Russia's national security problems in Transcaucasia and the era of globalization.

According to analysts and military specialists, the current geopolitical situation in Transcaucasia is characterized by dynamism, continued existence of hotbeds of armed conflicts and military-political tension, a clash of interstate and ethnic interests, and unstable and contradictory processes of formation of newly independent states in the context of continued rivalry over a redivision of spheres of influence and control of the region's strategic resources at regional and global levels.

There is every reason to believe that the situation in Transcaucasia in the early 21st century will be determined to a much greater extent than in the past by processes expected within each of the Transcaucasian states (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia), and also by their relations with Russia and by the nature and level of their cooperation with other leading countries of the world and with their southern neighbors (primarily Turkey and Iran).

At present, a solution of the geopolitical problems facing Russia in Transcaucasia is complicated by a number of adverse factors, namely: the policies of the ruling elites of Georgia and Azerbaijan, which largely associate the development prospects and the future of their countries with the West; the new global aspirations of the US and other NATO countries, which see this region as a zone of their strategic interests; the intense struggle for oil sources in the Caspian and routes of hydrocarbon transportation to world markets; unresolved international conflicts (Georgia-South Ossetia, Georgia-Abkhazia, Azerbaijan-Nagorny Karabakh-Armenia); and existing hotbeds of separatism and terrorism in the Russian Northern Caucasus.

Russia's relations in Transcaucasia with Azerbaijan and Georgia are particularly problematic. These two Transcaucasian states are actively looking for ways of integration into European economic and political structures and want to take part in the formation of a new security system based on Atlanticism. Their ruling elites are trying to overcome internal difficulties by using, among other things, the slogans and ideas of nationalism, pan-Turanism (Baku) or Westernism (Tbilisi), seeking to redirect the people's social discontent with the domestic situation toward a search for external causes of failures and setbacks. In pursuing such policies, they often enter into strategic interaction with each other and with other powers, often on an anti-Russian basis.

Azerbaijan associates its future in large measure with the establishment and development of new strategic relations with the US, Turkey and NATO and with attempts to play the Caspian oil card. At the same time, the country's political leaders are pursuing an intricate policy of lobbying for their interests in Russia.

Characteristically, a number of tactical successes in implementing this strategy have been scored by Azerbaijan solely because the desire of the republic's ruling elite to distance itself from Russia coincides with the plans of Russia's opponents (from among the Western countries) to exploit this situation in order to consolidate and expand their presence in Transcaucasia in close proximity to Russia's southern border.

One should note that Azerbaijan's attitude to Russia was artificially marred back in the Soviet period in connection with the armed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan's defeat in the Karabakh conflict further widened the rift between Moscow and Baku, led to a change in the latter's foreign-policy orientation and priorities, and then to a replacement of Russian interests in Azerbaijan with the geostrategic and oil interests of the US, other Western powers and Turkey. In addition to the republic's pivotal transport and communications positions, special importance now attaches to the military-geographical factor, since the West and Ankara regard Azerbaijan as a springboard for a possible geopolitical and economic push into Central Asia.

As its strategic benchmark, Azerbaijan has chosen the Turkish development model. Military-political and economic relations between the two countries are actively developing. Having scaled down its military cooperation with Russia and withdrawn from the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS States, Azerbaijan has deliberately and purposefully widened the circle of its Western partners as the basis for its new national security strategy. It has steadily developed its cooperation with NATO under the Partnership for Peace program (membership since 1994), which Baku regards as a prologue to the formation of a national security system based exclusively on Western military-political guarantees and as an opportunity for closer integration with NATO up to the point of accession to that alliance. NATO specialists assist Azerbaijan in defense planning and force development, in logistics, in training military personnel and special task forces, in arranging civil defense, etc. There is a regular exchange of political and military information and a functioning mechanism for political consultations. The NATO countries, Turkey in the first place, have in effect become involved in assisting Azerbaijan to defend its borders, including its air space, and provide assistance in technical equipment and in training border personnel. There is also a whole package of other programs for Azerbaijan's military cooperation with NATO and the US. Characteristically, the plans for NATO's eastward expansion, far from raising doubts or objections in the Azerbaijani political elite, are seen as an important factor in strengthening collective security in the region. An intensive militarization process is underway in the country. Today Azerbaijan's real military potential exceeds its officially declared potential and is significantly in excess of the quotas established for Azerbaijan by the OSCE Treaty.

