Revisiting the Principles of Free Will and Determinism: Exploring Conceptions of Disability and Counseling Theory.

Over three centuries ago Thomas Hobbes asserted that each person is free-- that is, has control over which actions to perform-- to the extent that the individual has the capacity to act upon his or her desires (Magill, 1997). Though Hobbes felt that such freedom was only an illusion (Yalom, 1980) his thought stills holds a stunning and prophetic significance for the contemporary counseling theories employed by rehabilitation counselors.

A theory is understood to be tool that a counselor uses to help organize information into meaningful frameworks that allow him or her to make sense of particular situations and events, to construct definitions, and to identify potential problems and solutions (see Corey & Corey, 1998). Counseling theories provide rehabilitation counselors guidance. However, implicit within this truism is the compelling lure that is felt toward a particular theory because it may help to confirm a counselor's own self-concept and philosophical beliefs about human nature (Emener, 1997; Nowlin & Blackburn, 1995; cf Emener & Ferrandino, 1983). It is axiomatic that people entering into the profession of rehabilitation counseling do so because of a desire to help others. This desire to help may be seen as the product of one's own life experiences (e.g., one's own disability), one's upbringing and, personal ideology. Throughout their education, rehabilitation counselors-in-training are introduced to a variety of counseling theories, and some of these he or she will be personally, perhaps emotionally, drawn to. Indeed, Corey and Corey (1998) emphasized that the most suitable theory for a counselor is the "one that is an extension of [his or her] values and personality" (p. 62). The question then becomes "why was a particular theory attractive to the student in the first place"? What moved him or her toward one theory and not another? As it is, the experienced counselor may have come to understand, through academia and practice, "what" he or she is doing with any given client (e.g., offering unconditional positive regard) but will, at some point, need to ask him or herself "why?" he or she is doing that in particular-- and not just because theory stipulates it (Nowlin & Blackburn, 1995; Dopson & Gade, 1981; emphasis added).

It is this attraction between counselor and theory that should necessitate rehabilitation counselors' reflection on their beliefs toward human nature in general, and disability in particular. "Why is an existentialist, an existentialist?" "Why is one counselor more comfortable with behavioral approaches and another with reality therapy?" A rehabilitation counselor's personal beliefs about human nature will a priori influence any theoretical orientation that is used to address disability (Emener, 1997; Nowlin & Blackburn, 1995). Counseling theories are certainly necessary but can become highly complex intellectual veils through which rehabilitation counselors perceive their clients. Thus, the attempt to recognize one's personal attraction to a particular theory is imperative in order to realize one's underlying assumptions about human nature and individual potential. The purpose of such a personal investigation, particularly regarding rehabilitation counselors, lies in the philosophical principles of free will and determinism which are generally regarded as the originating sources of contemporary counseling theory (Furlong, 1981).

Originating Principles

As is well known in the counseling professions, most theoretical views of humankind have sprung from one of two basic philosophical principles: free will (sometimes referred to as free-choice or freedom) and determinism (Furlong, 1981; Gelso, 1970; Roth, 1969; cf Nowlin & Blackburn, 1995). Broadly defined, the former view considers humans to be responsible beings having the power to control their own lives through choices which can influence the environment and others within it, while the latter view likens humans to highly sophisticated and complex machines who are totally determined by internal (hereditary) and/or external (environmental) forces beyond their control (Furlong, 1981). Thus, the object of attraction for which both principles struggle may be recognized as being the causal factor (s) for action-- in effect, control.

Perhaps the most notable theories to emerge, with respect to the inherent antithesis, are humanism/existentialism on the one side and behaviorism/environmentalism on the other. Without stating what is already commonly understood regarding these polar theories, it is important to note that what behaviorism devalues: freedom and choice; existentialism places at its center. The following discussion more closely examines the principles of free will and determinism as they may relate to contemporary counseling theory.

