to acknowledge many important social rights for the Palestinians such as the right to employment. The PLO assumed the responsibility of managing the affairs of the Palestinian community in the country.

Meanwhile, the PLO was evicted from Jordan, and had their leadership and guerillas main base relocated to Lebanon, where the Cairo Agreement endorsed their presence. The influx of several hundred thousand additional Palestinians upset Lebanon's delicate confessional balance, and polarized the country into two camps: proponents and opponents of the PLO presence.

Public order deteriorated with daily acts of violence between Christians who opposed Palestinian presence and Palestinians. The military intervention of the Lebanese army bombarding refugee camps prompted the Melkart Agreement. Under the provisions of this document the Palestinians had been accorded a greater degree of autonomy than some Lebanese citizens had. Inspired by this precedence, Lebanese Muslims organized under the leadership of Kamal Jumblat encouraged by the Palestinians tried to wrest similar concessions from the central government.

This period of autonomy was brought to an end with the 1982 Israeli invasion that forced the PLO to leave Beirut. The Palestinians in the camps were left as a result at the mercy of Lebanese militias. The only change was that of the common opinion which looked at the Palestinians as responsible for the outbreak of the civil war. With Israeli approval, Right wing Lebanese Forces militiamen slaughtered 2,000 Palestinians in Sabra and Shatila camps. [9]

However, these incidents did not prevent the resurgence of Palestinian political and military presence in 1984, threatening this time the powerful position the Shiites and Amal had established for themselves in post-1982 Lebanon. Originally hostile to PLO operations in 1970s, Amal was encouraged by Syria to turn its attention to the Palestinians in the camps of Sabra, Shatila, and Borj alBarajneh. They suspected an Israeli-US plot being implemented by Yasser Arafat to restore the anomalous state of affairs that previously existed prior to 1982. Heavy fighting erupted between the two parties in 1985 which was labeled the "war of the camps." The clashes resulting in heavy casualties were brought to an end with the deployment of Syrian troops in Beirut. Nevertheless, the Palestinians managed to maintain control over the camps. In July 1991, Lebanese Army units clashed with Palestinians in the Southern Lebanese camps of Rashidieh and Mieh-Mieh. The troops were executing a government order to disband Palestinian pro-Arafat militias. Over 60 people were killed, 150 were wounded and 450 Palestinians were taken prisoners. The PLO agreed to hand over their heavy weapons in exchange for the removal of army checkpoints surrounding the camps and allowing for a "serious political dialogue" concerning Palestinian civil rights, but not political ones. [10]

Since their arrival in Lebanon over 50 years ago, the experience of Palestinian refugees was one of marginalization, suffering, repression and armed violence. They were considered a threat to the Lebanese people and were treated as second-class citizens. Unlike Palestinian refugees elsewhere, Palestinians in Lebanon have been denied basic social and economic rights for a substantial portion of their 52 years in exile. The Palestinians were kept apart from the Lebanese population, not allowed to assimilate even if they wanted to. Until the late 1960s, the Lebanese government had at no point in time enacted any legislation governing or guaranteeing Palestinian civil rights. Palestinian refugees were treated the same as foreigners. Discriminatory policies against Palestinians resulted in their socio-economic marginalization. Since 1982 the Lebanese government has made every effort to make life uncomfortable, and Lebanon unwelcoming, for the Palestinian community. State measures include restrictions on living sp ace, building, property, residency and especially work since Palestinians are banned from more than 72 professions. [11] Between 1982 and 1992 no work permits were issued to Palestinians. [12]

Only a small fraction has been able to acquire Lebanese citizenship. The greatest majority remains stateless. In 1994, the mass granting of citizenship to some 400,000 people by the Lebanese government served to renew the internal debate concerning the Palestinian refugees. Opponents argue that the Palestinians did not fit the nationality requirements and that there were many undeserving cases. Among the accusations, is that Lebanese citizenship was granted to 25,000 Palestinians and possibly to a larger number. These Lebanese also maintained that it tipped the country's sectarian balance with the clear complications that political structures based on equality are being lined up for review and alteration to the disadvantage of Christian groups and to the Maronites in particular. In connection with the naturalization decree, official attempts at correcting the confessional balance with the naturalization of some 50,000 people (most of them were Christians) were countered by the Maronite Church's opposition and threats to mobilize the masses. [13]

LEBANESE STATEMENTS ON RESETTLEMENT

On the pretext that it would be interpreted as a concession before the peace talks with Israel are finalized, the Lebanese State refuses to grant Palestinians basic rights. Beirut constantly repeats the 1998 mantra of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri "Lebanon will never, ever integrate the Palestinians." They will not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would take the Palestinians off the international agency that has supported them since 1948. In the absence of a definite plan to deal with this crucial issue, and with the establishment of a Palestinian state, it is likely that Lebanon would accelerate this campaign.

