Reply by author Margaret Somerville to the review of her book by John B. Shea ("The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the Human Spirit," C.I., Dec. 2006, pp. 41-43).

Dr. John Shea's thoughtful review of my book raises some matters which I would like to clarify.

Dr Shea writes: "A hunt for the universal, absolute, metaphysical 'Truth,' Professor Somerville regards as a 'barrier to finding a shared ethics.' She also holds that concepts of the secular sacred and a basic presumption in favour of the natural avoid the problem posed by that hunt. She allows that one need not abandon one's 'own personal belief in that Truth, whatever it might be for us.'"

So far so good. But Dr. Shea continues: "In other words, she does not appear to believe in an objective moral truth that can be truly known and shared as such. Truth, then, is regarded merely the end product of debate and consensus."

I specifically do not believe that. Rather, my goal is to try to help people of very different beliefs and none at all recognize what they might have in common and in doing so come to recognize that there are some absolute human truths and, for those who are religious, Divine truths, on which we can all agree no matter what the basis for our stance regarding those truths. My hope is that through debate we can reach a collection of consensuses about certain human truths and values to which we can continue to add.

Dr. Shea writes: "She also says that the search for metaphysical truth must be abandoned in the search for a shared ethics, even if we are left free to have a personal belief in that truth. All we can achieve, she says, is a 'temporal truth always open to change.'"

Where we can't agree, at present or perhaps ever, some of us, in a spirit of humility, might regard our belief as a "temporal truth always open to change," even if we believe in an absolute truth. If it's absolutely true it won't change. I regard these two concepts of truth as compatible opposites. In articulating a concept of temporal truth I'm trying to create a milieu in which we can all see each other as searchers for the truth, even when we disagree what that the truth is, and, although we will try to persuade others of the truth of our truth, we will not seek to impose our truth on them nor they on us. In short, I'm seeking to build bridges across the secular-religious divide, and the science-religion one, that can allow people of good will on both sides to share their common values rather than always focusing on their differences and disagreements. For some people such as Dr. Shea, it would be antithetical to their beliefs to accept a concept of "temporal truth" in relation to some matters. Their rejection of the concept in those regards must be respected. I would point out, however, that a concept of temporal truths does not deny that there are absolute truths; rather it can mean we might not have yet fully articulated the latter. For instance, as our scientific knowledge has exploded, the way in which we express some absolute truths, for those of us who believe in them, has changed.

Dr. Shea is in error both in thinking that I see finding a shared ethics as just a conflict resolution mechanism and that I am a moral relativist: "The process of achieving shared ethics cannot be a credible guide to human behaviour. It is instead an example of one way to achieve conflict resolution; a way in which compromise, that may be just or unjust, moral or immoral, is the means used for ending a dispute. It is based on moral relativism, the idea that there are no universal moral truths and that right and wrong are determined by the individual or the culture."

I do believe that humans are inherently good and that a search for morality is an innate feature of human nature--otherwise why is it so universal over such vast time spans?--and speculatively I believe that we are probably hard-wired in our DNA (genes) to seek morality--but I reject genetic reductionism, that is, that the search for morality is nothing more than a genetically programmed behaviour, that "genes R us." Rather, as I explained above, through searching for a shared ethics I hope that we can cross the religious-secular and religious-science divides that are currently the locus of so much conflict, to find the values we have in common, rather than always focusing on those on which we disagree, sometimes to the point of extreme violence.

As an aside, here, it's quite a surprise to be labeled a moral relativist. Those people who are moral relativists accuse me of being principle-based, which is an approach to ethical analysis that is in stark contrast to moral relativism. I take comfort from the fact that each "side" sees me as being on the other side. That might mean that the approach I am suggesting could create a space within which many people could find the ethics and values they share.

Dr. Shea then states: "Professor Somerville believes that consensus ethics will provide true guidance to a world in which Natural Law and Divine Law have largely been abandoned."

