Revisiting neutrality: demand for Swiss diplomacy's "good offices" has fallen sharply since the Berlin wall collapsed in 1991. But a Zurich scholar says a more activist "peace facilitator" role now fills that gap well.

Swiss historian Daniel Trachsler recently wrote his doctoral thesis at the University of Zurich on the role of a post-World War II foreign minister (1945-1961), Max Petitpierre and the doctrine that bears his name.

It's still a timely topic, since neutral Switzerland became the world's leading mediator between countries not on speaking terms throughout the Cold War period. To be sure, this discreet "good offices" role crumbled along with the fall of the Berlin wall and now seems all but passe to many.

New Policy

Yet Petitpierre's promotion of "good offices"--the notion of a third country acting as a mediator between two conflicting states--had its day and seems overrated today. Trachsler tells Swiss News during an interview at the Federal Institute for Technology in Zurich that the old foreign policy has been recently replaced by one that is far more dynamic, namely an upfront role in and outside the United Nations championing peace and human-rights issues.

At the same time, the Zurich scholar explains that this shift to activism has come in for mounting criticism from those favouring a traditional behind-the-scenes Swiss stance. In Parliament these voices rise mainly from the Swiss People's Party (SVP).

Defending Neutrality

"They don't want Switzerland to become too active," Trachsler explains. "They don't want the country "exposed." They don't want to see the Swiss flag burnt (as it was by Israelis protesting the Geneva Accord in the Middle East.)"

The critics point with pride to the International Committee of the Red Cross as an example of prominent Swiss engagement at the international level--what Trachsler calls "service without exposing oneself." He says the critics prefer a "help only if asked" role.

This limited role fitted neatly into the Petitpierre doctrine--a notion holding that neutrality prevented Switzerland from joining the UN, but the Swiss would compensate for this in other ways such as by sheltering refugees, offering emergency aid, and upholding human rights.

"Give peace a chance"

The new peace role adds a fresh dimension. Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey defended it in late 2003 when her country's announced its public commitment for the Geneva Initiative.

"The Geneva Initiative," she insisted, "is a solitary light shining in the darkness. Even if it is weak, it enlightens the goal to reach. This light is welcome and must be kept alive."

As Trachsler points out, Calmy-Rey has linked Swiss hopes for greater human security to world peace and global respect for human rights. The stability that Swiss business needs to flourish worldwide, she reasons, requires peace. Thus the Federal Council and Parliament have accepted this argument and approved foreign policy's outspoken "new look".

For its part, Parliament voted in 2003 to grant CHF 220 million over four years to projects promoting human rights and peace. The 2004-2007 program spans civilian and military aspects and earmarks CHF 100 million for "good offices" and civil-conflict resolutions. It devotes the remaining CHF 120 million to the Swiss Expert Pool for Civilian Peacebuilding as well as policy formulation, strategic partnerships, special initiatives and administration.

Roots Of Policy

Historian Trachsler notes that though post-war "good offices" flourished under Petitpierre, they didn't begin with the Neuchatel lawyer. In fact, they trace back to the nineteenth century. The first Swiss role occurred in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War. However, passions unleashed by the Cold War--especially in war-torn Europe--gave new life to the intermediary role.

Trachsler's research shows that Switzerland had nineteen "good offices" mandates in 1984, but the number dropped to eleven by 1991. The country now fulfils only four such roles. The only substantial one--representing US interests in Iran--overshadows its protective mandates involving USA-Cuba and Iran-Egypt ties. Yet Swiss-style passive mediation was never as vital as the Federal Council portrayed it.

"Deeds didn't measure up to words," Trachsler says. "Mediation was only successful in the Algerian War case (between France and Algeria.) "It failed in the Falklands War, in Suez, and in Biafra.

"Why was its role so misunderstood?" he asks. "It was overstretched rhetorically, because the focus on neutrality served as a useful concept for Switzerland and the entire international community. It was needed to legitimise Swiss neutrality and the country's abstention from the United Nations."

Even so, roughly 300 Swiss diplomats still work quite independently to staff the "good offices" interest sections. These days, however, they often "facilitate", setting up conferences between conflicting countries or warring factions within a country torn by civil war. In this role Switzerland doesn't need to stick to "protective mandates".

A positive trend

"Switzerland's goal," Trachsler says, "is no longer to legitimise neutrality and abstain from the UN but to produce peace and stability. The trend is positive. The last 15 years have shown that Switzerland does have a role: more active and cooperative. more multilateral. The only question is the pace of negotiating peace and how to handle setbacks and international reactions."

Recent Swiss initiatives beside the Geneva Accord between Israel and the Palestinians include mediation roles in Sri Lanka and the Nuba Mountains in central Sudan. Both have involved civil wars, not clashes between countries.

"There's always the risk of failure," Trachsler admits, recalling the flawed Falkland Islands mediation effort. "The Falklands talks lasted only a matter of weeks before the parties [Argentina and Britain] opted not to negotiate further." The April 1982 war that followed lasted barely longer than the failed peace talks. Its saving grace after the ill-advised war turned out to be the ouster of Argentina's military junta and a return to civilian rule.

Myths Of Neutrality

According to Trachsler, his research shows that neutrality. "seldom offered a competitive advantage". A Swiss 1996 study on mediation efforts suggested that political and economic weight now outweigh formal neutrality as negotiating cards.

Norway's behind-the-scenes success in setting up the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks also helped dispel the notion that only neutrals can mediate effectively. The Oslo initiative in the Middle East by a NATO member, Trachsler says, "shows that you don't have to be neutral [to operate credible 'good offices']".

Trachsler calls Parliament's approval of the CHF 220 million grant for 21104-2007 "a big step forward", even if it's less than the CHF 240 million sought by the Federal Council. He points to the white paper now being drafted for peace policy in the Department of Foreign affairs as vital for long-term planning.

"One has to see its message, of course," he says, "but the grant from Parliament is already pointing in the right direction--that Switzerland should be more active and multilateral. Now this principle is debated more openly."