Russia-NATO strategic partnership: problems, prospects.

Contacts and cooperation between Russia and NATO began to develop in the early 1990s. To make a comprehensive, all-round analysis of the current situation and the difficulties that had to be dealt with along this path, it is important to view these relations in a historical context.

A little more than a decade has passed since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. It took some time for partnership to be established. First steps were made in 1991, when Russia became a founding member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, (a) then, in 1994, acceding to the Partnership for Peace Program. A real groundwork for a sound, long-term partnership between Russia and NATO, however, was laid with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (May 27, 1997), with the sides stating their mutual commitment to building a durable peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. The sides' obligations under the Act are crucial: "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation. The present Act reaffirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe, whole and free, to the benefit of all its peoples. Making this commitment at the highest political level marks the beginning of a fundamentally new relationship between NATO and Russia. They intend to develop, on the basis of common interest, reciprocity and transparency a strong, stable and enduring partnership." (1)

Pursuant to the Founding Act, the Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council was established as a deliberative body for regular consultations on security matters of common interest. Subsequently a broad program for practical cooperation in the sphere of security and defense was worked out and progress made in strengthening mutual trust. In the interest of closer cooperation, on March 18, 1998, Russia's mission to NATO was established. Yet the air strikes against Yugoslavia in 1999 caused serious disagreements and the Russia-NATO Joint Permanent Council suspended its work, but then relations began to normalize gradually.

In the wake of the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, Russia and NATO decided to take their relations up to a new level. As a result, on May 28, 2002, at the Rome Summit, Russia and NATO agreed to institute a new Russia-NATO Council to evaluate prospects for cooperation in the "G-20" format.

The Russia-NATO Council gives priority to matters of common interest, arising from the Founding Act. Cooperation is intensifying in a number of key areas, above all the war on terror, crisis resolution, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, confidence building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, and cooperation in civil emergencies.

The value of Russia-NATO partnership manifests itself on the practical level. From January 1996, Russian peacekeepers took part in forging a peace settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia played an important role in ending the conflict in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo where a Russian military contingent was based from June 1999 until July 2002.

On March 13, 1996, NATO and the Russian Ministry for Affairs of Civil Defense, Emergency Situations, and Elimination of Natural Disasters (MChS) signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Emergency Planning and Disaster Preparedness. Various exercises in disaster relief, seminars and symposiums with the participation of other partner states and international organizations facilitate military-civilian cooperation.

Considerable progress has been made recently in advancing cooperation, transparency and trust in search and rescue at sea. Following the sinking of the Kursk nuclear submarine in August 2000, in December of the same year, Russia and NATO agreed a work out program on search and rescue at sea.

Science is yet another key area of Russia-NATO cooperation. In May 1998, a memorandum on mutual understanding concerning scientific-technical cooperation between the Russian Ministry of Science and Technology and NATO was signed.

The main focus in military cooperation is on strengthening Russia's and NATO's capability for joint peacekeeping operations. Russia and NATO have shared interests in matters of military reform and modernization of the armed forces. Although cooperation in this sphere is still embryonic, we have an opportunity to use the experience of NATO member countries, many of which have carried out radical reforms to downsize their armed forces, making them more mobile and enhancing their operational effectiveness and ability to meet modern security threats.

Russia and NATO hold regular consultations on methods of dealing with new security challenges, such as terrorism and proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as proliferation of ballistic missile technology.

The rationale behind the need for closer cooperation between Russia and NATO is very simple: It is better to deal with common security challenges through concerted efforts. The decision to deepen this partnership by establishing the Russia-NATO Council highlighted their shared commitment to strengthen interaction and make a decisive contribution to achieving the long standing share goal of building a stable, peaceful and undivided Europe.

Yet are Russia-NATO relations entirely cloudless and trouble free? Could there be a recurrence of another "Kosovo crisis"?