Lebanese Politicians have always suspected Canada's involvement in an attempt to settle Palestinians permanently in Lebanon. In 1998, Lebanese newspapers exposed information related to "implanting" up to 200,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. This could be done only after weakening Christian political opposition and aggravating the economic crisis in the country to ease the implementation of the plan. [14]

Chamber of Deputies Speaker Nabih Bern fears Israel's plan to force the assimilation of Palestinians in their host countries, particularly in Lebanon with the help of the Canadian government: "Canada is part of a conspiracy against the Lebanese and Palestinian people and responsible for resettling Palestinians at the expense of Lebanon and Palestine." [15]

The Lebanese government insists on the "repatriation of Palestinian refugees," or anything that will remove the non-citizen Palestinian population in the country. This is due both to sectarian politics and the legacies of past conflict. The Palestinians' great contribution to Lebanese national post-Taif reconciliation has been that "they have taken all the blame for the civil war."

Recent statements by Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak have ruled out the return of hundreds of thousands of refugees to Israel. "I don't think there are any circumstances under which they will be able to return to Israel, a solution for them should be found in the countries where they are now living." But Lebanon has expressed its complete disagreement. It has made the return of the refugees a precondition for peace with Israel: "Our position is that we insist on an Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon and the Golan Heights and a guarantee of the right of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to return home," Lebanon President Emile Lahoud said. (Both Barak and Lahoud's quotes are from The Economist, Vol. 352, No. 8134, p. 35)

The unanimous Lebanese rejection of Palestinian implantation in Lebanon is reflected in the country's constitution, which states that there will be "no partition and no implantation." The State's position emanates from Lebanon's worries of the disruptive effect on the country's sectarian sensitive mosaic and upsetting its demographic structure. Politicians and important popular figures suspect that it is an Israeli plan whose objective is to cause the disintegration of the Lebanese State. [16]

Right wing Christians fear that a resettlement of the predominantly Muslim Palestinians would upset Lebanon's delicate sectarian balance. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Nasrallah Boutros Sfeir openly expressed these fears. "The peace that is being promised may have adverse consequences. If the resettlement of Palestinians in vast under-populated Arab countries is not acceptable then the effects on a small highly over-populated country like Lebanon would be even more dire," he said during a sermon. Elsewhere, Sfeir added, "Lebanon has suffered for 25 years because of the Palestinian presence and today we hear rumors that the past situation is likely to be recreated." [17] For Sfeir, the issue of the Palestinian refugees in the country is hampering Lebanon's peace and tranquility.

This position seems to find a wide backing by other politicians of different religious and political backgrounds. As early as 1997, Speaker of the Parliament Nabih Bern categorically rejected resettling the Palestinians in Lebanon" a stand not subject to any discussion or compromise. [18] "We are all, as Lebanese, against permanent resettlement, and no one can accept this disaster, this question is categorically rejected by all parties in Lebanon." MP Ahmed Karami declared. [19] "While the foreign media have been suggesting that resettlement is going to be imposed on the Lebanese we think that the Lebanese people because of their unity and solidarity can stop any resettlement plan" he added. Others like MP Kamil Ziade consider that Lebanon will refute "the implantation of Palestinians" because of its economic and demographic repercussions.

Christians consider that resettling the Palestinians permanently is beyond the capacity of Lebanon to absorb. It may threaten its very existence by endangering its natural unity and economy. Many advance the argument that Lebanon stands among the countries with the highest population density and the least resources and wealth. [20] They emphasize that Lebanon is a country of emigration and not immigration and settlement, losing people as a result of war and the bad economy. The chaotic naturalization of transient residents in addition to the settling of Palestinian refugees would increase Lebanon's population by 25%. No country can absorb that demographic change. It is in the midst of this heightened atmosphere that the controversial issue of Palestinian presence in Lebanon is being discussed.

