Rising Collapsing Saddam: A multi-part strategy for getting the job done.

When President Bush made clear that the next campaigns in the war on terror would focus on states developing weapons of mass destruction, the skeptical refrain instantly emerged: "Don't expect Iraq to be a pushover like Afghanistan." (Just a few months ago, of course, the skeptical refrain was, "Don't expect Afghanistan to be a pushover like Iraq.") And it's true that the campaign against Iraq will not be Desert Storm II. It will, instead, reflect the "transformational" strategic approach defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld outlined in his recent speech at the National Defense University -- using and integrating all the elements of national power towards the goal of ending the terror regime of Saddam Hussein. The key is not to focus on a single type of effort, but to apply pressure in a variety of ways until the regime collapses.

As with the Afghanistan war, our first moves should be diplomatic. An important factor in the swift victory over the Taliban was the isolation of the Afghan dictatorship. Iraq has long been an international pariah, but has lately been taking steps to improve its international standing, especially in the Arab world. The United States should not take forceful measures to prevent Iraq from polishing its image or claiming the mantle of victimhood. The U.S. should instead seek to keep the anti-terror alliance together, and conduct a serious public-information campaign against Iraq. Nor should the U.S. be deterred by an initial lack of allied enthusiasm; it is worth remembering that George H. W. Bush did not have even the entire U.S. Congress behind him at the beginning of Desert Storm.

The key to winning -- and maintaining -- international legitimacy for our anti-Iraq effort is the United Nations inspection process. Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) demands that Iraq "unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless" of weapons of mass destruction. In 1998, the Iraqis ejected the U.N. inspectors (or, as they called them, "the dogs of the U.N. Special Commission"); recently, they rejected a Russian plan that would have brought the return of the inspectors. If Iraq remains intransigent, we should begin an air campaign against suspected Iraqi weapons facilities. And even if Iraq does allow the inspectors to return, they must be empowered in ways they were not before: The Iraqis must not be allowed to use delaying and stalling tactics, as they have in the past -- shuttling records and evidence around the country one step ahead of discovery. If Iraq denies entrance to a building, we should bomb it as soon as the inspectors have been evacuated to a safe distance. This action is provided for in Resolution 687, of which Paragraph 12 calls for the "destruction, removing or rendering harmless" of these weapons. Bombing them is as certain as any other method, and it may have the beneficial effect of facilitating future inspections.

We can also find creative ways to enforce other U.N. resolutions. For example, the U.S. suspects that the Iraqis have been diverting oil revenues garnered under the "oil for food" program from their ostensible humanitarian purpose in order to support Saddam's military machine. The international community could claim the power -- even the duty -- to place the Iraqi oil industry under international supervision, and to route all profits derived from it to humanitarian relief distributed by U.N. agencies and NGOs. We should also pay special attention to Iraqi money trails and their connection to the terror networks. Many Iraqi accounts have already been frozen, but there are probably others yet to be found. The more sources that can be shut down, the fewer dollars will be accessible to support our enemies, and the less cash available to prop up the Baghdad regime.

Whether the inspectors return or not, the allies should prepare for military action. Unlike in Afghanistan, a substantial allied ground force will be necessary, to prevent preemptive Iraqi ground attacks against assets in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. On paper, the Iraqi armed forces still look strong: 400,000 men, 2,200 tanks, 2,900 armored vehicles, and 100 operational aircraft. Yet experience has shown that Iraqi arms are no match for smaller forces trained and armed by the West: Iraqi troops are unmotivated and untrained, their equipment ill- maintained and lacking spare parts. There is no reason to suspect that after ten years of sanctions the Iraqis will perform any better than they did in 1991.

The U.S. and Britain have lately stepped up attacks on Iraqi air- defense sites, and this effort should continue. The U.S. has also been slowly building up its troop presence in Kuwait -- from around 4,000 to 24,000 personnel. There are several thousand more in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and strong naval assets in the region. The allies will probably require a few hundred thousand ground troops to pursue active operations against Iraq. Marine expeditionary brigades could also be stationed in the Arabian Gulf to add an element of flexibility to offensive planning, forcing the Iraqis to use large numbers of units to defend their coastline and the nearby oil facilities. As in Afghanistan, special-forces troops could be launched from aircraft carriers to establish forward operating bases and capture airfields far behind enemy lines for air-mobile deployments. If the Iraqis again deploy in long forward defensive positions in the desert, the allies will be able to choose their point of attack, punch through with local superiority, and surround the enemy forces -- cutting their supply lines and rendering them ineffective. Allied air power would undertake its accustomed role of attacking command-and-control nodes, interdicting Iraqi ground forces on or behind the line of engagement, and targeting the Iraqi political leadership.

One scenario has it that the Iraqis will virtually abandon their southern provinces and establish a defensive bastion centered on the capital. Saddam Hussein recently reorganized his command structure around three military districts -- northern Iraq, southern Iraq, and Baghdad. Urban warfare is certainly more difficult for forces on the attack, and as the Russian experience in Grozny showed, victory can come at a prohibitive cost. But if the Iraqis established a Fortress Baghdad and settled in for a siege, the regime would be separated from its sources of national power -- most notably the oil-production facilities, which could then be handed over to a transition government. Baghdad could be punished with airpower and long-range artillery, until the futility of resistance became evident and Saddam was toppled from within.

This highlights a critical point: The Iraqi campaign will be won, ultimately, not through military conquest but through the actions of internal opponents of the regime. Iraq differs from Afghanistan in that there is no territorial enclave currently held by resistance fighters, no front line to punch through to drive on to Baghdad. Furthermore, Saddam has been in power for over two decades and his mechanisms of control are more finely tuned. Nevertheless, the allies can count on support from established resistance groups, such as the Iraqi National Congress; the various ethnic resistance movements (Kurds, Shiites, and Turkomans); and, most important, those Iraqi tribes that have supported Saddam's regime but that will realize that it would better serve their interests to be on the allied side. As in Afghanistan, it will be the job of our intelligence agents to make the case to these groups that the time to take sides is at hand, and that if they choose wisely they will be rewarded

No single internal revolt (barring, of course, one by his bodyguards) will bring down Saddam Hussein. But as the number of successful insurgencies grows, as the liberated zone increases and stabilizes, and as it becomes clear to the oppressed Iraqis that it is possible to throw off their chains without retribution, an irresistible momentum will build. It would be a mistake to focus too much attention on a single resistance group, or to place excessive emphasis on Kurdish or other separatist groups that may have agendas that could alienate important allies (e.g., Turkey). The basic message should be: All who help will be rewarded, and all who oppose will lose out. Self-interest will do the rest. The U.N. should be engaged to set up a broad-based transition regime as soon as prudently possible. A resolution should be passed modeled on Resolution 1378, which set up the transition for Afghanistan. The allies need not wait until Saddam is finished before pressing ahead with this agenda; to move forward now would demonstrate the seriousness of the international community.

And the timeline for transforming Iraq? Difficult to project. Diplomatic initiatives can be launched rapidly, but the troop buildup will take longer, and our stores of smart weapons will have to be replenished before we can mount a serious air campaign. As the president has pointed out, time is not on our side -- but the sooner we take action, the sooner the odds will reverse, and time will no longer be on the side of Saddam Hussein.