Free will

The concept of free will can be traced to the Book of Genesis and to ancient Greece and Socrates who advised all to "know thyself". Similarly, Pindar warned us to "choose thyself" and, Shakespeare's Hamlet opined, "to thine own self be true". These words clearly suggest that there are reasons to look within ourselves. Zegans (1989) interpreted these reasons as a core self or being, perhaps even a soul, which exists and is the foundation of human action and values. One of the basic components of tree will is that the person can sense the capacity to act; that he or she feels free to choose among a variety of possibilities. This is not to say that personal choice is devoid of a cause, rather that the cause is implied in the individual's choosing (cf Hulnick & Hulnick, 1991). The cause is intrinsic to the person instead of determined from beyond his or her control. Thus, William James referred to free will as an "independent variable" among fixed data (Roth, 1969). Angeles (1981) defined free will as making uncompelled choices and describes it as the "feeling that given the same circumstances I could have done otherwise than that which I did in fact do" (p. 105). Other authors have similarly defined free will, and though some have connected it with intentionality (Deci & Ryan, 1987; May, 1969) courage (Beck, 1994; Tillich, 1952) and autonomy (Deci, 1995), the one consistent theme throughout all has been responsibility (see Magill, 1997; Pink, 1996; Beck, 1994; Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn & Kidder, 1982; Furlong, 1981; Yalom, 1980; May, 1969; 1967, 1958; Lehrer, 1966; Tillich, 1952).

Responsibility has been defined as response + ability (Hulnick & Hulnick, 1991; Yalom, 1980; May, 1967; 1958). Simply stated, this means the ability to respond and to act upon one's own wishes rather than react as in a deterministic ideology. Moreover, May (1958) stressed that it is important to note the use of the prefix "re", as in re-sponsible, in that this implies the capacity to re-turn or to "come back to oneself as the one performing the act" (p. 74). Taking this term even one step further back to its Latin heritage, it is identified as spondere or spondeo and means "to pledge oneself to" or "to promise" (Simpson, 1963). Thus, May (1958) explained that responsibility, at its most basic level, designates the one who can be depended on or the one who can promise to act (i.e., the one who can be trusted). Wright (1980) also investigated the meaning of the prefix re as it is used within the term rehabilitation. He stated that the term rehabilitation might be defined as returning to a previous state [of unimpairment]. Of course, as Wright explained, such a definition can not include congenital disabilities yet the term still maintains overriding value above and beyond simple syntax. Nevertheless, such a close examination of these terms incites many questions regarding the "what" that one is re-turning to. Thus, adding an almost palpable quality to the connotative meanings behind the words of Socrates and Shakespeare mentioned earlier (e.g., "to thine ownself be true").

Considering the person with a disability, it is at this junction-- between free will and responsibility-- that perhaps the greatest conflict between determinism and freedom arises. Free will does not presuppose responsibility, or vice-versa. Though conceptually they do go hand-in-hand, they are likewise conceptually unique. A person can choose against his or her responsibility and subsequently his or her freedom. In such a case, this person is essentially exerting some free will in order to embrace determinism (Rogers, 1961). However, -- and without further splitting teleological hairs--it follows that the person in embracing determinism is likewise rejecting autonomy. Autonomy is a term that is quite familiar to rehabilitation educators, personnel and, students. Arokiasamy (1993) listed the achievement of personal [client] autonomy as being the ultimate goal of rehabilitation. In the motivation literature, numerous authors have conducted extensive research in the area of autonomy and how it supports one's self-determination, which is also grounded in rehabilitation philosophy (see Deci, 1995; O'Conner & Vallerand, 1994; Deci, Eghrari, Patrick & Ryan, 1994; Rigby, Deci, Patrick & Ryan, 1992 and; Deci & Ryan, 1987, 1980). Deci & Ryan (1987) defined autonomy as connoting an inner authorization of one's actions and behavior and asserted, "autonomous action is thus chosen" (p. 1025). Similarly, it has been stated that "choice presupposes freedom" (Schrag, 1961, p. 190). Under this light, it follows that free will may be either accepted or rejected depending upon one's beliefs and/or circumstances.

What this suggests for the person with a disability is that if the existential definition of responsibility and the motivational definition of autonomy are reasonably accurate, then the person with a disability may be at risk of feeling, at least to some degree, "forced" into a state of determinism. Moreover, the possibility of victimization seems to pose a potential threat as well (May, 1967). Though, feeling victimized may certainly depend upon type and severity of disability in addition to one's overall conception of disability (which will be addressed later).