One cannot fail to notice the periodic statements by Azerbaijani politicians about the possibility of deploying NATO military bases in the country's territory to counterbalance the Russian military base in Armenia. As they put it, this is dictated by Azerbaijan's striving "to restore the military-strategic balance disrupted by Armenia." One should note that such statements are in contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security between Russia and Azerbaijan. There is no doubt that the threat to deploy foreign military bases in the country is also used as a way of putting pressure on Russia in order to prevent its military cooperation with Armenia, which, in the opinion of Baku, is directed against Azerbaijan.

In spite of adherence to Western values, Azerbaijan's attitude to the West remains ambivalent. Baku has serious complaints against its Western partners over a number of key issues, primarily over a settlement of the Karabakh problem. The loss of 20% of the country's territory during the armed conflict and the presence of a million refugees in Azerbaijan are a heavy economic and moral burden for the Azeri society. It is believed that recent Western sympathies on the Karabakh problem more frequently lie with Armenia. The proposals made by the OSCE Minsk Group on Karabakh were seen in Baku as pro-Armenian.

Undisguised pressure on the part of leading Western states and international organizations was brought to bear on the Azerbaijani authorities before and during the 2003 presidential election. Its results were subjected to harsh criticism and in many respects were found to be inconsistent with international standards. At the same time, despite the reported violations, the election showed that today there is no alternative to Ilham Aliyev as the country's leader. In spite of difficult living conditions and numerous problems, the most challenging of which is a Karabakh settlement, the population voted for stability, law and order, as manifested in continuity of state power.

Today the US and Britain are taking diverse measures to unite the Azeri opposition for participation in the 2005 parliamentary election. Funds provided by the Soros Foundation are being used to develop a "package of democratic reforms" and to coordinate the drafting of a new election code for Azerbaijan.

In view of a lack of so-called "democratic transformations," the US and the International Monetary Fund have reduced the amount of financial aid to Baku. In contrast to Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan has not been included in the US Millennium Challenge program.

In foreign-policy strategy, there is no denying the fact that in its policy of restoring the country's territorial integrity and counteracting the military-political cooperation between Russia and Armenia, Azerbaijan intends to continue relying on influential international organizations, the US and Turkey.

Consequently, a dangerous (including military) confrontation with the possible involvement not only of regional, but also of world powers is brewing in the region. There are plans to build a regional security system with the participation of the US, NATO, the European Union, and Turkey, in which Russia would be assigned a secondary role.

In the opinion of specialists, a major catalyst for the emerging configuration of forces is provided by Caspian oil, and also by TRACECA, a Europe-Caucasus-Asia transport project barring Russia from world freight flows. Although so far there are no major strategically important pipelines in the region, while the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline is to be put into service in 2005, the question of military guarantees for the security of main oil pipelines is already on the agenda. If events follow this scenario, some elements of a joint Azerbaijan-NATO military infrastructure are a perfectly realistic prospect.

As regards relations with Russia, Azerbaijan undoubtedly takes into account the age-old historical ties between the two countries. It is prepared to reckon with Russia's strategic role and its interests in the region but, as Baku invariably emphasizes, "not at the expense of Azerbaijan's sovereignty." Baku mainly reproaches Moscow for its allegedly one-sided pro-Armenian position on the most painful issue for Azerbaijan: resolution of the Karabakh dispute. At the same time, some positive features have recently been recorded in Russian-Azerbaijani relations. The two countries' positions on matters relating to the status and division of the Caspian Sea are drawing closer together.

The prospects for the development of Russian-Azerbaijani relations will in large part continue to depend, in my view, on progress in resolving the problem of the Karabakh conflict and its negative consequences. According to Azerbaijan, Russia's role in settling the conflict is inadequate and has a pro-Armenian bias. That is why the Azerbaijani leadership takes a sufficiently reserved attitude to the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation. In resolving the Karabakh dispute, Baku intends to use the weight and influence of the Western countries and authoritative international organizations. It is to be expected that given the serious geostrategic interests of the US, Britain, other Western countries, and also Turkey, the EU and the OSCE, their participation in resolving the Karabakh problem will increase.

