Russia's Navy radio reconnaissance experience and the navy interaction with the Land Forces on seaward lines.

Valdimir Georgievich KIKNADZE, born April 22, 1976 in Grozny. Graduated with silver medal from Minsk Suvorov Military School in 1993, in 1998 graduated cum laude from Kaliningrad Higher Naval School. From 1998 till 2002 served in command billets in Baltic Fleet reconnaissance units. In 2004, successfully defended Ph.D. thesis, in 2005 finished full-time postgraduate course under Admiral Ushakov Baltic Higher Naval Institute. Senior editor of Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal (Military History Journal). The author of more than 50 scientific writings.

The integration and in-depth analysis of the heritage of Russia's theoreticians and experts in war science, which was tested in the battles of the world and local wars, and in the armed conflicts of varying intensity, are of enormous importance for the maintenance of the high military alert posture of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. Operational experience accumulated in the wars of the past contains splendid factual material, the study and scientific consolidation of which promotes the development of war theory. This assertion can also fully refer to the study of Russia's Navy radio reconnaissance in the Navy interaction with the Land Forces on seaward lines, and particularly in solving multifarious assistance tasks.

The Navy's assistance to the Land Forces on the seaward lines is one of the most critical tasks, performed by the Naval Fleets from the earliest times. This task acquired additional value with the advent of deck-based aircraft and the arming of surface and subsurface ships with long-range cruise missiles, i.e., after the Navy came into possession of the dramatic weapon capable of hitting the enemy inland targets at considerable distances from the coastline. The Navies of the states taking part in the wars in Yugoslavia (1999), in Afghanistan (2002) and in Iraq (2004) demonstrated the ultimate performance of this task with the new quality.

The war and sea military doctrines, which are currently in use, as well as the future war theories permit us to state that the assistance of the Navies to the Land Forces on the seaward lines in the event of the sea-and-ground campaigns or of the ground-air-and-sea operations is now and will evidently be in the future one of the top-priority tasks, especially in the Navy and Military Fleet operations. At the same time, the value of radio reconnaissance in modern warfare battles, in conflicts, and in peacekeeping and anti-terrorist operations is becoming still greater. This stems from the fact that the enemy sort of makes itself invisible for society at large, therefore, without the use of radio reconnaissance facilities, it is extremely difficult to detect the enemy and to render it harmless.

The first instance of Russia's Navy supported by the intelligence information based on radio interception data (1) in assisting the Land Forces on the seaward lines goes back to the joint Army-Navy operations during the defense of the Port Arthur naval base in the Russian-Japanese war (1904-1905). Admiral Ye.I. Alek-seyev's Staff was originally coordinating the intelligence activities on the sea in the course of the operations, but after the arrival of Vice-Admiral S.O. Makarov, Russia's Pacific Fleet Commander, these activities were transferred to his own Staff. Unfortunately, the plan of the time-urgent measures compiled by the Pacific Fleet Commander, after he got acquainted with the lie of matters, was never executed in full. The reason for this was the death of S.O. Makarov on board the Armored Flagship Petropavlovsk, which blew up after hitting sea mines on March 31 (April 12), 1904.

The main problem, which the Russian intelligence officers ran into both on land and at sea, apart from the scarce and erratic enemy information, was lack of time. It was necessary, within the shortest timeframes, to establish the headquarters at all levels, staff them with qualified persons, distribute the duties and the attention areas between them and ensure interaction. It should also be borne in mind that the situation on the theater-of-war operations was getting more and more complicated every day. Nevertheless, despite the welter of drawbacks of Russian military intelligence, and the obvious advantages possessed by the Japanese intelligence officers, the source data testifies to the fact that the Russian intelligence officers gradually succeeded in building-up the requisite structures and achieved interaction at the strategic, operation and tactical levels. At the same time, the performance efficacy of Russia's military intelligence was growing continuously.

Note that, precisely during the Russian-Japanese war, the elements for the reconnoitering of the enemy forces were used for the first time as the new kind of intelligence, which was emerging in the Russian Navy, i.e., radio reconnaissance for the interception of the enemy communications and for the detection of its location at the definite distance by measuring the power of the transmitted radio signals (by carrying out radio interception), as well as by the decrypting of the intercepted radiograms. The first military use of radio interception, as the element of radio reconnaissance, showed the high validity of the new kind of intelligence support for the naval operations. Unfortunately, it often happened in our country's history that the first operational experience was cast to oblivion for a long time, and thus failed to evolve further and impeded the setting-up of the new configuration designed for carrying out radio reconnaissance.