Determinism

At its most basic level, the principle of determinism declares that all things in the universe are governed by some precipitating cause (Angeles, 1981). Stated differently, everything in the universe is dependent upon, and necessitated by, an outside causal agent or influence. C could not have come about unless A first affected B in a very specific way. The notion of contingency is inherent in this description in that, as B is dependent upon A, so also does any particular instance of A contingently necessitate B (Lehrer, 1966). Essentially it is a very linear cause and effect relationship in which B is indefinitely subsequent to A, and, without the initiating occurrence of A, C becomes seemingly irrelevant. Respectfully, Darwin explained that genetics and natural selection were the controlling agents of humans while Marx described the influence of economic and class forces (see Furlong, 1981).

The "medical model" of helping and coping as illustrated by Brickman et al (1982) flows from this cause-effect relationship. Within this model, a person is not held responsible for the cause of his or her problem nor for finding a solution. In effect, the individual has control over nothing. This omission of responsibility fosters dependency, and in this case, a dependency on doctors, nurses, rehabilitation professionals, God, etc. As will be addressed below, dependent behavior is, in essence, a form of faith (Beck, 1994). That is, the presumption that some other force will provide security, health and, direction.

Within a deterministic paradigm, given adequate knowledge and understanding of the cause and subsequent behavior or functioning of a particular person or event, one could make predictions about future behavior and functioning. It is at this point that analytic psychology is implied. The traditional psychoanalytic model views human behavior as completely determined regardless of the fact that it segregates the human psyche into opposing elements, i.e., id, ego, and superego; or pre-conscious, unconscious, and conscious (Yalom, 1980; cf Hackney & Cormier, 1996). Generally speaking, an individual's neurosis is said to be the result of a repressed past and, a standard criticism of determinism is that it places individuals under the control of their past (Magill, 1997). May (1967) illuminated a danger that lies within this theory by explaining that when such a deterministic view of an individual is used, the person is likely to conclude that he or she is the victim of instinctual drives or other outside forces, both of which are considered beyond personal control. Likewise, Livneh and Sherwood (1991) explained that successful adaptation to a disability is possible only when the person accepts his or her new limitations and minimizes defenses. This is a striking notion, as there seems to be a thin line between the implied "denial" one may have toward a disability and its impacts and the exercise of self-determination to adjust with it.

Traditionally, research on the attribution of responsibility has presumed that people are more interested in understanding the causes of events (Brickman et al., 1982). Such a manner of thinking presupposes the question "why?" as in "why me?" or "why did this happen?" and is antithetical to the inherent possibilities within asking oneself "how will I respond?" This denotes a culturally accepted "past orientation," not unlike traditional psychoanalysis. In a rehabilitation counseling relationship one result of such past orientation could conceivably be the strong suggestion to clients that they are the products of forces beyond their control (Bruyere, 1986).

However, Brickman et al., (1982) contended that quite the opposite may be true; that people in general are more concerned with controlling behavior in order to maximize desired outcomes. The authors asserted that this is evident in the practice of self-rewards or self-punishments that are contingent upon a particular behavior or achievement. This line of reasoning illustrates a "future orientation" and aligns with May's (1967) view that, as a person seeks to control his or her future then he or she clearly does not feel like a powerless victim.

Lehrer (1966) offered a relevant example of deterministic thinking for rehabilitation counselors and certain disabilities. Lehrer presented an imaginary research experiment in which the movements of the subject were totally controlled by the experimenter through the use of a device worn on the subject's head. Because of this device, the subject was unable to control or direct his own movements and was therefore dependent upon the experimenter. It was explained that: (1) the subject could not make his body move; (2) the subject could not prevent his body from moving and; (3) though the subject may choose or will his body to move such desire will nevertheless generate no effect. The subject's choosing and willing came to be regarded as superfluous and, try as he may; he really had no choice concerning the movements of his own body. Adding a definitive reality to this fiction, Hocking asserted decades ago that, "a self without a body would be a self without a will" (1928, p. 84). Though this statement is philosophically debatable, it does suggest potential obstacles for a person with a disability even today, namely that if one believes one is powerless; then one is. Therefore, how a person arrives at certain beliefs will likely "determine" his or her response to a given situation. This example illuminates one likely source of frustration, anger and declining motivation for individuals with a disability (and their rehabilitation counselors) as the person's sense of autonomy has been seemingly negated by their conception of a disability and its impact on free will.

