Responses to: "Patriot fratricides--the human dimension lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom".

Today We Can Automate Complex Procedures

From a networked fires perspective, the author Dr. John K. Hawley [of the article in this edition] brings up a point we must address. Where and how much human intervention is required in any fires chain, regardless of whose it is?

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In the case of the Patriot fires chain, the author has taken the position that additional human intervention is required because it is too difficult to automate complex procedures. I disagree with this analysis on the basis that I don't think it is too hard to automate complex procedures.

The author has an accurate assessment that artificial intelligence (AI) is still an undeveloped concept. However, great strides have been made in cognitive reasoning. This is basically complex algorithms programmed into a system to allow it to make decisions based on inputs. We can automate the process with cognitive reasoning. Yes, automating complex procedures is hard, but doable.

The key point in the article is that the current man-machine interfaces have to be improved. The decision really is about speed of service. The better the automated system, the faster we can accomplish the mission. This is not the only consideration, but it is the main one.

We also have to consider fratricide, clearance procedures, ROE [rules of engagement], collateral damage, etc. Future automated systems will be successful if they can prove to be trustworthy and are accepted by commanders.

As the TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] Systems Manager for FATDS [FA tactical data systems], I work on automating complex procedures and determining if, when and where the system needs a human IP [intervention point]. I can foresee in the not too distant future the capabilities to design a safe, efficient and fast (collectively also very effective) NetFires system of systems.

COL John L. Haithcock, Jr.

TSM FATDS, Fort Sill, OK

Automated [C.sup.2] Has Fratricide Implications for the FCS Force

I agree with Dr. Hawkley's premise that, "Soldiers and not the automated system must be the ultimate decision makers in air and missile defense engagements." I think his assessment also applies to NetFires [networked fires].

But we (the Field Artillery) already know this--have known it for some time. We have an artillery [C.sup.2] [command and control] system--AFATDS [advanced FA tactical data system]--that will allow automated (no-man-in-the-loop) fire support, control and direction from sensor-to-shooter.

In our pre-NetFires environment, once a fire mission gets to the shooter (howitzer or launcher), it is fired; our crews are not charged with decision making. (It's different for Patriot sections because our crews don't operate independently as a Patriot section does.) Yet, with this capability, we have purposely built in IPs that allow human decision making to provide oversight to the automated process.

Dr. Hawkley rightly asserts that, "Driven by advances in technology and mission changes, Patriot crewmember roles have evolved from traditional operators to supervisors of automated processes. The job of supervisory controller is different from that of traditional operator, and these differences must be reflected in system design, performance support features (decision aids), and training and professional development."

I believe we already are validating Dr. Hawkley's assertion through our work in current and future systems designs, decision and performance support aids, and training and professional development. We realize we have moved beyond "operators" to "supervisory controllers." I always have thought that we have to stop thinking of AFATDS and our other ABCS [Army battle command system] pieces as something run by an "operator."

AFATDS is a command and control system and should be controlled by a leader who uses it to assess the situation, make decisions and direct actions. Yet in the past, we routinely put a very junior operator on the system who could set the machine up and run it well but couldn't leverage the [C.sup.2] and decision support capacities of the system. This is changing as units realize there is too much lost by taking leaders out of the loop in the process--units are now asking for more experienced Soldiers slotted against the battle command systems.

In the modular force, substitute FEC [fires and effects cell] and AFATDS FDC [fire direction center] for the Patriot crewmember in the article and we have the same responsibilities for Field Artillery Soldiers. In the NetFires world, substitute FEC (and possibly the entire battlefield command network) and we get the feel for the "supervisory controller" aspect that he describes.

Our Soldiers and leaders, who are so integral to the evolving NetFires systems, must be empowered with the ability (training and system design) to use these systems as leadership enablers, not leadership substitutes. There are not many degrees of separation between a good decision to fire a mission and a bad decision to fire a mission--and if a bad decision is made, the excuse cannot be, "The network made me do it."

Much of the talk about "the network" and all of its mysterious technological workings gives me pause to think about some analysis of the early going in WW II provided by Major Ferdinand Miksche in 1941. Major Miksche was a Czech artillery officer who was directed to gather and publish lessons learned from the early fighting in World War II--sort of an early CALL [Center for Army Lessons Learned] mission.

In contrasting the German and French artillery, he wrote, "The German artillery officer is permeated by the spirit of the infantry. He is capable of appreciating the needs of the infantry and using his own initiative to provide support when and where it is most urgently needed.

"The French gunner officer--once so dashing and audacious--has now become a geometrician and over-theoretical mathematician. He devotes his attention far more to the technical aspects of planning artillery than to the tactical needs of the infantry, of which he has little understanding" (F.O. Miksche, "Attack--A Study of Blizkrieg Tactics," 1941).

We must caution ourselves against becoming enthralled with the "technical aspects" of NetFires and ensure leaders can exercise the "art" of war, using their "initiative to provide support when and where it is most urgently needed."

LTC Samuel R. White, Jr., FA

Futures Concept Integration Officer

Concepts Division

Futures Development and Integration Directorate (FDIC), Fort Sill, OK