Revolutionizing firepower: the enabling destructive and suppressive Element of combat power.

Whatever defeat mechanisms are employed in a particular engagement, the outcome generally is decided by how well opponents can maneuver, destroy and suppress, protect and lead at the point of decision in the settings imposed by the mission and environment. This ability to perform these four basic functions of combat and, thus, influence the outcome of battles and engagements is referred to as combat power. It has meaning only in a relative sense--relative to that of the enemy--and has meaning only at the time and place where outcomes are determined.

This is how the US has thought of combat power since this definition was introduced in the 1982 version of the capstone tactical manual FM 100-5, Operations. But what is interesting to note today, is that while modem information technologies enhance all the traditional elements of combat power, they have the potential of revolutionizing firepower.

To fully appreciate this, we have to first think of this element of combat power more broadly. In a modem sense, firepower combines all lethal and suppressive effects against enemy personnel, organizations and materiel. Firepower provides the enabling, violent, destructive and suppressive force essential to realizing the effects of maneuver. It is the means of suppressing the enemy's fires, neutralizing his tactical forces and destroying his ability to fight. This is done by killing, wounding or paralyzing the enemy's soldiers and by damaging the materiel and installations necessary for his continued combat effectiveness.

But achieving superior relative lethal and suppressive effects in a given situation will require more than raw firepower. It will hinge on the ability to find and identify suitable targets; decide and plan strikes quickly; engage with systems within reach; apply both lethal and suppressive effects with precision, volume and potency; employ weapons systems flexibly; replenish supplies of munitions; and assess the results of strikes. Enhanced technologies will improve the chances that friendly soldiers will employ overwhelming lethal and suppressive effects when and where required.

However, there is nothing new in what I have said so far. Destroying the enemy's equipment and killing enemy personnel may not always be necessary or even desirable, depending on the situation, but it may be sufficient to suppress their ability to function. Some suppressive, incapacitating and psychological shock effects are byproducts of lethal and destructive weapons; some are products of nonlethal weapons, such as jammers and various other incapacitants. Enhanced technologies can greatly improve the ability to produce both lethal and suppressive effects in the future.

The lethal firepower and suppressive effects system combines lethal, incapacitating and psychological (shock) effects against personnel, organizations and materiel. One measure of effectiveness is the ability to concentrate and shift these effects as required within the scheme of operations. This involves targeting, precision, lethality, range and mobility.

Better targeting and greater precision in delivery achieves better effects per round, but they also achieve greater economy because the basic loads of tactical organizations last longer. And increasing the lethality or suppressive effect per pound of munitions could greatly enhance the potency of the onboard basic load.

The longer range at which targets can be engaged greatly increases the number of engagement opportunities from a given position. More importantly, it multiplies the number of opportunities to concentrate firepower and suppressive effects, in support of subordinate combined arms tactical organizations. It also speeds the sequential concentrations of support between foci of effort. Enhancing the air and ground mobility of delivery systems can enhance the speed and agility with which "bases of fire" can be positioned, repositioned and protected. Overall, the lethal output per person of fire support organizations potentially could be increased dramatically.

These are all important ways to improve fire support systems, but they do not affect basic paradigms. There are several developments that will: ambush-like strikes; changing roles of direct and indirect fires in schemes of maneuver; a new suppression paradigm; and proactive and reactive fire networks.

Ambush-Like Strikes. The ability to acquire, track and process more targets at greater ranges revolutionizes fire planning--particularly in the ability to plan and execute long-range ambush-like strikes using large volumes of precision and suppressive weapons in synergistic combinations against specific organizations or functional groupings.

The concept of time-on-target (TOT) artillery strikes is not new. However in many cases it will be possible to strike the many discrete targets that comprise the essential elements of a military organization or functional grouping at the same time.

There are great advantages to employing precision weapons in large numbers within a compressed timeframe. But the advantage of precision fires begins to degrade rapidly once the enemy begins to evade and the difficulty of targeting increases.

Engaging in a very compressed timeframe also magnifies suppressive effects. Suppressive munitions can be interspersed with precise ones. Communications can be jammed, electronics can be made inoperable and humans can be isolated, shocked and disoriented. Thus the enemy could be presented with an overwhelming problem.