Conceptions of Disability

Several authors have asserted that a counselor's philosophy of human nature (e.g., that people have free will or that their lives are determined) greatly influences how he or she conceptualizes and subsequently approaches the counseling process (Emener, 1997; Nowlin & Blackburn, 1995; Emener & Ferrandino, 1983, and Gelso, 1970). Likewise, it is logical to assume that a rehabilitation counselor's philosophy of disability will influence how he or she conceptualizes the client's potential adjustment. Furthermore, how the client conceptualizes disability will impact the degree to which he or she feels capable of testing any limitations imposed. Gelso (1970) asserted that people have an innate need to experience freedom subjectively and cited Temerlin (1963) who stated that the experience of free will works to describe the psychologically healthy person. Later, Shontz (1975) explored the meaning of psychological health and characterized it as a feeling of vitality and the vigorous pursuit of goals. As with the precepts of free will and autonomy, health was defined by Shontz as being experienced intrinsically by the individual. He offered the example of when a person may say, "I am healthy" rather than, "I have caught a case of good health" (p. 120). The implication is that, along with free will and autonomy, health is something that one is rather than something one has or is given.

The above discussion introduced the importance of how one conceptualizes disability. Extending Wolfensberger's (1976) work, Hershenson (1992) proposed that if a client, his or her relevant environment (i.e., family, etc.) and the rehabilitation counselor differ in their conceptions of disability, the rehabilitation process would be greatly impaired. For example, if an individual who acquired an impairment felt "challenged to adjust" while his or her parents "mourned the loss of their child's future", the resultant conflict could negatively impact adjustment for all involved. Accordingly, Hershenson provided a theoretical framework to aid in the identification and resolution of such potential hazards.

Sociopolitical Influences on Individual Conceptions

From a sociopolitical perspective, Hershenson (1992) suggested that the perceived causes of disability have traditionally fallen within one of three categories: faith (that one must accept events as the will of a supernatural force), logic (events are naturally caused and can be empirically determined) and, power (that one does have some control over events and can create change). His thesis was partially based upon the work of Arokiasamy, Rubin & Roessler (1987) who indicated that throughout history, four distinct conceptions of disability have issued. Briefly these were supernatural causes, medical causes, natural causes, and finally the minority group paradigm (which is attributed to Hahn, 1985). This work also extended Hershenson's (1983) earlier research where he first interpreted the cycles of faith, logic and power that our culture moves through according to the current zeitgeist. Hershenson concluded that while only one principle is dominant at a time, all three are present and conceivably "balanced" on a hierarchical scale. Thus, when one principle does not sufficiently explain events, a different principle becomes dominant (much like a fad) and, in this way, sets the cycle in motion. Implied is the idea that since each individual is to some degree a "product" of the presiding zeitgeist, then this cultural belief is likely to be absorbed into the individual's own belief system. This includes the beliefs of rehabilitation counselors and their clients, and it is here that the four models of helping and coping, as described by Brickman et al (1982), become most salient. Briefly, the "medical model" has already been described as denying a person control over problems or solutions. Next, the "compensatory model" states that people are not responsible for a problem but are responsible for the solution; the "moral model" declares that people are responsible for both the problem and solution and; finally, the "enlightenment model" maintains that individuals are responsible for the problem but the solution is out of their hands. As can be seen, only the medical model completely omits client responsibility, and this has been the traditional model of our health systems (cf Condeluci & Williams, 1997). Parenthetically, it is important that the rehabilitation counselor note that responsibility is often equated with blame and the assumptions that a counselor may have about a client can easily direct the style of help provided. Instead, blame tends to be more of a sociological imposition whereas responsibility connotes an ontological awareness.

In the same vein, how each client views the cause of his or her disability will determine to what degree he or she feels able to respond to it or to act upon the situation at hand. Accordingly, Hershenson (1992) explained that the conception based on faith would likely lead one to simply accept a disability without question and await professional advice. The conception based on logic may lead to a very linear scientific or medical conclusion that also nurtures dependency, in this case, perhaps upon a medical doctor. Finally, the conception based on power would likely lead to advocacy for some kind of change (i.e., societal change). Thus, the cause of disability remains determined only through speculation.

Vash (1981) noted other factors that may affect how an individual conceives a disability and asserted that these factors may alter the relative balance and presumably disturb a person's belief system. Vash (1981) addressed three factors (which she called "determiners") that can influence how a person responds to a disability. These are: 1) the overall nature of the disability, 2) certain person variables (e.g., gender, activities affected, interests and values, etc.) and, 3) environmental variables (e.g., familial and community influences).