It should be borne in mind that the format of this cooperation has changed. The alliance now comprises 26 member states, seven of which--Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia--joined NATO after the Rome Summit. Although the basic approaches in Russia-NATO relations have not formally changed during this time, the facts speak otherwise. Four of the newly admitted states (the Baltic republics and Slovenia) are not party to the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which means that both de jure and de facto, infrastructure components of offensive forces of third states, directed against the Russian Federation, could be deployed on their territory. NATO has assured Russia that the alliance's new members will adhere to the obligations arising from the CFE Treaty, eventually acceding to it. So far these are only declarations. For some reason, they are not in a particular hurry to ratify the CFE, which was signed in Istanbul on November 19, 1999. (2) The situation calls for a new level of military-political transparency in the alliance's activities, as well as concrete efforts to eliminate the gray area in Europe.

Brussels links the ratification of this treaty to Russia completing the withdrawal of its troops from Georgia and the Trans Dniester region. It will be recalled that neither Georgia nor Moldova, both of which are party to the Treaty, has challenged the status of Russian military bases in their territory, especially since the problem of force withdrawal from Georgia has in effect already been resolved and a withdrawal procedure coordinated and agreed.

NATO enlargement remains a sensitive issue for Russia's entire society. The Russian position is immutable: We are against CIS states being admitted to the military bloc. For some reason, the alliance does not respond to Russia's concerns about the situation in the post-Soviet area. This is part of a general policy trend--to isolate Russia from its allies in the military sphere.

Russia should fully take into account the alliance's strategy of spreading its influence to countries neighboring Russia in the west, south and south east, uphold its interests, show strong will, make no concessions, and pursue a pragmatic and effective foreign policy. This raises a number of questions. First, why do we have to cooperate with NATO at all? Second, what could be the practical payoff from this interaction? And finally, in what areas is it expedient to develop military cooperation with the alliance?

To some extent, an answer to these questions was given in the statement by the Russian president at the 2002 Rome Summit: "We have come a long way from confrontation to dialogue, from opposition to cooperation. We have adopted a declaration that lays down the basic principles of interaction, established a mechanism in the form of a new Russia-NATO council, and identified tentative areas for joint efforts. So we strongly hope that the Rome document is not just a statement of intent, but a sound foundation for joint, constructive work." (3)

The NATO chiefs of states attending the summit said that they would work together as equal partners. This is a very important historic fact. Five years after the Founding Act was adopted, the new declaration for the first time ever recorded the principle of equal participation between Russia and NATO.

There is no doubt that prospects for further cooperation between Russia and NATO will hinge on how soon the alliance can overcome the inertia of the Cold War and readjust to meet new security challenges and threats.

Practical interaction with NATO in countering new global threats to international security is not the only condition (but a very important one) for Russia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic security system. In the absence of such interaction, this integration will be incomplete, while the Russia-NATO Council will not become its core element.

At the same time, full-scale and full-fledged cooperation between Russia and NATO is impossible without military cooperation programs in such spheres as fighting international terrorism, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and regional stability problems.

Joint planning and conduct of military operations requires the interoperability of reconnaissance, command and control and communication systems of Russian and NATO forces. This problem was highlighted by the Russia-NATO Council session in Moscow on March 14 and 15, 2005. The participants noted with satisfaction that in the preceding 18 months, Russia and NATO had organized and conducted more than 60 various activities, with another 50 planned before the end of 2005, many of them designed to facilitate the training and preparation of Russian military servicemen for participation in future joint operations with NATO. The question arises: Can Russia participate in a joint operation with NATO countries outside Europe? The answer is yes and no. Today, it is not easy to identify a geographic area beyond Europe where Russian and NATO interests and priorities would coincide to such a degree as to make it possible to talk not only about the possibility of conducting peacekeeping operations but also interaction between rapid response forces in the foreseeable future.

For well known reasons, Russia is not directly involved in either the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan or in international security forces deployed in Kabul under the aegis of the UN. As for Iraq, Russia's position here is clear: It is among the countries that opposed the operation to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime by force.