THE SAMPLE

Respondents from six Lebanese religious groups drawn from different Lebanese regions were included in a quota sample of 1,073 Lebanese. The sample includes 385 female (36%) and 688 male respondents (64%). An effort was made to reflect the expected representation of each confessional grout in proportion to their actual size in Lebanon's population as nearly as possible. [21] In most essential respects the sample reflected the most important characteristics of the Lebanese population over the age of 18. [22] The only demographic feature that differs from the population is education, with better-educated individuals being over represented in the sample. [23]

QUESTIONNAIRE ADMINISTRATION

The interviews were conducted by fourteen interviewers during the months of December 1999 to January 2000. The interviewers participating in the study were informed on the topic and all responses were entered on the questionnaires by the interviewers themselves. During the conduct of the survey the interviewers encountered some difficulties related to social and political resistance. The survey was concluded after an adequate number of questionnaires had been completed. [24]

In this research, and in order to prevent systematic errors, a pilot was administered to a group of 40 people of varying age and occupational background. Following their feedback, some of the questions were rewritten in a clear and direct form in the final format of the questionnaire and some were omitted. In order to avoid random error, the researcher tried to shorten the period of administration of the questionnaire which did not exceed fifty days. This was intended to avoid sudden political changes. The respondents themselves represented the researcher with significant clues for the evaluation of the quality of their responses. Any knowledgeable observer can immediately discern the consistency and pattern of reality of the sample. After the processing of the data, the "internal consistency" and "response bias" tests were applied to ensure the reliability of the responses and the absence of methodological problems in the questionnaire.

ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS

On the other hand, the Druze population has to do mainly with the outcome of the 1983 mountain war when their successful alliance with Palestinian factions proved to be the turning point for Druze victory over the right wing Lebanese Forces militia.

Measures of inter-group perceptions and tolerance of Palestinians are being discussed in this part. They constitute a first step in the integration process of immigrants or refugees in any society. The thermometer scale was employed for the purpose of obtaining a high level of accuracy in measuring the intensity of inter-group perceptions of Lebanese and Palestinians. In comparison with other Lebanese groups, the Palestinians appeared the most resented. An examination of the summary scale for Palestinian perceptions revealed that only 22 percent of the respondents favorably viewed them whereas a majority of 70 percent were unfavorable of the Palestinians. Twenty-two percent showed mixed feelings. The pattern of responses could be explained in relation to the nature of political conflict in Lebanon. Palestinians are continuously portrayed as "trouble-makers" and are seen as a potential political threat. The Christians adopted a hostile standpoint towards the Palestinian resistance for their exploitation of the internal contradictions of Lebanese society. Most Lebanese have not overcome this negative image of the Palestinian people in the post-civil war period. Further breakdown by sect suggests that Sunni and Druze respondents manifest positive perception of Palestinians. During the Lebanese civil war, the Sunnis have expressed a moderate attitude refusing to build a militia and to get involved militarily in the Lebanese conflict. Instead, they allied themselves with the Palestinians with an aim of reforming the Lebanese political system but without any success. Ever since the tripartite agreement in 1985 the Sunnis were excluded and became marginalized in the Lebanese political scene. In 1976, Kamal Jumblat, Druze leader of the Lebanese National Movement and an important segment of the Muslim elite felt that the PLO's military presence in Lebanon offered them a rare opportunity to extract significant political concession from the Maronite ruling state.

Muslim respondents showed more sympathy toward Palestinians than their Christian counterparts. This group had ideological sympathy with commando operations against the Israelis. Other reasons were war related: during the civil war, Palestinian refugees were themselves often targets for violence. First they where attacked by Christian right wing militias: they were slaughtered in Tal al Zaatar in 1976 and in Sabra and Shatila camps in 1982. And later on, in 1986-7, the "war of the camps" initiated by Syrian backed Shiite-Amal militias against the camps of Rashidieh and Bourj al-Barajneh had devastating results on the Palestinians. While it occurred in the latter half of the 1980's, this war was supposed to ensure the dispersal of the refugees, the destruction of the camps, and such a diminishment of their numbers so that they would never regain political power or autonomy in Lebanon. [25] The third reason was humanitarian: Lebanon is the only host country where the quota of camp inhabitants is still higher tha n 50 percent who suffer as a result of their miserable conditions. [26]

Rosemary Sayigh suggests that evidence from the third generation of refugees in Lebanon indicates marked discrimination in universities, the work place and social life, and indicates the presence of uncrossable boundaries. Based on the 1992 FAO Survey, Sayigh asserts the presence of "signs of the tenacity of refugee/non-refugee boundaries." [27] According to Sayigh, "Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a manner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that immigrants carried tuberculosis. [Many Lebanese argue that] segregating Palestinians would facilitate normalization of post-war Lebanon with national health restored through the isolation of an infectious presence."