Upon closer inspection, and though there is some overlap, one can see that while Hershenson's (1992) cycles of conception attend to the broader cultural and social factors, Brickman et al's (1982) models of helping may be seen as addressing what is perhaps the middle-ground, or where the client's belief systems meet the cultural belief systems (through the practices of rehabilitation or medical professionals) and finally, Vash's (1981) determiners focus more on factors within and immediately around the person. Under this light, the rehabilitation counselor is in the pivotal position of liaison whose goal it is to provide a neutral ground where negotiations for solutions to a problem may be explored. A great deal may depend upon the counselor's own personal views of human nature (i.e., free will or determinism) and to what, or whom, he or she attributes the cause of a disability. Theoretically, Hershenson's (1992) cycles of conception collaborate with Brickman et al's (1982) models of helping as well as Vash's (1981) determiners to provide a basis for understanding the variety of ways that a person's belief system may be influenced. An important consideration for the rehabilitation counselor is that each of these factors will imply a large and varying amount of possible influences upon one's beliefs about determinism or free will and any subsequent responsibility.

Counseling Theories

Essentially the word theory refers to what one thinks may be true about a particular phenomena and there are a number of counseling theories to address as many crises, problems or events. Below is a brief exploration into five of the more commonly utilized counseling theories in rehabilitation. Each theory's potential benefits and limitations for rehabilitation counseling are addressed along with the embedded assumptions regarding free will and determination.

Psychoanalytic

The psychoanalytic approach has been addressed in this paper and the implication was given that this intervention might not be of great utility for the rehabilitation counselor. Psychoanalysis requires extensive training for the therapist and its prolonged treatment methods render it an unlikely candidate for the conceptual and adjustment issues confronting a person with a disability (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991). However, for the post-acute individual, psychoanalytic methods may prove beneficial in facilitating greater insight into the person's needs and motives.

Yet, as a whole, it seems that the psychoanalytic emphasis on past events may imply to the rehabilitation client that such past events are of more importance to healthy living, which appears to conflict with rehabilitation's emphasis on self-determination. Also, Beatrice Wright (1983) warned that one of the greatest barriers to disability adjustment is the "perceptual factor of contrast" in which the client continually compares his or her present with the past, and in so doing, focuses upon limitations rather than possibilities.

Adler's Individual Approach

This theory takes into account the whole person, that is to say one's physical, emotional, interpersonal, intellectual and spiritual aspects as they interact with and impact the individual (Hansen, Rossberg & Cramer, 1994). Behavior change is not reported to be of great concern; rather this approach seeks to bring about a change in goals and concepts. Heavily weighted within this theory is the notion of feelings of inferiority. Such feelings might result from being a child in a world of adults, functional or structural abnormalities, a lower social status, or being compared and evaluated (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991). As for its utility to rehabilitation counseling, Livneh and Sherwood reported that this intervention is limited by some of the same aspects as psychoanalytic methods such as the duration of treatment. However, this intervention's focus on inferiority feelings and subsequent noncoping behaviors could prove quite useful in the early depressive or angry stages of adjustment. During this time, the focus would be on the client's current non-coping behaviors and the attempt to establish effective strategies (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991).

Person-Centered Approach

As is well known, this approach has traditionally proven of great use to the rehabilitation counseling profession, however it is not without its limitations. See (1985) listed eight "nearly insurmountable obstacles" that lie between the Person-Centered approach and the requirements of rehabilitation counseling (p. 18). Among these were (a) a reluctance to establish specific goals; (b) an aversion to evaluation; (c) the relative lack of interest regarding the environment and, (d) a process orientation rather than an outcome orientation. Yet, because of its phenomenological foundation this approach will certainly facilitate greater client insight into his or her conceptualizations of a disability and feelings of free will or determinism. Additionally, the notion of an "ideal-self", or who one would like to become, may work to instill within clients the hope and effort for preferred change (i.e., possibility).

The Person-Centered Approach may be very helpful in the early stages of disability with helping a person gain insight into his or her perceptions and feelings, to explore one's values and, to begin the adjustment process. However, there remains the apparent discrepancy between the aforementioned possibility of an ideal-self and the means with which to reach that point. The limited emphasis upon specific goal setting could conceivably suggest to a client that control is of less importance prolonging the adjustment process.

