Rudy as prosecutor: the glorious career of a high-profile attorney.

EVERYONE knows Rudolph Giuliani as "America's mayor"--but prior to that he was arguably "America's prosecutor" as well. He spent 13 years as an associate attorney general, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and U.S. Attorney, compiling a genuinely impressive record of accomplishment in fighting the mob and public corruption. He was aggressive and innovative; his record suggests not only that he, in the words of a former colleague, "has a stubborn conviction about what he believes," but also that he knows how to implement those convictions. Giuliani's prosecutorial experience is thus an unappreciated but important piece of the case for his candidacy: that he has the proven leadership skills to be president.

In 1970, Giuliani became an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Southern District of New York. After serving as chief of the Narcotics Unit, he prosecuted highly publicized police-corruption cases. In 1974, Giuliani's courtroom skills became part of prosecutorial legend in former congressman Bertram Podell's bribery trial. As the New York Times later recounted: "After hours of Mr. Giuliani's grueling cross-examination, Mr. Podell--quite calm at the start--became so flustered that he poked out a lens of his glasses, requested a recess and then pleaded guilty."

After private practice in the 1970s, Giuliani returned to public life in the No. 3 job--associate attorney general--in the Reagan Department of Justice. He was in charge of the U.S. Attorneys and Marshals, drug enforcement, immigration, and prisons. He spearheaded several substantial initiatives in this period. When he arrived, he explained to senior officials that the most pressing issue facing them was the federal government's failure to tackle violent crime, which was largely related to narcotics. As part of his reinvigoration of federal drug prosecution, drug-enforcement funding substantially increased, and the Drug Enforcement Agency was placed under the FBI. He also greatly expanded the federal drug task forces that were coordinating the efforts of multiple agencies, and increased cooperation with state and local authorities.

Giuliani revised the FBI's "Levi Guidelines" that set rules for domestic-terrorism investigations. A then-young attorney named John Roberts explained that the existing rules were the subject of "compelling criticism" to the effect that they "unduly constrain our ability to learn about truly subversive and dangerous individuals and groups in advance of violent activity." Attorney general William French Smith wrote in his memoirs that Giuliani's "careful and lengthy review" achieved the desired result: new security guidelines "designed to prevent abuses by government without preventing or discouraging government from combating the abuses perpetrated by terrorist groups."

As for his role in judicial nominations in this period, Giuliani has been careful to emphasize that he was the point man for nomination of U.S. Marshals and U.S. Attorneys, but not judges. Numerous senior officials who served with him confirm that in addition to daily senior-management meetings with the attorney general, which covered pending nominations, Giuliani attended the Tuesday meetings devoted to judicial selections and nominations. He would present his recommendations for U.S. Attorneys and Marshals but also offer his views on judges.

Did he share the administration's view that judges should eschew "making law from the bench"? Yes, according to his peers. "We were of one mind on this, that judicial nominees needed to be academically excellent and understand the role of judges," says Robert McConnell, who served as assistant attorney general for legislative affairs. Theodore Olson, then assistant attorney general for the Office of Legal Counsel and now with Giuliani's campaign, says he has discussed judicial selection with Giuliani for 25 years; he declares that he is "confident" that Giuliani adheres to the view that "it is important that appointees do judging and not lawmaking." Olson emphasizes: "I very much think he's got that."

In his memoirs, Smith says that Giuliani was "one of the most imaginative and successful persons" ever to hold the No. 3 position. Those I interviewed praise his ability to make decisions, and to lead. McConnell explains: "He would study an issue and come to a conclusion. He'd make a decision and then be willing to debate it and show his reasoning. He was almost enthusiastic to debate an issue. He would put his views and reasoning on the line." W. Bradford Reynolds, then-head of the Civil Rights Division, says Giuliani was "definitely a good lawyer" and "unafraid to take on the tough cases."

In 1983 Giuliani returned to New York as the Southern District's U.S. Attorney. McConnell recounts: "He came in and said Al D'Amato told him he would recommend he be nominated for U.S. Attorney for the Southern District. I said, 'So what?'--not thinking anyone would leave to take a job he now supervised. He said that ever since he was a little boy he wanted to be the U.S. Attorney in New York. I said I wanted to be a fireman when I was little but grew out of it." Giuliani explained that, other than attorney general, this was the best job a prosecutor could have. Many still consider it the premier U.S. Attorney's office, with some of the best lawyers and most interesting cases; it also enjoys significant independence from Washington.

WELCOME BACK, COPPER

With approximately 130 attorneys working under him, Giuliani prosecuted groundbreaking Mafia and public-corruption cases, amassing a record of 4,152 convictions with only 25 reversals. But his pursuit of big securities-fraud convictions and small-time drug cases--and of publicity as well-raised hackles.