These ambush-like engagements could cause more rapid and complete organizational collapse.

Equally important will be a planning mindset that sees target sets in terms of their systemic significance. This merely requires the adaptation of the principles of target value analysis (TVA) developed by the Field Artillery School in the early 1980s. This approach to deep battle targeting was used to identify the highest pay off targets (HPTs) in a large force array based on our knowledge of Soviet doctrine, the context of the engagement and the mission of the friendly force.

The capability to conduct such precision ambush derives from enhanced situational understanding with savvy analysts who can identify targets of the greatest systemic value, the ability to use information technologies, and a layered and fused sensor system to evolve fire plans and achieve multiple high-speed sensor-to-shooter linkages. It also derives from a layered system of firepower and suppression with the mobility and reach to engage the high-value targets of an entire formation in depth and simultaneously (rather than sequentially and over time).

While ambush-like TOT strikes are possible in theory, current organizations and methods require revision. Today's organizations and fire delivery methods are optimized for serial engagements rather than parallel engagements of multiple HPTs.

The Changing Roles of Direct and Indirect Fires in Schemes of Maneuver. Advancements in indirect fire support could affect the force's ability to maneuver greatly and change the roles and relationships of direct and indirect fires at the lower tactical levels in mechanized combat. By indirect fires, we mean any fires that originate from beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) to the target. Being able to begin an engagement out of visual contact and reliably create de sired lethal and suppressive effects allow a more rapid advance in assaulting maneuver.

Increasingly, the combined arms commander's preference in a "deliberate" situation will be to use indirect precision munitions to open engagements and carry the burden of killing. This is because having confidence in the lethality of these systems, he can avoid revealing his forward direct fire systems and can save direct fire ammunition for tasks to which they are better suited. He will prefer to initiate action with direct fire systems in hasty situations because of the relative rapidity, reliability and simplicity with which these systems can be brought to bear under chaotic conditions.

Thus in deliberate engagements, he will engage his objective with precision indirect fires just before he clears the last "inter-visibility line." Then he will assault through the objective using direct fire systems to suppress and decisively finish the enemy.

In dismounted warfare, the change is not so extreme because indirect systems have been the most lethal instrument for at least a century. But even there, the ability to control and focus lethal and suppressive effects during close combat assault could be, greatly enhanced. This permits a more rapid and secure closure.

Information age fire support will change the way combined arms commanders plan their battles and engagements. Because they will be able to count on the effects of precise fires and suppression to a much higher degree, they will plan their maneuver around those expected results.

There also will be more stringent operational control over the allocation of munitions, especially the more capable, more precise and, thus, more expensive kind that will never be available in unlimited numbers.

To the extent that greater understanding of the enemy situation leads to more frequent deliberate engagements, higher commanders will be able to allocate such munitions more often, based on requirements. For instance, if the objective of an attack is an organization comprised at most of x key targets suitable to such munitions, the allocation of munitions for that mission could be based on x and conditioned by only two other factors--uncertainty about the enemy and the importance of the mission. This is similar in theory to former US Army doctrine for the allocation of tactical nuclear munitions.

New Suppression Paradigm. Still another development that affects basic paradigms is the great potential for enhancing suppressive effects that are not the byproduct of lethal munitions. A precision munitions-dominated battlefield may produce much less suppressive byproducts. This is not a problem in stand off attrition engagements, such as counterbattery fire, but it is a problem in the assault phase of close combat.

The large number of conventional munitions required to kill produce a great suppressive byproduct of blast and flying steel well beyond the munitions' lethal radius. This effect can keep enemy resistance in check while the assault force is closing.

Fire support with precision munitions has a much smaller suppressive byproduct. Far fewer rounds are required to produce lethal effects, and it is generally not wise to use these expensive munitions to fire at anything but confirmed targets.

At the same time, it would not be profitable to transport tons and tons of conventional munitions across oceans merely to serve suppression requirements during close combat. Future suppression weapons could combine the properties of some crowd-control weapons with methods for degrading the performance of soldiers and defeating the functioning of weapons, vehicles, electronics, communications and optics.

These enhanced suppressive weapons would have the additional benefit of being tailorable to the situation. They could be combined with lethal munitions, as required, and capable of far greater suppressive output per ton than conventional munitions.