Russia's relations with Azerbaijan could be influenced by the development of the internal political situation in the republic. Thus, the situation in the country could take a turn for the worse in view of the dissatisfaction expressed by the opposition over the results of the presidential election held in October 2003 and its intentions to go over to more radical forms of protest.

Azerbaijan has to cope with sufficiently dangerous and intensifying ethnic problems (Lezghians, Talyshes), which should not escape Russia's attention, since they carry a charge that destabilizes the situation in the south of Russia, primarily in Daghestan. They fuel disintegrative trends and under certain circumstances could provoke undesirable events in the Northern Caucasus.

Azerbaijan has problems with neighboring Iran, which has a large Azeri diaspora. The Iranian side is naturally put on guard by the appeals and policy statements of some Azerbaijani political organizations and movements: to seek the reunification of all Azeris within a single "Greater Azerbaijan."

In recent years, serious problems for the security of Russia have arisen from the Georgian direction. According to experts, the Georgian political elite and a significant part of Georgian society have turned out to be unprepared for an independent and responsible solution of national development problems based on self-reliance in the conditions of a sovereign state. The ambitions of Georgian politicians have come into conflict with the extremely weak economic potential of the new Georgian state; they have served to divorce Georgia from Russia and reorient it toward the West. As a result, the Georgian leadership has fallen into political and economic dependence on the sponsor countries (US, Turkey), which demand certain concessions from Tbilisi.

The internal political and economic situation in Georgia is far from stable. It is characterized by persistent socioeconomic tensions, low living standards of most of the population coupled with large-scale corruption in the upper echelons of Georgian society, the existence of separatist trends and regional isolation, and lack of visible prospects for a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts. The country is living at the expense of international aid and Western credits.

The Georgian regional elites, seeing no sign of constructive assistance from Tbilisi, are often obliged to act on their own, with the result that the republic has split into separate enclaves only nominally dependent on the center. Thus, Mengrelia and Javakhetia, just as until recently Adjaria, in effect exist quite autonomously.

A particularly painful problem is that of ensuring Georgia's territorial integrity. The civil war has led to a de facto withdrawal from Georgia of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Not wishing to reunify with Georgia, the population of these republics seeks to be admitted to Russian citizenship as a way of securing their own and their children's future. Difficult talks aimed at resolving these conflicts, despite mediation efforts by Russia, the United Nations and the OSCE, have not brought the parties' positions on basic issues closer together to any significant degree.

In foreign policy, the Georgian leadership has demonstrated a steady intention to move in the direction of closer ties with the West, integration into European structures, and full membership of the Atlantic security system.

In the absence of significant development resources, the Georgian leadership seeks to use as a resource of this kind the country's geostrategic position, its possible role as an important connecting element in international traffic arteries running through the Caucasus. Georgia's role in this capacity could be very significant indeed in the event of implementation of the large-scale Eurasian transport project TRACECA and projects for the transportation of hydrocarbons from the Caspian zone to world markets.

At the end of January 1999, Georgia was admitted to the Council of Europe. The Western presence in Georgia has gained considerable influence. The preparatory work for Georgia's phased integration into the NATO system has been completed. Today the republic is one of the most active and interested participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace program. Its armed forces are being adapted to NATO standards, notably under the US Train and Equip program. The Georgian military-political leadership regards participation in these programs as a key factor of ensuring national security. President Mikhail Saakashvili, who came to power as the result of a velvet revolution in November 2003, is firmly resolved in the near future to prepare the country for NATO accession. As part of the active cooperation between Tbilisi and NATO, Georgia has been granted the right to acquire arms and military equipment in NATO countries; military personnel for the Georgian armed forces are trained at NATO educational institutions; Georgia takes part in military exercises jointly with Western partners, etc. In this sphere, close to or over a hundred events are scheduled every year. These include large-scale naval exercises in the zone of oil terminals designed to accomplish training missions in protecting sea lanes and escorting tankers.

Georgia's relations with neighboring Turkey in the military field are developing intensively.

There is reason to believe that in spite of a declared intention to build relations with Russia on the terms of long-term strategic partnership, Georgia is inclined to take part in coalitions set up on an anti-Russia basis or capable of acquiring an anti-Russian orientation. Georgia is an active member of GUAM (an organization which also includes Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova). The country's involvement in implementing the plans to establish a Eurasian transportation corridor has steadily increased. The Georgian leadership regards this Western-promoted project as a crucial condition of the republic's economic revival and is doing its utmost to ensure that Georgia plays a key role in it. The project is materializing as new transportation facilities are put into service in order to create freight flows between the countries of Europe, Transcaucasia and Central Asia as an alternative to those running through Russia and to extend them further to the east (pipelines Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum).