The Gestalt Approach

Fundamental to this approach is the holistic integrity of each individual. The emphasis is on personal responsibility and self-awareness. The Gestalt Approach promotes recognition of the "here-and-now" and one's ability to create change. Such a therapeutic endeavor parallels closely with the emphases of rehabilitation (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991). The concept of responsibility further promotes the ability (the necessity) of a client to "take up the reins" of his or her own life. These techniques have proven quite useful for clients who may be "trapped" within denial, depression, or anger (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991) lending credence to Wright's (1983) notion of the perceptual factor of contrast mentioned above. Various techniques such as "empty chair" or "role-playing" promote responsibility as they essentially engage the client with him or herself through actual self-dialogue and differing, even conflicting, perceptual fields.

Gestalt theory and techniques are perhaps best suited for promoting free will in rehabilitation clients. Its emphasis on responsibility and self-awareness establish self-trust (i.e., spondere) and an understanding of how a present experience may be influencing the person (i.e., "I" statements, such as "I feel" or "I am"). Additionally, and more importantly, this approach emphasizes to clients what they can do to change a particular experience. There are clear implications for responsibility and control as clients are encouraged to understand, accept, and, if desired, change perceptions. This would also include the ability to change one's overriding conception of disability.

The Rational-Emotive/Cognitive Approach

Probably the most relevant concept that RET and Cognitive therapies offer rehabilitation counseling is Ellis's (1973) A-B-C Theory of Personality and Beck's (1976) parallel view that a person's affect and behavior are determined by perceptions (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991). The A-B-C Theory of Personality argues that an antecedent event (in this case a disability) is not the cause of particular consequences. Rather, it is the person's belief system that exacerbates consequences. One's present cognitions result in negative feelings about oneself, which lower self-esteem. The RET/Cognitive approaches are well equipped to aid a client during the initial impact stages (i.e., denial or depression) in how they help the client to restructure illogical or irrational beliefs. Also, these approaches work well in breaking down seemingly overwhelming obstacles into more manageable units (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991). Most often, clients are assisted in setting and achieving short-term goals that work to build self-esteem and confidence and promote responsibility. In order to aid with the facilitation of intrinsic motivation it seems evident that the RET/Cognitive therapies may prove quite beneficial because of their emphasis on short-term goals. Using "walking" as a metaphor, the goals might represent various "steps" toward a feeling of increased control. Finally, and of perhaps the greatest significance for rehabilitation, is that clients are taught and encouraged to end their disability related frustrations by either changing the environment or learning to accept existing situations. In effect, to choose and to act.

Future Considerations for Rehabilitation Counselors

A conceptualization, regardless of its origin, is not a "solid". A concept is just that--conceived--and is therefore alterable. Beck (1994) spoke of courage, and, with little doubt, it requires great courage in order to become aware of and attempt to change one's established ways of thinking. That most things new and unknown tend to elicit increased anxiety and uncertainty supports Beck's thought. As he reported, "an act of courage is independent behavior, while an act of faith is dependent behavior," (p. 8). The implication is that an act of courage is done in spite of the awareness of possible consequences, in this case anxiety (whereas an act of faith is to wait dependently on some external force, and is not necessarily of religious import). The end result of this being that such a courageous act could instill within the client an increased sense of autonomy and self-determination that, in turn, would promote intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1987).

Areas that could be explored by rehabilitation theory and practice might include, first, the notion of the counselor being the "alter ego" of the client (Beck, 1994). Beck described the counselor's role here as helping the client to clarify matters, to exhort action, and to lend strength, confidence, and expectation. Most importantly, the alter ego provides the empathic link upon which the client may rely while embarking upon critical decisions. The alter ego may at this point act as the liaison between a client and his or her cultural, social and, personal conceptions of disability, with one result conceivably being a heightened awareness of personal power and choice for the client.

