Response to: "TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR--indirect fires in the battle of Fallujah".

I read the article in the March-April 2005 issue with great interest and, in part, with utter amazement. It appears, from the article, that the new artillery tactics are to leave behind the ability to mass fires by deploying batteries with task forces and then further diluting that ability by deploying sections. The authors [Captain James T. Cobb, et. al.] also indicated that the tactics included other artillery support available that was not used because they "didn't trust the accuracy" of the support in danger-close missions. By the end of the article, I had visions of "flying artillery unlimbering to fire grape shot at the flank of the advancing infantry."

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

While it is obvious that artillery tactics and deployment in post-invasion Iraq and a MOUT [military operations in urban terrain] battle like in Fallujah would not require Cold War battalions of artillery, I was concerned in reading the AAR [after-action review] that the ability to mass fires, quickly coordinate those fires and keep up with ammunition planning and resupply has also been diluted. Is this from the dispersion of batteries with the concurrent loss of adequate artillery staff?

The strength of the US Field Artillery has been its ability to coordinate massed artillery fires quickly and accurately. Reading this article, I had the impression that this ability is being lost.

LTC(R) Robert L. Greene, FA, USAR, Glen Allen, VA