Also note that interaction between the Land Forces, which were defending the Port Arthur sea base, and the Navy in the carrying out of reconnaissance activities was hindered by the disputes and friction, which flared up between the Commanding Generals of the Land Forces and of the fortification zone, and the Admirals of the Pacific Fleet. This led to each Commander seeking to collect and analyze the information about the enemy. Additional constraints for the Supreme Command to obtain the unbiased information were due to the incessant competition and discord between the Staffs of different levels, each of them seeking "to go one better than the others with the abounding information obtained"2 to the detriment of information credibility.

The tactical employment of the Navy's radio reconnaissance for the interaction with the Land Forces on the seaward lines in the Russian-Japanese war (3) highlighted the need for the coordinated intelligence activity on the seaward lines, in addition, the intelligence activity control must be territorially as close to the Operating Forces and their Headquarters as possible and this activity control must be concentrated in the hands of the single Commander (the diarchy of the Army and Navy Commanders is inadmissible). Regrettably, the adequate conclusions were not made.

On the eve of World War I, the General Staff of the Russian Navy also tended to underestimate the importance of naval reconnaissance and did not pay proper attention to its organization, or to the development of the intelligence forces and facilities. Some circles in the Naval Command believed that talented and dynamic Commanders themselves are capable of evaluating the situation correctly without additional intelligence information. This attitude toward intelligence led to the inadequacy and weakness of the forces capable of conducting Naval reconnaissance by the time the War began. For example, the shipboard reconnaissance units in the Baltic Fleet were not used at all, its activity being limited to posting patrol vessels at 100 miles from the central mine-and-artillery position; aerial reconnaissance was merely at its incipient stage; there was no secret service in the Fleets whatsoever, while the covert operations of the Naval General Staff procured the limited data, which did not meet the reconnaissance information needs of the Fleets.

Finally, when the political tensions were at their highest point of aggravation, the Navy Commanders found themselves practically cut off from the critical information, while the need for the more complete and reliable data about the enemy was perceived by the Command a few days prior to the start of the War. "There is critical need for secret agents now, but it seems that we have none at all"--so it was summed up by Admiral N.O. Essen, (4) Chief of the Baltic Fleet Naval Forces. Capt. 1st Rank A.V. Kolchak, Deputy Chief of Staff for Naval Operations gave far more poignant criticism, when he said: "We are completely deprived of the information about the enemy. Our secret service isn't worth a brass farthing. It is not doing anything useful." (5) By July 25, 1914, the tentative structure was drafted for the Secret Service to monitor the enemy during the War, which consisted of 13 agents that was clearly not enough. For all that, their number never increased till the end of the War. The Radio Communication Service was the only reconnaissance organ in the Baltic Fleet, which was really capable of obtaining the necessary information about the enemy. But before the War, Russia's Naval Forces disposed of the insignificant number of the communications service stations, which were engaging in radio interception. Besides, the ambiguous status of the radio interception stations, which operated in the interests of Naval Intelligence, being subordinated to the Chief of the Communication Service, created additional constraints for the organization of radio interception in the Navy.

Leaving aside the detailed description of Russia's radio interception activities during World War I, (6) note only one of the most spectacular examples of the Navy's intelligence support for Russia's Land Forces in the seaward lines, i.e., the disruption of two attempts by the German Fleet to battle through into the Riga Bay, which were coupled with the German Land Forces advance to Riga.

Thus, World War I graphically demonstrated the need for the intrinsic Intelligence means and facilities of all kinds in the seaward lines, which are attached to the sole Commander, who either coordinates or exerts control over the Army and Navy Forces operating in the seaward theater-of-war operations, as well as being responsible for the capabilities and readiness of the intelligence forces to address the assigned tasks.

During the Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia (1917-1922), there were a good few examples of the Russian Navy's successful radio interception activities in the assisting of the Land Forces in the seaward lines: the information, which was intercepted by the Volga-Caspian Sea Flotilla radio operators in October 1918, permitted to free the Red Army POWs in the area of Galiany; the information, which was intercepted in April 1920, helped uncover the planned defection of the Army Garrison headed by General V.S. Tolstov to the Persian (Iranian) port of Enzeli (Pahlevi); the interception by the Aleksandrovskii Fort radio station, in May 1919, of the secret messages between the Staffs and the Naval Forces of General A.I. Denikin, of Admiral A.V. Kolchak and of the Allies, which provided for the early uncovering of the enemy plans and the adoption of countermeasures, etc.