Proactive and Reactive Fire Networks. Another development affecting basic paradigms is the concept of networking fires, sensors and command and control in several contexts--force protection, defense and offense. Combining such capabilities can yield active organization-level protection systems, rapidly reactive defenses and proactive systems in support of offensive maneuver.

The Soviet Army of the 1980s understood the potential of these systems. The US Navy and Marine Corps have gained some experience with network-centric warfare in Operation Sea Dragon and other experiments. The Soviets would have called their approaches "surveillance strike complexes."

A surveillance strike complex is an aptly named very rapid reactive system. Any penetration of the area of surveillance is immediately identified friend or foe, an engagement decision is made, the optimum "shooter" of the moment is selected, targeting data is sent to that shooter, the target is engaged, damage is assessed and the cycle may repeat again, if required. This entire "kill chain" could be automated, or it could contain human nodes as sensors or decision makers. Some elements could be very low-tech.

To a US Army artilleryman, this looks very much like old news. The Army's long-established and well-functioning counterbattery system integrates long-range radars, automated fire control and firing batteries in "quick-fire" loops. Well-planned defenses of all the services for most of the last century included such rudimentary surveillance strike complexes although sensors were forward observers (FOs) or manned radars linked by radio or telephone to fire direction centers (FDCs) that further were linked to aircraft or to firing batteries on the ground or afloat. The replacement of analog with digital technology greatly speeds the kill chain and renders it far more efficient.

The more important point is that this concept has great potential at every level from the smallest tactical unit upward within each service and across ser-vice boundaries. It is theoretically possible to establish systems at every level to respond very rapidly to every recognizable hostile phenomenon.

Two important points need to be made about surveillance strike complexes. First, ground targets will be the most difficult to differentiate, especially in circumstances where neutral civilians and hostile combatants are intermixed and immersed in ground clutter. The science of automatic target recognition is advancing rapidly but will remain the weakest link for some time.

Second, this application of technology has the potential for strengthening defenses to a remarkable degree, especially in circumstances in which target discrimination is not a great concern. We also should expect our opponents to exploit this concept.

The Soviets in the 1980s were very much interested in applying similar concepts to the offense--these they called "reconnaissance strike complexes." In a surveillance strike complex, the enemy initiates action that suits him well for defensive situations. In a reconnaissance strike complex, the reconnaissance element of the system initiates the kill chain.

The idea is based on the same fundamental notion as the old German concept of "reconnaissance pull tactics" where reconnaissance units looked at "surfaces and gaps" in the enemy dispositions to find maneuver opportunities. Here the network is established in support of offensive maneuver and responds immediately when certain triggering events occur or sought-after targets are found.

Firing resource availability is not based on the chance of their availability. Resources are deliberately emplaced based on best estimates of requirements and are dedicated to respond reliably and instantly when the triggering event occurs.

All future offensive actions at all levels could be supported by reconnaissance strike complexes keyed to finding and destroying specific key components of the enemy's system of defense.

Offensive operations also will depend on reactive protection systems. These are, in essence, a mobile variant of defensive networks. An ever-increasing danger for advancing air or ground maneuver is entering the zone of effect of a surveillance strike complex. Any potential opponent could cover every prepared defense at every echelon with difficult-to-spot sensors and hidden observers networked to indirect surface and air defense weapons.

A two-pronged approach is required to avoid unacceptable casualties when these kinds of defenses cannot be out flanked and there is insufficient time to reduce them with standoff means only. On the one hand, over watching reconnaissance strike complexes could find and dismantle the most vulnerable elements of the opposing unit's system ahead of the advance. But this will usually be insufficient and need to be accompanied by a layering of reactive protection systems that are really very rapid counterfire systems set to react immediately to defeat any source of missile, artillery, mortar or rocket fire.

Relatively close-in "reactive protection" from long-range, high-caliber direct fire systems is also possible. These systems can be organized into attacking network-centric air and naval formations, but these principles also apply to tactical combat formations on land.