It was not so long ago that the Mafia held great power in New York, and removing it from the fabric of the city's life seemed a pipe dream. Giuliani set himself to the task. The RICO statute passed in 1970 allowed prosecutions aimed at membership in a crime organization rather than prosecutions for discrete acts, but the statute had not been widely used. According to Andrew McCarthy, who tried the 1985-87 Pizza Connection Mafia case, "Rudy was very innovative in use of the statute. Until then people hadn't known how tailor-made it was for organized crime." Others point to RICO cases prosecuted before Giuliani, but acknowledge that he brought unprecedented urgency and resources to bear.

In the Pizza Connection case--at 17 months, the longest federal criminal case in history--16 defendants were convicted. The case's sheer size and international scope, the use of a Mafia member as a witness, and the numerous convictions made this case extraordinary, but it was just one in a string of Giuliani's major organized-crime prosecutions.

If the Pizza Connection case made headlines, the 1985-86 Mafia Commission case left the mob a shell of its former self. Hundreds of hours of wiretap evidence were compiled over years to go after all five Mafia-family heads rather than just individual criminals or families. The New York Times explained: "Giuliani's brainstorm was to go the next step: Attack the board of directors guiding all of New York's Mafia families in loan sharking, drug trafficking, labor racketeering, and contract murder." In a single courtroom in Manhattan, with Michael Chertoff as lead prosecutor, the heads of the families plus many of their associates were convicted. Said Giuliani: "We can end this debate about whether the Mafia exists. We can prove that the Mafia is as touchable and convictable as anyone. And without their mystery, they will lose power."

According to Randy Mastro, then deputy chief of the civil division of the U.S. Attorney's office, another Giuliani "brain child" was using civil RICO statutes against the Mafia and organizations it had corrupted. Armed with voluminous evidence of the Mafia's infiltration of the Teamsters, Giuliani and Mastro prepared in 1987 a pathbreaking civil action to place the Teamsters in receivership. Given the implications--they were essentially taking over one of the largest unions, and one that had endorsed President Reagan--the approval of the Justice Department (DOJ) was needed. Giuliani "passionately" argued in favor of bringing the action and keeping it in New York (the venue of ongoing Mafia criminal trials), but DOJ transferred it to Washington.

The case sat for a year, Giuliani continuing to press for its return to New York. In 1988, when every presidential candidate except George H. W. Bush had pledged not to sue the Teamsters, Giuliani succeeded in getting it sent back to New York; he also obtained an expedited trial schedule, which forced a settlement that empowered an "administrator" to remove the union's Mafia elements and, eventually, preside over democratic elections by union members.

Giuliani also used civil RICO against the notoriously Mafia-infested Fulton Fish Market, a snake pit of extortion and corruption. He gained only a partial victory: The court ordered an overseer to review the Mafia's control of the market's "unloading" operation--but the judge found insufficient evidence to place the Mafia-controlled union in receivership. (Giuliani's crusade to clean up the Market would continue until, as mayor, he was finally able to remove its Mafia elements.)

CLEANING HOUSE

Giuliani also crusaded against public corruption, setting up a discrete unit and encouraging attorneys to respond to tips. Opportunity knocked when the FBI in Chicago uncovered a web of corruption emanating from New York's Parking Violations Bureau (PVB). It would become the biggest New York corruption scandal in generations. Investigation revealed that a web of bribery and kickbacks had turned the lucrative PVB into officials' personal piggy bank, and key witnesses were given immunity in exchange for testifying against Queens borough president Donald Manes (who would then commit suicide) and Bronx Democratic chieftain Stanley Friedman.

Giuliani left the Mafia Commission case to try Friedman personally. Some claim he saw a bigger publicity payoff; others say it was a more interesting job for a prosecutor to cross-examine live witnesses than tediously play wiretap recordings of Mafia figures. Those who worked on the case say that Giuliani--after having pushed it along to a quick trial date--realized that there were significant risks involved in the prosecution, and told his team, "I'll be there with you guys." The case was on the front page daily; David Zornow, one of its prosecutors, says simply, "This was the biggest case and it was natural for [Giuliani] to try it."

Again using RICO, Giuliani alleged that Friedman and three associates had turned the PVB into a criminal enterprise. Alan Dershowitz later argued that prosecutors had stretched the law like an "accordion," but Giuliani and his team responded that it would have been "unthinkable not to use" RICO statutes against this scheme of corruption. After Giuliani decided to try the case, he spent days in a room with his trial team mastering the details. The defense had been pushing to move the trial out of town over prosecutors' objections. Giuliani, who had clerked upstate, quickly realized a more conservative jury would benefit the prosecution and agreed to a trial in Connecticut.