The review and analysis of the history of Russia's naval intelligence activities in assisting the Land Forces in the seaward lines during the Civil War and foreign intervention in Russia (7) were conducive to the following lessons to be drawn due to their practical value in this day and age: when the Navy combat deployment system is drastically changing, the intelligence means and facilities must be capable and alert for the performance of the tasks not only in the naval operational zone (in the interests of both the Navy, and of the Land Forces operating in the seaward lines); the implementation of the intelligence tasks (radio interception tasks) in the interests of the Navy can be assigned, if need be, to the means and facilities of the Land Forces, which must be ready and capable of conducting intelligence activity in the interests of the Navy.

The local wars and the armed conflicts in the period between two World Wars (1922-1941) also feature the examples of the successful radio reconnaissance activities of the Russian Navy in performing the task of assisting the Land Forces in the seaward lines. (8) For example, the early uncovering of the enemy plans by the radio operators of the Pacific Fleet and of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla, during the preparation and implementation by Japan of the act of provocation in the Khasan Lake area in July-August 1938, permitted to deprive the enemy of surprise superiority advantage in the assault of the principal naval base of Vladivostok and of the Primorie coastland from sea, air and land, as well as to ensure the successful defense of the left flank of our troops in the Posiet Bay area against the enemy potential sea attacks. During the 12 months of 1938, the naval radio reconnaissance facilities uncovered the makeup and the location of 713 military formations and units of the Japanese and Manchuria troops; at the same time, the radio data share of the total intelligence information obtained by various kinds of reconnaissance amounted to 30%-35%, and at other times (the Nipponese operations to seize Nanking and Hankow in the first months of the Sino-Japanese war) 100% of the intelligence data was obtained by the radio intercept means. Note that, to confirm authenticity, the radio reconnaissance information was submitted to the higher Command together with the radio intercepted materials. Eventually, on August 10, 1938, following the decisive counteroffensive of the formations and units of the 1st Detached Red Banner Far Eastern Army headed by the Marshal of the Soviet Union V.K. Blukher, the enemy was thrown back with heavy losses to its territory, and at noon, on August 11, 1938, the battles near Lake Khasan ended.

The valuable intelligence information was obtained by the Pacific Fleet radio interception units in May-September 1939, when Japan's Manchurian Army troops opened the large-scale operations in the Khalkin-Gol River area in the Mongolian People's Republic by attempting to launch the armed incidents in the most important sectors of our border. For example, the valuable materials were intercepted concerning the projection of the Land Forces, the air operations, including several operational orders. The Fleet Command gave very high appraisal of the intercepted data by encouraging the large number of intelligence men. The radio reconnaissance units of the Amur Red Banner Flotilla timely reconnoitered and immediately reported to the Command about the departure from Harbin of the main body of the Sungari River Flotilla comprising 16 ships with the Marine units on board heading toward the lower reaches of the Sungari River and about the impending appearance of the Flotilla on the Amur River. After getting the information, the Amur Red Banner Flotilla units decisively terminated the attempts at violating our territorial waters that was conducive to the failure of the Nipponese war provocations on the Sungari operational lines.

Thus, the first combat deployment of radio reconnaissance units by the Soviet Navy confirmed its value and capabilities, above all, in the uncovering of the enemy aggressive intentions. The new organizational form of radio reconnaissance activity consisted in the formation of radio reconnaissance groups on the strategically important lines, and in the conducting of radio reconnaissance for counterintelligence support.

The activities of the Soviet Navy's radio reconnaissance proved to be none less credible in the appraisal of the situation on the maritime and seaside theater-of-war operations on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, (9) which helped uncover the enemy devices and ensured the timely warning of the Command about the threat of aggression. The information obtained by the Soviet Navy's radio reconnaissance on the eve of the war was the important asset in the analyzing of the pre-war situation, and contributed to the Navy Command's decision taking concerning the switching of the Naval Forces to the increased alert posture level--Operational Readiness No. 2, and later on--to Operational Readiness No. 1 that hindered the enemy surprise attack on the maritime theater-of-war operations and thereby helped avoid the significant losses of the Naval Forces in the initial days of the war. Nevertheless, the drawbacks of the radio reconnaissance organization are also worth noting, in particular, the absence in the radio reconnaissance activity, at that moment, of the classifier of the warnings, which signified the threats to the security and the interests of our state on the part of the states being reconnoitered, and their direct preparation for aggression.