In effect the entire complex of relations with Russia, both bilateral and within the CIS framework, is seen in Tbilisi through the prism of obtaining unilateral advantages without reciprocal obligations. In particular, Georgian politicians are urging Russia to ensure the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity by exerting influence on Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In spite of the significant contribution of the Russian peacekeepers to maintaining peace between Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali (fulfillment by them, in complicated conditions, of their duties in full measure in accordance with the prescribed status of neutral intermediary), the Georgian leadership keeps expressing dissatisfaction with their activities and insists on involving them in the performance of functions alien to them in forcing Abkhazia and South Ossetia to fulfill the settlement conditions laid down by Tbilisi. Periodically threatening to raise the question of a withdrawal of the Russian peacekeeping force from Abkhazia, Tbilisi is setting the stage for a replacement of the Russian peacekeepers in the zone of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict by a multilateral peacekeeping force under UN auspices. Among the options being considered is the possibility of applying enforcement measures to Abkhazia according to the Bosnian or Kosovo scenario. Today the whole burden of performing disengagement functions lies on the Russian contingent. Judging from the current situation, one can say that a withdrawal of the peacekeepers from the conflict zone will inevitably lead to a resumption of the armed conflict.

In April 2000, Georgia, just as Azerbaijan, refused to renew its participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty, and even before that it stopped using the services of Russian border guards and is now guarding its state border on its own. Considering that Georgian border forces are not prepared to fully perform the assigned missions, this creates serious difficulties in ensuring Russia's security. This problem is particularly urgent in the context of the antiterrorist operation being conducted in Chechnya.

The Georgian side is insisting on an early withdrawal of Russian military facilities from the country's territory. But people living in Javakhetia and Adjaria are against a withdrawal of the military bases from Akhalkalaki and Batumi, since they provide the only opportunity to get a job.

According to specialists, a withdrawal of the Russian bases from Georgia will reduce Russia's opportunities to react to an adverse development of the military-political situation in Transcaucasia and will to some extent impede the implementation of plans to recreate an integrated antimissile and air defense system in the territory of the CIS countries. Evidently, a withdrawal of the Russian bases from Georgian territory will remove the last barriers to the advance of NATO military structures into Transcaucasia.

Russian-Georgian relations are complicated by the existence of a visa regime, because this prevents a free inflow of foreign exchange in the amount of up to a billion dollars per year from Georgian citizens living in Russia (whose number is variously estimated at 700 thousand to 1 million persons).

Russia's relations in Transcaucasia are particularly stable with Armenia. The main contributing factors here are as follows: Armenia's unfriendly environment, the economic blockade and the continued military-political confrontation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and also the unresolved Karabakh problem.

As a very important part of Transcaucasia, Armenia, by virtue of its geographical and geopolitical position and its specific historical ties with Russia, is not only Moscow's effective ally, but also a strategic springboard for Russian influence in the Caucasus.

The priorities of Armenia's present leadership in the field of foreign policy are primarily designed to ensure national interests, strengthen national independence and security, resolve the Karabakh problem, and attract significant financial assistance from abroad in order to overcome the grave consequences of the war and the socioeconomic crisis. In implementing its political line, Armenia takes a multipronged, pragmatic and flexible approach, combining integration processes both with Western structures and with the CIS states. In its relations with NATO, it has taken a balanced stand and seeks to build these relations with due regard for the tasks of its military-political partnership with Russia. And in developing its cooperation with Russia, Yerevan seeks to put them into the context of global processes at work in the world, closely following the current development of Russia-US-NATO relations and projecting their possible pattern in the future. Armenia has signed virtually all the joint documents of multilateral cooperation within the CIS framework. At the same time, it is cautious in its assessment of the effectiveness of CIS mechanisms and is in no hurry to join the common customs area. The country's leaders think it premature to raise this question, although more than a million signatures have already been collected in support of such a move.