On the contrary, I hope that finding that consensus might guide us back to a Natural Law and, I would add, a Natural Morality, that we could all accept whether or not we are religious and, for those who are religious, no matter which religion.

"Her book has the sub-title, Journeys of the Human Spirit. How can one really speak of the spirit except as a fuzzy metaphor of some imagined sacredness of human nature if one does not believe that we are sons and daughters of God?"

I believe we all experience the human spirit and that we can all agree on its importance, once again, whether or not we are religious. I regard spirituality as a natural inherent human characteristic common to all humans, which some express through religious belief and practice, and others express in secular ways. I call our capacity to experience that spirituality the "human spirit." It is the intangible, invisible, immeasurable reality that we need to find meaning in life and to make life worth living--that deeply intuitive sense of relatedness or connectedness to all life, especially other people, to the world, and the universe in which we live. Some religious people, including it would seem Dr. Shea, would deny that that can be experienced or found outside religion. But if they believe that faith is a gift from God, that God is all-loving, then why would non-religious people not be given this human capacity even when they are not people of faith?

Dr. Shea concludes:

He [the editor of The Catholic Register] mentions the fact that Professor Somerville holds that there is a universal, absolute metaphysical truth and that there are universal moral principles, knowable to all cultures. Not mentioned is the fact that in her search for a shared ethics, Dr. Somerville rules out a search for universal truth. All we can achieve, she says, is "a temporal truth always open to change."

I hope that what I have written above confirms that the editor of the Catholic Register is correct in his interpretation of my own views. But my goal in The Ethical Imagination is not to impose those views on people who do not believe as I do in this regard; rather, it is to find as much common ground with them about ethics and values as I can.

P.S. Apologies for the length of this letter, but the review raises some important issues.

Montreal, Q C

Dr. John Shea comments:

Professor Margaret Somerville assures us that she does believe in an objective truth that can be known and shared. She also does believe that we need not abandon our personal belief in that truth when we search For a shared ethics. I fully accept her assurance. It certainly makes sense to engage in debate in order to discover which matters we and others can agree upon.

A problem occurs, however, when it is asserted that one can believe in an absolute truth but at the same time, in the search for a shared truth, one can regard it as a "temporal truth open to change." One simply cannot have it both ways. Trying to do so may seem to facilitate dialogue. It may also lead to confusion and a false notion of what values we actually share. In Catholic teaching, for example, contraception and deliberate killing of an innocent human being, are intrinsically evil and cannot be justified.

The categorization of some moral absolutes as "temporal" may lead to acceptance of specific exceptions in the practical application of a morally absolute principle. For example, abortion may be accepted for the sake of the "health of the mother'. In vitro fertilization, that leads to the death of many human beings, has been almost universally accepted. Pre-implantation diagnosis to prevent inherited disease is accepted even though it does not prevent the disease but rather, kills a diseased human being. Euthanasia and assisted suicide are increasingly accepted on the basis of "the right to die," or 'control over one's death," or because of the cost of patient care to the taxpayer. An agreement to disagree in a friendly way is much better than a spurious consensus. We must remember that nature bites back. Our failure, adequately, to counter the politically correct ideas of the day has resulted in, for example, a worldwide plague of sexually transmitted infections of unprecedented proportions, a previously unknown imbalance between the number of young and old people that may destroy the economy, millions of human beings killed by abortion in the name of 'Freedom of choice' and a loss of the moral authority of parents and of governments to fulfill their lawful duties.

The explosion of scientific knowledge should not alter absolute moral principles or the way in which they are articulated. It does indeed, however, present us with new moral problems that we can solve by using the unchanging moral principles that we already possess.

The fact is that the notion of temporal truth cannot be accepted as even temporarily true. We must indeed debate in a polite, frank, and friendly, fashion, sticking to our beliefs about moral absolutes and presenting them in a calm and reasoned way. If they are not accepted, so be it. We must always respect a person, but we must not give respect to a false moral principle, or its application, as if it were true.