The Soviet Navy's task of assisting the Land Forces in the defensive and offensive operations on the seaward lines, as well as in the front-line lake and river areas acquired exceptional priority in the course of the Great Patriotic War. The English historian B. Topstall gave the most praiseworthy assessment of the interaction of the Soviet Naval Forces with the Land Troops. He wrote the following in his The World War on the Sea: "In the course of the war, Russia's strategy was planned and implemented with the highly tough-minded judgment; moreover, this strategy contributed to the successes of the Red Army to a much greater degree, than it is commonly known." (10)

Without reviewing in detail the tactical employment of the Soviet Navy's radio reconnaissance in the Great Patriotic War, (11) note only one of the principal forms of its activity, which contributed to the successful solution of the Navy's task of assisting the Land Forces, which is of practical value in these days, namely, the setting-up of the radio reconnaissance groups within the Fleet seacoast intelligence detachments.

Although on the eve of the war and in its initial period, the Fleet radio reconnaissance activity was viewed solely as the type of operation-level intelligence, in the course of the second and the third periods of the war, it became the highly effective means for obtaining the tactical-level information, the availability of which permitted to establish more effective interaction of the forces on the basis of the operation-level intelligence information. The promptly obtained information across the vast territories (both in the maritime and land theater-of-war operations), the profound discernment of the intrinsic interrelationships of the events, the unraveling of the enemy devices and intentions were the most valuable qualities of the Fleet radio reconnaissance activity in this domain. The radio reconnaissance groups, which were attached to the Operational Command of the Fleet Forces Control Bodies and to the individual units, which assisted the Land Forces, became the basic units of the tactical-level reconnaissance activity.

In 1943-1945, the similar groups operated under the Baltic Fleet sea base (on the Island of Lavensaari), under the North Fleet sea base (on the Island of Dikson and in the Rybachii Peninsular) and under the Black Sea Fleet base (in Sevastopol and Gelendjik), attached to the Air Force and Air Defense command centers of the Baltic Fleet, North Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet, on the surface ships and submarines of the North Fleet, and as part of the White Sea Flotilla, Lake Ladoga Flotilla and Lake Peipus (Chudskoe Ozero) Flotilla, and also with 9th and 61 st Air Crews and 9th Ground Attack Air Crew of the Air Arm of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet.

The operating radio reconnaissance data was widely used by the Command both in the defense and in the assault operations. For instance, the radio reconnaissance group of the seacoast radio detachment of the Black Sea Fleet, which operated in Sevastopol from January 4, 1942 to July 3, 1942, uncovered the projection of the enemy Army units from the dislocation areas to the area of Grammatikovo and Saurun, the enemy troop concentrations in the area of Feodosia and Sudak, the projection of the 6th Army Corps from Nikolayev toward Lozovaia; the redeployment of the German army units from Bessarabia, the emergence of the 7th Army Corps from Sibiu in the Crimea, the concentration of the enemy troops on the lines of Rostov-on-Don, the redeployment of the German Mountain Units near Novorossiisk and Nalchik, etc. The achievements of radio reconnaissance activity were mentioned in the report of the Black Sea Fleet Commander to the Navy Commander-in-Chief dated January 19, 1945, who noted that, during the war, radio reconnaissance provided all the operations launched in the theater-of-war operations with the timely and reliable data. Besides, the radio reconnaissance data was used by the Azov Sea Flotilla and the Danube Flotilla, by the Command of the Transcaucasian Front, North-Caucasian Front and the Don Front, by the Command of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Ukrainian Fronts, as well as by the Command of the Primorie Detached Army.

In January 1944, to ensure the Fleet's assistance to the Land Forces in the liberation of the Baltic Region, the radio reconnaissance group of the seacoast radio detachment of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet was set up in Gdov, which, in cooperation with tactical reconnaissance, and with the shipcrews of the Lake Peipus (Chudskoe Ozero) Flotilla and with the frogmen, managed to obtain the critical information about the German flotilla on Lake Chudskoe. This allowed to destroy the enemy flotilla and to open the gate for the Red Army into the Baltic Region.