Table 4 suggests that personal contacts between respondents and Palestinians are very limited. Two-thirds of the respondents disclaimed any relations with Palestinians, while most of those who reported an association spoke only in terms of simple friendship. Other areas of contact included occupational, residential, civic and political contacts, all of which were narrow in scope. Sunni respondents reported frequent contacts with members of the Palestinian community more than any other Lebanese group. As might be expected, Christian respondents reported infrequent personal contact with Palestinians. Several factors could explain the pattern of responses: Palestinian visibility was reduced in post-civil war Lebanon. Refugee camps had been scattered among the different Lebanese regions and some like Shatila and Bourj Al-Brarajneh Beirut, and Ain Al-Helweh in Saida, had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas. Today few Palestinians remain in Christian dominated areas and tend to be concentrated in areas of Shiit e demographic preponderance (the South, Beirut southern suburb, the Biqaa). A history of bloodshed reinforces Shiite visibility of Palestinians in addition to outright opposition to their presence by mainstream Shiite leaders. On the other hand, inside Palestinian camps, violent clashes are frequently reported. Probably fear of endangering their own life and property explains the Lebanese respondents' negative stance.

Marriages between members of Lebanese communities are infrequent in practice. While civil marriages are infrequent in Lebanese society, most people are accustomed to marrying within the same religious faith and probably the same sectarian group. The fact that Armenians are until today not well integrated in Lebanese society enhances this proposition. While differences in faith should be considered; for many, a long history of bloodshed between Christians and Palestinians could not be overcome.

When Palestinians entered the country in 1948, communal tensions were already endemic. After the 1967 war, the PLO gained political and military power in Lebanon, and it increasingly touched off a resonance of sympathy from Sunni muslims, who had "their own home-grown grievances against the institutionalized domination of their state apparatus by the Maronites." [28] The date generally given for the start of the 1975-76 civil war in Lebanon is 13 April 1975, the day unidentified assailants reportedly shot a member of the Kataeb party in front of a church, and right-wing Christian gunmen retaliated by ambushing a bus full of Palestinians in a Christian quarter of Beirut. Many Lebanese blame the Palestinians for providing the fuel for the civil war that laid waste to their country from 1975 to 1990. And while they are reluctant to recall the murderous fighting that went on between Lebanese militias, they are quick to point fingers at the Palestinians, whose cross border attacks on Northern Israel prompted the Israelis to invade Lebanon in 1982. In fact, the Palestinians became a divisive political issue in Lebanese politics only after 1969 when they started to wage their raids against Israel. Unexpectedly, the majority of the Sunnis seem to blame the war on Palestinians. In a country fraught with age-old confessional disputes, the religious bond (the majority of the Palestinians being Sunnis) is expected to foster fraternal links between the two groups. "Sunnis" lack of hostility towards Palestinians is reinforced by the fact that both groups were allies during the civil war with Palestinians acting as the "sword" of the Sunnis. How could the Sunnis possibly incriminate the Palestinians for the conflict now" Palestinians rise to power had antagonized the Sunnis without helping Muslims to assert themselves. They do not blame the Palestinians only for the civil war, but for its essentially unresolved outcome. According to Sayigh, "Palestinians play little part in this new Lebanon. Marginalized politically, economica lly and socially, they constitute a sect without a recognized place in a sectarian society." [29]

VIEWS ON NATURALIZATION

An estimated 400,000 people were granted citizenship as a result of the 1994 decree, which the Maronite League opposed on the basis that it granted citizenship to undeserving applicants: the decree was at the time opposed by Lebanese from all faiths. Maronite Patriarch Cardinal Sfeir railed to block attempts to enact a new controversial decree.

Only 4 percent of the respondents felt that the Nationalization Decree was appropriate. By contrast, 41 percent said it was too rigid and 55 percent that it should be stopped.