One of the great dangers to mobile ground tactical units will be encounters with hidden dismounted infantry armed with simple antitank weapons or direct fire systems in "keyhole" positions. In these cases, active and passive protection alone could be insufficient. Classical overwatch techniques using vehicular optics and direct fire weapons also could be insufficient. But combining these with a system of overwatch that is capable of sensing the first enemy shot, locating the source and immediately engaging it with a combination of lethal precision and suppressive effects could be sufficient to limit casualties and permit more rapid and more audacious advances.

If the enemy came to understand that any shot fired at the friendly unit could result in an immediate and deadly response, he could be greatly deterred.

While some portions of these capabilities have been demonstrated in recent combat situations, we also have seen failures, Failures tend to be at the beginning and end of the kill chain (target identification and damage assessment) when human eyes are replaced with technical sensors and when firing decisions are based on inadequate discrimination. Reactive protection systems also will have problems finding the source of missiles without predictable trajectories.

These are issues we will resolve eventually, but so far we have been generous in funding shooters and far too miserly in funding the networking and sensing capabilities to make these systems reliable. The full potential of modern organizations only can be achieved when vital networks are functioning. Their combat power contracts dangerously as networks are degraded.

Impact on Organizational Designs. These new capabilities will require new approaches to organizational design. Robust over-the-horizon target acquisition (TA) capabilities could become an integral part of fire support organizations at every level. In a system for BLOS fighting, every link is equally important for success.

Dedicated aerial targeting sensors ensure the latest and most timely targeting data and report fire mission results. These could become a permanent feature of fire support systems at every level that has indirect or BLOS capabilities.

The current practice of relying on dual-purpose reconnaissance, surveillance and TA (RSTA) organizations for this vital function represents a false economy because it makes this important new potential only conditionally available. RSTA organizations must serve two masters: the commander who wants decision information and other equal elements of the command who need TA support. In the future, combined arms commanders will prefer to separate RSTA functions in organizational designs.

An important measure of the effectiveness of any system of lethal and suppressive support is the degree to which commanders can concentrate combined effects at critical foci and with what agility they can shift those concentrations to new foci within both hasty and deliberate settings. To the extent that echelons within tactical organizations share an understanding of the situation and are unified in purpose, new technical combinations make it possible to reinforce the efforts of organizations more than one echelon deep, as is the current practice. These new technical combinations are primarily more integrated fire control and greater accuracy and ranges for higher level supporting systems.

In deliberate situations, the potential for reinforcement in depth is far greater than in hasty ones. In hasty situations the nearer and more responsive components of the overall system will have greater value. Therefore it will still be important to provide a layer of fire support for each echelon, but what is required at each layer is still in question. All-told, the combination of integrating fire control in depth and increasing range, accuracy and functional agility for lethal and suppressive support at each echelon can greatly enhance the productivity of the overall system.

What can be done to enhance firepower effects is impressive. Overall, the lethal output per person of fire support organizations potentially could be increased dramatically. Enhanced technologies can improve the degree to which the organization can bring to bear lethal and suppressive capabilities when and where required.

But the key is to do more than improve current approaches. We must design new organizations and tactical methods to exploit the new approaches. (See the figure.) Such changes easily could lead to order of magnitude increases in firepower effects--could revolutionize rites.

* Exploit the new complementary relationship between indirect and direct fires.

* Adopt new planning paradigms for fire and maneuver.

* Integrate long-range target acquisition into fire support systems.

* Understand how to optimize beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) capabilities at the lower tactical levels.

* Learn how to network fires, sensors, and command and control for force protection, defensive and offensive purposes.

* Enhance the suppressive effects of modern "fire support" systems.

* Organize for and employ large-scale precision and suppressive time-on-target (TOT) strikes against systemic wholes.

* Enhance the ability of the echeloned system to concentrate combined effects in depth and shift the foci of concentration flexibly throughout the battlespace.

Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege is a Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) consultant for advanced warfighting experiments, wargames and other studies; was one of the principal developers of the Army's AirLand Battle concept; and the founder and first Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also serves as an advisor on future joint operating concepts for the Joint Staff at the Pentagon and Joint Forces Command at Norfolk, Virginia. In a previous assignment, he was a Special Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Secretary General of NATO. General Wass de Czege retired in 1993 after serving as the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Riley, Kansas. He holds an MA in Public Affairs from Harvard University.