In the concluding stage of the war, the operational experience of the radio reconnaissance groups of the Fleet coast-side radio detachments was further augmented. For instance, from December 5, 1944 to May 1945, the radio reconnaissance group operated under the Headquarters Remote Control Point of the Baltic Red Banner Fleet in Palanga, which played the important part in the provision of reconnaissance information to the Fleet Forces, which were assisting the Land Forces on the coast-side directions during the decisive battles for the enemy expulsion from the Baltic coastlines.

The analysis of the operational experience of the Soviet Navy's radio reconnaissance in assisting the Land Forces in the seaward lines during the Great Patriotic War goes to show that the drawing closer of the Fleet's radio reconnaissance means to the Fleet's vanward units themselves makes it possible to use their data more expeditiously and to solve the most important issues concerning the effective use of intelligence information. Besides, the war experience once again confirmed the advantages of radio reconnaissance in comparison with other kinds of reconnaissance, as well as the capabilities and the readiness of the Navy's radio reconnaissance forces in the solution of the tasks for reconnaissance preparation not only in the interests of the Fleet forces, but also in the interests of the Command of the Land Troop Formations, which operate in the adjacent areas.

The resultant historic experience of the reconnaissance activity of the Russian Navy in the Fleet's assistance to the Land Forces in the seaward lines, and the conclusions drawn from it, which are practically important for the nowadays and for the foreseeable future, considering the principles of the modern warcraft theory, make it possible to define the following vectors in the development of the national security system in the seaward lines.

First: the Fleet's solution of the task to assist the Land Forces in the seaward lines, given the considerable changes in the Fleet basing system (in the event of the fast-moving retreat from the seaward lines due to the abandonment of the coast-side positions, and in the event of the advance across the expanded coast-side zone) calls for the considerable increase of radio reconnaissance flexibility. The reconnaissance forces and means must be capable and ready for the solution of the tasks outside the Fleet's operation zone. The attainment of this capability is possible at the expense of the considerable augmentation of the radio reconnaissance mobile component (including unmanned and remotely controlled aircraft), by the setting-up of alternative emplacement positions, etc. Thus, the Army reconnaissance forces, the tactical and technical capabilities of which enable to obtain reconnaissance information in the operation zone of the adjacent theater-of-war operations, must be ready and capable of conducting reconnaissance in the Fleet's interests. The attainment of this level of military capability is possible at the expense of the unification of the reconnaissance means, of the improvement of the military intelligence training system, of the high-level interaction between the different kinds of reconnaissance and the intelligence bodies of the fighting services of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Second: the coordination of the intelligence activity of the reconnaissance forces of the fighting services of the Armed Forces and of the service arms, deployed in the seaside theaters of military operations (in the tentative theaters of military action), must be carried out by the special control body, which is deployed in this military-territorial jurisdiction, and which is vested with all the requisite powers and capabilities for the organization of the most effective reconnaissance preparation of the forces and means. Besides, given the radio reconnaissance special capability for the uncovering of the enemy plans, which was confirmed by the afore-cited historical experience, it can be assumed that the setting-up of the special control body (which would not only coordinate, but would also directly manage the reconnaissance activity on the impendent lines) will be conducive to the timely, reasonably full and reliable informing of the country's military and political leadership about the impending outside threats to national security. The attainment of the high-level of inter-service and inter-arm cooperation of the reconnaissance groups in the seaside theaters of military operations is dictated, among other things, by the need for radio reconnaissance capability for the increased volume and enhanced magnitude of the exchange of the obtained reconnaissance information (about which the radio reconnaissance units must be timely informed by the Command and by other kinds of intelligence), and by the need for the radio reconnaissance information to be verified by other kinds of intelligence in the event the Command takes the decision on the deployment of the forces and assets.

Third: one must admit the expediency of the deployment of the Navy's ground-based radio reconnaissance forces in Russia's fluvial theaters of military operations. Among the lessons drawn from the historical experience of the radio reconnaissance activity of Russia's naval military flotillas, the following is to be emphasized: the need for the on-going radio reconnaissance activity in the theater of military operations, as well as for the coverage, as the reconnaissance objects, of all the military, paramilitary and mobilized objects in the theater of military operations in peacetime; the need for the trained organic groups of tactical radio reconnaissance as part of the mobile motor subdivisions of radio reconnaissance on the maritime (fluvial) theaters of military operations; the capability of the reconnaissance forces and assets for organizing of the processing and of timely submittal of the radio reconnaissance information to the higher-level Command.