Greek-Catholic and Greek-Orthodox respondents seem to side with the Maronites on this particular proposal. The Melkite Bishop of Zahle, an overwhelmingly Catholic region, claimed that the government was encouraging 50,000 Christians from Syria, Jordan and other countries to apply for citizenship even though they had no intention of living in Lebanon and therefore would be of no benefit to the country or its economy. Their usefulness, if the plan is a serious proposition, would be as a make weight for the numbers gone. [30] As to the major deficiency in the naturalization decree a substantial majority felt that Lebanon's national interest was not guaranteed in the decree. In contrast, only 18 percent of the respondents felt that the alleged naturalization of few Palestinians was the deficiency. On the other hand, only 17 percent of the respondents seem to attribute the major deficiency in the Naturalization decree to its exclusion of Lebanese emigrant citizenship right. For years there have been arguments, ma inly from Christian politicians that Lebanese emigrant should be able to vote in elections through the embassies of their countries. At present citizens residing abroad must return to Lebanon to cast their votes. The aim was to preserve the estimated balance of the population.

Compared to the results depicted by the 1994 study, respondents of all sects seem to maintain an increasingly negative attitude towards the 1994 naturalization decree. The pattern of the responses could be explained by reference to several factors:

1. Analysts and politicians have increasingly focused on the negative aspects of the "naturalization" decree. For this purpose, several conferences were held to discuss the implications of the 1994 decree on Lebanon. While all participants in these meetings agree on the adverse repercussions of naturalization, they also have used this question to discredit the previous government responsible for its enactment.

2. The media has extensively portrayed the Palestinian refugee presence "as a time bomb expected to detonate any time causing the disintegration of Lebanese society."

3. Actual Official Lebanese statements serve to mobilizing the public against attempts at naturalization.

4. President Elias Hrawi's intention, towards the end of his mandate, to enact a supplement to the 1994 decree and the wide opposition and antagonism it created.

5. Interior Minister Michel Al-Murr statement that a new clause has been added to the naturalization draft law to prevent Palestinians from gaining citizenship. This change is intended to quell the fears of some groups such as the Maronite League, Murr said. Barak's statement raises fears in Lebanon that they will have to pay the price for a regional settlement. [31]

The official policy of the Lebanese government attempts to stimulate Palestinian emigration from Lebanon in order to end with the lightest possible Palestinian demographic and political burden.

Christian groups were more reluctant to acknowledge Palestinian rights. The sectarian structure of the Lebanese political system in which Christian Maronites were dominant in the past prevented the acceptance of Palestinians into Lebanese society. As a result, the Christians adopted a hostile standpoint towards the Palestinian resistance, accusing them of exploitation of the internal contradictions of the Lebanese society to their own ends: "We have no desire to throw these people into the sea, or to annihilate them, all we ask of them is to start looking for another land to settle on, outside the Lebanese territory." [32] This continued to be the rule even after Maronite political dominance was greatly reduced by the end of the civil war. While the Maronites are concerned about the potential damage Palestinian presence in Lebanon can do to their community, the Shiites in Southern Lebanon have paid the price with fierce Israeli retaliation for Palestinian guerrilla operations. The intensity of Palestinian-Sh iite rivalry was manifested during the three years "war of the camps" between 1985 and 1987. In 1990, PLO military expansion in the Southern region of Sidon led to bloody encounters between the Palestinians and the Shiite Hizbullah. Shiite respondents' disaffection from the Palestinians is clearly expressed as the majority would like to see them deported from Lebanon. In fact, Hizbullah Secretary General Sheikh Hassan Nassrullah's statements strengthen this preference: "The Palestinians should go back to Palestine" or if some international body proposes to take them out of Lebanon and distributes them among Syria, Iraq, Canada, Australia or other parts of the world." [33] Those who insist on denying Palestinians their most essential rights justify their attitude on the basis of refusing resettlement. Accordingly, allowing Palestinians to improve their social and economic situation would enable Palestinians to assume the stand of a community in the diaspora, like any other Arab community in Lebanon. The Lebane se government would be able to correct the anomalous situation of the Palestinians with its corresponding restrictions without considering this step a move towards indirect resettlement. [34]

