Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery.

Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery. By Elliot A. Rosen. (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2005. Pp. xii, 308. $39.50, ISBN 0-8139-2368-9.)

Elliot A. Rosen has spent his career in the archives reading the papers of many of the chief economic policy makers and idea men of the era of the Great Depression and contemplating their insights, personalities, and political maneuverings. In this evenhanded account, he examines in considerable detail the thoughts and actions of men like Laughlin Cuttle, Lewis W. Douglas, Alvin H. Hansen, Cordell Hull, Raymond Moley, George N. Peek, Alexander Sachs, Rexford Tugwell, and James P. Warburg. Although Franklin D. Roosevelt is clearly the central figure in this picture, his thoughts, words, plans, and even his actions are not generally the focus. Rather, he is portrayed as an enigmatic man and is glimpsed mainly in the reflections of others.

Rosen proceeds chronologically and selectively, beginning with the international financial crisis and deflation that greeted Roosevelt, abortive negotiations to stabilize exchange rates, and the debates that culminated in Roosevelt's ultimate decision to revalue the dollar to 60 cents or $35 to the ounce of gold. Ultimately, Roosevelt's policies regarding international finance and trade can be seen as attempts to move toward autarky, which would free the government's hand to boost domestic prices and adopt industrial planning. Next Rosen takes up a wide array of New Deal policies including the National Industrial Recovery Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority, fiscal policy, and social insurance, before turning to fears that reemerged with the recession of 1937-1938 that the economy was headed for long-term stagnation. The book closes by examining failed attempts at broader economic planning, especially in the National Resources Planning Board, and the growing coalition against major portions of the New Deal that coalesced in the late 1930s. Although the book covers a lot of ground, it barely discusses some of the major economic policy decisions of the era, including those regarding domestic financial markets and labor unions.

Rosen has a clear grasp of the era's political, intellectual, and economic history. His judgments about the policy successes and failures of the era are sensible, and his ability to concisely summarize the complex arguments, motivations, and policy tradeoffs is exceptional. The book is at its best when it captures important complexities, such as the Roosevelt who nominally accepted the goal of a balanced budget but had an even greater desire that Congress give him a "kitty" of billions of dollars in discretionary funds with which to dole out political favors, relieve economic distress, and try to jumpstart the economy. Unfortunately, however, the whole is less than the sum of the parts. While learning about specific policy episodes and broader policy outlooks, the reader is left wondering what lessons have been learned.

In the final chapter, Rosen argues that the long-term successes of the postwar economy came from the innate strengths of the American economic framework--relentless technological progress, education, managerial innovation, and utilization of natural resources--not from the policy innovations of the New Deal. However, these conclusions come from sources outside the archives that Rosen has explored and the events that he has analyzed. As an economic historian who does not specialize in the Great Depression but who has read a good deal about it, this reviewer approached the book eagerly but was ultimately frustrated because it is doubtful that this approach is an efficient way to learn important lessons about the 1930s. Once one steps back, Rosen's picture is very blurry, and it is unclear whether or not the scenes that he paints are being captured from the appropriate point of view. Perhaps the ultimate frustration is with the figure at the center of the canvas, Franklin Roosevelt: his enigmatic nature blurs the picture of the entire decade--and this seems to be Rosen's most compelling point.

ROBERT WHAPLES

Wake Forest University