Russia's strategic deterrence: security functions and development prospects.

The nuclear arms race did not begin today or yesterday, but more than 65 years ago. It was triggered by Nazi Germany. Back in 1938, Otto Hahn, a German radiation chemist, discovered that under certain conditions the uranium nucleus could be split into fission fragments. From that moment work began on building a heavy water uranium reactor as the first step toward making the nuclear bomb. But Nazi Germany was unable to complete the work as in 1944 the only heavy water plant, in Norway, was destroyed by allied air strikes.

World War II ended in 1945 with nuclear weapons being used against Japanese cities--not, however, by Germany, which had been the first to start working on the uranium warhead, but by the United States. From that moment the race began to build nuclear weapons. Five states eventually acquired nuclear weapons. Importantly, the nuclear weapons capability acquired by the Soviet Union after World War II prevented a new world war.

The quantitative and qualitative parity in nuclear missile weapons with the United States that was achieved in the 1970s-1980s reaffirmed the Soviet Union's role as the second superpower. During this period Soviet-U.S. relations were invariably marked by a glaring gap between confrontational official policies and the relatively stable condition of their relations.

In the early 1990s, the new Soviet leaders harbored unrealistic hopes that Russia's good intentions were sufficient cause for a radical restructuring of relations between the former adversaries (Russia would join NATO as a full-fledged member, would accede to the U.S. missile defense system as a full-fledged U.S. ally, and so on and so forth). This, however, was not what happened in practice.

Russia's nuclear capability still worries the United States. Since the latest election campaign in the United States--that is to say, since last fall--high priority has been given (especially within the Democratic Party of the United States) to the idea of pulling out Russia's "nuclear sting" by establishing "international" control over Russian nuclear installations and facilities.

The emergence of a new threat on the part of international terrorist organizations led the Russian and U.S. presidents, V.V. Putin and George W. Bush, respectively, to proclaim strategic partnership as their shared goal. At their meeting in Bratislava on February 24, 2005, they signed a statement on security cooperation in the nuclear sphere which brought up two new elements. First, assistance to third countries in ensuring their nuclear security and second, cooperation in implementing any necessary measures should weapons of mass destruction fall into terrorist hands.

On the issue of strategic stability, in the past few years Russia and the United States have signed a number of bilateral treaties on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, including the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, reducing the number of nuclear warheads to 1,700 to 2,200 by the year 2012. We believe that the need for strategic deterrence will remain substantial political justification for preserving nuclear weapons for a long time yet.

Simultaneously with the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2002, the United States adopted a new military doctrine, presenting a new view on the composition and tasks of the strategic triad (see Figure).

Analysis of the composition of the nuclear triad, especially the offensive forces, leads to the conclusion that the new U.S. triad comprises both nuclear and non-nuclear offensive forces and assets, active defense (missile and air defense) and passive defense assets, and a modernized structure of rapid reaction forces. The adoption of the new U.S. nuclear doctrine shows that the United States still adheres to the doctrine of achieving and maintaining military-strategic superiority. By contrast, the USSR (Russia) has all times pursued the objective of deterring aggression. Nor does Russia today seek confrontation with the United States.

Thus, the RF Military Doctrine (Article 8) states that nuclear weapons are a factor in deterring aggression and ensuring military security. They can be used in response to nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction being used against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies as well as in response to a large scale act of aggression with the use of conventional weapons in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation. Therefore the two sides have distinctly opposite military political objectives.

Clearly, since the sides have different military political objectives while the U.S. strategic offensive forces include a non-nuclear capability, the task of achieving and maintaining strategic deterrence in peacetime conditions based on the parity of the quantitative compositions of strategic weapon systems becomes virtually intractable for Russia. In these conditions we should constantly expect new U.S. breakthroughs in the operational/strategic and (or) military technical spheres, which will ensure the United States military strategic superiority by developing and deploying new strategic weapon systems as it sees fit.

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This prioritizes the problem not of maintaining the balance of the quantitative parameters of the sides' strategic forces, but the problem of maintaining the balance of their strategic weapons capabilities. Without effective strategic missile and nuclear weapons Russia will not be in a position to maintain a balance of combat capabilities.

It is also important to note one distinguishing feature of the present time, specifically that nuclear weapons, which constitute the foundation of our security and strategic stability, could eventually become a security threat for us--not, however, within the framework of bilateral relations but on the part of third countries. This situation could set a new precedent in the Russian-U.S. relations.