The Sunnis and the Druze seem the least affected by Palestinian resettlement. Among the respondents, Sunnis and Druze agreed more than any other group that Palestinians in Lebanon should be entitled to most social and economic rights. Conversely, only a slight minority felt that Palestinians should be eligible to citizenship. The Sunni community recovered some weight in the post-Taif Lebanon, with the resurgence of the older upper class, the eclipse of militias, Maronite misfortunes and an enhanced role of Sunni Prime Minister. Palestinian permanent presence would give a tremendous boost to the political status of Lebanese Sunnis. Lebanese media has been emphasizing the government's worries concerning the future of the 360,000 Palestinian refugees in the country. The probability that they may be allowed to stay indefinitely has increased Lebanese suspicions." [35]

In fact, Druze leader Walid Jumblat had suggested back in 1994 that several thousand Palestinians thrown out of East Beirut be resettled in a deserted village on the southern margin of the Shuff; i.e., Quari. Jumblat received backing from Hariri, who shared his opinion about the impracticality of expelling Palestinians from the country. [36] This expressed a common Druze-Sunni interest; this reality seems to be confirmed by the findings since Sunni and Druze respondents appear to be more hospitable and open to the idea of resettlement than any other groups.

The other dimension of the problem is related to the disruptive impact of resettlement. Those who stress the political and historical reason for insisting on the deportation of the refugees, emphasize the link between the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon and the wars and troubles it has been through. They see in Palestinian armed presence a dangerous impetus for another civil war. Today, Palestinian camps remain political and military "ghettos," with several hundred armed men belonging to different Palestinian factions. The pro-Arafat Palestinians for their part, refuse to hand over their weapons in the absence of a clear understanding with Lebanese authorities concerning the camps: "Weapons may be needed to cope with particular instances" according to Shafiq Al Hout, [37] the former representative of the PLO in Beirut.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

The study has shown that Palestinian presence is a pervasive issue in Lebanon. All Lebanese groups showed lack of enthusiasm to "resettling the Palestinians" in the sense of granting them citizenship and political rights. On the other hand, granting Palestinians their civil rights is welcomed by a portion of Lebanese, namely the Muslims. Granting Palestinians their civic rights would serve to alleviate their socio-economic situation in Lebanon and reduce the country's economic problem.

Accordingly, Palestinians would be able to assume the stand of a community in the Diaspora, like any other Arab community in Lebanon. The Lebanese government would be able to correct the anomalous situation of the Palestinians with its corresponding restrictions without considering this step a move towards indirect resettlement. [38]

The international community may require Lebanon to take a step in this direction whenever solving the issue of the refugees becomes necessary. France and the US have advised Lebanese officials to cease their public statements on the resettlement of the refugees and to take a more logical stand in order to find a real solution for this humanitarian and security problem. Accordingly, this issue cannot be resolved outside the bilateral talks between Lebanon and Israel and without the intervention of great powers. "Insisting on refusing resettlement is not a practical solution. The Palestinians will not be repatriated but this doesn't mean they will be nationalized" other alternatives will be considered." [39]

The situation is complicated further in light of the recession of Syrian-Israeli talks. Syria, who exercises full hegemony over Lebanese public life and political decision-making, supports the maintaining of Palestinian armed presence as part of their strategy. Undoubtedly, the Syrians would choose to reactivate the Lebanese-Israeli front, in the event of the failure of the peace talks, through their pro-Syrian Palestinian fighters in the camps. In connection with Syrian strategy, the Lebanese government finds itself compelled to acquiesce to unabated armed Palestinian presence in refugee camps which is reminiscent of the civil war. [40]

Simon Haddad is a Lecturer in the Political Studies and Public Administration Department at the American University of Beirut. The author wishes to thank Professor Hilal Khashan for his thoughtful reflections on this essay.

ENDNOTES

(1.) Robert I. Friedman. Zealots for Zion. New York: Random House, Inc., 1992, P. 197.

(2.) Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk Sluglett. The Times Guide to the Middle East. London: Times Books, 1991, P. 210.

(3.) Nur Masallah. The Palestinian Refugee Problem: Israeli Plans to Resettle the Palestinian Refugees 1948-1972. Ramallah: Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Center [shaml], 1996, p.2.

(4.) Martin Gilbert. The Arab-Israeli Conflict. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992, p. 54.

(5.) Ibid, p. 54.

(6.) Masallah. Op. Cit., p. 4.

(7.) Sluglett and Sluglett. Op. Cit., p. 222.