In the Transcaucasian region, Armenia seeks to maintain even relations with Georgia. At the same time, Yerevan's attitude to Tbilisi is somewhat wary in view of the latter's advances to Turkey and its political and economic union with Baku.

Armenia's traditional distrust of Turkey, which is seen by Yerevan as the main external threat, is an important circumstance providing a solid basis for Russian-Armenian cooperation for some time to come.

Armenia has no diplomatic relations with Turkey, which creates serious economic difficulties for it and, in the opinion of Western states, prevents the implementation of major pipeline-transport projects between Europe and Asia. In the recent period, Turkey's hostile stand with respect to Armenia has once again come into focus in connection with the positive consideration by the parliaments of a number of leading countries of the world (in particular, France) of the issue of international recognition of the guilt of the Ottoman Empire in the 1915 genocide of Armenians. The adoption of anti-Turkish resolutions in European parliaments has already given a new twist to the spiral of tension in relations between the two neighboring countries, putting off the problem of establishment of diplomatic relations between them for an indefinite period. As a condition for the establishment of such relations, Turkey is insisting on Armenia's withdrawal of the genocide issue from the agenda and on a settlement of the Karabakh problem.

Relations with Iran have a special place in Armenia's regional policy. Their development shows that Iran is interested in the strengthening of Armenia as an independent and self-sufficient state capable of becoming a long-term partner of Iran in its regional rivalry with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Turkey's new ally. Relations between the two countries are developing quite successfully, which points to an emerging long-term partnership between the two states. In the opinion of experts, closer relations between Armenia and Iran, far from being in contradiction with Russia's strategy in Transcaucasia, are turning into an important independent factor in containing Atlanticism and Turkish influence.

In spite of Armenia's close military-political relations with Russia, one should expect to see the development of active ties between Yerevan and the leading Western countries, primarily Britain, France and the US. Russia should be prepared for US attempts to change Yerevan's pro-Russian orientation through a rapprochement between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the search for ways to resolve the Karabakh problem, which is very important for the West from the standpoint of achieving regional stability and safe access to Caspian oil, especially as regards its transportation to world markets. The Armenian leadership will continue to be subjected to consistent pressure for the liquidation of the Russian military base, a gradual narrowing of the scope of cooperation with Russia and a scaling down of relations with Iran.

The results of this pressure are already becoming evident in Armenia's foreign policy. The US presence in Yerevan is on the increase and may reach a scale undesirable for Russia. Washington's political and diplomatic activity (as a counterweight to the Russian presence) with active involvement of the wealthy and influential Armenian diaspora abroad will evidently continue to increase, with a corresponding increase in the influence exerted on the country's political elite.

So far it appears that the fundamental importance of the Russian factor is still one of the main foreign-policy priorities for the republic. In the conditions of Western and NATO penetration into the post-Soviet space, Turkey's expansionist policy in the Caucasus and intensification of the activities of fundamentalist forces and regimes, Armenia is objectively becoming Russia's stable and reliable geopolitical ally not only in the South Caucasus, but also throughout Hither Asia.

In the current situation, in Washington's view, a weakening of the pro-presidential forces in Armenia and Robert Kocharian's positions will mean a victory for a "policy of complementarity and balance" in Yerevan's foreign-policy relations. Experts believe that this is the reason why Western observers have criticized the parliamentary and presidential elections in the republic in 2003 and 2004, describing them as undemocratic.

The problem of a Karabakh settlement remains a significant component of the military-political situation in Armenia and in the region. According to political scientists, the state of the republic's economy raises the urgent question of Armenia's integration into the world economic community. However, according to available estimates, the Karabakh confrontation is a significant obstacle in the way of business activity, an inflow in investment and implementation of projects in the region. In this context, the US and a number of other Western states are trying to draw Armenia into regional affairs to a maximum extent. An important condition here is a peaceful resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in exchange for Armenia's participation in oil, transportation and other projects that will allegedly bring economic prosperity to the entire Transcaucasian region, including Armenia.

The hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian basin have become a key factor in the development of the situation in Transcaucasia. Owing to the substantial reserves of oil and gas discovered in the Caspian zone, this region has become one of the most dynamic centers of political and business activity in the world.