Thus, as the past experience graphically shows, the present-day military warcraft and the theories of future wars require the provision of high-level interaction between the different kinds of intelligence, of flexible control in the obtaining and distribution of the intelligence information on the part of the central intelligence activity control bodies. The attainment of the needed result, i.e., of the capability for the early informing of the county's military leadership about outside security threat, is practicable only in the event of the setting-up of the central intelligence activity control bodies on the strategic lines, for instance, of the operational intelligence centers of constant readiness on the strategic lines with the operational attachment of all the intelligence forces available on the given strategic line irrespective of the attachment to the fighting services of the Armed Forces and of the service arms. (12) The centers themselves must be subordinated to the Main Intelligence Department of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

Taking into account Russia's serious domestic security threats, which are imminent today due to the inadequate struggle against international terrorism, which acts in the sophisticated and unrelenting manner, as well as due to the advance of "the color revolution contagion" from the territories of the adjoining states, the inter-departmental coordination and the centralization of the intelligence activity on the strategic lines must be in-place without delay, if anything, even "to the detriment of the departmental interests." In meeting these conditions, it is advisable to attach the operational reconnaissance centers to the Security Council of the Russian Federation.

NOTES:

1. Radio interception--one of the stages of radio reconnaissance, its initial stage. Its aim is to detect the transmitting radio communication of the enemy object and to determine its location by direction finding.

2. Quoted from: Ye.Yu. Sergeyev, "Russkaya razvedka v nachale voiny s Yaponiyei 1904-1905 godov," Novaya y noveishaya istoriya, No. 1, 2005, p. 79.

3. V.G. Kiknadze, "Zarozhdeniye radiorazvcdki otechestvennogo VMF v russko-yaponskoi voine 1904-1905," Flagman, No. 5, 2004, pp. 59-62; "Radiorazvedka otechestvennogo VMF v voinakh pervoi poloviny XX veka," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9, 2005, pp. 22-26.

4. Voenno-morskoy entsiklopedicheskii slovar, Moscow, 2003, p. 938.

5. Quoted from: V.A. Petrov, Voenno-morskaia agenturnaia razvedka v Pervoi mirovoi voine, Book 8, Russkoye Proshloye Publishers, St. Petersburg, 1998, pp. 165-201.

6. V.G. Kiknadze, "Radiorazvedka Rossiiskogo flota v Pervoi mirovoi voine," Voprosy istorii, No. 11, 2004, pp. 144-152.

7. V.G. Kiknadze, "Sovetskaia voenno-morskaia razvedka v period Grazhdanskoi voiny i voen-noi interventsii v Rossii (1917-1922): prakticheskaia znachimost urokov proshlogo," Voennaia mysl', No. 9, 2005, pp. 67-72.

8. V.G. Kiknadze, "Rol radiorazvedki Krasnoznamyennoi Amurskoi flotilii v razgrome Yaponii," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 8, 2005, pp. 12-14; "Radiorazvedka otechcstvennogo VMF v voinakh pervoi poloviny XX veka," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 11, 2005, pp. 13-16.

9. V.G. Kiknadze, "Razvedka sovetskogo VMF nakanune Velikoi Otechestevennoi voiny 1941-1945: rol radiorazvedki v otsenke obstanovki na morskykh teatrakh nakanune voiny," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, No. 9, 2005, pp. 153-161; Razvedyvatelnoye obespecheniye boyevykh deistvii sovetskogo VMF nakanune i v khode Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, Sovetskii VMF v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, Analiz, Razmyshleniya, Vospominaniya, Sankt-Peterburgskii VMI, St. Petersburg, 2005, pp. 50-64.

10. Quoted from: Voenno-morskoi flot Sovetskogo Soyuza v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941-1945, 2nd revised and enlarged edition, Vol. 1, Severnyi flot, Morskoi Peterburg Publishers, St. Petersburg, 2005, pp. 10-11.

11. For more detail see: V.G. Kiknadze, V.S. Visoven, "Radiorazvedka sovetskogo VMF v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine," in: Moriaki-baltiitsy v boiakh za Rodinu (1941-1945), Yantarnyi skaz Publishers, Kaliningrad, 2005, pp. 222-238.

12. V.G. Kiknadze, "Zavisimost resultatov vedeniya radiorazvedki ot intensivnosti radiosvyazi protivnika," Voennaia mysl', No. 2, 2005, pp. 69-75.

Capt. 3rd Rank V.G. KIKNADZE

Candidate of Military Sciences