In Giuliani's withering cross-examination of Friedman, "Rudy let Stanley be Stanley," according to Zornow. Under cross, Friedman admitted he had received a large payment to represent the taxi drivers' association in dealings with the city; he claimed it was a legitimate fee rather than a bribe. Giuliani said to Friedman, "That's $100,000 for two phone calls." His ego getting the better of him, Friedman haughtily replied, "That's one phone call, Mr. Giuliani." The jury convicted Friedman and three others.

BROKEN-WINDOWS PROSECUTING

Evaluating Giuliani, Southern District prosecutors call him "a real lawyer" or "the real deal." They explain that he did actual lawyering, deciding strategy and delving into the minutiae when he tried a long case. They unanimously recount his considerable stamina, energy, and focus in working six-day weeks.

Not all the cases were big, and this was a sore point with some judges and attorneys. Traditionally, federal prosecutors handled drug-kingpin cases, leaving small dealers to local authorities. Expressing outrage that New York "drug supermarkets" operated with impunity, Giuliani responded with the "Federal Day" program: At unpredictable times, prosecutors coordinated street operations with DEA agents and local police to arrest and then prosecute street drug dealers.

Opinion was sharply divided on whether this was a wise use of federal resources. Many prosecutors supported Federal Day; Rhea Dignam, chief of the Narcotics Unit, recalls that Federal Day encouraged local law enforcement not to simply catch and release street criminals but to carefully assess their plea deals. Many prosecutors pointed to the benefit young attorneys received in learning to try cases. Critics, however, accused Giuliani of trying to boost his conviction statistics, and some prosecutors resented spending time on "petty" matters; some judges bemoaned the influx of small drug cases into their courtrooms.

Giuliani also turned his sights on public housing, where residents were plagued with drug dealers living in their midst. He came up with the idea of using federal forfeiture laws to seize the "tenancies" as drug-related assets. Using laws then in effect to "seize first and litigate later," they were able to remove dealers even before trial. When DEA agents raided public housing to evict dealers, the aggrieved neighbors who had endured years of violent criminal activity "would literally stand and cheer," according to attorneys involved.

On securities crimes, Giuliani's record is mixed. The Southern District did successfully prosecute Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken, but critics cite the notorious 1987 public arrests of three Wall Street traders as evidence of over-zealousness: The charges against them were later withdrawn. (The oft-repeated account that all three were dragged, handcuffed, off the trading floor before TV cameras is incorrect, according to a senior attorney involved: Only one defendant who refused to go voluntarily with federal agents was handcuffed.) Although one later pled guilty on other charges and went to prison, Giuliani acknowledged in a New York Times interview that "I should have slowed it down and I should have found out how complex the case was."

Critics claim that his use of criminal statutes to prosecute trading behavior not previously considered criminal was "hyper-aggressive." But several prosecutors now in private practice say that, throughout history, it has occurred that certain types of criminal behavior are tolerated before they become the focus of prosecution; cases that once seemed novel come to be recognized as well within the mainstream of securities enforcement. Civil libertarians have criticized the "perp walks" for the accused traders; but prosecutors contend that this tactic had been used before, and is justified, because white-collar criminals should not be treated differently from other criminals.

Giuliani's very public persona created complaints that he was a media hound using his office as a stepping stone to mayor. Even prosecutors not entirely fond of him disagree, saying the publicity was a good thing for the U.S. Attorney's office, and helped educate the public and deter crimes. In Mafia and corruption cases, especially, the public and potential witnesses need to know that prosecutors are being effective. Moreover, the good press obtained by the office caught DOJ's eye and assisted the Southern District in getting funding, according to senior attorneys. Attorneys recall that the entire prosecution team would be present at post-conviction press conferences, and that Giuliani was "very good at giving credit."

Southern District attorneys overwhelmingly say Giuliani was a remarkable leader--inspiring and encouraging, going to bat for subordinates and imbuing the office with a sense of purpose. One veteran attorney explains: "There is a cheerleading aspect to the office of U.S. Attorney. You need to develop esprit de corps. He walked the halls and was a real motivator." Many say it was the most exciting time of their lives. Explaining this praise, Zornow says: "Working for [Giuliani] was working for a very energized person. He was a very, very good motivator. He was able to stake out big goals and motivate people to meet them. He got people to think of being part of an exciting enterprise."

Twenty years later, many attorneys describe Giuliani with great emotion. One says: "I'd march up the hill, down a hill, and into battle with him." Giuliani has to hope that, eventually, a lot of Republican primary voters will get a similar feeling.

Jennifer Rubin is a freelance writer in Washington, D.C.