So it seems expedient to clarify the concept of deterring aggression and preserving strategic stability at least along the two following lines: clarification of the basic propositions of the nuclear deterrence system, taking into account the creation and deployment of the strategic defensive system in the United States and the appearance of strategic offensive nuclear weapons in third countries; and the development and creation of the necessary assets for non-nuclear deterrence, taking into account the possibility of the proliferation in the world of strategic offensive non-nuclear weapons.

First. The concept of nuclear deterrence.

According to reports in the foreign press, the U.S. Single Integrated Operational Plan, SIOP 2000, provides for 65 options of limited nuclear strikes against Russia with two to 120 warheads. In some cases, up to 1,000 warheads are to be used against nuclear installations in the Russian Federation.

The main principle in deterring nuclear aggression in the process of building the strategic nuclear forces in the USSR and the Russian Federation has been the maintenance of a rough balance (parity) of strategic nuclear forces with the United States in their combat composition and combat capabilities within the limits of the existing strategic offensive reductions treaties. Given the severe budgetary constraints in the Russian Federation, it is necessary to give a more clear-cut definition to the notion of "strategic nuclear parity."

A side's nuclear deterrence capability is characterized by its ability to deliver to the opposing side's territory a specified number of warheads with the required effectiveness of impact under any situational conditions.

It is known that a massed missile nuclear strike in the course of retaliatory action can be delivered in the form of a launch under attack, a retaliatory (counter force retaliation) strike under attack, and a retaliatory strike after attack. The successful accomplishment of tasks in a counter force retaliation strike requires the constant modernization of the missile attack warning system, above all, of its principal element--the space component.

The level of damage inflicted on the opposing side is predicated on the number of warheads delivered to its territory (guaranteed delivery). According to experts at the RF Academy of Military Sciences, the critical level of damage that is necessary for deterring an adversary can be assumed at up to 30 percent to 35 percent of its production capacities and up to 20 percent to 25 percent of its population. This hypothetical level of damage can be inflicted on the adversary should 400 to 500 standard (equivalent) warheads be delivered to its territory in the course of a retaliatory strike. This value--the number of warheads delivered to the territory of a possible adversary--can be assumed as the upper limit of damage sufficient for deterring the adversary.

With the U.S. deployment of a missile defense system and further reductions of strategic nuclear forces under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the guaranteed delivery of this number of warheads to an adversary's territory in the course of a retaliation strike after attack becomes an unrealistic task. The required number of warheads can be delivered to an adversary's territory in the best case scenario, with a counter force retaliation strike and in the worst case scenario, with a retaliatory strike under attack.

The minimum damage level can be established on the basis of the estimated combat capabilities of the U.S. missile defense system. Estimates show that depending on the combat composition of the missile defense system and its firepower, its combat capability to intercept warheads will vary from 30 to 35 units to the virtually complete neutralization of retaliatory action by the RF strategic nuclear forces. Assuming this, the threshold of vulnerability with regard to an adversary's territory is the ability of the strategic nuclear forces, with any missile defense system in place, to deliver 40 to 50 warheads in the most difficult (undesirable) form of a nuclear missile strike, which will correspond to a level of damage that is unacceptable to the United States.

Based on the aforementioned, the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence can be formulated as follows: If the combat capabilities of the strategic nuclear forces ensure the delivery to an adversary's territory under attack of at least 10 percent of the maximum level of 400 to 500 warheads, the possible adversary will hardly dare to carry out a preemptive strike against the Russian Federation even if it has a missile defense system.

As the combat capabilities of missile defenses increase, the probability of a disarming strike should be expected to grow. Therefore, in addition to military political measures, it is necessary to implement measures of a diplomatic nature, designed to ensure a considerable strengthening of the negotiating process and the preparation and signing at the first stage of at least a bilateral treaty with the United States not only on a balanced reduction of strategic offensive nuclear weapons but also of non-nuclear precision guided weapons and defense systems.

The present author believes that effective countering of an adversary's missile defenses will additionally require:

-- providing missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, capable of effectively overcoming missile defenses;

-- practicing ICBM launches on non-ballistic trajectories--i.e., with control not only by pitch tilt but also by azimuth; introducing low, extended low and changing azimuth trajectories, and preparing ICBM launches across the South Pole;

-- providing ICBM assets with missile warheads equipped with advanced EW systems.

We believe that the main military political objective of the international community today is the preservation of the established tri-polar nuclear model (countries of the NATO bloc--Russia-China) and the prevention of its transformation into a multi-polar nuclear model. The formation of new nuclear geo-poles will not only jeopardize the existing agreements between Russia and the United States in the nuclear weapons sphere but will even further escalate the general nuclear arms race.