In the view of specialists, the importance of the Caspian-Caucasian region is due not so much to its hydrocarbon reserves (such reserves located under the Caspian Sea are estimated at 10-14 billion tons of equivalent fuel or 3% of explored world reserves) as to the close proximity of major oil and gas producers, both current and future. Azerbaijan is one of the most promising oil producing states on the Caspian, given the size of its reserves and the quality of oil, its developed infrastructure, well-trained personnel and proximity to communication lines.

Matters relating to the transportation of oil and gas to foreign markets and the division of Caspian resources, which involves a formulation and acceptance by all the Caspian states of a common standpoint on the status of this inland sea, remain serious regional problems. Today there is a growing mass of contradictions and rivalries around these problems. The closely intertwined opposing strategic interests of regional and leading nonregional states and the emergence of new "centers of attraction" lead to the formation of a potential hotbed of international competition and tension and affect the military-political equilibrium both in the Caucasus and in neighboring Central Asian states.

Russia as one of the five Caspian states has a direct relation to this problem, and it is by no means a matter of indifference to it on what principles the Caspian Sea will be divided, who and on what conditions will take part in this division, and what effect will this have on the overall situation in the region, notably on Russian interests.

The current situation is such that policy and strategy in the Caucasus and on the Caspian are to a considerable extent determined by nonregional powers, primarily the US. Washington's main strategic goal is to force Russia out of the region and not only to deprive it of the possibility of taking part in oil and gas exploration, development and transportation, but also to isolate it from the Caucasus altogether. And this goal is being pursued consistently and for the most part successfully, notably with the help of the present authorities in Azerbaijan and Georgia.

In the Caspian project, Russia is currently assigned the role of a secondary partner. In the oil contracts concluded in Azerbaijan by international consortia, the Russian Federation in the aggregate has a small share (LUKoil), whereas the share of US, British and Norwegian companies is close to 80%. At the same time, the US is in no hurry to make large investments in economically dubious projects, preferring in the first place to gain strategic advantages and an opportunity to control this geopolitically valuable region.

According to analysts, US policy in Transcaucasia in the short and medium term is to be based on the US National Security Strategy for a New Century, under which the US will not allow hostile countries to dominate in any region of strategic importance to the United States. And the so-called Madeleine Albright Doctrine goes even further: it provides for an isolation of Russia and is designed to ensure a free supply of Caspian oil and gas to international markets independently of Russia.

For the US and its allies, crucial geostrategic importance attaches to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project. First, as an alternative project it can markedly reduce the significance of Russian pipelines and deprive Russia of the possibility of serving as the only transportation corridor for Caspian oil to the West; and second, it will help to squeeze Russia out of Caspian oil projects and then out of the Transcaucasian region in general. In addition, such a strategic facility will require the deployment of military contingents for its protection, providing a pretext for military intervention in the region, notably by nonregional forces.

The West seeks to translate its political objectives into practice primarily through large oil corporations, giving them full government backing. The US State Department has repeatedly declared that it will protect the interests of US oil companies. The leaders of Azerbaijan and Georgia support the US presence in the region, regarding it as the key component of the emerging balance of forces.

In the context of the current geopolitical situation, attention is drawn to the new NATO doctrine, which provides for operations outside the NATO area of responsibility, and for the right to intervene in the solution of any "humanitarian" problems in any country without a mandate from the UN Security Council.

Among the important factors shaping the situation in the region are Turkey and Iran.

Turkey has been sufficiently active in the Caucasus both as a US partner and a NATO member and as an independent force. Its strategic significance in the region for the interests of the US and NATO remains very high both in military and in other terms.

Turkey remains a major counterweight to Iran, which the US has included among the so-called rogue states. Turkey has strong positions in Azerbaijan, one of the key states of Transcaucasia. Ankara is working along various lines to ensure the transportation of Caspian energy resources through its territory. The US is also actively lobbying for the Turkish route for the export of Caspian oil to world markets. Turkey's economic, political and military relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia have been developing successfully. In Western plans, Turkey constitutes a real force and is a major factor in putting pressure on Armenia in the matter of resolving the Karabakh problem in the interests of Azerbaijan. Turkey's growing military potential with the support of NATO forces can be used to counteract the military-political alliance between Russia and Armenia.

All of this shows that in the 21st century Turkey remains one of the key participants in events in the Caucasus region, an important advocate and custodian of NATO and US interests in the Middle East, and a source of growing threats to Russian interests.