Still, it cannot be ruled out that the situation in regions in which NATO is showing heightened interest (Central Asia and the Transcaucasus) could destabilize in the foreseeable future. In such regions, Russia and NATO should learn to come to terms as to the mechanisms of joint response and crisis management, including military action. Such actions, providing, not excluding, Russia's participation, would be in compliance with the principle of joint responsibility for the resolution of internal conflicts.

These steps should be supplemented with the conceptual elaboration of political aspects of joint response to crises, requiring not only the maintenance of peace but also possible intervention in the interest of preventing a crisis or stopping its escalation. Framework political documents coordinated within the Russia-NATO Council should be backed by a system of concrete military cooperation. (b)

Nonetheless, despite the positive signs, there are some impediments to the development of military cooperation between Russia and NATO. These include insufficient language proficiency and the lack of targeted funding for such programs. This weakens the effectiveness of such cooperation.

It is the view of the present author that a new military cooperation model will need to be built. As is known, NATO gives priority to command and staff exercises in rehearsing command and control of troops, interaction, logistic support, etc. The most challenging task here will be the integration of Russian senior officers and generals into command and control agencies. Russian representatives will need to have an ability to work independently with documents in English, communicate with higher command and their subordinates, issue clear orders and clearly understand orders from their superiors.

In forecasting the development of military cooperation within the Russia-NATO Council, it is necessary to improve the methodology of planning, preparation and conduct of joint exercises. Staff officers and generals should have skills in organizing activities in such spheres of military cooperation as special operations, redeployment of troops, psychological and information operations, and logistic support in interaction between international forces. In the longer term, Russia's participation in the Euro-Atlantic security system should be geared toward closer interaction between Russian and NATO armed forces. This cooperation will make Russia's military reform more focused.

Further military cooperation will enhance the Russian-NATO capabilities to work together within the framework of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

One extremely important step toward effective military cooperation between Russia and NATO would be the institution of new long-term cooperation mechanisms under the auspices of the Russia-NATO Council. Russia and NATO should build a new strategic partnership, which will bring considerable benefits, going far beyond mutual interests.

NOTES:

1. Osnovopolagayushchiy akt o vzaimnykh otnosheniyakh, sotrudnichestve i bezopasnosti mezhdu Rossiyskoy Federatsiey i NATO (Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). 1110, Brussels, 1997, p. 3.

2. Sistemnaya istoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy, 1918-2003, in 4 vols, Vol. 4, p. 446.

3. Russia-NATO Council. The Rome Summit. 1110, Brussels, 2002, p. 17.

Lt. Gen. A.I. VORONIN

Member of the Federation Council Defense and Security Committee

Alexander Ivanovich VORONIN was born on July 12, 1936, in the village of Yelkhovka, Sergievskiy Rayon, Kuybyshev Oblast; served in the USSR and RF Armed Forces for over 40 years; the M.V. Frunze Orel Tank School (1956), the V.I. Lenin Military-Political Academy (1969), the Military Academy of the General Staff (1980); the Volga Military District, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the Trans Baykal Military District, and the Far East Military District; in 1990-1993, people's deputy of the Russian Federation; at present, a member of the Federation Council Defense and Security Committee; since 1996, a member of the RF Federal Assembly delegation at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

(a) The North Atlantic Cooperation Council is a special body for regular consultations on security and stability in Europe, which started working on December 20, 1991 (it originally comprised 25 states). The organization was established as a body to promote multilateral contacts between Central European, Baltic, and CIS countries on the one side, and NATO on the other, without becoming NATO members since the enlargement of the North Atlantic alliance by admitting some states and rejecting others, not surprisingly, caused a number of military-strategic problems.

(b) Such a program, Vzaimodeystvie Rossii v meropriyatiyakh Severoatlanticheskogo alyansa, has been developed by the NATO Defense Planning Committee jointly with the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, and provides for constant monitoring as a platform for cooperation projects.