As for the new nuclear states (India, Pakistan, and Israel) as well as nuclear states of the second and subsequent waves that have not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the principal efforts on the part of the international community here should be concentrated on preventing the military political leadership of these countries from pursuing global objectives. One objective indication of the absence of such goals is these countries' renunciation of intercontinental (global) nuclear weapon delivery means (ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers) as well as of their development and deployment programs. Taking into account their location, the maximum range of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles for new nuclear states must not endanger the vitally important centers of any state within the existing tri-polar nuclear model.

Fulfillment of this condition is predicated on the following requirements:

-- establishment by the nuclear club countries and the international community of quantitative and qualitative parameters for nuclear weapons ensuring regional stability;

-- coordinated monitoring by the nuclear club and the international community over the quantitative and qualitative parameters of the nuclear weapons deployed by new nuclear states on the regional level, and

-- implementation by the nuclear club countries and the international community of effective measures of a diplomatic (peacetime) and coercive (military) nature in the interest of forcing the new nuclear states to observe the established quantitative and qualitative parameters of the nuclear weapons deployed on the regional level as well as of regional stability.

Second. The concept of non-nuclear deterrence.

According to reports in the foreign press, the U.S. top political leadership decided to create and deploy as part of the strategic triad a new super-system (intelligence, planning, command, control and communication), including:

-- an offensive non-nuclear strategic system;

-- a single global integrated intelligence and information system comprised of the space, air, and ground components; and

-- a global electronic warfare (EW) system.

The high specifications of said systems and the prospect of their further development and integration into a single super-system show that the United States assigns an operational-strategic role to this super-system, which could eventually and to a considerable degree facilitate the achievement of military strategic objectives in a war:

-- delivery of a disabling strike against an adversary's strategic forces;

-- disruption of the operation of state and military command and control centers;

-- delivery of substantial strikes against an adversary's armed forces; and

-- disruption of the country's military-economic capability.

There is no doubt that the creation of such a super-system in the United States can seriously disturb military strategic stability in the world. As the supersystem's combat capabilities increase, it will be able to ensure the delivery of a disarming strike by precision guided weapons armed with conventional warheads against an adversary's strategic nuclear forces and a reduction in the deterrence capability of strategic nuclear weapons.

In the course of his European tour on March 2, 2005, RF Defense Minister S.B. Ivanov said that "in the present situation, it is not nuclear but chemical weapons that pose the greatest real danger to the civilized world." This necessitates the elaboration of a non-nuclear deterrence concept. It acquires increased topicality and practical relevance.

The concept of non-nuclear deterrence should be based on the same principle as the concept of nuclear deterrence, namely the ability of the country's strategic forces to ensure guaranteed punishment of an aggressor for starting hostilities. Considering that the infrastructure of any modern state contains environmentally hazardous installations, there is good reason to believe that the task of inflicting a guaranteed (disabling) level of damage on an adversary on a regional scale can be fulfilled by a grouping with a limited composition of precision guided conventional combat assets.

The development of a non-nuclear deterrence concept will necessitate further analysis of the possibility of creating and deploying precision guided ICBMs armed with conventional warheads based on the 100-ton class, silo launched liquid propellant strategic missile.

Generally, the military-political objectives of non-nuclear deterrence are as follows:

-- to deter an adversary from deploying a missile defense system with combat capabilities threatening Russia's nuclear deterrence capability, using diplomatic avenues at the first stage for creating conditions for negotiations on a balanced reduction of strategic offensive and defensive capabilities;

-- to deter the major nuclear powers from escalating armed conflicts (local wars) into regional (large scale) wars with the use of conventional weapons; and

-- to deter other nuclear powers from nuclear aggression.

Thus, nuclear weapons will remain the foundation of Russia's strategic deterrence and security for a long time to come. Their maintenance in a state of permanent combat readiness precludes surprise aggression against Russia or its allies due to the capability of the strategic nuclear forces to inflict assured unacceptable damage on an aggressor.

At the same time, the evolution of precision guided strategic non-nuclear weapons can reduce the deterring role of strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore it is necessary, already now, to implement diplomatic measures and reach agreement on limiting strategic non-nuclear weapon systems. Should it prove impossible to come to agreement through diplomacy Russia, in the interest of maintaining a credible strategic deterrence capability, will apparently have to develop precision guided missiles with conventional warheads.

Col. Gen. V.V. KOROBUSHIN

First vice president of the Academy of Military Sciences

Doctor of Military Sciences