Secondly, it is important for the rehabilitation counselor to remember how very easy it is for a client, members of a client's family, important others, as well as the counselor him or herself, to be the product of the dominating cultural concept of disability. As liaison, it is vital that the counselor recognizes 1) his or her own beliefs about free will and determinism, 2) the client's beliefs toward free will and determinism, 3) the extent to which these beliefs for both counselor and client may be affected by the presence of a disability and, 4) the risk that a client's beliefs may be compromised not only by the disability itself but by the conflicting beliefs of their counselor, family and, society. Is the person making any decisions? If so, what types of decisions? Does the person express opinions or desires? Who does the client most rely on, and why? Is he or she making references to the future (e.g., "ideal self"--what could be) or are they focusing on the past (i.e., what can not be)?

This implies a third consideration for rehabilitation counselors, which is to "go back to the basics". What this means is that a person with a disability is prone to feeling quite fragmented (Livneh & Sherwood, 1991) and in this way is subject to becoming overwhelmed. Thus, going back to the basics means to keep things simple; that the counselor works to recognize whether a client seems able to freely choose--is response--able toward his or her situation--or is the person tending toward avoidance within the assumed security of a dependent state. Along these lines, it is conceivable that an "unmotivated" client simply may not know of another way to behave due to his or her degree of assimilation into one or another philosophical belief or sociological conception of disability. More importantly, it is perhaps at just such a juncture that the greatest impact of the paradox between free will and determinism occurs. The words of Thomas Hobbes mentioned earlier (i.e., each person is free to control his or her life to the extent to which he or she has the capacity to act upon his or her desires) and the fictional research subject described by Lehrer (1966) offer an interesting illustration of this paradox. Specifically, depending upon the severity of a person's disability, his or her thoughts, desires and will may not be able to generate physical action. Thus, one may come to feel like Lehrer's research subject where free will was felt to be somewhat superfluous because, no matter how hard the subject thought or chose, certain actions were not within his control. In this way, it seems possible that a deterministic viewpoint may be imposed upon a person. Moreover, depending upon the conceptions of the client's family along with the theory employed by the counselor, free will may come to be seen by a client as negligible.

It is important at this point to recall that rehabilitation is a cultural and social movement, in addition to a deeply personal process for individual clients. Rehabilitation addresses the interactions that occur between an individual and multiple environments, including the psychological, familial, social, biological, vocational, educational, and economic. Such a holistic approach is idealistic, yet rehabilitation remains quite pragmatic and operational as it promotes the free will of a client through any number of avenues (e.g., empowerment and inclusion). As a result, rehabilitation can then be understood in the verb tense as it stresses and promotes autonomy, responsibility, independent action (Lopez-Levers, 1997; Wright, 1980), courage (Beck, 1994), and choice (Vash, 1981). Thus a [the] goal of rehabilitation may be seen as the restoration of one's response--ability, indeed, as Beck, (1994) stated, it is the endeavor to "rehabilitate the will."

Conclusion

This paper addressed themes within the philosophical principles of free will and determinism that apply to certain psychological theories and counseling interventions. It also distinguished between sociopolitical conceptions of disability and factors affecting these. The emerging themes indicate that free will espouses what the rehabilitation movement practices: autonomy. The existential definition of responsibility was widely recognized as an intensely personal endeavor that promotes autonomy as it increases self-determination and intrinsic motivation.

Rehabilitation counselors-in-training will naturally be drawn to one or more counseling theories because of their own philosophical beliefs toward these concepts. Yet, the underlying assumptions of these theories may not support client ideology and suggest that the opposite of what they believe is true. Specifically, as the medical model has traditionally been the dominant approach of our health systems, the use of counseling interventions that devalue client responsibility could threaten efforts to restore autonomy. A deterministic ideology promotes passivity and is basic to traditional psychoanalytic methods. The Gestalt and RET/Cognitive interventions, and the phenomenological component of Person-Centered Therapy, offer much to a client dealing with the trauma of a catastrophic event. Both theories emphasized perceptual change and taking action, while the Person-Centered approach afforded an additional means toward client insight through subjective exploration. However, these approaches tend to be more helpful only in the early stages of disability adjustment.

It is vital that rehabilitation counselors work toward understanding their own philosophical beliefs about free will and determinism and their subsequent conceptions of disability. Rehabilitation counselors-in-training may need to ask themselves to what degree they feel response--able and free to choose within their own lives and explore situations when this feeling may have been altered.

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Andrew A. Phemister
Michigan State University

Andrew A. Phemister. Ph.D. Candidate. 203-A South Homer. Lansing. MI 48912. Email: [e-mail]