(8.) According to the Mideast Mirror, 13 October 1999, and to AlNahar, 9 November 1999, American officials have raised a number of proposals involving the transfer of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to other countries in the region (Iraq, Gulf States and Jordan). If none of these plans work out, American officials will seek reluctantly to arrange the naturalization of most refugees in Lebanon.

(9.) See, Charles Winslow. Lebanon: War and Politics in Fragmented Society. London and New York: Routledge, 1996; Robert Fisk. Pity the Nation. London: Andre Deutsche, Ltd., for the war period 1975-1989.

(10.) See, Edgar O'Balance. Civil War in Lebanon, 1975-1992. Great Britain, London: McMillan Press Ltd., 1998, p. 212.

(11.) Steven Edminister. "Trapped on All Side: The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon," U.S. Committee for Refugees, Washington, 1999, p. 11.

(12.) Rosemany Sayigh "Palestinians in Lebanon: Uncertain Future," in Peace For Lebanon, ed. by Deidre Collins, Lynne Reinner, 1994, p. 100

(13.) Daily Star. 28 November 1998.

(14.) Al-Nahar. 28 September 1998.

(15.) Al-Nahar. 27 November 1994.

(16.) Michel Edde. Speech by the former minister at the Universite Saint Joseph. 26 November 1999.

(17.) Al-Hayat. 13 March 2000.

(18.) Al-Nahar. 12 February 1997.

(19.) Al-Nahar. 29 July 1999.

(20.) Naamatallah Abi-Nasr. Conference on the "Palestinians in Lebanon: Between Naturalization and Resettlement," University of Kaslik, Jounieh, Lebanon. December 1999.

(21.) The religious groups were represented according to the following order: 29% Maronites, 9% Greek-Orthodox, 10% Greek-Catholics, 27% Shiites, 18% Sunnis and 7% Druze.

(22.) The age distribution of the respondents included 40% in the category of 18-25 years, 32% in the category of 26-35 years, 18% in the category 36-45 years and 11% in the category 46 years and older. The socioeconomic status of the respondents was also mixed since it included 6% upper class, 62% middle class and 32% working class respondents.

(23.) Educationally 9% of the respondents completed elementary education, 33% said they had completed secondary education and 58% received college education.

(24.) The sample size initially envisaged by the researcher was 1342 but the study was terminated after 1073 interviews were realized, with a completion rate of 80%.

(25.) Julie Peteet. Identity Crisis. Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon. Worldwide Refugee Information, U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1999, p. 28.

(26.) Rosemarry Sayigh, "Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future," Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn 1995, Vol.25, No.1, p.42.

(27.) Rosemary Sayigh. "Dis/Solving the Refugee Problem." Middle-East Report. Summer 1998, p. 22.

(28.) Helena Cobban. The PLO. People, Power and Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1984, p.47.

(29.) Rosemary Sayigh, "Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future," Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.25, No.1 (Autumn 1995), p.40.

(30.) Daily Star. 7 November 1998.

(31.) Al-Nahar. 28 July 1999

(32.) "Bashir Gemayel's 'Foreign Policy."' Publications of The Bashir Gemayel Foundation, 1999, p.12.

(33.) Middle East Insight, March-April 2000, vol. 15, no. 2, p. 31.

(34.) In Israel, giving Palestinians social and economic rights did not cause them to lose their identity. This point was discussed in "The Conference on the Palestinians in Lebanon" held at Oxford in 1996. Those who supported granting "civil rights to Palestinians" maintained that if Palestinians were allowed to work in the formal sector they would contribute taxes to the state and thereby benefit the Lebanese economy.

(35.) On 9 November 1999, a local newspaper, Al-Nahar, spoke of US plans to pressure Lebanon to accept a portion of its Palestinian community as permanent citizens. Later, the Herald Tribune (13 December 1999) highlighted once more Lebanon's concerns toward its Palestinian population. In addition, various articles spoke of alleged US and Canadian plots to resettle Palestinians in Lebanon.

(36.) Sarkis Naum. "Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: National, Sectarian and Confessional Considerations." Al-Wasat. 29 August 1994.

(37.) MTV Television. Beirut, 11 November 1999.

(38.) Al-Hayat. 30 September 1999

(39.) Al-Diyar. 8 March 2000.

(40.) Hilal Khashan and Simon Haddad. "The Coupling of the Syrian-Lebanese Tracks: Beirut's Options." Security Dialogue, volume 3, no. 2 June 2000, pp. 201-204.