Iran is probably the only country of all CIS and non-CIS states on the southern strategic direction that in the conditions of unprecedented pressure from the US and other Western countries has managed to pursue a truly independent domestic and foreign policy, to keep control of its natural resources and maintain a viable national economy. Today Russia and Iran have a whole range of similar or identical interests, both at regional level and in the area of bilateral relations. Tehran has taken a considerable interest in extending relations with Russia in different fields.

The prospects of cooperation with Iran can be inferred from already implemented projects for the supply of Russian armaments, Russia's participation in building a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, and from the experience of large-scale cooperation in metallurgy, coalmining, transportation of Iranian natural gas, etc.

There are sufficiently convincing reasons for closer relations between the two countries. In geopolitical terms, the similarity or identity of interests is determined by the similarity of the situations in which the two countries find themselves at the present historical stage. Russia and Iran are equally concerned about the development of some political processes in Transcaucasia leading to a consolidation of the positions and influence of the Western countries and Turkey. Russia and Iran are almost equally threatened with NATO's enlargement and an intensification of NATO activities in the region.

Iran's rivalry with Turkey will continue to be a major factor of the military-political situation in the region. The Iranian leadership is concerned about Turkish activity in realizing pan-Turkist designs and about Turkey's desire to become the regional leader and to take part in Caspian oil projects. Such different-vector aspirations have significantly deepened the existing differences between Tehran and Ankara and have increased distrust and tension in their mutual relations.

Consequently, there are objective prerequisites for a serious and constructive dialogue between Iran and Russia. A positive development of Russian-Iranian relations could have a stabilizing effect on the situation in Transcaucasia.

To summarize, one can say the following.

First. The geopolitical situation for Russia in Transcaucasia remains very complicated. The Russian Federation is losing strategic space in the south. We are faced here with a redivision of spheres of influence, with a resultant weakening of Russian positions and a consistent strengthening of the positions of the West. Oil projects in the Caspian zone have attracted the attention of the Western powers, primarily the US, which has declared the region to be a zone of its strategic interests. The presence of world powers in this part of the world obviously ceases to be balanced and the US advantage is becoming overwhelming. This means that the emerging situation inevitably gives rise to a conflict not only of economic, but also of political and military-strategic interests.

Second. There is an obvious threat of NATO approaching Russian borders from the south not only through a buildup of NATO activities in the region, but also as the result of implementation, in one form or another, of the desire expressed by some Transcaucasian states (Azerbaijan, Georgia) to join the North Atlantic alliance.

Third. Unresolved conflicts (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh) and the continued probability of the emergence of new conflict situations based on international, ethnic and religious contradictions are a serious factor that has an adverse effect on regional stability.

Fourth. Various economic, transport and military-political structures of the GUAM type are being established and are gathering strength on an anti-Russian basis and as a counterweight to Russia, resting on the influence and support of the Western powers.

Fifth. Regional powers (Turkey, Iran) have stepped up their activities in pursuit of their geopolitical interests. The population of these countries is expected to reach 100 million in the first half of the 21st century, and the struggle for living space and resources may intensify still further. Transcaucasia has become the epicenter of a clash between different-vector forces. In the opinion of analysts, this is precisely where (and also in the space beyond the Caspian) a zone of conflict between Turkey and Iran is taking shape. The struggle between these two countries for domination and influence in the region could eventually develop into a large-scale conflict.

Sixth. Work is in progress to create alternative transportation corridors connecting Asia with Europe through the Caucasus so as to isolate Russia from major international communication routes and freight flows. Such corridors are disadvantageous and dangerous to Russian interests.

Seventh. The environmental situation in the coastal and water areas of the Caspian Sea is close to critical, endangering the population, the economy and the natural environment of this region. The threat comes from the adverse effects of intensifying oil production, which could lead to a rapid depletion of natural resources and to an ecological disaster.

Consequently, crisis trends in the political, socioeconomic and environmental situation in the region are a significant threat to Russia's national interests and security. This calls for the adoption of comprehensive measures meeting the country's fundamental interests and designed to address the main strategic task: to maintain peace and stability and to strengthen friendship and cooperation between Russia and the Transcaucasian states with due regard for each other's interests and with a sense of responsibility for the future of our peoples.

Maj. Gen. Yu. Ye. IVANOV

Deputy Chief of Staff, North Caucasian Military District